Merritt v. WIPRO LIMITED

Filing 74

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 63 Motion to Compel; granting 65 Motion to Extend Deadline; denying 68 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Chief Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham on 3/6/2025. (ctc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
KENNETH MERRITT,
Plaintiff,
v.
WIPRO LIMITED,
Defendant.

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No. 23-cv-02453-SHM-tmp

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S SECOND
MOTION TO COMPEL, GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO EXTEND
DEADLINES, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
Before the court are defendant Wipro Limited’s (“Wipro”)
Second Motion to Compel Complete Written Discovery Responses and
for Sanctions and its Motion to Extend Deadlines. 1 (ECF Nos. 63,
65.) Pro se plaintiff Kenneth Merritt responded to the motion to
compel on February 18, 2025. (ECF No. 66.) Merritt did not respond
to Wipro’s Motion to Extend. Also before the court is Merritt’s
Motion for Protective Order, to which Wipro responded on March 4,
2025. (ECF Nos. 68, 72.) For the reasons below, Wipro’s Second
Motion to Compel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, Wipro’s

1Pursuant

to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been
referred to the United States magistrate judge for management of
all
pretrial
matters
for
determination
or
report
and
recommendation, as appropriate.

Motion to Extend is GRANTED, and Merritt’s Motion for Protective
Order is DENIED.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Relevant Procedural History
On December 17, 2024, Wipro filed its first motion to compel

discovery,

seeking

to

compel

complete

responses

to

its

interrogatories and requests for production, and to deem admitted
its requests for admission. (ECF No. 52.) Merritt did not respond,
and the undersigned granted the motion on January 23, 2025. (ECF
No. 55.) The undersigned ordered Merritt to serve full and complete
answers to Wipro’s interrogatories and its requests for production
by February 12, 2025. (Id. at PageID 520.) Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 36, the undersigned also deemed admitted
Wipro’s requests for admission because Merritt failed to respond
to those requests within thirty days. (Id.) The undersigned warned
Merritt that failure to timely respond would result in sanctions,
including dismissal of his complaint. (Id.) On January 28, 2025,
Merritt filed responses to Wipro’s interrogatories and requests
for admissions with the court. 2 (ECF Nos. 56, 57.)

2As

discussed above, the undersigned deemed admitted Wipro’s
requests for admissions. (ECF No. 55.) Thus, Merritt’s belated
attempt to respond is improper and the requests are still deemed
admitted.
- 2 -

B.

Wipro’s Motions
On February 13, 2025, Wipro filed both its Second Motion to

Compel and its Motion to Extend. (ECF Nos. 63, 65.) In its Motion
to

Compel,

document

Wipro

again

seeks

supplementary

requests

and

interrogatories.

responses

(ECF

No.

to

64.)

its

Wipro

explains that, during the pendency of its first motion to compel,
Merritt

served

requests

on

supplementary

December

17,

responses

2024.

(ECF

to

No.

64

Wipro’s
at

discovery

PageID

604.)

However, Wipro argues these were insufficient. (Id.) Wipro again
attempted to consult with Merritt regarding his responses from
January 28 through 31, 2025. (Id. at PageID 605.) Merritt responded
“[i]t is not [his] responsibility to conduct [Wipro’s] discovery
for [it].” (Id.; ECF No. 64-2 at PageID 630.) According to Wipro,
Merritt did not supplement his discovery responses before the
February 12, 2025 deadline, and it argues that the responses he
filed with the court are deficient. (ECF No. 64 at PageID 605.)
Regarding its requests for production, Wipro contends that
Merritt

“has

not

produced

any

documents

in

response

to

[its

requests].” (Id. at PageID 607.) Wipro believes that Merritt
“possesses at least some responsive documents that he refuses to
produce” because his interrogatory responses filed with the court
contained screenshots of documents that he had not previously filed
or produced. (Id.; see also ECF Nos. 56, 57.) Wipro also argues
that Merritt is required to produce all documents responsive to
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its requests even though he previously attached some of those
documents with his court filings. (ECF No. 64 at PageID 608.)
Regarding its interrogatories, Wipro asserts that each of
Merritt’s responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1-17 are insufficient.
(Id. at PageID 609-12.) Wipro also argues that Merritt failed to
provide his answers under oath pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 33(b)(3). (Id. at PageID 608.)
Because of these repeated deficiencies in Merritt’s discovery
responses, Wipro asks that the court dismiss Merritt’s complaint
with prejudice. (ECF No. 64 at PageID 612.) Alternatively, Wipro
requests monetary and non-monetary sanctions, including reasonable
costs associated with bringing this motion and that the court stay
this matter until Merritt complies. (Id. at PageID 615.) In support
of its motion, Wipro attached its letter to Merritt outlining the
alleged

