First American CoreLogic, Inc. v. Fiserv, Inc. et al

Filing 420

***DUPLICATE ORDER PLEASE IGNORE ***CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER and CONCLUSION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roy S Payne on 9/21/12. (ehs, ) Modified on 9/21/2012 (ehs, ).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
CORELOGIC INFORMATION
SOLUTIONS, INC.
v.
FISERV, INC., et al.

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Case No. 2:10-CV-132-RSP

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On March 7, 2012, the Court held a hearing to determine the proper construction of the
disputed claim terms in U.S. Patent No. 5,361,201. After considering the arguments made by the
parties at the hearing and in the parties’ claim construction briefing (Dkt. Nos. 213, 220, and
225), the Court issues this Claim Construction Memorandum and Order.
APPLICABLE LAW
A.

Claim Construction
“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention

to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start
by considering the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1313. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications
Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims
themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R.
Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 861. Courts give claim terms their ordinary and accustomed meaning as
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the

entire patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
The claims themselves provide substantial guidance in determining the meaning of
particular claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. First, a term’s context in the asserted claim
can be very instructive. Id. Other asserted or unasserted claims can aid in determining the
claim’s meaning because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id.
Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For
example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that
the independent claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314–15.
“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id.
(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am.
Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This is true because a patentee may define his own
terms, give a claim term a different meaning than the term would otherwise possess, or disclaim
or disavow the claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. In these situations, the inventor’s
lexicography governs. Id. The specification may also resolve the meaning of ambiguous claim
terms “where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack
sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.”
Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325.

But, “‘[a]lthough the specification may aid the court in

interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments and examples
appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.’”

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Comark

Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant
v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1323. The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim
construction because a patent applicant may also define a term in prosecuting the patent. Home
Diagnostics, Inc., v. Lifescan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of the
specification, a patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent.”).
Although extrinsic evidence can be useful, it is “‘less significant than the intrinsic record
in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317
(quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court
understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use
claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad or
may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert
testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the
particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert’s conclusory, unsupported
assertions as to a term’s definition is entirely unhelpful to a court. Id. Generally, extrinsic
evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read
claim terms.” Id.
B.

Means-Plus-Function Limitations
The asserted claims also contain means-plus-function limitations that require

construction. Where a claim limitation is expressed in “means plus function” language and does
not recite definite structure in support of its function, the limitation is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112,
¶ 6. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In relevant part, 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 mandates that “such a claim limitation ‘be construed to cover the
corresponding structure . . . described in the specification and equivalents thereof.’” Id. (citing 35
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U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6). Accordingly, when faced with means-plus-function limitations, courts “must
turn to the written description of the patent to find the structure that corresponds to the means
recited in the [limitations].” Id.
Construing a means-plus-function limitation involves multiple steps. “The first step in
construing [a means-plus-function] limitation is a determination of the function of the meansplus-function limitation.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303,
1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Once a court has determined the limitation’s function, “the next step is to
determine the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Id.
A “structure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or
prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.”
Id. Moreover, the focus of the “corresponding structure” inquiry is not merely whether a
structure is capable of performing the recited function, but rather whether the corresponding
structure is “clearly linked or associated with the [recited] function.” Id.
DISCUSSION
A.

Disputed Claim Terms 1-3 and 8-10

Claim Term 1: “training data”
Claim Term
“training data”
(claims 1, 3, 7, 9,
12, 14, 15, and 19)

CoreLogic’s Proposal
“data which is available
regarding real estate
properties”

Defendants’ Proposal
“records of historical data grouped as inputs
and corresponding outputs that enable a
statistical model to be fully developed”

CoreLogic argues that the scope of this term is readily understood in the context of the
patent, and should not be limited to one exemplary type of record disclosed in the specification.
Dkt. No. 213 at 6.

For example, the background of the invention describes how “[i]t is

desirable . . . to have an automated system that uses available information regarding real estate

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properties to provide accurate estimates of value.” Dkt. No. 213 at 6 (quoting ‘201 Pat. at 2:1720). CoreLogic cites other portions of the specification consistent with its construction: “models
are trained using training data describing a number of individual real estate properties,
characteristics, and prices, as well as area characteristics . . . .” ‘201 Pat. 5:47-49. CoreLogic
notes that the specification gives nearly 50 examples of training data, such as the number of
bedrooms, number of fireplaces, type of parking, and square footage of the property. Dkt. No.
213 at 6-7.

