Peters v. International Paper Company

Filing 95

Order GRANTING 65 Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Opinion Witness, FINDING AS MOOT 91 Renewed Motion in Limine No. 8. Signed by Judge Jon Phipps McCalla on 02/06/2024. (eoc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
ROHAN PETERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
INTERNATIONAL PAPER
COMPANY

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 2:22-cv-02132-JPM-atc

)
)
Defendant.
)
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF’S
WITNESS, MATTHEW HUGHEY, PH.D.
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is Defendant International Paper Company’s (“International Paper’s” or
“Defendant’s”) “Motion In Limine to Exclude from Trial the Testimony and Report of Plaintiff’s
Human Resources Expert, Matthew Hughey, Ph.D.[,]” Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of
their Motion to Exclude, Plaintiff Rohan Peters’ (“Peters’” or “Plaintiff’s”) Response, and
Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response. (ECF Nos. 65-66, 68, 73-74; see also ECF Nos. 67,
70-72.) Defendant moves to exclude Plaintiff’s proffered opinion witness, sociology professor Dr.
Matthew Hughey, pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
and Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702. (ECF No. 65-66.) Also before the Court is Defendant’s
“Renewed Motion in Limine No. 8 and Incorporated Memorandum to Exclude Any Evidence
Relating to the Expert Opinion and Testimony of Plaintiff’s Human Resources expert, Matthew
Hughey, Ph.D.” (ECF No. 91.)
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an African-American Pilot, brought this action against his former employer,
International Paper, “for wrongful termination and retaliation arising out of Defendant’s
discrimination based on his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” (ECF
No. 1 at PageID 1.) Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgement on May 31, 2023. (ECF
No. 46.) The Court granted summary judgement in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s racial
discrimination claims and on Plaintiff’s entitlement to certain categories of damages on December
28, 2023. (ECF No. 75.) This case is set for a jury trial beginning February 20, 2023.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows opinion testimony to be offered by witnesses who are
“qualified as [] expert[s] by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” if their
specialized knowledge “help[s] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in
issue,” their testimony is “based on sufficient facts and data . . . the product of reliable principles
and methods[,] and” they have “reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. In Daubert, the Supreme Court established that district courts have a
responsibility to serve as a “gatekeeper” in ensuring that scientific evidence be admitted only if it
is both relevant and reliable. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. Daubert established that reliability for
scientific testimony can be shown by whether 1) the theory is testable scientific knowledge that
can assist the tryer of fact; 2) the theory has been subjected to peer review or publication; 3) known
error rates or controlling standards for techniques were used; and 4) there is general acceptance of
the test in the relevant community. Id. at 593-94. Daubert’s progeny clarified that Daubert’s
general holding applies not only to scientific testimony, but to other testimony based on specialized
knowledge. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 146 (1999). The Supreme Court
emphasized in Kumho Tire that a district court’s role includes ensuring that experts “employ[] in
2

the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field,” and that district courts should “consider the specific factors identified in Daubert
where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.”
The proponent of the witness seeking qualification under Rule 702 bears the burden of
establishing that qualification by a preponderance of the evidence. Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171 (1987); Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). Courts determine the reliability of an expert’s opinion
through evaluation of the methodology and principles that form its basis, and determination of
whether those methods and principles are reliably applied to facts in the case. Greenwell v.
Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 497 (6th Cir. 1999); Fed. R. Evid. 702.
District courts are not required to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data by
only the ipse dixit of the expert. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). “A court
may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered.” Id. (citing Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (C.A.6),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826, 113 S.Ct. 84, 121 L.Ed.2d 47 (1992)).
III.

ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that Dr. Hughey’s testimony “inappropriate[y] . . . substitute[s] his own
opinion in place of the jury and instruct[s] the jury on which legal conclusion should be drawn[;]”
that “Dr. Hughey hardly qualifies [to render an opinion] in workplace discrimination or retaliation
and an in-depth review of his experience reveals he has very little experience in such issues;” and
that “Dr. Hughey does not base his opinions on sufficient facts[,]” uses unreliable methodology,
and fails to apply his principles and methods to the facts of this case. (ECF No. 66 at PageID 91314.) Defendant further argues that no sources listed on Dr. Hughey’s CV relate to retaliation, that
Dr. Hughey’s typography errors reveal copy-and-paste analysis from prior cases without
3

meaningful application to the facts of this one, and that Dr. Hughey’s comparative references to
the Klu Klux Klan and high-profile incidents of police brutality are unfairly prejudicial. (Id. at
PageID 917-919.)
Plaintiff counters that Defendant mischaracterizes Dr. Hughey’s report and it’s “final
conclusion that, in his opinion, ‘racial prejudice was more than likely a factor in Plaintiff[‘s]
treatment by Defendant[.]’” (ECF No. 68 at PageID 992 (quoting ECF No. 68-1).) Plaintiff argues
that Dr. Hughey’s CV qualifies him to render an opinion on the subjects of “race, racism, and
racial discrimination.” (ECF No. 68 at PageID 995.) Plaintiff further argues, without citation to
law, that “this is a fact-intensive mater with numerous complex issues that cannot be assessed by
ordinary laypeople[]” without the assistance of opinion witnesses. (ECF No. 68 at PageID 1006.)
Most of Parties’ materials on this issue focus on Dr. Hughey’s proffered testimony on racial
discrimination.

