Morgan v. Saint Francis Hospital

Filing 29

ORDER Granting 20 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; Adopting Report and Recommendations re 25 Report and Recommendations. Signed by Judge Thomas L. Parker on 1/25/2019. (pab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

CLIFFRIE MORGAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAINT FRANCIS HOSPITAL,
Defendant.

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No. 2:18-cv-02042-TLP-tmp

ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case. Plaintiff, Cliffrie Morgan, is
handling the case pro se. Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failing to state a claim. (ECF No. 20.) The case was
referred to the Magistrate Court for management of all pretrial matters under Local
Administrative Order 2013-05. The Magistrate Court issued a Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) recommending that the Motion be granted and the action dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6). (ECF No. 25.) The R&R is now ripe because Plaintiff timely objected to the R&R
and Defendant has responded. (See ECF Nos. 26, 27, 28.) For the reasons below, the Court
ADOPTS IN PART AND MODIFIES IN PART the R&R. As a result, Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED.
LEGAL STANDARD
The following standards apply to this case.

I.

Review of the R&R
When reviewing a Report and Recommendation from the Magistrate Court,
[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also
receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). After conducting a de novo review, a
district court need not articulate all the reasons it rejects a party’s objections. Tuggle v. Seabold,
806 F.2d 87, 92 (6th Cir. 1986). Nor does the Court have to review under a de novo standard the
portions of the R&R that the parties did not properly object. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150
(1985). A party objecting to the R&R must do so with enough specificity “to enable the district
court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373,
380 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th
Cir. 1991)). That said, a party cannot “to raise at the district court stage new arguments or issues
that were not presented to the magistrate [court]” absent compelling reasons. Murr v. United
States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Waters, 158 F.3d 93, 936
(6th Cir. 1998)).
II.

Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In
practice, Rule 8 requires that a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Engler v.
Arnold, 862 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2017).
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A court will grant a motion to dismiss if a plaintiff has no plausible claim for relief. But
a court must review the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Herhold v.
Green Tree Serv., LLC, 608 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2015). Additionally, “[p]ro se
complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and
should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
(quotations omitted). Of note, courts must only consider matters as part of the pleadings when
reviewing a motion to dismiss.1 Wysocki v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 607 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th
Cir. 2010). After all of this, “[a] complaint should only be dismissed if it is clear to the court
that ‘no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the
allegations.’” Herhold, 608 F. App’x at 331 (quoting Trzebuckowski v. City of Cleveland, 319
F.3d 853, 855 (6th Cir. 2003)).
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court will first address the Magistrate Judge’s proposed factual findings here.
Plaintiff makes only one factual objection to the R&R. She argues that Defendant filed an
answer on April 26, 2018, and therefore waived its right to move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss
the complaint. (ECF No. 26 at PageID 67.) Yet a review of the record reveals that Defendant
did not respond to the Complaint until it moved to dismiss on May 15, 2018. (See ECF No. 20.)
The Court therefore rejects Plaintiff’s objection because it is factually incorrect. There are no

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The Magistrate Judge correctly notes that documents referred to in the pleadings and central to
the complaint may be reviewed without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Commercial
Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335–36 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen a
document is referred to in the pleadings and is integral to the claims, it may be considered
without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.”); Greenberg v. Life Ins.
Co. of Virginia, 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that courts can consider documents
central to a complaint but not formally incorporated by reference or attachment to a complaint as
part of the pleadings).
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more factual objections to the R&R. With that in mind, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings of fact here. (See ECF No. 25 at PageID 58–60.)
ANALYSIS
I.

Timeliness of Claims
Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge on December 12, 2016. (Id. at PageID 6.) Defendant

argues that some of Plaintiff’s claims are untimely and that any claims alleged to have occurred
before February 13, 2016, must be dismissed. (ECF No. 20 at PageID 43–44.) Plaintiff alleges
that at least two acts of discrimination occurred before this date.2 (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3.)
The date Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge is important because Title VII claims must be
brought within a certain period. See Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir.
2001). Tennessee is a “deferral state,” and thus the applicable statute of limitations is 300 days
from the date of the alleged act of discrimination if the plaintiff instituted the applicable state
proceedings. See Tartt v. City of Clarksville, 149 F. App’x 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“Tennessee is a ‘deferral state’ for purposes of the federal discrimination statutes . . . [and]
when a plaintiff institutes the relevant state proceedings . . . he must file his EEOC charge
within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.”). “While the 300-day bar is not jurisdictional, it
does have the effect of a statute of limitation, and is not to be waived without good cause.” Id.
(citing Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of E. Tenn., 302 F.3d 367, 376 (6th Cir. 2002)). Here, this 300
day statutory period means that Plaintiff’s EEOC charge filed on December 12, 2016, was

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Plaintiff claims that Defendant discriminated against her on June 17, 2014, and on September
16, 2015. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3.)
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untimely for any events occurring before February 16, 2016.3 As a result, Plaintiff’s claims of
discrimination on June 17, 2014, and on September 16, 2015, are untimely.
All the same, Plaintiff objects to this point and argues that all of her claims are timely.
(ECF No. 26 at PageID 67.) She tries to use the relation-back doctrine of amended pleadings to
support her argument. Yet Plaintiff cites no previous pleadings to which the relation-back
doctrine could be applied. Thus, Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that
the claims occurring more than 300 days before the EEOC charge was filed be dismissed and
MODIFIES the date before which the claims are time-barred. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
claims alleged to have occurred before February 16, 2016, is GRANTED.
II.

