Jefferson County Association of Deputy Sheriffs and Corrections Officers et al v. Jefferson County, Texas

Filing 240

ORDER adopting the 234 Report and Recommendation. The Defendants' 224 motion for summary judgment is denied as to all Plaintiffs other than Monica Beaumont. Ordered that the Defendants' 224 motion for summary judgment is granted as to Monica Beaumont. Monica Beaumont's claims against the Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 3/27/2013. (bjc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
JEFFERY T. BINGHAM, Individually
and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated
Plaintiffs,
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS, and
SHERIFF G. MITCH WOODS
Defendants.

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-48

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AND SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AS TO MONICA BEAUMONT
The Court referred this matter to the Honorable Zack Hawthorn, United States Magistrate
Judge, for all pretrial matters pursuant to an Order of Reference entered on October 2, 2012.
(Doc. No. 230.) Pending before the Court is the Defendants’ “Motion for Summary Judgment”
(Doc. No. 224). The Court has received and considered the report (Doc. No. 234) of the
magistrate judge, who recommends that the Court deny the Defendants’ motion because there is
a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the Defendants committed a willful violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Defendants filed objections to the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation and the Plaintiffs filed a response to those objections. (Doc. Nos. 237,
239.)
The Court has conducted a de novo review of the Defendants’ objections to the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation based on the relevant pleadings, motions, exhibits, and
orders. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). After careful consideration, the Court concludes that the
magistrate judge correctly determined that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
whether the Defendants committed a willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
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Therefore, the Court will adopt the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.

The

Defendants’ objections are addressed briefly below.
The Defendants first object that the Court should, at the least, grant summary judgment as
to Plaintiff Monica Beaumont’s claims because her consent form was filed on December 6, 2011,
(Doc. No. 218)—beyond the September 12, 2011, deadline set in this Court’s Order Regarding
Class Certification and Notice to Members of the Putative Class (Doc. No. 181) and beyond even
the three-year statute of limitations for willful violations.

The Defendants mentioned this

argument only in passing in their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 224, at 6), and the
magistrate judge did not reach the issue in his report and recommendation. Nonetheless, the
argument is meritorious since Plaintiff Monica Beaumont’s consent form was filed beyond the
deadline set by this Court in the Order Regarding Class Certification and Notice to Members of
the Putative Class (Doc. No. 181). Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have not raised any opposition to
dismissal of Monica Beaumont’s claims in either their Response to the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment or in their Response to the Defendants’ objections to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation. Therefore, the Court enters a supplemental order, below, granting
summary judgment as to the claims of Monica Beaumont.
The Defendants’ second objection is that the claims against Defendant Sheriff Mitch
Woods should be dismissed because there is no evidence that he was individually responsible for
any willful violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act that might have occurred. (Doc. No. 237,
at 4–5.) The Defendants did not raise this argument or their cited authorities within their Motion
for Summary Judgment; therefore, the issue was not before the magistrate judge. See (Doc. No.
224). Accordingly, this objection to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is
without merit.

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The Defendants’ also object that the magistrate judge applied the Jiffy June standard of
willfulness instead of the correct, McLaughlin standard of willfulness. See McLaughlin v.
Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988); Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139
(5th Cir. 1972). This objection is also without merit. The magistrate judge exclusively applied
the McLaughlin standard when he made the determinative finding that “there is a genuine dispute
as to whether the County either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its
conduct was prohibited by the [Fair Labor Standards Act].”

(Doc. No. 234) (quoting

Ikossi-Anastasiou v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 579 F.3d 546, 552 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quoting McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988))) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
As to the Defendants’ objections 3–5 (Doc. No. 237, at 5–9), the Court has carefully
considered the objections in light of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and the
relevant filings and exhibits. The Court finds that the magistrate judge’s determinations on these
issues were likewise correct as to both law and fact.
It is, therefore, ORDERED that the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge
(Doc. No. 234) is ADOPTED. The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.
224) is DENIED as to all Plaintiffs other than Monica Beaumont.
It is, further, ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.
224) is GRANTED as to Monica Beaumont. Monica Beaumont’s claims against the Defendants

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are dismissed with at Beaumont, Texas, this 7th day of September, 2004.
SIGNED prejudice.
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 27th day of March, 2013.

________________________________________
MARCIA A. CRONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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