deficiencies

of

his

responses,

and

its

email

correspondence with Merritt regarding its outstanding requests.
(ECF Nos. 64-1, 64-2.)
Merritt filed his response in opposition on February 18, 2025.
(ECF No. 66.) Regarding the requests for production, Merritt argues
both that he has produced all documents in his possession and that
Wipro already possesses many of the documents it requests. (Id.)
He contends that Wipro’s motion is an effort to delay the court’s
resolution of his second motion for summary judgment. (Id.) Merritt

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does not address Wipro’s requests for monetary sanctions and
dismissal.
In its Motion to Extend, Wipro asks that the court extend the
deadlines to complete discovery and to file dispositive motions by
eight weeks. (ECF No. 65.) The deadline for discovery was February
27, 2025, and the deadline for dispositive motions is March 31,
2025. (ECF No. 31.) Although Wipro indicates that Merritt opposes
the motion, (ECF No. 65 at PageID 639), Merritt did not file a
response within fourteen days as required by Local Rule 7.2(a)(2).
However, Merritt appears to oppose the motion in his Motion for
Protective Order. (ECF No. 68.)
C.

Merritt’s Motion
Merritt filed his Motion for Protective Order on February 18,

2025. (Id.) Merritt argues that Wipro’s requests are harassing and
duplicative, and that it is using discovery requests to delay the
court’s decision on Merritt’s second motion for summary judgment.
(Id.) He also argues that he has complied with Wipro’s discovery
requests. (Id.) Merritt asks that the court prohibit Wipro from
seeking

documents

he

claims

to

have

already

produced

or

has

“certified as non-existent”; bar requests for documents Wipro
maintains in its ordinary course of business; and deny any requests
for an extension of discovery, among other relief. (Id. at PageID
68.) Merritt identifies some document requests he objects to in a
cursory fashion, but does not otherwise specifically address any
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of Wipro’s interrogatories, nor does he certify that he attempted
to confer in good faith before filing his motion as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1).
Wipro filed its response in opposition on March 4, 2025. (ECF
No.

72.)

Wipro

argues

that

Merritt’s

motion

is

limited

to

conclusory allegations that bely the record, and it reiterates its
contention

that

Merritt

has

failed

to

produce

responsive

documents. (Id.)
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

Legal Standard
The scope of discovery is governed by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(b)(1), which provides that “[p]arties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The party seeking discovery is
obligated to demonstrate relevance. Johnson v. CoreCivic, Inc.,
No. 18-CV-1051-STA-tmp, 2019 WL 5089086, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Oct.
10, 2019). Upon a showing of relevance, the burden shifts to the
party

opposing

discovery

to

show,

with

specificity,

why

the

requested discovery is not proportional to the needs of the case.
William Powell Co. v. Nat'l Indem. Co., No. 1:14-CV-00807, 2017 WL
1326504, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2017), aff'd sub nom. 2017 WL
3927525 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2017), and modified on reconsideration,
2017 WL 4315059 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2017). Six factors are
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relevant to proportionality: (1) “the importance of the issues at
stake in the action;” (2) “the amount in controversy;” (3) “the
parties'

relative

access

to

relevant

information;”

(4)

“the

parties' resources;” (5) “the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues;” and (6) “whether the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(1).
B.

Motion to Compel
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, “[a] party seeking

discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation,
production,

or

inspection”

if

“a

party

fails

to

answer

an

interrogatory submitted under Rule 33; or a party fails to produce
documents or fails to respond that inspection will be permitted——
or fails to permit inspection——as requested under Rule 34.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv). Having fully considered the
parties’ arguments, the undersigned GRANTS Wipro’s Second Motion
to Compel as to its requests for production and interrogatories.
Reviewing Wipro’s requests, the undersigned first finds that
they are all relevant for the purposes of discovery. Second, the
undersigned finds Merritt’s contention that he has produced all
documents in his possession not supported by the record. Even where
Merritt has made certain documents part of the record, he is still
required to produce them in response to Wipro’s discovery requests.
See Provost v. Corrections Corp. of Am., No. 2:08-cv-02488-JDT- 7 -

cgc, 2010 WL 396231, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 27, 2020) (finding
“that the fact that [the] [p]laintiff . . . introduced certain
responsive documents in the record is irrelevant” for purposes of
a

discovery

request).

