Harris v. Wal-Mart, Inc.

Filing 13

ORDER Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Punitive Damages Claim Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr. on May 8, 2024. (Mays, Samuel)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
KIMBERLY HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAL-MART, INC.
Defendant.

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No. 2:23-cv-02558-SHM-tmp

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PUNITIVE DAMAGES
CLAIM UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6)
This is common law negligence case. Plaintiff Kimberly Harris
sued Wal-Mart, Inc. on July 27, 2023, in the Circuit Court of
Shelby County, Tennessee, after slipping and falling in a Wal-Mart
parking lot.

(ECF No. 1-2 at 4-8.)

The case was removed to this

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on September 5, 2023.
1.)

(ECF No.

Before the Court is Defendant’s September 6, 2023 Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Punitive Damages Claim.

For the following

reasons, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
I.

Background
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following.

On August

5, 2022, she was leaving a Wal-Mart store in Bartlett, Tennessee,
when she slipped and fell on an “unmarked greasy substance” in the
parking lot.

(ECF No. 1-2 at 5, ¶¶ 4-5.)

Defendant had a duty to

use reasonable care to maintain safe premises, to discover any

dangerous conditions on its property, and to warn invitees to its
property of any such conditions, including by putting up signs or
warnings.

(Id. at 5-6, ¶¶ 7-10.)

Defendant was negligent in its

attempt to clean the substance from its parking lot.
¶ 5.)

(Id. at 5,

Defendant also “willfully and wantonly failed to make safe

and/or warn of the existence of this danger on the premises,”
although it had “actual knowledge” of the condition.

(Id. at 6,

¶ 10.)
On

September

6,

2023,

Defendant

answered

Plaintiff’s

complaint and moved to dismiss her claim for punitive damages.
(ECF Nos. 6, 8.)
a

claim

under

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state
Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

12(b)(6)

because

Plaintiff’s

allegations of ordinary negligence fail to meet the high standard
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages, which Tennessee
law allows only under the most egregious circumstances.

(ECF No.

8 at 5.)
Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant’s Motion.
II.

Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
This Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Defendant, a limited partnership, is a citizen of Delaware and
Arkansas.1

(ECF No. 1 at 2, ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff is a citizen of

Tennessee.

(Id. at 2, ¶ 5; ECF No. 1-2 at 4 ¶ 1.)

Defendant Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., is a Delaware limited
partnership with its principal place of business in Bentonville,
1

2

Plaintiff seeks damages for “severe and permanent personal
injuries,” including to her back, neck, leg, and knee; past,
present, and future physical pain; and past, present, and future
mental and emotional pain.

(ECF No. 1-2 at 6-7, ¶ 12.)

She

requests actual, compensatory, and punitive damages of up to
$200,000.

(Id. at 7.)

Because the parties are citizens of

different states and the damages alleged exceed $75,000, the Court
has diversity jurisdiction.

Rosen v. Chrysler Corp., 205 F.3d

918, 920-21 (6th Cir. 2000) (“In diversity cases, the general rule
is

that

the

amount

claimed

by

a

plaintiff

in

his

complaint

determines the amount in controversy, unless it appears to a legal
certainty that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional
amount.”)
State substantive law applies to state law claims brought in
federal court.

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).

Arkansas. (ECF No. 1 at 2, ¶ 6.) For purposes of determining
citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), a limited partnership is
deemed to be a citizen of every state where its general and limited
partners reside. See Hooper v. Wolfe, 396 F.3d 744, 748 (6th Cir.
2005). For purposes of determining citizenship under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c)(1), a limited liability company is deemed to be a citizen
of every state where its members reside. See Delay v. Rosenthal
Collins Grp., LLC, 585 F.3d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009). Because
“a member of a limited liability company may itself have multiple
members -- and thus may itself have multiple citizenships -- the
federal court needs to know the citizenship of each ‘sub-member’
as well.” Id. Defendant has pled facts sufficient to show that
all of the partners of Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, as well as all of
the corporate entities that are members and “sub-members” of those
partners, are citizens of Arkansas or Delaware. (ECF No. 1 at 2,
¶ 6.)
3

Where there is no dispute that a certain state’s substantive law
applies, the court will not conduct a choice of law analysis sua
sponte.

See GBJ Corp. v. E. Ohio Paving Co., 139 F.3d 1080, 1085

(6th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff filed the instant suit in Tennessee

court, alleging common law negligence claims under state law. (ECF
No. 1-2 at 4-8.)
law.