Age Discrimination and Retaliation Claims
Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s age discrimination and retaliation claims should be

dismissed for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. (ECF No. 20 at PageID 41–42.)
Generally, a Title VII plaintiff may not “bring claims in a lawsuit that were not included in [her]
EEOC charge[s].” Deister v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 647 F. App’x 652, 658 (6th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2010)); see also 29
U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). An exception to this rule exists where “a plaintiff . . . alleged sufficient
facts in his or her EEOC complaint to put the EEOC on notice of the other claim even though
the plaintiff failed to check the appropriate box on the EEOC’s complaint form.” Spengler v.
Worthington Cylinders, 615 F.3d 481, 490 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Dixon v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d
212, 217 (6th Cir. 2004)).

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The Court notes that Plaintiff does not allege that she instituted the relevant state proceedings
(see ECF No. 1 at PageID 6), and thus the most likely applicable statute of limitations is 180
days and not 300 days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). That said, the point is moot as Plaintiff’s
claims for any acts of discrimination occurring before February 16, 2016, are untimely under the
longer limitations period.
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A.

Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust Her Administrative Remedies on Her Age
Discrimination Claim.

Plaintiff’s EEOC charge alleges only that Defendant discriminated against because of her
alleged disability. (ECF No. 20-1.) Her EEOC charges include no information that would put
the EEOC on notice of an age discrimination claim. Accord Younis, 610 F.3d at 363 (holding
that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on his Title VII retaliation claim
because he did not mark the box for retaliation on his EEOC charge form and failed to include
facts that would put the EEOC or his employer on notice that he intended to allege retaliation);
Waggoner v. Carlex Glass America, LLC, 682 F. App’x 412, 416–17 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding
that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for his claim of retaliation
because he only included allegations of his disability in his EEOC charge).
Despite this shortcoming, Plaintiff argues that her responses to the EEOC questionnaire
satisfy the exhaustion requirement. (See ECF No. 26 at PageID 67.) But the EEOC
questionnaire is not part of the charging document and is therefore evidence outside the scope
pleadings. See Dorn v. General Motors Corp., 131 F. App’x 462, 471 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The
questionnaire does not purport to identify itself as a charging document.”). The Court,
therefore, does not consider it in evaluating Defendant’s Motion. So the Court ADOPTS the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
age discrimination claim.

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B.

Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust Her Administrative Remedies on Her Retaliation
Claim

Plaintiff’s retaliation claims fail for the same reason as her age discrimination claim.
And Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment before filing her EEOC charge.4 Her
termination cannot, therefore, be in retaliation for her filing her EEOC charge. Thus, the Court
ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
III.

Disability Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff’s final claim of disability discrimination is similarly inadequate. A plaintiff

successfully establishes a prima facie case of discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when the plaintiff shows that (1) she is disabled; (2) she is “otherwise
qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, with or without accommodation;” and
(3) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Vaughn v. Parkwest
Med. Ctr., 716 F. App’x 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 826 F.3d
885, 891 (6th Cir. 2016)). These elements of a prima facie case of discrimination are
evidentiary standards, however, and need not be fully established at the pleading stage.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–11 (2002). That said, a plaintiff must still plead
“‘factual content’ from which a court could ‘draw the reasonable inference’” that the plaintiff
was discriminated against based on disability. James v. Hampton, 592 F. App’x 449, 460–61
(6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
The Magistrate Judge recommended granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on this
claim because Plaintiff failed to allege sufficiently facts showing that she was entitled to relief
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The record establishes that Defendant terminated Plaintiff on December 9, 2016, and that she
filed her EEOC charge on December 12, 2016. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 8; ECF No. 1 at PageID
6.)
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under the ADA. (ECF No. 25 at PageID 65–66.) In particular Plaintiff failed to allege facts that
would allow the Court to infer that she was disabled during the relevant time frame or that she
was otherwise qualified for the position she held before termination. (Id. at PageID 65.) The
term “disability” is defined under the ADA as meaning an individual with: “(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
Plaintiff’s complaint lacks any factual allegations that would allow the Court to infer
reasonably that she suffered from a disability during the relevant period. She tries to cure these
deficiencies by adding additional facts in her objections to the R&R, such as the fact that she
suffered tissue and nerve damage. (See ECF No. 26 at PageID 68.) That said, like the EEOC
questionnaire discussed above, this is not the appropriate stage to add new facts to the litigation.
See Murr, 200 F.3d at 902 n.1; Harper v. Houston, No. 17-2132-STA-cgc, 2018 WL 354609, at
*5 n.2 (“It would be improper for the Court to consider the new facts because they are matters
outside the pleadings.”). And the email attached to Plaintiff’s objections (ECF No. 26-1 at
PageID 78) was neither attached to nor essential to the complaint, leaving them outside the scope
of review on a motion to dismiss. See Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 640 (6th Cir. 2016). And
Plaintiff has not sought to amend her complaint to add these other facts.
The pleadings also do not include facts that plausibly allege that Plaintiff was qualified
for the job, with or without an accommodation. She only alleges that she requested and was
denied light duty work while she recovered from her injury. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.) These
allegations do not enable the Court to make a reasonable inference that she was qualified to
perform the position from which she was terminated. Her objections to the R&R merely recite

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the requirements of the job, without showing that she was qualified to perform those
requirements. The Court therefore ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and
GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the ADA claim.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation. Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED, this 25th day of January, 2019.
s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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