Datatreasury Corporation v. Small Value Payments Company

Filing 39

STATUS REPORT Opening Claims Construction Brief (REPLACES # 38 ) by Datatreasury Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex A# 2 Exhibit EX B)(Cooper, Rodney) Modified on 2/1/2006 (mpv, ). Modified on 2/1/2006 (mpv, ). Additional attachment(s) added on 2/1/2006 (mpv, ).

Datatreasury Corporation v. Small Value Payments Company

Doc. 39

IN THE UNITED STATESDISTRICTCOURT F ORTHE EASTERNDISTRICTOF TEXAS MA R SH ALL DIVISION DATAT REA S U R YCORP., Plaintifi vs. MAGTEK, [NC., alklaMAG-TEK, INC., ffid SMALL VALUE PAYMENTSCOMPANY. Defendants,

JURY TRIAL DEMAND C V No.: 2-O3CV-459 C V No.:2:04-CV-85

PLAIN T IF F 'S COMBINED OPENING BRIEF ON CLAIMS CONSTRUCTION REGAR D IN G DEFENDANITS MAGTEK. INC. Ah[D SMALL VALUE PAYMENTS COMPAhIY

Dockets.Justia.com

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES A l t i r i s , Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,3l8 F.3d 1363(Fed.Cir. 2003).......... A s t r a z e n e c a A B Mutual Pharmaceutical v. Co. 384 F.3d 1333(Fed.Cir.2004)... B a y e rAG. v. Biovail Corp.,279 F.3d 1340(Fed.Cir. 2002).......... B r o o k h i l l -Wilk v. Intuitive Surgical fnc, 334 F.3d 1294(Fed.Cir. 2003).......... C o n s t a n tv. Advanced Micro-Devices, 1nc.,848F.2d 1560(Fed.Cir. 1988) C y b o rCorp.v. FAS Tech.,138 3d1448(Fed.Cir. 1998) F. D e M a r i n i Sports, Inc. v. Worth,lnc.,239 F .3d l3l4 (Fed.Cir. 2001).......... D i g i t a l Biometrics,Inc. v. Identix,Inc., 149 F.3d 1335(Fed.Cir. 1998) E a s t m a nKodak Co. v. GoodyearTire & Rubber Co.,lL4 F.3d 1547(Fed.Cir. 1997) E c o l a b ,Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc.,264F.3d 1358(Fed.Cir. 2001)... E l e c t r o Med. dts., S.A.v. CooperLife Sciences, Inc.,34 F.3d 1048(Fd.Cir. 1994) E - P a s sTechs., Inc. v. 3 Com Corp.,343F.3d 1364 F a n t a s ySportsProp. v. Sportsline.com, 1nc.,287F.3d 1108,1118(Fed.Cir.2002) G e n e r a t i o n OrthoticsInc. v. Medical Techlnc.,263 F.3d 1356(Fed.Cir.2001) II I n n o v a / P u r e w a t e r ,Inc. v. Sffiri WaterFiltration Systems, Inc.,38l F.3d 11l l ( F e d .Cir.2004)... I n t e r n a t i o n a l VisualCorp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co.,99l F.2d 768 (Fed,Cir. 1993) J o h n s o nWorldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985 (Fed.Cir. 1999) 10 ...........9, ......6 ........7 ........9,l0 .......9 ..................9 .....1 I .............8 .....9 ......8 .......9 ................9 . . . . . .6 ...........9

....7 .......7 ......8, 10

(BNA) 1801(Fed.Cir. Feb. L i e b e lFlarsheimCo. v. Medrad,1nc.,358F.3d 898,69 U.S.P.Q.2D

M a r l o n a n v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,52 F.3d 967(Fed.Cir. 1995)(en banc),aff'd,517 U.S.

(ree6) 370

...........6

N o r t h e r n Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung I1 ElectronicsCo., 215 F.3d 1281(Fed.Cir. 2000) ................... O m e g aEngineeringInc. v. RaytekCorp.,334 F.3d l3l4 ......12

P a l l Corp. v. PTI Techs, 1nc.,259F.3d 1383(Fed.Cir. 2001),vacatedon other grounds535 U.S.

r r 09(2002)
Panduit Corp.v. DennisonMfg. (Fed. Co.,810 F.2d1561 Cir. 1987). P h i l l i p sv. AWH Cotp.,415 I 303,l3l2 (FedCir. 2005.. . F3d .