Defendant concedes the application of Tennessee

(ECF No. 8-1 at 2.)

The Court will apply

Tennessee

substantive law.
III.

Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of

a complaint that “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

When evaluating a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must determine
whether the complaint alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A claim is

plausible on its face if “the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
A

court

must

construe

the

complaint

in

the

light

most

favorable to the plaintiff and draw all reasonable inferences in
her favor. Golf Vill. N., LLC v. City of Powell, 14 F.4th 611, 617
(6th Cir. 2021) (citing Cahoo v. SAS Analytics, Inc., 912 F.3d
4

887, 897 (6th Cir. 2019)).
legal

conclusions

or

The Court “need not accept as true

unwarranted

factual

inferences.”

Id.

(internal citations, quotation marks omitted).
IV.

Analysis
“To prevail on a claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must

show, by clear and convincing evidence, that a defendant acted
intentionally, fraudulently, maliciously, or recklessly.”

Sanford

v. Waugh & Co., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 836, 848 (Tenn. 2010).

Because

punitive damages “are intended to punish a defendant, to deter him
from committing acts of a similar nature, and to make a public
example of him,” they are only available in cases involving “the
most egregious of wrongs.”

Id.

at 849 (internal citations,

quotation marks omitted); see e.g., McLemore ex rel. McLemore v.
Elizabethton Med. Invs., Ltd. P’ship, 389 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2012) (upholding award of punitive damages where medical
malpractice at a nursing home led to a patient’s death); Hatfield
v.

Allenbrooke

Nursing

and

Rehab.

Ctr.,

LLC,

No.

W2017-00957-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 3740565, at *52-53 (Ct. App. Tenn.
Aug. 6, 2018) (upholding punitive damages award where nursing home
patients experienced “outrageous lack of care”); Scutt v. McLean,
1987 WL 12047 at *2 (Ct. App. Tenn. June 10, 1987) (upholding a
punitive damages award where defendant exhibited “willful and
reckless

disregard”

for

public

intoxicated).
5

safety

by

driving

while

That Plaintiff pleads negligence claims does not preclude
her from seeking punitive damages.

See Doe 1 ex. rel. Doe 1 v.

Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, 154 S.W. 3d 22, 38 (Tenn.
2005) (explaining that “recklessness is typically a criterion for
determining whether punitive damages are warranted in negligence
cases”).
that

However, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts showing

Defendant’s

behavior

went

beyond

“ordinary

negligence”

because Defendant was “aware of, but consciously disregarded” a
“substantial

and

unjustifiable”

risk.

Duran

v.

Hyundai

Motor

America, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 178, 206-07 (Court App. Tenn. 2018).
Plaintiff has not stated a claim for punitive damages.
Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant breached its “duty to
use reasonable care” by “negligently tr[ying] to clear/clean” the
substance on which Plaintiff slipped, or to warn of its presence,
states a claim for negligence.

(ECF No. 1-2 at 5-6, ¶¶ 5, 8-9.)

A plaintiff seeking punitive damages must show that a defendant’s
negligence “reached a substantially higher level than ordinary
negligence.”

Duran, 271 S.W.3d at 206-07.

Plaintiff here makes

the conclusory allegation that Defendant had “actual knowledge” of
the dangerous conditions on its property, but “willfully and
wantonly” failed to make the property safe.
¶ 6; 6, ¶ 10).
favorable
ignored

a

to

(ECF No. 1-2 at 5,

Even construing that allegation in the light most
Plaintiff,

known

risk.

Plaintiff

shows

Plaintiff

does

6

only
not

that

Defendant

demonstrate

that

Defendant ignored such a “substantial and unjustifiable risk” that
its conduct was the “gross deviation from the standard of care”
necessary to warrant a claim for punitive damages.

Hodges v. S.C.

Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992) (defining the standard
for “recklessness” for the purposes of a punitive damages claim).
The allegation that Plaintiff sustained serious injuries,
alone, is insufficient to show that Defendant ignored a risk of
such magnitude that
standard of care.

it committed an egregious breach of the

Jones v. Wiseman, No. 2:18-cv-02197-SHL-dkv,

2019 WL 4060885, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. May 16, 2019) (rejecting the
argument that a jury could find that defendant was reckless simply
because

its

actions

caused

plaintiff’s

injury).

Because

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that Defendant acted willfully
and wantonly do not state a plausible claim for punitive damages,
Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
V.

Conclusion
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Punitive Damages

Claim is GRANTED.
So ordered this 8th day of May, 2024.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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