Edwards v. Shelby County, Tennessee

Filing 105

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 79 Motion for Reinstatement or Front Pay, Pre-Judgment Interest, and Post-Judgment Interest. Signed by Chief Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham on 11/22/2024. (ctc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
REBECCA EDWARDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE,
a Tennessee municipality
operating as the SHELBY COUNTY
HEALTH DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 22-cv-02682-TMP

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF AS TO REINSTATEMENT
AND FRONT PAY AND GRANTING MOTION AS TO PRE- AND POST-JUDGMENT
INTEREST
Before the court is plaintiff Rebecca Edwards’s Motion for
Equitable

Relief,

filed

on

July

27,

2024. 1

(ECF

No.

79.)

Defendant Shelby County (“the County”) filed its response in
opposition on October 9, 2024. (ECF No. 104.) For the reasons
below, the motion is DENIED as to reinstatement and front pay
and GRANTED as to pre- and post-judgment interest.
I.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Edwards was employed by the Shelby County Health Department
from August 3, 2020, until her termination on October 8, 2021,
The parties consented to having the undersigned conduct all
proceedings in this case, including trial, the entry of final
judgment, and all post-trial proceedings. (ECF No. 13.)
1

first as a “Contact Tracer Health Investigator” and then as a
“Environmentalist

Contact

Tracer

Inspector.”

(ECF

No.

63

at

PageID 1006.) Edwards filed her complaint on October 5, 2022.
(ECF No. 1.) Edwards alleged employment discrimination under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et
seq. (“ADA”), including failure to accommodate, retaliation, and
wrongful

termination,

as

well

as

procedural

due

process

violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment of
the

United

States

Constitution,

and

the

Shelby

County

Civil

Service Merit Act of 1971. (Id.)
Following discovery, the County moved for summary judgment
on all of Edwards’s claims on March 5, 2024. (ECF No. 38.) On
June 12, 2024, the undersigned granted the County’s motion in
part, dismissing Edwards’s procedural due process claims, but
denying

it

as

to

Edwards’s

failure

to

accommodate

and

retaliation claims under the ADA. (ECF No. 54.)
A jury trial was conducted on July 15, 2024. (ECF No. 66.)
At trial, both parties introduced some evidence that Edwards had
interviews scheduled for other positions with the County that
were canceled following her termination. (See ECF Nos. 77; 99 at
PageID 1610, 1625, 1637.) The County also presented evidence
that

Edwards’s

position

was

grant-funded

and

was

set

to

be

eliminated when that funding was exhausted on June 30, 2022.

- 2 -

(ECF No. 99 at PageID 1617.) It is undisputed that the position
ended as scheduled and due to exhaustion of the grant.
On July 18, 2024, the jury returned a verdict for Edwards
on all counts, and judgment was entered in accordance with the
verdict. (ECF Nos. 74, 78.) The jury awarded Edwards $205.46 in
nominal

damages,

$38,009.73

in

$100,410.92

backpay.

(Id.)

in

compensatory

In

awarding

damages,

backpay,

the

and
jury

specifically found that Edwards was only entitled to backpay
through

June

30,

2022,

the

date

on

which

her

position

was

scheduled to end and ceased to exist. (ECF Nos. 74 at PageID
1047; 99 at PageID 1617.)
On July 27, 2024, Edwards filed her motion for equitable
relief, requesting reinstatement, or, in the alternative, front
pay. (ECF No. 79.) Edwards also requests that she be awarded
pre- and post-judgment interest in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
1961.

(Id.)

The

County

filed

its

response

in

opposition

on

October 9, 2024. (ECF No. 104.) The County argues that Edwards
is not entitled to reinstatement because her position no longer
exists and because she did not present evidence that she was
otherwise entitled to employment with the Shelby County Health
Department.

(Id.)

The

County

also

argues

that

front

pay

is

inappropriate because, in only awarding backpay through June 30,

- 3 -

2022, the jury found that Edwards was not entitled to employment
beyond June 30, 2022. 2 (Id.) Edwards did not file a reply.
II.
First,

Edwards

REINSTATEMENT

requests

reinstatement

to

her

employment

with the County. “Upon a finding of invidious discrimination, a
district court has wide discretion to impose equitable remedies
. . . .” Fuhr v. Sch. Dist. of City of Hazel Park, 364 F.3d 753,
760 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Shore v. Fed. Express Corp., 42 F.3d
373, 377 (6th Cir. 1994)(“Shore II”). “[R]einstatement is the
preferred

equitable

prove[n],”

and

remedy

where

plaintiffs

are

presumptively

reinstatement. Id. at 761 (citing
Paint

Corp.,

112

F.3d

831,

836

discrimination

has

been

entitled

to

E.E.O.C. v. Yenkin–Majestic
(6th

Cir.