.......1 I
......6,7 . .8,9

(Fed.Cir. (1996) F.3d 1995),cert.denied,l16S.Ct.1567 Q u a n t u m C o r p . v . R o d i m e , 6 5 1577
Renishaw PLC v. MarpossSocieta' per Azioni,l58 F.3d 1243(Fed.Cir. 1998)...... Rexnord Corp.v. Laitram Corp.,274F.3d 1336(Fed.Cir.200l).......... S c r i p p sClinic v. Genenteclt, 1nc.,927F.zd 1565(Fed.Cir. 1991) SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTVEnterprises, 1nc.,358F. 3d 870 (Fed.Cir. 2004).......... .........8 11 .......8, ........8 ......7

T e l e f l e x Inc., v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.,299F3d 1313,63 U.S.P.Q.2D(BNA) 1374 , ( F e dCir. 2002)......... ...........9, 11 10, Texas Digital Sys., Inc.v. Telegenix, fnc.,308 F.3d 1193(Fed.Cir.2002)......... U n i o n Oil of Caltfornia v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,208 F.3d 989 (Fed.Cir. 2000).... ........7,11 ..........8

Vanguard Prods.Corp. v. ParkerHannifin Corp.,234F.3d 1370(Fed.Cir. 2000)......................11 V i t r o n i c sCorp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,90 F.3d 1576(Fed.Cir. 1996) 10 ...........9,

W . E .Hall Co. v. Atlanta Corrugating,LLC,370 F.3d 1343,71U.S.Q.PzD (BNA) 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2004)......... W h i t ev. Dunbar, ll9 U.S. 47 (1886)

.....10 ......8

Y o r kProd., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr.,99 F.3d 1568,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619 (Fed.Cir. I 996) ........8

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND PARTIES POSITIONS
O n July 25,2005 and July 21,2005, this Court enteredSchedulingOrders forPlaintiff DataTreasury's("DTC") patent lawsuits againstMagTek, Inc. and SVPCO, respectively. A copy of these Scheduling Orders are attachedat Exh. A and B, respectively. The dockets for thesetwo actions track identically for purposesof claim construction ("Markman Proceedings"). On January 25,2006, DTC requestedthis Court to consolidateany claim construction hearing (if the Court finds it necessary)for consistencyin this round of the Markman Proceedings. Consolidation of all Markman Proceedingsis proper in view of preservingjudicial resourcesand the parties proposedclaim construction. For example,both DTC and Defendant Magtek, Inc. agreeon all claims previously construedby this Court. DTC and Defendant MagTek, Inc. differ only as to the construction of the term "image." It is for the above reasonsDTC filed a combined opening brief on claim construction in the abovereferencedcausesof action.

II.

INTRODUCTION TO PROCEEDINGS This is an actionfor patentinfringernent. Plaintiff DTC alleges and that services, products

made,sold,offeredfor saleandusedrespectively the Defendants by infringe (directlyor i n d i r e c t l y numerous ) claims DTC'sUnitedStates ("the'988Patent") of PatentNo. 5,910,988 (Exh.C) andUnitedStates (Exh.D). The '988 Patent Patent 6,03 No. 2,137("the '137 Patent") contains claimsto an inventionregarding system capturing a for images papertransactions of and papertransactions. oneaspect the invention,the imageanddataof the paper datafrom these In of transaction transmitted are across communication facility where a networkto a centralprocessing

various activities can be performed. The o137 Patent derives from a continuation application of t h e ' 9 8 8 Patentapplicationand includesa terminal disclaimer. The'137 Patentis a more narrow v e r s i o n of the'988 Patentwherein the papertransactionis specifically a check. In the'988 patento paper transactioncan be a check or other types of financial documents. The claimed system in the '988 and '137 Patentsprovide numerous advantages, including reliability, security, fault tolerance and high performance at a low cost. T h e '988 and 0137Patentsinvolve ninety-three(93) claims representing DataTreasury's i n v e n t i v e property. The specifications the '988 and'137 Patentsare similar except the'137 in P a t e n tspecificationincludesan additional figure (Figure l1). Since May of 2002,thesePatents and their ninety-three claims have been the subject of intensive examination by this Court. More specifically, this Court conducteda bifurcated Markman Proceedingsto construethe patents claims. The first prong addressed issue of whether the claims were to be construedas "means the f o r " under 35 U.S.C. $l 121T The secondprong addressed remaining claim construction 6. all issues. In conducting the Markman Proceedings(Phase1 and Phase2), the Court appointed a Technical Master. On February 19,2004, this Court renderedPhase1 of its Markman Order a d d r e s s i n g a35U.S.C.$ll2n6issues.AcopyofthisOrderisattachedasExh.E. ll Approximately one year later, this Court renderedPhase2 of its Markman Order and addressed all remaining claim construction issues.A copy of this Report and Recommendationof the United StatesMagistrate is attachedas Exh. F, along with JudgeFolsom's Order adopting all aspectsof the Report and Recommendation. In Phase2 of its Markman Order, the Court provided construction for approximately forty (40) terms or phrases. Having construedthe majority of all relevant terms, little remains to be done in this