Defendants argue that their construction is more appropriate because it gives

meaning to the word “training.” Defendants’ construction relies upon the description of the
training process in the specification and inventor deposition testimony to support their
construction. Dkt. No. 220 at 18-19.
The Court finds that CoreLogic’s construction is better supported by the specification, is
a better fit in the context of the invention, and is likely to be more readily understood by the jury
because it defines “training data” in terms of the content of the data as opposed defining the data
by its function. Accordingly, the Court finds that the term training data means “data which is
available regarding real estate properties.”
Claim Term 2: “predictive model”
Claim Term

CoreLogic’s Proposal

Defendants’ Proposal

“predictive model”
(claims 1, 3, 7, 9,
14, and 15)

No construction necessary,
but if construed, construe as:
“model that generates
estimates using a predictive
technique”

“statistical model that automatically learns
relationships among predictor variables
based exclusively on training data and that
uses the learned relationships to estimate
values based on new input values”

CoreLogic contends that the term “predictive model” does not need construction, and that
Defendants’ construction improperly limits the term to only cover neural networks, which is only
one embodiment disclosed in the specification. Defendants agree that the term covers more than

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just neural networks, but that the term should exclude regression models, which is what
Defendants claim their construction accomplishes. Defendants argue that their construction is
proper in light of: 1) the claim language surrounding the term, 2) the disparagement of regression
models in the specification, and 3) the portions of the prosecution history that suggest the
examiner understood the claims to only cover neural networks, and 4) the fact that regression
models cannot be trained or said to learn. The Court addresses each of these arguments.
1.

Surrounding Claim Language

Defendants’ argue that “the claim wording suggests a predictive model that is actively,
automatically developed based on learned relationships,” a concept which they contend is better
captured by their construction. Dkt. No. 220 at 11. Defendants observe that the method claims
require “developing a predictive model from the training data,” and that the corresponding
system claims require “a model development component, coupled to the predictive model, for
training the predictive model from the training data.” Id. Defendants cite additional evidence
from the specification and the prosecution history showing “the dynamic, automated nature of
the ‘predictive model.”” Id. at 12-13.
The Court is not persuaded that it is necessary to construe “predictive model” to include
limitations from the surrounding claim language. To the extent the terms “developing” and
“development” limit the types of predictive models that fall within the scope of the claims, the
limitation is already present in the claims, and Defendants have not justified reiterating that
limitation into the construction of other terms within the same claims.
2.

Disavowal of Regression Models by Disparagement

Defendants argue that “the patent disavows the ‘traditional statistical techniques, such as
multiple linear regression and logistic regression,’ disparaging them as ‘deficient.’” Dkt. No.

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220 at 13. Defendants cite the following passages from background of the invention as examples
of the patent disparaging regression models or techniques:
Traditional statistical techniques, such as multiple linear regression
and logistic regression, have been tried, but such techniques
typically suffer from a number of deficiencies. One deficiency is
the inability of traditional regression models to capture complex
behavior in predictor variables resulting from nonlinearities and
interactions among predictor variables. In addition, traditional
regression models do not adapt well to changing trends in the data,
so that automated model redevelopment is difficult to implement.
‘201 Pat. at 1:56-66.
***
A model developed using all homes in one square city block might
theoretically be an effective predictor for that particular
neighborhood, but it may not be possible to develop such a model
with sufficient stability and reliability, due to the relatively small
sample size. On the other hand, a model developed using all homes
sold in the United States in the past month might have a
sufficiently large sample size, but might be unable to capture local,
neighborhood characteristics to provide an accurate appraisal.
Thus, a significant deficiency of traditional regression modeling
techniques when applied to real estate appraisals is the inability to
successfully model neighborhood characteristics while including a
sufficiently large sample size to develop a robust, stable statistical
model. ‘201 Pat. at 2:2-16.
CoreLogic argues that the specification criticizes the traditional application of regression
models, but does not disparage regression models generally. Dkt. No. 225 at 4-5. According to
CoreLogic, the cited portions of the background of the invention describe the inability of prior
art regression models to handle problems with sample sizes, which is a problem remedied by the
automated techniques disclosed in the patent. Id. Moreover, CoreLogic notes that the patent
explicitly teaches using a regression model as the predictive model: “Although neural network
models are used in the embodiment illustrated herein, any type of predictive modeling technique
may be used, such as regression modeling.” Id. at 5 (quoting ‘201 Pat. at 6:13-16).

