Jones v. AmeriSave Mortgage Corporation et al

Filing 27

ORDER granting 21 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer; denying 24 Request for Judicial Notice and Motion for Expedited Hearing; and denying 25 Motion for Discovery. Defendant AmeriSave's answer due by January 28, 2025. Signed by Chief Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham on January 7, 2025. (hlb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
GREGORY JONES,

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)
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)
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Plaintiff,
v.
AMERISAVE MORTGAGE
CORPORATION and FREEDOM
MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
Defendants.

No. 24-cv-2952-TLP-tmp

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE
ANSWER AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND
EXPEDITED HEARING AND FOR DISCOVERY
Before

the

court

is

defendant

AmeriSave

Mortgage

Corporation’s (“AmeriSave”) motion for an extension of time to
answer or otherwise respond to plaintiff’s amended complaint,
filed on December 31, 2024.1 (ECF Nos. 21, 22.) Also before the
court are plaintiff Gregory Jones’s Request for Judicial Notice
and Motion for Expedited Hearing and Motion for Discovery, both
filed on January 2, 2025. (ECF Nos. 24, 25.) For the reasons set
forth below, AmeriSave’s motion is GRANTED and Jones’s motions are
DENIED.

1Pursuant

to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been
referred to the United States magistrate judge for management of
all
pretrial
matters
for
determination
or
report
and
recommendation, as appropriate.

I.

AmeriSave’s Motion for Extension of Time to Answer
The court first considers AmeriSave’s motion for an extension

of time. (ECF No. 21.) In its accompanying memorandum, counsel for
AmeriSave asserts that his recent engagement in this action and
delays from the winter holidays have necessitated additional time
to review the factual allegations and available documents relevant
to plaintiff’s claims. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 289.) AmeriSave asks
for

an

additional

21

days

to

respond

to

Jones’s

complaint,

extending its response deadline from January 2, 2025, to January
22, 2025. (Id. at PageID 288-289.) Jones filed his response in
opposition on January 2, 2025. (ECF No. 23.) The court notes that,
upon review, Jones’s response appears to be a duplicate of his
“Request for Judicial Notice and Motion for Expedited Hearing,”
filed later that same day. (See ECF Nos. 23, 24.) Nevertheless,
the undersigned construes Docket Entry No. 23 as Jones’s response
and considers the merits of his arguments against AmeriSave’s
motion,

namely

[instant]

that,

proceedings

according
will

to

result

Jones,
in

“any

ongoing

delay

and

in

the

irreparable

harm.” (ECF No. 23 at PageID 292.)
“Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that, if a motion requesting an extension is made before the
original time to act expires, the Court may extend the time to act
for good cause shown.” Austin v. Camping World RV Sales, LLC, No.
2:21-cv-02541-TLP-cgc, 2023 WL 3922659, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 30,
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2023) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)). Here, AmeriSave filed its
motion on December 31, 2024, two days before its original response
deadline of January 2, 2025. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 288-289.) The
court has also considered defendant’s arguments in favor of and
Jones’s arguments against the motion. The undersigned finds good
cause for the requested 21-day extension.
For

good

cause

AmeriSave has

until

shown,

defendant’s

motion

is

GRANTED.

Tuesday, January 28, 2025, to answer or

otherwise respond to Jones’s complaint.
II.

Plaintiff’s Request
Expedited Hearing

for

Judicial

Notice

and

Motion

for

The court next addresses Jones’s Request for Judicial Notice
and Motion for Expedited Hearing dated January 2, 2025. (ECF No.
24.) Citing Federal Rule of Evidence 201, Jones first asks the
court to “take judicial notice of the following facts”:
The Defendants colluded to unlawfully foreclose on the
Plaintiff's
property
by
presenting
altered
and
fraudulent documents. These documents lack Plaintiff's
signature, Gregory Jones[], and do not bear the
signature of an authorized representative of the
Defendants. Neither Defendant qualifies as the real
party in interest, as required under FRCP 17(a). Despite
this, Defendant Freedom Mortgage Corporation continues
to unlawfully pressure and extort payments from the
Plaintiff.
(Id. at PageID 295.)
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides that the “court may
judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute
because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s
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territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily
determined

from

questioned.”

sources

whose

accuracy

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

cannot

reasonably

be

The rule further states that

the court “must take judicial notice if a party requests it and
the court is supplied with the necessary information.”

