Hardy v. Hershey Company (Memphis)

Filing 38

ORDER ADOPTING 36 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING 22 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 34 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Mark S. Norris on 9/26/19. (Norris, Mark)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
TRACIE HARDY,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 2:18-cv-2210-MSN-cgc
THE HERSHEY COMPANY,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation on Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment dated June 20, 2019
(“Report”). (ECF No. 36.) The Report recommends that Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment be granted and that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be denied. (Id. at PageID
243.) Plaintiff filed objections to the report on June 28, 2019. (ECF No. 37.) For the reasons set
forth below, the Court ADOPTS the Report. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
As set forth in the Report, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint alleging violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117, as amended by the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (as amended, the “ADA”). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to
accommodate her disability and retaliated against her in violation of the ADA. Plaintiff filed a
Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on

December 9, 2019. The EEOC Charge alleged discrimination on the basis of disability. The
EEOC Charge provided September 30, 2016 as the date discrimination began and indicated the
discrimination was continuing on the date the EEOC Charge was filed. The EEOC issued Plaintiff
a Right to Sue letter on January 8, 2018.
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 4, 2019. (ECF No. 22.) In
its motion, Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment based on a settlement agreement
it entered into with Plaintiff (“Settlement Agreement”) in which Plaintiff released Defendant from
liability for the claims set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint. (Id. at PageID 109–11.) Plaintiff
responded on February 15, 2019. (ECF No. 28.) In her response, Plaintiff alleges many of the
same claims set forth in her complaint, and she asserts that her claim is not covered by the release
language in the Settlement Agreement. (Id. at PageID 158.) Plaintiff further states she “should be
able to recover damages beyond normal workers’ compensation benefits.” (Id. at PageID 158.)
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 18, 2019. (ECF No. 34.)
Plaintiff’s motion reiterates the claims set forth in her complaint and the arguments set forth in her
response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Magistrate Judge found that “the sole issue presented in the cross-motions for
summary judgment [was] whether the Settlement Agreement entered into between Plaintiff and
[Defendant] constitutes a release of liability for the claims raised in the instant action.” (ECF No.
36 at PageID 249–50.) After analyzing the language of the Settlement Agreement, the Magistrate
Judge recommended finding that the language of the Settlement Agreement did apply to Plaintiff’s
claims in this matter, and therefore, the Magistrate Judge further recommended that Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgement be granted and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be
denied.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on the federal judiciary by
permitting the assignment of district court duties to magistrate judges. See United States v. Curtis,
237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869–70 (1989));
see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 F. App’x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003). For dispositive matters, “[t]he
district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been
properly objected to.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). After reviewing the
evidence, the court is free to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge’s proposed findings or
recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court is not required to review—under a de
novo or any other standard—those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no objection
is made. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court should adopt the
magistrate judge’s findings and rulings to which no specific objection is filed. See id. at 151.
Objections to any part of a magistrate judge's disposition “must be clear enough to enable
the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Miller v. Currie, 50
F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Arn, 474 U.S. at 147 (stating that the purpose of the rule is
to “focus attention on those issues . . . that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.”). Each objection
to the magistrate judge's recommendation should include how the analysis is wrong, why it was
wrong, and how de novo review will obtain a different result on that particular issue. See Howard
v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
A general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments previously presented and
addressed by the magistrate judge, does not sufficiently identify alleged errors in the report and
recommendation. Id. When an objection reiterates the arguments presented to the magistrate judge,
the report and recommendation should be reviewed for clear error. Verdone v. Comm'r of Soc.

