Thomas v. Coffin

Filing 6

ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, DISMISSING COMPLAINT, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 11/26/18. (mbm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
ANTHONY THOMAS,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
LEE COFFEE,
Defendant.

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No. 18-2207-JDT-tmp

ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, DISMISSING COMPLAINT,
CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE

On March 26, 2018, Plaintiff Anthony Thomas, who is incarcerated at the Shelby County
Criminal Justice Center (Jail) in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a civil complaint and a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court issued an order on March 27, 2018,
granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record
the Defendant as Criminal Court Judge Lee V. Coffee, of the Thirtieth Judicial District of
Tennessee.1
Plaintiff alleges that he is being detained at the Jail under unspecified “extreme
conditions” due to overcrowding and that his bond is set at $3,000,000, which allegedly is

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The complaint identifies the Defendant as Judge Lee Coffin, in Shelby County. There
is no judge by that name in Shelby County. However, there is a Judge Coffee; therefore, the
Clerk is directed to MODIFY the docket to reflect that the Defendant’s correct name is Lee V.
Coffee.

excessive under the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) He seeks reimbursement for
property, including his house and three vehicles, that he lost as a result of being incarcerated, an
investigation into why his bond is so high, and a reduction in that bond. (Id. at 3.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaintC
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or
(2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to
determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380,
383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than
a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it
is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of
the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). “Any complaint that is legally frivolous would
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ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
328-29).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint=s factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, a judge does not have to accept Afantastic or delusional@ factual
allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for frivolousness.
Id. at 471 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are
not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891
F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th
Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not
spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1975))); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua
sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court
nor the district court is required to create Payne=s claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S.
225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se
litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to
affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se
litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the courts from

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neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly
charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not
encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”).
The complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer=s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights
secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a defendant acting
under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability in the performance of their judicial
functions. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363
(1978); Bright v. Gallia Cnty., Ohio, 753 F.3d 639, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2014); Leech v. DeWeese,
689 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2012). Whether a judge or other official is entitled to absolute
immunity in a given case turns on a “functional” analysis. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
810-11 (1982). The “touchstone” for applicability of absolute judicial immunity is “performance
of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private
rights.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993). The setting of bond is
an action that is unquestionably within the scope of Defendant Coffee’s judicial function.
Therefore, the claim against Defendant Coffee is barred by judicial immunity.
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To the extent that Thomas may be asking this Court to intervene in his criminal
proceeding and order the charges dismissed, the Court cannot do so. Under the Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” The Sixth Circuit
has explained that “[t]he Act thereby creates ‘an absolute prohibition against enjoining state
court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically defined exceptions,’
which are set forth in the statutory language.” Andreano v. City of Westlake, 136 F. App’x 865,
879-80 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S.
281, 286 (1970)). Federal injunctions against state criminal proceedings can be issued only
“under extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and
immediate.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The Supreme Court has emphasized that
[c]ertain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of
having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves
be considered “irreparable” in the special legal sense of that term. Instead, the
threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights must be one that cannot be
eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.
Id. at 46. Irreparable injury may be found only where the statute under which the Plaintiff is
charged is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions, or where there
is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or other unusual circumstances that would call for
equitable relief.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 231 (1972) (internal quotation marks,
ellipses and citations omitted). In this case, Thomas does not allege the type of extraordinary
circumstances that would permit the Court to become involved in his state-court criminal matter.

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For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety for failure
to state a claim.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an
opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not
required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir.
2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that
cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of
access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court concludes that leave to amend is not warranted.
In conclusion, the Court DISMISSES the complaint for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Leave to
amend is DENIED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), the Court must also consider whether an appeal by
Plaintiff Thomas in this case would be taken in good faith. The good faith standard is an
objective one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The same considerations
that lead the Court to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim also compel the conclusion that
an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Therefore, it is CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1915(a)(3), that an appeal in this matter by Plaintiff Thomas would not be taken in good faith.
The Court must also address the assessment of the $505 appellate filing fee if Thomas
nevertheless appeals the dismissal of this case. A certification that an appeal is not taken in good
faith does not affect an indigent prisoner plaintiff’s ability to take advantage of the installment

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procedures contained in § 1915(b). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th
Cir. 1997), partially overruled on other grounds by LaFountain, 716 F.3d at 951. McGore sets
out specific procedures for implementing the PLRA, §§ 1915(a)-(b). Therefore, Thomas is
instructed that if he wishes to take advantage of the installment procedures for paying the
appellate filing fee, he must comply with the procedures set out in the PLRA and McGore by
filing an updated in forma pauperis affidavit and a current, certified copy of his inmate trust
account for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the notice of appeal.
For analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of future filings, if any, by Thomas, this is the
second dismissal of one of his cases as frivolous or for failure to state a claim.2 This “strike”
shall take effect when judgment is entered. Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763-64
(2015).
The Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2

Thomas previously filed Thomas v. Simpson, et al., No. 00-2490-JPM (W.D. Tenn. June
28, 2000) (dismissed as frivolous).
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