Fed. R.

Evid. 201(c)(2). However, judicial notice of a fact is only
appropriate if the fact is “beyond reasonable controversy.”

In re

Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 466 (6th Cir. 2014)
(quoting United States v. Ferguson, 681 F.3d 826, 834 (6th Cir.
2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the court finds that Jones’s factual allegations are
not

adjudicative

facts

for

which

judicial

notice

would

be

appropriate. At this early stage in the litigation, many of the
facts as alleged by Jones——which defendants have not yet admitted
or contested——are still subject to reasonable dispute. The court
therefore DENIES Jones’s request and declines to take judicial
notice of his proposed statement of facts.
In addition, Jones moves the court for an “expedited hearing”
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57. (ECF No. 24 at PageID
295.) Rule 57 instructs that trial courts “may order a speedy
hearing of a declaratory-judgment action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 57. In
the instant action, Jones seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,
punitive damages, and court costs relating to what Jones describes
as “an alleged loan agreement” between himself and defendant
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AmeriSave. (ECF No. 9 at PageID 236, 239-40.) He asserts that
“continued

enforcement

of

payments

to

the

Defendants

without

confirmation of the Defendants’ possession of the alleged original
agreement is directly harming the Plaintiff” and seeks an expedited
hearing “to prevent further injury and to ensure the preservation
of rights.” (ECF No. 24 at PageID 295-296.)
Beyond affording district courts the ability to grant a speedy
hearing, “Rule 57 does not provide specific guidance as to the
circumstances

in

which

an

expedited

proceeding

will

be

appropriate.” Rogers v. Gray Media Grp., Inc., No. 1:22-CV-00035GNS, 2022 WL 10662399, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 18, 2022) (quoting GBX
Assocs., LLC v. United States, No. 1:22-cv-401, 2022 WL 1016218,
at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2022)). Instead, “courts have broad
discretion in deciding whether to grant a speedy hearing” under
Rule 57. Id. (citation omitted).
The undersigned finds that an expedited or “speedy” hearing
is again not warranted at this early stage of litigation. As of
the date of this order, neither named defendant has yet to file a
responsive pleading. See GBX Assocs., 2022 WL 1016218, at *4
(denying plaintiff’s request for a speedy hearing in part because
defendant had yet to file a responsive pleading and the time to do
so

had

not

expired).

Furthermore,

the

court

finds

that

the

allegations presented by Jones in his motion and amended complaint
are not the sort of “primarily . . . legal” claims for which a
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speedy hearing is often appropriate. See Rogers, 2022 WL 10662399,
at *3 (citing GBX Assocs., 2022 WL 1016218, at *7-8) (“A speedy
hearing

may

be

appropriate

where

the

determination

is

based

primarily on legal issues, rather than factual.”). Jones’s motion
for an expedited hearing is therefore DENIED at this time.
III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery
Finally, in his January 2 Motion for Discovery, Jones moves
the court to “compel Defendant[s] . . . to produce the original
note relevant to the above-captioned matter.” (ECF No. 25 at PageID
298.) Jones argues that he is entitled to this discovery pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34. (Id.)
Although Jones is correct that he may request production of
the relevant note through the discovery process, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(d) generally provides that “[a] party may not
seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred
as required by Rule 26(f)[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Here, the
parties have not conferred under Rule 26(f), are not involved in
a proceeding exempted from the initial disclosure requirements,
and have not stipulated or agreed to conduct discovery. See id.
The court also has yet to hold a scheduling conference or enter a
scheduling

order.

As

such,

Jones’s

Motion

for

Discovery

is

premature and accordingly DENIED.
After defendants have filed their Answer(s), the court will
conduct a scheduling conference pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 16. At that time, the undersigned will consider an
appropriate discovery and briefing schedule in this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
January 7, 2025
Date

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