That

Wipro

possesses

some

of

the

same

documents it requests as part of its business operations is also
immaterial. While the court understands that Wipro may already
possess some of these documents, “[e]ven if [it] already has” these
documents, “this does not relieve [Merritt] of h[is] obligation to
respond in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Morgan v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., No. 18-cv-2042-TLP-tmp, 2020 WL
4274586, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. July 24, 2020), aff'd, 2020 WL 4917731
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 21, 2020) (granting defendant’s motion to compel).
Merritt’s

vague

objections

that

at

PageID

allow

the

burdensome,

(ECF

No.

66

information

that

would

Wipro’s

requests

are

do

not

provide

undersigned

to

meaningfully

646),

unduly
any

evaluate this objection, and are thus denied. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
34(b)(2)(B) (providing that a party must “state with specificity
the grounds for objecting to the request”). Accordingly, Wipro’s
motion is GRANTED as to this request. Merritt is ORDERED to
supplement

his

responses

to

Wipro’s

document

requests

within

fifteen days, by providing all documents in his possession or
control that are responsive to each document request.
Next,

the

court

finds

that

Wipro’s

interrogatories

are

relevant and proportional to the needs of the case, and that
- 8 -

Merritt’s responses are insufficient for at least two reasons.
First, Rule 33 requires that a party must answer interrogatories
“separately and fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
33(b)(3) (emphasis added); see also S. Fifth Towers, LLC v. Aspen
Ins. UK, Ltd., No. 3:15-CV-151-CRS, 2017 WL 9285424, at *1-2 (W.D.
Ky. Jan. 5, 2017) (granting motion to compel where interrogatory
answers were not provided under oath). Merritt has not provided
his answers under oath. Second, under Rule 37, “an evasive or
incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a
failure to disclose, answer, or respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
Merritt’s responses range from partial answers to the wholly
unresponsive. For example, in Interrogatory No. 1, Wipro asked
that Merritt
Identify each person who has knowledge of discoverable
information pertaining to the claims or defenses
asserted in this action. For each person identified,
state his/her name, address, telephone number, a
description of the specific facts and knowledge he or
she has, and any documents related to the claims or
defenses that he or she has in his or her possession,
custody, or control.
(ECF No. 56 at PageID 522.) Merritt responded, “I have only been
in [c]ontact with Tayseer, he currently still in [sic] employed at
Medtronic’s [sic] and I have not had any more contract [sic] with
Ms. Lewis.” 3 (Id. at PageID 523.) In Interrogatory No. 8, Wipro
3In

support of his first motion for summary judgment, Merritt filed
affidavits from Tayseer Aiash and Demetria Lewis. (ECF Nos. 34,
35.)
- 9 -

requested

that

Merritt

“[i]dentify,

for

each

week

of

[his]

employment with [Wipro], the number of hours that [he] worked by
listing the exact date of the time worked, the location where the
work was performed, and any supervisors or managers who knew to
whom [he] reported on that particular date.” (Id. at PageID 527.)
The interrogatory asked that he “provide a good faith estimate of
the number of hours on that date” if he could not remember the
exact number of hours he worked. (Id.) Merritt responded, “[i]f
you need to see that I was not salaried, please look at the 4 check
stubs I submitted with inconsistent pay.” (Id. at PageID 528.) The
undersigned agrees with Wipro that this response is deficient.
Indeed, this request relates to information that Merritt would
specifically need to prove as part of his overtime claim. See Viet
v. Le, 951 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946), superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in Carter v. Panama Canal Co.,
463 F.2d 1289, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) (“An employee who claims
that he was not paid this overtime rate ‘has the burden of proving
that

he

performed

work

for

which

he

was

not

properly

compensated.’”). Moreover, Merritt’s general contention that some
requests “were repetitive and duplicative,” (id. at PageID 521),

- 10 -

is not sufficient under Rule 33. 4 See Sobol v. Imprimis Pharms.,
No. CV 16-14339, 2017 WL 5035837, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2017)
(citing Strategic Mktg. & Research Team, Inc. v. Auto Data Sols.,
Inc., No. 2:15-CV-12695, 2017 WL 1196361, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
31, 2017)) (“[B]oilerplate objections are legally meaningless and
amount to a waiver of an objection.”). Accordingly, the undersigned
GRANTS Wipro’s second motion to compel as to Interrogatory Nos. 117.