Markmanproceeding thoseto follow. DataTreasury or recognizes construction this Court the by for all termspreviouslyconstrued respectfully only the term and requests Courtto construe the "image,"which hasnot beenpreviouslyconstrued this Court. by

III.

SUMMARY Each of the patentsin suit involves specialputpose software running on generalpurpose

computer hardware and peripherals. It is the operation of the software that converts standard computer equipment and peripheralsinto a system coveredby one or more of the claims in the ' 9 8 8 Patentand'137 Patent, An appropriateconstructionofthe asserted claims thus encompasses any such specialpurpose software loaded on computer hardware and/or peripheralsthat is capable o f p e r f o r m i n g t h e elernents the claim. SeeFantasy SportsProp. v. Sportsline.com, of fnc.,287 F . 3 d 1108,1118(Fed.Cir.2002).

III.

LEG A L AUTHORITIES The Court,not thejury, determines Marlvnanv. Westview claim constnrction.

I n s t r u m e n t s ,Inc., 52 F .3d 967, 97 0-7| (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (The constructionof patent c l a i m sis determined a matterof law), aff'd,517 U.S.370 (1996).Claim construction simply as is a processto provide understandingto the scopeof the claimed invention. Panduit Corp. v. D e n n i s o nffi. Co.,810 F.2d 1561 ,1576 (Fed.Cir. 1987). This Court hasproperlyidentified

"[t]he goal of claim construction is to determine what an ordinary artisanwould deernthe invention claimed by the patent, taking the claims together with the rest of the specification." Exh F , Report and Recommendation, 2 (citingAstrazenecaAB v. Mutual PharmaceuticalCo. 384 p.

F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 200a)). Claim constructionis NOT a processto changethe scopeof the c l a i m s . Panduit at 1576.("The constructionof claims is simply a way of elaboratingthe normally terse claim language[] in order to understandand explain, but not to change,the scopeof the claims"). The Federal Circuit has repeatedly cautionedthat it is improper to use details from the preferred embodimentsthat appearin the wriffen description of the patent in order to limit the languageof the claims that might otherwise have a broader scope. Innova/Purewater, Inc. v. S a f a r i WaterFiltration Systems, fnc.,38l F.3d 1l I I ,lllT (Fed.Cir. 2004) (citationsomitted).

Indeed, even when a patent describesonly one embodiment the claims are not to be read restrictively to cover just that one embodimentunless the patenteeclearly intended to limit the claim languageto that embodiment by using "words or expressionsof manifest exclusion or restriction." Id. (citations omitted). Thus "[it] is well settled that no matter how great the ternptationsof fairness or policy m a k i n g , courtsdo notredraft claims." QuantumCorp. v. Rodime,65 F.3d 1577,1584(Fed.Cir. oois 1 9 9 5 ) ,cert. denied,ll6 S.Ct.1567 (1996). The specification not a substitute nor can itbe for, u s e dto rewrite, the chosenclaim language. 'specifications teachClaims claim."' SuperGuide C o r p . v. DirecWEnterprises, 1nc.,358 F. 3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Where a specification doesnot require a limitation, that limitation should not be read from the specification or p r o s e c u t i o nhistory into the claims. Bayer AG. v. Biovail Corp.,279 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Additionally, it is improper to rewrite the claims, either by disregardingwords that are presentor adding others that are not. Id.; International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co.,