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A disavowal of claim scope based upon disparagement in the specification “requires
‘expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.’”
Epistar Corp. v. ITC, 566 F.3d 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Teleflex Inc. v. Ficosa N.
Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “A patentee’s discussion of the shortcomings
of certain techniques is not a disavowal of the use of those techniques in a manner consistent
with the claimed invention.” Epistar, 566 F.3d at 1335. The Court finds that the critical
language here does not rise to the level of a clear disavowal of regression models generally. The
critical language in the specification is directed to “traditional regression models,” and this
distinction from regression models in general was made repeatedly. Moreover, the specification
explicitly teaches using “regression modeling” for the predictive modeling.

Because the

specification criticizes “traditional regression models” and simultaneously teaches using
“regression modeling,” the patentee did not manifestly exclude or restrict all regression models.
3.

Prosecution History

Defendants contend that the prosecution history requires that the term be construed to
exclude regression models. Dkt. No. 220 at 14-15. First, the inventors allegedly distinguished
their invention from the prior art by arguing that “‘a predictive model is employed to learn
relationships among various elements of property data’ and does so with a ‘minimum of human
effort.’” Id. at 14. Furthermore, the inventors allegedly responded to a written description
rejection by relying on “technical articles and text describing neural networks that the inventors
incorporated by reference into the patent specification.” Id. Finally, Defendants note the patent
examiner’s statement in the notice of allowance that “the claimed predictive model ‘is
structurally supported and defined in applicants’ specification as a neural network,” and claim
that this statement by the examiner establishes that the predictive model is limited to covering
neural networks. Id. at 14-15.
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CoreLogic contends that nothing in the prosecution history equates predictive models
with neural networks, and that there is no clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope. Dkt.
No. 225 at 5. Moreover, CoreLogic argues that Defendants have misrepresented the nature of
written description rejection. Id. CoreLogic explains that inventors incorporated the neural
network material in order overcome a written description rejection to the “neural network”
claims, and not to the broader “predictive model” claims. Id.
The Court finds that Defendants have not shown there was a clear and unmistakable
disavowal of claim scope.

In distinguishing the prior art, the inventors did not limit the

predictive model to neural networks. See Dkt. No. 220-6 at 10 (distinguishing prior art by noting
that one claim uses a predictive model, and another claim uses a neural network as the predictive
model). Moreover, the response to the written description objection does not limit the claims to
cover only neural network embodiments. A review of the prosecution history reveals that the
patent examiner was concerned that there was no support for neural networks in the
specification, and not predictive models as claimed by Defendants in their brief.
4.

Training Methods for Regression Models

Defendants argued at the Markman hearing that regression models must be excluded
because they do not learn and cannot be trained, which is inconsistent with the patent’s
description of predictive models. See Tr. 12:5-15, 21:6-20. CoreLogic responded by pointing to
a teaching in the patent that “[t]raining methods for regression models are well known in the art.”
Tr. 31:2-25 (quoting ‘201 Pat. at 10:42-43). Given that the patent claims that training methods
for regression models exist, and Defendants only offer attorney argument in response, the Court
declines the invitation to exclude regression models from the term predictive model.