Merritt

is

ORDERED

to

provide

complete

responses

to

all

sanctions,

the

interrogatories signed under oath within fifteen days.
Finally,

regarding

Wipro’s

requested

undersigned finds that dismissal is not warranted at this time. 5
Dismissal is a proper sanction under Rule 37 where a party does
not comply with a discovery order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v).
However, it “is the sanction of last resort.” Beil v. Lakewood
Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1994).
The court considers four factors when evaluating whether
dismissal is warranted under Rule 37:
The first factor is whether the party's failure to
cooperate in discovery is due to willfulness, bad faith,
or fault; the second factor is whether the adversary was
4In the parties’ correspondence, Merritt also incorrectly contends,

without explanation, that Wipro’s 18 interrogatories exceed the 25
allowed under Rule 33(a)(1). (ECF No. 64-2 at PageID 630.)

5Because

the undersigned finds that dismissal is not warranted
here,
disposition of this motion by order is appropriate. See
Builders Insulation of Tenn., LLC v. S. Energy Sols., No. 17-cv2668-TLP-tmp, 2020 WL 265297, at *4-5 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 17, 2020).
- 11 -

prejudiced by the party's failure to cooperate in
discovery; the third factor is whether the party was
warned that failure to cooperate could lead to the
sanction; and the fourth factor in regard to a dismissal
is whether less drastic sanctions were first imposed or
considered.
Freeland v. Amigo, 103 F.3d 1271, 1277 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing
Bass v. Jostens, Inc., 71 F.3d 237, 241 (6th Cir. 1995); Bank One
of Cleveland, N.A. v. Abbe, 916 F.2d 1067, 1073 (6th Cir. 1990);
Reg’l Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Inland Reclamation Co., 842 F.2d 150,
154–55 (6th Cir. 1988)). None of these factors is dispositive.
Barron v. Univ. of Mich., 613 F. App'x 480, 484 (6th Cir. 2015)
Under the first factor, “whether the party's failure is due
to willfulness, bad faith, or fault—requires ‘a clear record of
delay or contumacious conduct.’” Carpenter v. City of Flint, 723
F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Freeland, 103 F.3d at 1277).
“Contumacious conduct refers to behavior that is perverse in
resisting authority and stubbornly disobedient.” Id. at 704-05
(quoting Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dep't, 529 F.3d 731,
737

(6th

plaintiff’s

Cir.

2008))

conduct

must

(internal
display

quotations
either

an

omitted).
intent

to

“The
thwart

judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard for the effect of
[their] conduct on those proceedings.” Id. (quoting Tung–Hsiung Wu
v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005)) (internal
quotations omitted). Wipro argues that Merritt has engaged in bad
faith conduct by stating his intention not to produce any more
- 12 -

information and by refusing to comply with the court’s previous
order.

While

the

undersigned

has

serious

concerns

regarding

Merritt’s approach to discovery, it would appear that Merritt’s
deficient responses and his conduct are partly the product of bad
faith and partly due to his lack of legal sophistication and
misunderstanding the requirements of discovery.
Under the second factor, “[a] defendant is prejudiced by a
plaintiff’s dilatory conduct if the defendant is ‘required to waste
time, money, and effort in pursuit of cooperation which [the noncompliant party] was legally obligated to provide.’” Id. at 707
(quoting Harmon v. CSX Transp., 110 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 2013)).
Wipro has been prejudiced by Merritt’s conduct, in part because it
“has expended significant resources attempting to obtain routine
discovery,” (ECF No. 64 at PageID 613), and because Merritt has
not complied with basic discovery requests before the February 27,
2025 deadline.
With respect to the third factor, Merritt has received one
prior warning that his complaint could be dismissed if he failed
to comply with the court’s January 23, 2025 order. 6 (ECF No. 55 at
PageID 520.) Under the fourth factor, the undersigned has not
previously imposed or considered less drastic sanctions against

6The

presiding district judge has also warned Merritt that failure
to comply with procedural rules could result in sanctions. (ECF
No. 23 at PageID 266.)
- 13 -