991 F .2d 768,771-72 (Fed. Cir. I 993) (Words, terms or phrases presentin the claims do not not s u d d e n l ybecomeclaim limitations). In this Court's Markman Order, the Court instructed "'[w]e first look to the claims themselvesand turn next to the written description and prosecutionhistory, which should always b e considered construethe languageof the claims."' Ex F, Report and Recommendation, p.2. to ( q u o t i n gEcolab,Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc.,264F.3d 1358,1366(Fed.Cir. 2001). "The analyical focus must begin and remain centeredon the languageof the claims themselves,for it is that languagethat the patenteechoseto use to 'particularly point[] out and distinctively claim[] the s u b j e c tmatter which the patentee regardsas his invention.' 35 U.S.C. $ 112, n2." Brookhill W i l k v . Intuitive Surgical, Inc,334 F.3d 1294, 1298(Fed. Cir. 2003); see alsoPhillips v. AWH C o r y . , 4 l 5 F3d 1303,l3l2 (FedCir. 2005)(en banc)(quotingWhitev. Dunbar,ll9 U.S. 47,52 ( 1 8 8 6 ) "it is'unjust to the public, as well as an evasionof the law, to construeit in amanner different from the plain import of its terms"'). "While certain terms may be at the center of the claim construction debate,the context of the surroundingwords of the claim also mustbe consideredin determining the ordinary and customary meaning of those terms." Id. at 1299. Moreover, unambiguous claim terms need not be construedother than to apply their ordinary meaning using the exact words of the claim . Digital Biometrics, fnc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1 3 3 5 , 1344(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The actualwords of the claim are the controlling focus.") ( e m p h a s i sadded);Union Oil of Califurnia v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989,995 (Fed. Cir. 2 0 0 0 ) ,(quotingScrippsClinicv. Genentech, lnc.,927 F.2d 1565(Fed.Cir. 1991);Johnson W o r l d w i d e Assocs., v. Zebco Corp.,175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999);RenishawPLC v. fnc. M a r p o s sSocieta'pt, Azioni,l58 F.3d 1243,1249(Fed. Cir. 1998);YorkProd., Inc. v. Central

Tractor Farm &Family Ctr.,99 F.3d 1568, 1619(Fed.Cir. 1996); VitronicsCorp. v. C o n c e p t r o n i cInc.,90 F.3d 1576(Fed.Cir. 1996); EastmanKodakCo.v. GoodyearTire & , R u b b e rCo.,114 F.3d 1547(Fed.Cir. 1997);Cybor Corp.v. FAS Tech.,138F. 3d1448 (Fed.Cir. 1 9 9 8 ) ;Electro Med. dts., S.A. v. CooperLife Sciences, Inc.,34 F.31048(Fed. Cir. 1994);Teleflex, I n c . , v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F3d 1313, 1374 (Fed Cir. 2OO?);Constant AdvancedMiuov. D e v i c e s ,Inc., 848 F .2d I 560 (Fed. Cir. I 988); GenerationII Orthotics Inc. v. Medical TechInc., 2 6 3 F . 3 d 1356(Fed.Cir.200l);LiebelFlarsheimCo. v. Medrad,fnc.,358 F.3d 898,69 U . S . P . Q . 2 D(BNA) l80l (Fed.Cir. Feb.200!; E-PassTechs., Inc. v. 3 Com Corp.,343 F.3d 1 3 6 4 , 1 3 6 9(Fed.Cir. 2003); accordBrookhill -Wilkv. Intuitive Surgical,Inc,334 F.3d 1294, 1 3 0 0(Fed.Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Thus "the words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning." P h i l l i p s v. AWH Cotp.,4l5 F3d 1303, l3l2 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing VitronicsCorp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). And the construingcourt is to give the claim termfs] its full breadth of ordinary meaning as understoodby personsskilled in the relevant art."RexnordCorp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 200l); ( Teleflex,Inc. v. Ficosa