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Sec., No. 16-CV-14178, 2018 WL 1516918, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2018) (citing Ramirez v.
United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)); Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 277 F. Supp. 3d 932, 965 (E.D. Tenn. 2017).
DISCUSSION
On June 28, 2019, Plaintiff filed “Plaintiff’s Appeal of Granted Summary Judgement for
Defendants” (ECF No. 37), which this Court construes as objections to the Report. Many of
Plaintiff’s objections are reiterations of the claims in her complaint, the arguments in her response
to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and the arguments in her Motion for Summary
Judgment. However, Plaintiff makes two objections that differ from the claims and arguments
she has previously asserted, both of which go to the validity or enforcement of the Settlement
Agreement. First, Plaintiff asserts that the Settlement Agreement is not binding because her
signature was not notarized; and second, Plaintiff asserts that the Settlement Agreement is not
enforceable because it was not signed by anyone on behalf of Defendant. (ECF No. 37 at PageID
252–53.)
Plaintiff’s first argument that the Settlement Agreement is not binding because it was not
notarized is without merit. The Settlement Agreement does not contain an acknowledgment
section or other verification section for a notary to complete, and Tennessee law does not require
a settlement agreement, i.e. a contract, to be notarized to be binding upon the signatories. Plaintiff
does not assert that the signature is not hers, but merely that her signature was not notarized. For
the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s objection is OVERRULED.
Second, Plaintiff asserts that the Settlement Agreement is not binding because it was not
signed by Defendant. In support, Plaintiff provides a copy of the Settlement Agreement, which
reflects her signature dated May 18, 2017, but no signature of Defendant. (ECF No. 37 at PageID

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265–70.) However, Defendant submitted a copy of the Settlement Agreement that shows it was
signed by Defendant’s plant manager, NaKia Grimes, on June 13, 2017. (ECF No. 22-5 at PageID
123–28.) Plaintiff argues that because the copy of the Settlement Agreement that she received was
signed only by her, the Settlement Agreement is not legally enforceable. (ECF No. 37 at PageID
253.)
A settlement agreement is a type of contract and is governed ‘by reference to state
substantive law governing contracts generally.’” Cogent Solutions Group, LLC v. Hyalogic, LLC,
712 F.3d 305, 209 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bamerilease Capital Corp. v. Nearburg, 958 F.2d 150,
152 (6th Cir. 1992)). The Settlement Agreement states that it is interpreted under the laws of
Tennessee without regard to conflict of laws principles. (ECF No. 22-5 at PageID 127.) In order
for a contract to be enforceable under Tennessee law, “it must result from a meeting of the minds
of the parties in mutual assent to the terms . . . .” Anglo-Danish Fibre Industries, Ltd., 2002 WL
1784490, at *4 (quoting Johnson v. Cent. Nat'l Ins. Co., 356 S.W.2d 277, 281 (Tenn. 1962)). “In
determining mutuality of assent, courts use an objective standard based on the manifestations of
the parties.” Staubach Retail Servs.-Southeast LLC V. H.G. Hill Realty Co., 93 S.W.3d 861, 866
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (citing 11 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of
Contracts § 30:6 (4th ed. 1999)). Under Tennessee law, it is not necessary that both parties sign
a contract to establish mutual assent. Id. at 865 (“[A] written contract is not required to be signed
to be binding on the parties.”). A written contract signed by only one party is binding on the other
non-signing party if the non-signing party manifests consent to the contract’s terms. Id. at 866.
The Settlement Agreement is an enforceable contract. The parties mutually assented to the
terms as evidenced by their signatures. Defendant’s signature on a date subsequent to that of
Plaintiff does not affect the validity of the Settlement Agreement. Even if Defendant had not

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signed the Settlement Agreement, mutual assent to the Settlement Agreement has been
demonstrated through the parties’ actions: Defendant issued Plaintiff a check for the amount stated
in the Settlement Agreement (less applicable federal, state, and local withholdings) (ECF No. 223 at PageID 118; ECF No. 22-6 at PageID 130), and Plaintiff signed the Settlement Agreement
and cashed the check (ECF No. 22-5 at PageID 123–28; ECF No. 22-3 at PageID 118–19; ECF
No. 22-6 at PageID 130). The Court also notes that Plaintiff was represented by counsel when the
Settlement Agreement was negotiated and signed. (ECF No. 22-2 at PageID 115.) For the
foregoing reasons, the Court finds the Settlement Agreement enforceable and Plaintiff’s objection
is OVERRULED.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s remaining objections are general objections or merely restate the arguments
previously presented and addressed by the Magistrate Judge. The Court has reviewed the Report
for clear error and finds none. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report. For the reasons set
forth above, Plaintiff’s objections to the Report are OVERRULED. Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply in
opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is disregarded. Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is DENIED. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 26th day of September, 2019.

s/ Mark S. Norris
MARK S. NORRIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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