1997);

Thurman

v.

Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1171 (6th Cir. 1996);
Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1995); and
Shore

v.

Fed.

Express

Corp.,

777

F.2d

1155,

1159

(6th

Cir.

1985)(“Shore I”). However, there are certain circumstances where
reinstatement is inappropriate or infeasible, including “where
the plaintiff has found other work, where reinstatement would
require

displacement

of

a

non-culpable

employee,

or

where

hostility would result.” Roush v. KFC Nat. Mgmt Co., 10 F.3d
2The

County does not address Edwards’s request for pre- and postjudgment interest. The County also requests that, should
equitable relief be awarded, that award be stayed pending the
County’s appeal to the Sixth Circuit. (ECF No. 104.)
- 4 -

392, 398 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Bohannon v. Baptist Mem’l
Hosp.-Tipton,

No.

09-2220-STA,

2010

WL

1856548,

at

*8

(W.D.

Tenn. May 7, 2010)(finding reinstatement was not warranted where
the plaintiff’s position was eliminated).
The County argues that reinstatement is inappropriate here
because

Edwards’s

position——and

the

sole

purpose

for

that

position, the COVID-19 pandemic——no longer exists. 3 Indeed, the
County presented evidence at trial that Edwards’s position as a
contact tracer was eliminated after June 30, 2022. (ECF No. 99
at PageID 1617.) In her motion, Edwards does not specify to
which position she seeks reinstatement, nor has she explained,
either in her motion or at trial, whether a comparable position
exists.

Under

these

circumstances,

reinstatement

is

not

appropriate, and the court declines to create a new position for
her. See Alexander v. Bosch Auto. Sys., Inc., 232 F. App’x 491,
497 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245
(1979))(holding

that

reinstatement

3The

was

“not

possible”

as

a

County cites Gunter v. Bemis Co., Inc., 906 F.3d 484, 492
(6th Cir. 2018), for the proposition that a plaintiff is not
entitled to reinstatement for a position that has been
eliminated. However, outside of the single, out-of-context
quotation provided by the County in its parenthetical, that case
does
not
discuss
whether
a
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
reinstatement where a position has been eliminated, and instead
finds that the district court committed reversible error by
giving the jury the option of awarding front pay rather than
reinstating the plaintiff. Id.
- 5 -

remedy

under

existed);

ERISA

because

Bohannon,

2010

plaintiffs’

WL

1856548,

positions
at

*8

no

longer

(holding

that

reinstatement was not available because the plaintiff’s position
and department were eliminated); see also Ray v. Iuka Special
Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 1246, 1255 (5th Cir. 1995)
(finding that the plaintiff’s “position no longer exists,” and
that “reinstatement is inappropriate when a comparable position
is not available”); Webster v. Bd. of Supervisors of U. of La.
Sys., No. 13-6613, 2015 WL 4459211, at *7 (E.D. La. July 21,
2015) (citing Woodhouse v. Magnolia Hosp., 92 F.3d 248, 257 (5th
Cir.

1996))

available

(“[T]he

because

Court

no

finds

comparable

that

reinstatement

position

exists

to

is

not

which

plaintiff could be reinstated.”).
Accordingly, Edwards’s motion is DENIED as to her request
for reinstatement.
III. FRONT PAY
In

the

alternative,

Edwards

requests

front

pay.

“[T]he

remedies of reinstatement and front pay are alternative, rather
than cumulative,” Suggs. v. ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72
F.3d 1228, 1234 (6th Cir. 1996), and “front pay is simply money
awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment
and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement,” Pollard v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001); see also
Shore

I,

777

F.2d

at

1158

(“Front
- 6 -

pay

is

therefore

simply

compensation

for

the

post-judgment

effects

of

past

discrimination.”). 4 “Determination of when to award front pay is
within the discretion of the trial court . . . .” Suggs, 72 F.3d
at 1234. The Sixth Circuit has outlined six factors to consider
in deciding whether front pay is appropriate:
(1) the employee's future in the position from which
[they were] terminated; (2) [their] work and life
expectancy; (3) [their] obligation to mitigate [their]
damages; (4) the availability of comparable employment
opportunities and the time reasonably required to find
substitute employment; (5) the discount tables to
determine the present value of future damages; and (6)
other factors that are pertinent in prospective damage
awards.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Edwards requests front pay for approximately three years,
until she reaches the age of 65. In support, Edwards argues that
she

enjoyed

prospect

of

a

history
continued

of

promotion

employment

by

the

prior

County

to

her

and

the

unlawful

termination. (ECF No. 79 at PageID 1081.) Edwards asserts that,
based

on

the

County’s

responses

to

her

interrogatories,

her

“unlawful termination was a factor when [the County] decided not
to hire or interview for” other positions. (Id. at PageID 1082.)
She explains that she is 62 and that she continues to look for
suitable

employment,

albeit

without

success.