North America Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325(Fed. Cir.2002). Additionally, the full rangeof the ordinary meaning and accustomedmeaning of a disputed claim term is presumedto be correct. SeeJohnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 989. This presumption of the disputed claim term receiving its full breadth and ordinary meaning may rarely be overcome. The Federal Circuit outlined three exceptionsto overcomethe presumption of full breadth and ordinary meaning in Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,318 F.3d 1363(Fed.Cir.2003). Theseexceptions as follows: are (1) "the patenteeacted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecutionhistory." (Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,318 F.3d 1363,1370(Fed.Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). (Seealso, "[t]he presumptionwill be over come -Wilk,334 F.3d at 1298--1299)(stating Brookhill where the patentee,acting as his or her own lexicographer, has clearly set forth a definition of the term different from its ordinary and customary meaning.") (emphasisadded).3t (2) or "the patenteedistinguishedthat term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment,expressly disclaimed subject matter, or describeda particular enrbodimentas i m p o r t a n t to the invention,Altiris, fnc. v. SymantecCorp., 318 F.3d at 1370,(Fed. Cir. 2 0 0 3 ) ) (emphasisadded) (Seealso,Brookhill-Wilk,334 F.3d at1299) (stating"[t]he presumption also will be rebutted if the inventor has disavowed or disclaimed scopeof coverage,by using words or expressionof manifest exclusion or restriction, representinga c l e a r disavowal of claim scope.") (3) or o'theterm 'chosen by the patenteeso deprives the claim of clarity' as to require resort to the other intrinsic evidence for a definite meaning Altiris Inc., at 1370 (emphasis added). I An inventor or patentee may impart a novel meaning to a claim term and thereby act as his own lexicographer. However, to do so the inventor must clearly statethe special definition of t h e term in the patent specificationor file history. Vitronics Corp.,g0 F.3d at 1582; W.E.Hall Co. v . Atlanta Corrugating,LLC,3T0 F.3d 1343(Fed. Cir.2004); See Johnson WorldwideAssoc.v. Z e b c o Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("by clearly setting forth an explicit definition for a claim term"). Clarity of stating the alternatemeaning is paramount for the patenteeto act as his own lexicographer and thereby disclaim a term's ordinary and customary meaning-mere ambiguity is not sufficient. Where the written description and prosecution history are ambiguous as to whether the patenteeused the claim terms inconsistentwith their ordinary and customary m e a n i n g ,it is the ordinary and customarymeaningthat the terms obtain. W.E.Hall Co.,370 F.3d 1 3 4 3(Fed.Cir. 2004).

10

Essentially then,"claim termstakeon their ordinaryandaccustomed meanings the unless patentee demonstrated intentto deviatefrom [thatmeaningf."Teleflex, v. FicosaNorth an Inc. America Corp.,299F.3d 1313,1327(Fed. Cir. 2002)(emphasis TheFederal Circuit, added). however, interprets theseoccuffences strictly andhason numerous reversed the occasions construing courtfor limiting the full plain andordinarymeaning a disputed claim term without a of clearshowingof at leastoneof threeexceptions. example:az For
The Federal Circuit refused to rely on ambiguity surrounding the examiner's silence or patentee'slack of argument during prosecution to construea claim term. D e M a r i n i Sports,Inc. v. Worth,lnc.,239 F.3d 1314,1326-27(Fed.Cir. 2001). The Federal Circuit refused to limit the ordinary meaning of the claim becausethe alleged disclaimer in the file wrcpper was at best "inconclusive." Rexnord Corp. v. L a i t r a m Corp.,274F.3d 1136,1347(Fed.Cir. 2001). The Federal Circuit found the scopeof the disclaimer over the prior art reference was ambiguous and thus remanding for clarification. Pall Corp.v. PTI Techs,Inc., 2 5 9 F.3d 1383,1393-94, (Fed.Cir.200I),vacatedon othergrounds535 U.S. ll09 (2002). The Federal Circuit viewed the inventor's staternents amenableto multiple as reasonableinterpretationsand deemedthe remarks so ambiguousthat, "[]ike the district court, we simply can not tell" becausethe inventor's staternent"is far too slender a reed to support the judicial narowing of a clear claim term." Northern T e l e c o mLtd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 215 F.3d 1281,1294 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Federal Circuit refused to narrow the assertedclaims basedon prosecution disclaimer because"the prosecution history does not support [the infringer]'s argumentthat the Vanguard inventors 'expressly disclaimed' claim scopebeyond [ t h e ordinary meaningf." VanguardProds. Corp. v. Parker Hannifin Corp.,234 F . 3 d 1370,1372(Fed.Cir. 2000).

For brevity sake,Plaintiff DTC presentsonly a few of thesecasessince 2000. By no m e a n s ,is this list exhaustive.

'

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Thus the law can not be clearer, any allegedly disavowed staternents the inventor must by "be both so clear as to show reasonableclarity and deliberateness (citation omitted) and so

unmistakable as to be unambieuousevidenceof disclaimer." OmegaEngineering Inc. v. Raytek C o r p . , 334 F.3d 1314, 1325 (citation omitted) (ernphasis added).

IV.

