Oliver et al v. Hull

Filing 13

ORDER DIRECTING DEFENDANT TO SUPPLEMENT NOTICE OF REMOVAL. Signed by Chief Judge Sheryl H. Lipman on 9/24/2024. (shl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL OLIVER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
RICHARD HULL,
Defendant.

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No. 2:24-cv-02565-SHL-cgc

ORDER DIRECTING DEFENDANT TO SUPPLEMENT NOTICE OF REMOVAL
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Richard Hull’s Notice of Removal (ECF
No. 1), filed on August 9, 2024. Hull asserts that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ claims based on diversity of citizenship, which only applies to actions where the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Id. at PageID 2.) To satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement, Hull aggregates each Plaintiff’s claim for damages. (Id.) Because aggregation is
only appropriate in certain situations, the Court DIRECTS Hull to supplement his Notice of
Removal with additional authority to support his assertion. The Court also CANCELS the
scheduling conference in this matter pending a determination on subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs Michael Oliver, Eveline Newton, and Bradley Faulkner bring negligence and
negligence per se claims against Hull after Hull reversed his vehicle into the front of Faulkner’s
car while the parties were stopped at an intersection. (ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 3, 5–7, 12.) Each
Plaintiff seeks a total damages award of $70,000. (Id. at PageID 13.) Hull removed this case
from the Shelby County Circuit Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), which permits removal to a
district court with original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the plaintiff’s claims. (Id.)
Hull’s sole basis for this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims is diversity of
citizenship.
A district court can exercise diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over actions between

citizens of different states when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1). At least one plaintiff’s claim must independently satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement. Everett v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 460 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated on
other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010). A single plaintiff can aggregate the
value of her claims against a defendant to meet this threshold requirement. Id. But the same is
not true for multiple plaintiffs. Id.
Two or more plaintiffs may only aggregate the value of their claims to meet the amount
in controversy requirement when they are uniting “to enforce a single title or right in which they
have a common and undivided interest.” Id. (quoting Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222
U.S. 39, 40–41 (1911)). This common fund exception typically involves “claims to a piece of
land, a trust fund, an estate, an insurance policy, a lien, or an item of collateral” that the plaintiffs
claim as common owners. Id. at 824 (quoting Gilman v. BHC Sec., Inc., 104 F.3d 1418, 1424
(2d Cir. 1997)). The “identifying characteristic of a common and undivided interest is that if one
plaintiff cannot or does not collect his share, the shares of the remaining plaintiffs are increased.”
Sellers v. O'Connell, 701 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir. 1983).
Here, each Plaintiff could have sued Hull separately without any effect on their individual
claims. Thus, they do not have a common and undivided interest in their personal injury claims.
Because each Plaintiff only seeks $70,000, the amount in controversy requirement does not
appear to be satisfied. Plaintiffs did not move to remand their case back to state court for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. But the Court can raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte. Klepsky v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 489 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 2007).
Because the authority cited above undermines Hull’s assertion that the amount in
controversy requirement can be satisfied by aggregating each Plaintiff’s claim, the Court

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DIRECTS Hull to supplement his Notice of Removal with authority to support his contention by
October 4, 2024. Otherwise, based on the foregoing, the Court will sua sponte remand this
matter back to Shelby County Circuit Court. The Court also CANCELS the scheduling
conference in this matter set for Wednesday, September 25, 2024, at 10:30 a.m., pending a
determination on subject matter jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24th day of September, 2024.
s/ Sheryl H. Lipman
SHERYL H. LIPMAN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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