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For all these reasons, the Court finds that the term “predictive model” should be given its
plain and ordinary meaning. Moreover, the Court finds that the plain and ordinary meaning of
the term is not limited to a neural network, and does not exclude a regression model.
Claim Term 3: “error model”
Claim Term

CoreLogic’s Proposal

Defendants’ Proposal

“error model”
(claims 1, 3, 10, 12,
17, 18, and 19)

“model that estimates error in the predicted
sales price of the subject property
generated by the predictive model”

“model that estimates error
in an output value generated
by the predictive model”

The only difference between the parties’ proposed constructions is whether the error
estimation relates to a predicted sales price or an output value in general. CoreLogic explains in
its brief why it believes that its construction would be more readily understood by the jury, and is
a better fit in the context of the claims. Dkt. No. 213 at 10-12. Defendants’ brief does not offer
any reasons to adopt their construction over CoreLogic’s. Dkt. No. 220 at 19. Because the
Court is persuaded that CoreLogic’s construction is likely to be more readily understood by the
jury and is adequately supported by the evidence cited by CoreLogic, the Court finds that the
term means a “model that estimates error in the predicted sales price of the subject property
generated by the predictive model.”
Claim Term 8: “computer-implemented process”
Claim Term

CoreLogic’s Proposal

“computer-implemented process”
(claims 1-3, 5, 9-12, and 14)

No construction necessary.
Ordinary meaning.

Defendants’ Proposal
“a process carried out by a
general purpose computer”

CoreLogic argues that no construction is necessary because 1) the term only appears in
the preamble and the body of the claim sets out the complete invention, and 2) the term has a
plain and ordinary meaning that would be understood by the jury. Dkt. No. 213 at 12-13; Dkt.

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No. 225 at 6-7. CoreLogic argues Defendants’ construction is improper because the process can
be performed by a special purpose computer, and that the phrase “computer-implemented” does
not necessarily exclude any human interaction in the process. Dkt. No. 225 at 6-7. Moreover,
CoreLogic notes that figure 2 of the patent depicts a user interface, which suggests that at least
some human involvement in the claimed appraisal process is proper.

Tr. 91:20-92:13.

Defendants argue that construction is necessary because “the patent is directed to ‘an automated
real estate appraisal system . . . ,’” and the patent disparages manual specification or adjustment.
Dkt. No. 220 at 17-18.
The Court finds that the term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning because the
term has a meaning that will be understood by the jury. Although a computer is required to
practice the invention, the Court is not persuaded that any human interaction (such as by entering
data associated with a real estate property into the user interface) is excluded. With respect to
requiring a “general purpose computer,” Defendants conceded at the Markman hearing that
simply “a computer” is required. Tr. 99:4-14. Therefore, the Court finds that the plain and
ordinary meaning of the term is not limited to a general purpose computer, nor does it exclude
human interaction or input.
Claim Term 9: “developing/development”
Claim Term

CoreLogic’s Proposal

Defendants’ Proposal

“developing/development”
(claims 1, 3, 5, 10, 12, and 14)

No construction necessary.
Ordinary meaning.

“building or converting to useful
form using the computerimplemented process”

Defendants argue in a conclusory fashion that their proposed construction is consistent
with the positions Defendants have taken on other disputed claim terms, and that the term must
mean that “the computer-implemented process builds the predictive model.” Dkt. No. 220 at 19.

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CoreLogic argues that the term has a plain and ordinary meaning that should control, and that
Defendants have not explained how “building or converting” is more understandable than the
plain and ordinary meaning of the word “developing.” Dkt. No. 213 at 13-14. CoreLogic argues
that the computer-implemented nature of the invention is already captured in the relevant claims,
and that it is unnecessary to reiterate that limitation here. Id.
The Court agrees with CoreLogic that it is unclear how “building or converting” will be
more easily understood by the jury than the plain and ordinary meaning of the word
“developing,” and that it is unnecessary to reiterate the computer-implemented nature of the
claims. Defendants do not explain how the plain and ordinary meaning of their proposed
construction varies from the concept encompassed by the word “developing.” Accordingly, the
Court finds that the term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
Claim Term 10: “model development component”
Claim Term
“model
development
component…for
training the
[predictive/error]
model”
(claims 15 and 17)

CoreLogic’s Proposal

Defendants’ Proposal

This phrase is not governed
by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.

Governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6

No construction necessary.

Function: training the [predictive/error]
model
Corresponding Structure: No algorithm or
other structure is disclosed rendering the
term indefinite.

