Cotton v. Beaumont Enterprise
Filing
8
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER. Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed as frivolous and for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/23/2014. (bjc, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION
AARON COTTON
§
VS.
§
BEAUMONT ENTERPRISE
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14cv301
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Aaron Cotton, an inmate at the Jefferson County Correctional Facility, proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Beaumont Enterprise.1
Factual Background
Plaintiff claims the defendant, a newspaper company, made a statement that he was charged
with “indecency to a child” which is not true. Plaintiff claims the alleged false statement has caused
damage to his reputation, and he now seeks compensation.
Standard of Review
An in forma pauperis proceeding may be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (3)
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous
where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989);
Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005); McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061
(5th Cir. 1997).
A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory. See Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997).
1
This case was directly assigned to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to this district’s General Order 14-10.
Plaintiff has provided voluntary written consent to have the assigned United States magistrate judge conduct all further
proceedings in this case, including trial and entry of final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The defendants
in this action have not been served; thus, they are not parties to the action at this time. As a result, their consent is not needed
for the undersigned to make a final determination in this matter. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995).
In addition to the legal basis of the complaint, Section 1915 empowers the court to pierce the
veil of the complainant's factual allegations if they are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1992). A complaint lacks
an arguable basis in fact if, after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts
when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32.
In Denton v. Hernandez, the Supreme Court "declined the invitation to reduce the clearly
baseless inquiry to a monolithic standard." Denton, 504 U.S. at 33. Examples of complaints within
the clearly baseless inquiry are those which describe fanciful, fantastic, or delusional scenarios. A
complaint is factually frivolous if the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or wholly
incredible. Pleaded facts which are merely improbable or strange, however, are not clearly baseless
for Section 1915(d) purposes. Id.
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the factual allegations
are not sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Dismissal for failure
to state a claim is appropriate when the plaintiff has failed to plead “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570). Plaintiffs must state
enough facts to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570.
In considering whether to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, all factual allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and construed favorably
to the plaintiff. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Assoc., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993).
However, conclusory allegations will not suffice to prevent dismissal for failure to state a claim. Id.
2
Analysis
Elements of a Cause of Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes a suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redressing
violations of the Constitution and federal law by those acting under color of state law. See Nelson
v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004); Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). It provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
official is clothed with the authority of state law, is action under color of state law. Townsend v.
Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002). A defendant acts under color of state law if he misuses
or abuses his official power and if there is a nexus between the victim, the improper conduct, and
the defendant's performance of official duties. Id. If, however, a state officer pursues personal
objectives without using or misusing the power granted to him by the state to achieve the personal
aim, then he is not acting under color of state law. Harris v. Rhodes, 94 F.3d 196, 197 (5th Cir.
1996).
Two allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First,
the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege
that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Green v. State Bar of Texas, 27 F.3d 1083, 1087 (5th
Cir. 1994). Plaintiff must also prove that the alleged constitutional or statutory deprivation was
intentional or due to deliberate indifference, not the result of mere negligence. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-29, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).
3
Here, plaintiff has failed to allege or demonstrate that the actions of the Beaumont Enterprise
are attributable to the state. Further, plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant intentionally acted
to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional or statutory rights. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims should
be dismissed as frivolous and for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Order
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed as frivolous and
for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A final judgment will be entered in this
case in accordance with this order.
SIGNED this 23rd day of July, 2014.
_________________________
Zack Hawthorn
United States Magistrate Judge
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?