THE PROPERCONSTRUCTIONOF THE TERM IMAGE
Plaintiff DataTreasuryoffers the following construction for the term "image." The term

i m a g e is found in claims 26-41,ffid 46-50in the '988 patent and claims 26-41, ffid 43 inthe '137 Patent. The construction DTC setsforth shall have similar meaningsin the claims of both the '988 Patentand '137 Patentunless statedotherwise. For purposesof theseMarkman Proceedings,the term image should be construedto mean "An optically or electronically formed representativereproduction of an object, for example, an optical reproduction formed by a lens or mirror or an electro-optical device such as a charge-coupled d e v i c e (CCD), or other optical system." The construction is fully supportedby the surrounding claim language,specification of the '988 a n d ' 1 3 7 patentsand relatedfile histories. The text surroundingthe term image involve " c a p t u r i n g . " In the specificationof the'988patent, col. 5 ln. 48-51, it states"[i]n the preferred embodiment,the DAT scanner202has the abilityto support a full range of images resolution values which are cornmonly measuredin Dots Per Inch (DPI)." This languageclearly demonstrates that a scanneris one-tlpe of device for capturing an image but not the only. Additionally, this languagedemonstrates flexibility and variability of different tlpes of the reproductionsof paper transactions. The construction offered by DTC is consistentwith the claim language,specification, and file histories. More importantly, a person skilled in the art, Professor

l2

JohnHiles,havingextensively reviewedthe surrounding and claim language, specification file historiesinterpretthe term imagein this way. Professor is JohnHiles Declaration providedat Exh. G. Additionally,this construction consistent narrower is but thanhow the term "Image"is defined in theWebster's Third New International Dictionaryandthe IBM Dictionaryof Computing, respectively Exh. H andI. at

v.

CONCLUSION
PlaintiffDTc has adequatelyshown that the term image should be construedas above.

The construction offered by DTC is supportedby and consistentwith what a person skilled in the art would understandthe term to mean in view of the surrounding claim language,specification and file histories. ProfessorJohn Hiles as a person skilled in the art further validates this construction. For thesereasons,Plaintiff DTC respectfully requeststhe Court to enter an order adopting the provided claim construction.

Respectfully submitted,

R odA. Cooper
S t a t e No. 90001628 Bar

Tnn CoopnnLaw Frnvr
545E. JohnCarpenter Freeway, Suite 1460 Irving, Texas 7 5062 (facsimile) 9 7 2 . 8 3.I I 88; 972.692.5445 1 r [e-mail] I

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Edward L. Hohn S t a t e No.09813240 Bar N e i l Smith Texas # 00797450 Bar Nt& P^q.rrnRSoN Ro^Lctt, LLP & 2 0 5 Linda Drive Daingerfield, Texas 7 5638 4415(facsimile) 9 0 3.645.7333; 903.645. [e-mail] dnsmi th(fu ix Iaw.fr m.com i Joe Kendall State No. 11260700 Bar Karl Rupp State BarNo.24035243 Pnovosr * UpTpHREY 3 2 3 2 McKinney, Suite 700 D a l l a s , Texas 7 5204 2 14.744.3000;214.7 44.3 I 5 (facsimile) 0 j kendaI I @pr ovostumphr qt. com lwupp@pr ovost umphr qv.com T. John Ward, Jr. State BarNo. 00794818 Law Orrrcn oF T. Jonn'WARD' JR., P . O . Box l23l L o n r y i e w , Texas 75606-1231 9 0 3 . 7 .64A0;903.758 57 .7397(facsimile) jw@,iulfirm.com E r i c M. Albritton Bar S t a t e No.00790215 AlnnrrroN L^q,w Frnnn P . O . Box 2649 Longview, Texas 7 5606-2649 9 0 3 . 7 .8449;903.758 57 .7397(facsimile) eri c@aI br i ttonhwrtrm. com

ArroruvEYs Pr,anxrmr FoR

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I herebycertiff that a true andcorrectcopyof the foregoingPLAINTIFF'S OPENINGBRIEF ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION beensentelectronically the partieslistedbelowon the 3flday of January, has 20A6. to D a v i dA. Dillard R. Charles Halloran Christie,Parker& Hale,LLP 3 5 0W. Colorado Boulevard S u i t e500 Pasadena, California 1105 9 O t i s Carroll W e s l e yHill keland Carroll & Kelley, P.C. 6 1 0 1South Broadway T y l e r ,Texas75703 P r e s t o n McGee W. Flowers Davis,P.L.L.C. l 0 2 l ESELoop323,Suite 200 T y l e r ,Texas75701 O f Counsel: H. James Carter T. James Williams JaneJaang SULLTVAN& CROMWELL LLP 1 2 5BroadStreet New York, New York 10004 Steve Belisle RonaldA. Clayton FITZPATRICK,CELLA, HARPER& SCINTO 30 Rockefeller Plaza N e w York,New York 10112-3801 Attorneys TheClearingHousePayments Company for

Rod Cooper

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