(Id.)

And,

considering the third and fourth factors, she argues that the
4Backpay,

in contrast, compensates an employee through the date
of judgment. See Shore I, 777 F.2d at 1158-59.
- 7 -

County has not offered evidence to show that she has failed to
mitigate damages. (Id.) In opposition, the County argues that
the first factor is dispositive: as the County sees it, the
jury’s finding that Edwards was only entitled to backpay through
June

30,

2022,

necessitates

the

finding

that

Edwards

had

no

future in her position. 5 (ECF No. 104 at PageID 1840.) The court
finds the County’s argument persuasive.
The

court

acknowledges

that

Edwards’s

working

for

three

additional years is reasonable under the second factor and that
she has taken reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages under
the third factor. But, considering the first factor, the County
put on evidence at trial that Edwards’s position was scheduled
to be eliminated after June 30, 2022, (ECF No. 99 at PageID
1617),

and

the

jury

specifically

limited

backpay

through

that

date,

than

rather

Edwards’s

through

the

award

of

date

of

trial, (ECF No. 74 at PageID 1047.) Without deciding whether the
5The

County also argues in a footnote that Edwards is not
entitled to front pay because she did not specifically request
it as part of her calculation of damages in her pre-trial order.
(ECF No. 104 at PageID 1839.) However, reinstatement and front
pay are alternative remedies, and “[c]ourts generally award
front pay when reinstatement is inappropriate or infeasible.”
Suggs, 72 F.3d at 1234. Accordingly, “if a plaintiff elects to
be reinstated and the Court finds it inappropriate, the
plaintiff is not then foreclosed from seeking front pay as an
alternative remedy.” Burton v. Zwicker & Assocs., PSC, 978 F.
Supp. 2d 759, 766 (E.D. Ky. 2013), aff'd, 577 F. App'x 555 (6th
Cir. 2014). Thus, the Court will not deny Edwards’s request on
this particular basis.
- 8 -

jury’s limiting backpay necessitates that the jury found Edwards
had no future in the position, the undersigned independently
finds

Edwards

“had

no

expectation

of

continued

employment”

beyond June 30, 2022: her position was eliminated, and she has
not shown that a comparable position exists for which she is
otherwise qualified. Bohannon, 2010 WL 1856548, at *8. Front pay
is meant to remedy the post-judgment effects of discrimination,
Pollard, 532 U.S. at 846, but because the jury concluded that
Edwards was entitled to backpay only through June 30, 2022, it
would be inconsistent to conclude that, absent discrimination,
Edwards would have had a continued expectation of employment
from the date of judgment onwards when there would be a two-year
gap during which she had no entitlement to any employment. Thus,
under the specific facts of this case, Edwards is not entitled
to front pay. See Bohannon, 2010 WL 1856548, at *8 (granting
summary judgment for defendants on the availability of front pay
because the plaintiff’s position and department were eliminated
during the pendency of litigation).
Because Edwards did not have an expectation of continued
employment with the County and is not entitled to front pay on
that basis, the undersigned need not address the fourth, fifth,
and sixth factors.
Accordingly, Edwards’s motion is DENIED as to her request
for front pay.
- 9 -

IV.

PRE- AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST

Finally, Edwards requests pre- and post-judgment interest.
Edwards is statutorily entitled to post-judgment interest. 28
U.S.C. § 1961. Accordingly, Edwards’s motion is GRANTED as to
her

request

for

post-judgment

interest,

and

she

is

hereby

awarded post-judgment interest on her economic and compensatory
damages at the rate set under § 1961.
Regarding

pre-judgment

contest

Edwards’s

GRANTED

as

to

interest,

request.

that

the

Accordingly,

request,

and

she

County

is

Edwards’s
hereby

does

not

motion

is

awarded

pre-

judgment interest on her economic and compensatory damages at
the rate set under § 1961.
It is furthered ordered that the County’s obligation to pay
pre- and post-judgment interest is stayed consistent with the
court’s August 27, 2024 order. (ECF No. 95.)
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Edwards’s Motion for Equitable
Relief is DENIED as to her requests for reinstatement and front
pay and GRANTED as to her request for pre- and post-judgment
interest. The County’s obligation to pay pre- and post-judgment
interest is stayed consistent with the court’s August 27, 2024
order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

- 10 -

s/Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
November 22, 2024
Date

- 11 -