Defendants argue that a “component” is too generic to convey structure, and should be
treated as a mean-plus-function limitation. Dkt. No. 220 at 26-27. Defendants argue that figure
9 discloses a model development component, but does not identify structure or an algorithm. Id.
CoreLogic argues that because the term does not use the word “means” there is no presumption
that the term is a not mean-plus-function limitation. Dkt. No 213 at 29. CoreLogic notes that
“over a third of the written description . . . is dedicated to describing the structure and function of

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the ‘model development component,’ and [the specification] includes references to multiple
diagrams.” Id. at 30. At the Markman hearing, CoreLogic argued that in light of the significant
disclosure, that a person of ordinary skill would understand that the model development
component refers to a part of a software structure. Tr. 105:5-106:8. CoreLogic explained that
figure 9 is not a mere black box representation of the module, but is a figure that illustrates the
logical structure of a computer program and describes the inputs to the component as well as
illustrates the relationship between the various components of the software. Tr. 107:6-108:9.
When a claim term does not use the word “means,” a rebuttable presumption arises that
the term is not a means-plus-function limitation governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. CCS Fitness,
Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d. 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002). To rebut the presumption, a
party must show “that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites a
function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id. A claim term
recites sufficient structure if it has an understood meaning in the art. Id. It is proper to consult
the intrinsic record, including the written description, to determine whether the presumption that
a claim lacking the term means recites sufficiently definite structure.

Inventio AG v.

Thyssenkrupp Elevator Americas Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The issue is
whether a skilled artisan, after reading the patent, would conclude that the limitation is so devoid
of structure that the drafter constructively engaged in means-plus-function claiming. Id.
The Court finds that Defendants have not rebutted the presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112,
¶ 6 does not apply to this claim term, and is persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would find that the term refers to a software structure that handles training the predictive model.
The written description of the patent depicts the model development component as part of the
system architecture in Figure 9. The figure and written description at column 6, lines 3-22, show

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how the model development component is connected to the other elements, including training
data input and model outputs. The model development component is then described in greater
detail in columns 6 and 7, and throughout the specification. From the written description, a
person skilled in the art would understand that the model development component is a computer
program operating on a computer system such as shown in Figure 1.
Like the “modernizing device” and “computing unit” in Inventio, the model development
component is not so structurally devoid it should be rewritten in means-plus-function format.
The written description indicates that a person skilled in the art would understand the model
development component to connote sufficiently definite structure. Therefore, the Court finds
that the term is not governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and that the term should be given its plain
and ordinary meaning.
B.

Agreed Means-Plus-Function Claim Terms 4-7
The parties agree that claim terms 4, 5, 6, and 7 are claim terms governed by 35 U.S.C.

§ 112, ¶ 6. The parties also agree on the function of each of the terms. The only dispute is
whether the specification discloses a sufficient corresponding structure for each term. CoreLogic
argues that specification discloses structure for each of the terms in the form of flowcharts,
algorithms described in prose, as well as the complete source code for an embodiment of the
invention, which was attached as an appendix to the specification. Tr. 116:22-117:7. Moreover,
CoreLogic has submitted two affidavits by Dr. Jost (a named inventor) that identify the portions
of the source code appendix that support the various means-plus-function limitations. See Dkt.
Nos. 225-3, 228-1. CoreLogic observes that Defendants rely solely upon attorney argument to
support their position that the specification does not adequately disclose structure for each of the
means-plus-function limitations. Tr. 117:16-118:2.

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Defendants contend that the specification does not provide adequate disclosure of
structures corresponding to each of the mean-plus-function limitations. With respect to the
source code, Defendants argue that it difficult to identify the portions of the source code relevant
to each limitation, and suggest that the patent’s draftsman should have been more explicit. Tr.
125:4-127:4. Defendants admit that they have not attempted to execute the source code, but
claim that multiple persons who have degrees in computer science have examined the source
code and cannot figure it out. Tr. 128:10-15.
For

