Deangelis v. Vasquez

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS AND ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION that the petition be dismissed. Signed by Judge Marcia A. Crone on 3/23/17. (mrp, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NICOLAS DEANGELIS,
Petitioner,
versus
WARDEN N. VASQUEZ,
Respondent.

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14-CV-213

MEMORANDUM ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS AND ADOPTING
THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Nicolas DeAngelis, an inmate confined at the Federal Correctional Institution
at Mendota, California, proceeding pro se, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The court referred this matter to the Honorable Keith F. Giblin, United
States Magistrate Judge, at Beaumont, Texas, for consideration pursuant to applicable laws and
orders of this court.
The magistrate judge has submitted a Report and Recommendation of United States
Magistrate Judge concerning the petition. The magistrate judge recommends the petition be
dismissed.
The court has received the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge,
along with the record, pleadings, and all available evidence. Petitioner filed objections to the
Report and Recommendation. The court must therefore conduct a de novo review of the
objections asserted by petitioner.
Petitioner was convicted of numerous criminal offenses. He asserts that under the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008), his money laundering
convictions are invalid. Pursuant to Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir.
2001), petitioner may only challenge his money laundering convictions in a Section 2241 petition
if his claim: (1) is based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision which establishes
he may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense and (2) was foreclosed by established circuit

law at the time the claim could have been raised during his trial, direct appeal or initial motion to
vacate, set aside or correct sentence filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
A claim based on Santos could not have been raised during petitioner’s trial or on direct
appeal. However, as the magistrate judge explained, it could have been raised in an initial motion
to vacate. The opinion in Santos was issued on June 2, 2008. Petitioner’s convictions became
final on March 19, 2007. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides for a one-year statute of limitations
for motions to vacate, set aside or correct sentence. The statute provides that the period of
limitations begins to run on the date of the latest of four possible events. One event is the date the
conviction became final. If this was the date the period of limitations began to run in petitioner’s
case, he could not have raised a Santos claim in an initial motion to vacate as Santos was decided
more than one year later than the date on which petitioner’s convictions became final. However,
the statute also provides that the period of limitations could begin to run on the date the right
asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized and
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. As stated above, Santos was decided
on June 2, 2008. As this date is later than the date on which petitioner’s convictions became final,
and as Santos applies retroactively to cases on collateral review,1 the period of limitations with
respect to a Santos-based challenge to petitioner’s money laundering convictions did not begin to
run until June 2, 2008. Petitioner had one-year from that date to file a motion to vacate raising
a Santos-based claim regarding his money laundering convictions. United States v. Williams, 402
F. App’x 943, 944 (5th Cir. 2010); Reeder v. Edenfield, 2013 WL 12098729, at * 3 (N.D. Tex.
June 3, 2013); Hinojosa v. Maye, 2012 WL 2191694 (W.D. Tex. June 13, 2013). While
petitioner did not file a motion to vacate, he nevertheless could have asserted his current ground
for review in an initial motion to vacate filed pursuant to Section 2255. As a result, his ground
for review was not barred by governing circuit law at the time he could have asserted it in an
initial motion to vacate and is therefore not cognizable in a Section 2241 petition.
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Garland v. Roy, 615 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2010); King v. Keller, 372 F. App’x 70, 73-74 (11th Cir. 2010).

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ORDER
Accordingly, petitioner’s objections are OVERRULED.

The findings of fact and

conclusions of law of the magistrate judge are correct, and the report of the magistrate judge is

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ADOPTED. A final judgment shall be entered dismissing the petition.
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 7th day of September, 2004.
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 23rd day of March, 2017.

________________________________________
MARCIA A. CRONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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