Dr. Hughey’s report provides historical context, analysis, and conclusions

applicable to the racial discrimination claim in this case. (ECF No. 68-1.) Indeed, retaliation is
only discussed as a basis for Dr. Hughey’s ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff experienced racial
discrimination. (See, e.g., Id. at PageID 1602.) Plaintiff’s claims for racial discrimination,
however, are not before the jury, having been dismissed at the summary judgment stage. (ECF
No. 75.) Given the intervening grant of summary judgment, the remaining relevant opinion
proffered by Dr. Hughey concerns retaliation. See Goller v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab & Corr., 285 F.
App’x 250, 256 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 860 (6th
Cir. 1997)) (establishing required showings for a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII,
which do not include proof of discrimination); Fed. R. Evid. 401 (evidence is relevant only if it
has a tendency to prove a fact “of consequence to determining the action.”). Dr. Hughey’s fifty-

4

nine (59) page report mentions retaliation only four (4) times. 1 Of these, two are recitations of
Plaintiff’s claims, and the other two are, respectively, a section and a phrase offered in support of
the conclusion as to racial discrimination. (ECF No. 68-1 at PageID 1021, 1053-56, 1602.) The
four-page section titled “Racial Gaslighting and Retaliation” includes one and one-half pages of
block quotes, one page summarizing the concept of gaslighting, one and one-half pages of
summary of facts alleged, and the concluding sentences:
A company wishing to avoid conflict of interest and to engage in fair, equitable, and transparent
employment practices would not have a [] subject of the complaint oversee disciplinary
measures over the complainant. The action likely sends a message of intimidation with the
implicit meaning to drop past, and/or avoid future, complaints.
(ECF No. 68-1 at PageID 1056.)
“[A]n expert’s opinion must be supported by more than subjective belief and unsupported
speculation and should be supported by good grounds, based on what is known.” McLean v.
9880111 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800-801 (6th Cir. 2000). Here, Dr. Hughey’s section on
retaliation provides a single, limited conclusion on retaliation, without citations to support or
analysis describing the bases, methods, or principles he applied to reach that conclusion. Dr.
Hughey’s summary of the facts followed by an ipse dixit conclusion not only creates too wide an

For ease of reference, these mentions are as follows. On Page 9, the report states that “The Plaintiff alleges he was
terminated because of his race, as well as in retaliation for filing an internal complaint of racial discrimination and
for filing the EEOC charge.” (ECF No. 68-1 at PageID 1021.) Page 41-44 includes the section “Racial Gaslighting
and Retaliation.” (Id. at PageID 1053-56.) Page 41, discussing comparative treatment, states that “The Plaintiff
alleges he was terminated because of his race, as well as in retaliation for filing an internal complaint of racial
discrimination and for filing an EEOC charge.” On Page 50, the report concludes:
1

In sum, based on the presence of the ‘voodoo doll’ in the office—and that it was dismissed as a ‘joke’—
coupled with the fact that Plaintiff’s complaint about it resulted in a suggestion that he change (via anger
management course), that the vague and changing benchmarks for varied ‘plans’ to alter Plaintiff’s
behavior and with special reference to his ‘attitude[,]’[] the misuse and cherry-picking of the survey and its
results, the assertions that Plaintiff was intimidating and/or causing others to be in fear of him, coupled with
the racialized hierarchy and leadership, the gaslighting and retaliation, and the unequal treatment of
employees and lack of anti-discrimination training in the culture and structure of Defendant[], leads me to
the opinion that racial prejudice was more than likely a factor in Plaintiff[’s] treatment by Defendant[][.]
(Id. at PageID 1602.)

5

analytical gap between the facts and his conclusion, but fails to address matters beyond the
common knowledge or experience of the average layperson. See Jones v. J.B. Hunt Transport,
Inc., 2003 WL 25676127, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. July 21, 2003); see also Curtis v. Oklahoma City
Public Schools Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207,
1218-1219 (10th Cir. 2002). As such, Dr. Hughey’s testimony is not properly offered under Rule
702 and should be excluded.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The body of Dr. Hughey’s report establishes his opinion on Defendant’s racial discrimination
claim, which was dismissed through summary judgment. Dr. Hughey’s opinion on retaliation, to
the extent it exists, does not include analysis or application of any methodology. For this reason
and those discussed above, Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Dr. Hughey’s testimony is
GRANTED. Defendant’s Renewed Motion in Limine No. 8 is MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of February, 2024.
__/s/ Jon P. McCalla_________________
JON PHIPPS MCCALLA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6