mean-plus-function

limitations

implemented

by

computer

software,

the

corresponding structure described in the patent specification must include an algorithm for
performing the function. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
1999). The corresponding structure is not a general purpose computer but rather the special
purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty
Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Court is not persuaded that
the terms at issue are indefinite because the specification fails to adequately disclose the
corresponding structure for each of the means-plus-function limitations. As Defendants’ note, it
is unusual for the entire source code of an embodiment to be disclosed in a patent application.
Defendants have not offered any evidence that the source code is inoperative or does not practice
the asserted claims. The length of the source code – a few hundred pages – does not appear to be
too voluminous to be useful to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Furthermore, CoreLogic
offers the testimony of Dr. Jost to identify the source code in the appendix that is the
corresponding structure for each of the means-plus-function limitations. Defendants suggest that
Dr. Jost may not be a person of ordinary skill in the art, but do not offer any evidence as to what
the applicable standard should be, or what that person would understand from the patent’s

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disclosure. Defendants do not offer competing evidence from any witness, lay or expert, to
contradict Dr. Jost’s testimony.
Therefore, with respect to means-plus-function claim terms 4-7, the Court finds that the
specification adequately discloses a corresponding structure for each of the means-plus-function
limitations, and adopts the corresponding structure proposed by CoreLogic.
Claim Term 4: “training data input means”
Claim Term

CoreLogic’s Proposal

“training data
input means…”
(claims 15, 17,
and 19)

Agreed Function: inputs training data to the system
Corresponding Structure: Computer or CPU
programmed to carry out an algorithm that accepts
user supplied property data via input device to
computer or CPU, or accesses data storage
containing data describing real estate properties, as
well as regional data, and all engineering
equivalents thereof, or source code disclosed at col.
17, ln. 1 - col. 277, ln. 31 and all engineering
equivalents thereof. Data storage is conventional
RAM, ROM and disk storage devices and all
engineering equivalents thereof.

Defendants’ Proposal

Corresponding
Structure: No
algorithm or other
structure is disclosed
rendering the term
indefinite.

The Court finds that the term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
Function: The parties have stipulated that the function of the training data input means is
to input training data to the system.
Corresponding Structure: The Court finds that the corresponding structure is a computer
or CPU programmed to 1) carry out an algorithm: a) that accepts user supplied property data via
input device to the computer or CPU; b) that is described by the source code at col. 211, line
“data out.train;” c) that is described by the source code at col. 239, line “If epflag=‘trn’ output
out.train;” or d) that is described by the source code at col. 239, line “proc reg data = out.train;”

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or 2) access data storage containing data describing real estate properties, as well as regional
data. Data storage is conventional RAM, ROM and disk storage devices.
Claim Term 5: “training data aggregation means”
Claim Term
“training data
aggregation
means…”
(claim 15)

CoreLogic’s Proposal

Defendants’ Proposal

Agreed Function: aggregates training data
Corresponding Structure: Computer or CPU
programmed to carry out an algorithm that
aggregates individual property data in the training
data set into area characteristics in a flexible manner,
using the smallest geographic areas containing
sufficient data to produce reliable models (e.g. FIG.
18) and all engineering equivalents thereof, or source
code disclosed at col. 17, ln. 1 – col. 277, ln. 31 and
all engineering equivalents thereof.

Corresponding
Structure: No
algorithm or other
structure is disclosed
rendering the term
indefinite.

The Court finds that the term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
Function: The parties have stipulated that the function of the training data aggregation
means is to aggregate training data.
Corresponding Structure: The Court finds that the corresponding structure is a computer
or CPU programmed to carry out an algorithm: a) that aggregates individual property data in the
training data set into area characteristics in a flexible manner, using the smallest geographic
areas containing sufficient data to product reliable results (Fig. 18); or b) that is described by the
source code starting at col. 211, line “pred_sp2 = pred_sp * pred_sp” and ending at col. 239, line
“obsno=_n_.”

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Claim Term 6: “area data input means”
Claim Term
“area data input
means…”
(claims 15, 17,
and 19)

CoreLogic’s Proposal

Defendants’ Proposal

Agreed Function: inputs area data to the system
Corresponding Structure: Computer or CPU
programmed to carry out an algorithm that accepts
user supplied area data via input device to computer
or CPU, or accesses data storage containing data
describing regional data, and all engineering
equivalents thereof, or source code disclosed at col.
17, ln. 1 – col. 277, ln. 31 and all engineering
equivalents thereof. Data storage is conventional
RAM, ROM and disk storage devices and all
engineering equivalents thereof.