Merritt. Moreover, the undersigned finds that an extension of the
deadlines should allow Wipro to obtain the information it is
requesting. Thus, while Wipro’s arguments are well taken, the
undersigned finds that dismissal is inappropriate at this time.
Accordingly, Wipro’s motion is DENIED to the extent it requests
dismissal.
The court, having considered less drastic sanctions, at this
time declines to award expenses or monetary sanctions. Kindred v.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., No. 19-cv-2660-TLP-tmp, 2021 WL
6751896, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 21, 2021) (declining to award
expenses while granting a motion to compel in part because of
plaintiff’s

pro

37(a)(5)(A)(iii)

se

status);

(“[T]he

court

see

also

Fed.

R.

must

not

order

this

Civ.

P.

payment

if . . . other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”).
Accordingly, Wipro’s request for expenses is DENIED.
Though the court declines to impose sanctions at this time,
Merritt

has

been

warned

twice

that

failure

to

comply

with

procedural rules and court orders will lead to sanctions. (ECF
Nos. 23 at PageID 266; 55 at PageID 520.) Merritt is once again
warned that failure to timely and completely respond to Wipro’s
discovery requests or to comply with the court’s orders will result
in more severe sanctions, including dismissal of his complaint and
monetary sanctions.

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C.

Motion for Protective Order
Rule 26 provides that “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue

an

order

to

protect

a

party

or

person

from

annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “To determine whether good cause exists, and the
proper level of protection, the court ‘must balance the requesting
party's need for discovery against the resisting party's claimed
harm that will result from disclosure.’” Westbrook v. Charlie
Sciara & Son Produce Co., No. 07-2657 MA/P, 2008 WL 839745, at *4
(W.D.

Tenn.

Mar.

27,

2008)

(quoting

In

re

Michael

Wilson

&

Partners, Ltd., No. 06-cv-02575-MSK-KLM, 2007 WL 3268475, at *1
(D. Colo. Oct. 30, 2007)).
Based

on

the

record

before

the

court,

Merritt

has

not

fulfilled his discovery obligations, nor has he shown good cause
for a protective order. Merritt provides only general objections
to Wipro’s requests. While he identifies some interrogatories and
production requests he believes are objectionable, he provides
only cursory statements that do not allow the court to meaningfully
evaluate his concerns. These objections are thus not sufficient.
Sobol, 2017 WL 5035837, at *4.
Merritt’s arguments that the requests are unduly burdensome
are also not persuasive. First, Merritt argues that he must travel
thirty miles to the court to file responses. (ECF No. 68 at PageID
651.) Merritt is not required to (nor should he) file his discovery
- 15 -

responses with the court, so this does not make Wipro’s requests
unduly burdensome. Second, as discussed above, Merritt is required
to produce relevant documents even where Wipro might already
possess them or where he has made them part of the record. Merritt
does not otherwise clearly argue how Wipro’s requests are unduly
burdensome.
Accordingly,

Merritt’s

motion

is

DENIED.

While

some

of

Wipro’s requested documents might not exist, Merritt must respond
to that effect to Wipro’s specific requests.
D.

Motion to Extend
In its Motion to Extend Deadlines, filed on February 13, 2025,

Wipro asks for an eight-week extension of the deadlines to complete
discovery and to file dispositive motions. (ECF No. 65.) Wipro
represents that Merritt opposes the extension, (id. at PageID 639),
and though he did not respond to the motion as required by the
Local Rule 7.2(a)(2), Merritt indicates his opposition in his
Motion for Protective Order, (ECF No. 68).
Based on the court’s conclusions above, the undersigned finds
that an extension of deadlines is warranted. Accordingly, Wipro’s
motion is GRANTED. The deadline to complete all discovery is
extended to April 30, 2025, and the deadline to file dispositive
motions and motions to exclude experts is extended to May 28, 2025.
The undersigned is mindful of the July 28, 2025 trial date, but
this extension does not alter that date. Unless otherwise ordered
- 16 -

by the presiding district judge, the trial date will remain the
same.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Wipro’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part, Wipro’s Motion to Extend is GRANTED, and
Merritt’s Motion for Protective Order is DENIED. The deadline to
complete discovery is now April 30, 2025, and the deadline to file
dispositive motions and motions to exclude experts is now May 28,
2025.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
March 6, 2025
Date

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