Corresponding
Structure: No
algorithm or other
structure is disclosed
rendering the term
indefinite.

The Court finds that the term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
Function: The parties have stipulated that function of the area data input means is to
input area data to the system.
Corresponding Structure: The Court finds that the corresponding structure is a computer
or CPU programmed to 1) carry out an algorithm: a) that accepts user supplied area data via
input device to the computer or CPU; or b) that is described by the source code at col. 211, line
“Set in.epmaster;” or 2) access data storage containing data describing regional data. Data
storage is conventional RAM, ROM, and disk storage devices.

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Claim Term 7: “individual property data input means”
Claim Term
“individual
property data
input means…”
(claims 15, 17,
and 19)

CoreLogic’s Proposal

Defendants’ Proposal

Agreed Function: inputs individual property data to the system
Corresponding Structure: Computer or CPU
programmed to carry out an algorithm that obtains
property data entered by the user on a data entry form
in a conventional window-based interface such as
those shown in FIGS. 2 and 3, or by batch input
using tape or disc storage devices and all engineering
equivalents thereof, or source code disclosed at col.
17, ln. 1 – col. 277, ln. 31 and all engineering
equivalents thereof.

Corresponding
Structure: No
algorithm or other
structure is disclosed
rendering the term
indefinite.

The Court finds that the term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
Function: The parties have stipulated that the function of the individual property data
input means is to input individual property data to the system.
Corresponding Structure: The Court finds that the corresponding structure is a computer
or CPU programmed to carry out an algorithm: a) that obtains property data entered by the user
on a data entry form in a conventions window-based interface, such as those shown in Figs. 2
and 3; b) that obtains property data by batch input using tape or disc storage devices; c) that is
described by the source code starting at col. 241, line “proc score” and ending at col. 243, line
“run;” d) that is described by the source code at col. 27; or e) that is described by the source code
at cols. 193-195.

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C.

Disputed Means-Plus-Function Terms 11-13

Claim Term 11: “training data input means is coupled to the error”
Claim Term

CoreLogic’s Proposal

Defendants’ Proposal

“training data input
means is coupled to
the error model”
(claim 17)

No construction
necessary. Construction
proposed by the parties
for “training data input
means.”

Governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6
Function: inputs training data to the error
model
Corresponding Structure: No algorithm or
other structure is disclosed rendering the term
indefinite.

The Court finds that this term refers to the “training data input means” first introduced in
claim 15 and therefore requires no further construction.
Claim Term 12: “the individual property data input means…sends the individual property
data to the error model”
Claim Term

CoreLogic’s Proposal

Defendants’ Proposal

“the individual
property data input
means…sends the
individual property
data to the error
model”
(claim 17)

No construction
necessary. Construction
proposed by the parties
for “individual property
data input means.”

Governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6
Function: sends individual property data to
the error model
Corresponding Structure: No algorithm or
other structure is disclosed rendering the term
indefinite.

The Court finds that this term refers to the “individual property data input means” first
introduced in claim 15 and therefore requires no further construction.

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Claim Term 13: “area data input means…sends the area data to the error model”
Claim Term
“area data input
means…sends the
area data to the
error model”
(claim 17)

CoreLogic’s Proposal

Defendants’ Proposal

No construction
necessary. Construction
proposed by the parties
for “area data input
means.”

Governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6
Function: sends area data to the error model
Corresponding Structure: No algorithm or
other structure is disclosed rendering the term
indefinite.

The Court finds that this term refers to the “area data input means” first introduced in
. claim 15 and therefore requires no further construction.

CONCLUSION
The Court adopts the above constructions. The parties are ordered that they may not
refer, directly or indirectly, to each other’s claim construction positions in the presence of the
jury. Likewise, the parties are ordered to refrain from mentioning any portion of this opinion,
other than the actual definitions adopted by the court, in the presence of the jury. Any reference
to claim construction proceedings is limited to informing the jury of the constructions adopted by
the Court.
SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2012.
SIGNED this 21st day of September, 2012.

____________________________________
ROY S. PAYNE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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