Mondis Technology Ltd v. Chimei InnoLux Corporation et al
Filing
46
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - all motions ruled upon as set forth herein. Signed by Judge Rodney Gilstrap on 4/30/12. (ehs, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
MONDIS TECHNOLOGY LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHIMEI INNOLUX CORP., et al.,
Defendants.
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11-cv-378-JRG
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff Mondis Technology Ltd. (“Mondis”) and Defendants
Chimei-Innolux Corp. and Innolux Corp. (collectively, “Innolux”) briefing regarding various
issues related to supplemental damages and ongoing royalties. (Dkt. Nos. 20-23, 31, 32, 35-38.)
Also before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Stay Action in Light of Parallel International Trade
Commission Investigation. (Dkt. No. 34.)
As provided for in its September 30, 2011 Order, the Court awards Mondis supplemental
damages in the amount of $1,971,810 in damages for its 2011 supplemental sales that were not
considered by the jury. (Dkt. No. 11.) The Court now awards prejudgment interest on these
supplemental damages in the amount of $73,725.00. Also, as provided for in the September 30,
2011 Order, the Court awards damages at an ongoing royalty, as a percentage of total product
revenue, at the rate of 1.50% for computer monitors and 0.75% for televisions sold after June 30,
2011, for the remaining life of the adjudicated infringed claims of the asserted patents. This
ongoing royalty shall apply to “Infringing Products” that are directly or indirectly shipped into the
United States by Innolux, or on behalf of Innolux by any third party, or for which Innolux would
otherwise be liable as a direct or indirect infringer. For the purpose of determining ongoing
royalties and with respect to the infringed claims, Infringing Products are herein defined as those
computer monitors and televisions that were accused at trial, and those that are not colorably
different from the computer monitors and televisions that were accused at trial. The Ongoing
Royalties obligation shall run for the remaining life of the adjudicated infringed claims of the
patents-in-suit and shall bind Innolux and any persons or companies who are in active concert or
participation with Innolux, as well as the successors and assigns of Innolux’s computer monitor
and/or television business. Finally, the Court stays execution as to this and the Court’s September
30, 2011 order, contingent upon Innolux’s posting of a supersedeas bond in compliance with Local
Rule CV-62. Such bond must unequivocally establish that the bonding company will make
payment in full in U.S. dollars to Mondis for the amount of supplemental damages as a condition
of the supersedeas.
I.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On June 27, 2011, following a trial on the merits, a duly empanelled jury in this Court
returned a verdict awarding Mondis $15 million in damages for infringement by Innolux of
Mondis’ patents. Case No. 2:07-cv-565, Dkt. No. 586.1 A final judgment was subsequently
entered in Case No. 2:07-cv-565 in accordance with the jury’s verdict of infringement. Case No.
2:07-cv-565, Dkt. No. 666. The final judgment specified “[t]he full $15,560,847.00 recovery
[including prejudgment interest] is to be payable to Mondis Technology, Ltd. in U.S. Dollars in the
United States…” Id. at 3. The Court then severed Mondis’ motion for ongoing royalties and
supplemental damages for Innolux’s 2011 infringing sales. Id. at 4.
1
At the time that the jury entered its verdict, the only remaining co-defendants in the case were Chimei-Innolux Corp.
(“CMI”), a Taiwanese entity, and Innolux Corp. (“IC”), a U.S. entity. The verdict refers to these co-defendants
collectively as “Innolux.” See Case No. 2:07-cv-565, Dkt. No. 586.
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On September 30, 2011, the Court ordered Innolux to pay Mondis $1,971,810 in damages for
Innolux’s 2011 supplemental sales (that were not before of the jury) and also set ongoing royalty
rates of 1.50% for computer monitors and 0.75% for televisions. Case No. 2:11-cv-378, Dkt. No.
11. Innolux moved for reconsideration of that order, and on February 27, 2012, the Court denied
Innolux’s motion for reconsideration. Case No. 2:11-cv-378, Dkt. No. 25. On that same day, the
Court held a hearing in which both parties presented proposed final judgments. To better
understand the parties’ positions on the disputed issues, the Court ordered supplemental briefing
on their various areas of disagreement.
The parties dispute the following issues related to the final judgment: (a) the definition of
the royalty base for ongoing royalties; (b) the timing and frequency of reports and payments; (c)
whether prejudgment interest should be assessed on the supplemental damages; (d) whether a
portion of the judgment must be withheld due to Taiwanese tax laws; (e) whether the ongoing
royalties extend to Innolux’s successors and assigns; (f) whether Mondis is entitled to additional
discovery related to a possible transfer of assets from Innolux to Hon Hai Precision Ltd. (“Hon
Hai”); and (g) whether the supplemental damages award and the ongoing royalty award should be
stayed pending appeal.
Additionally, on March 14, 2012, Innolux filed a motion seeking a stay of this action
because Mondis recently initiated a Section 337 investigation at the International Trade
Commission (“ITC”) against Innolux.
(Dkt. No. 34.)
The parties dispute whether such
circumstances warrant a mandatory stay of this case according to 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a).
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II.
DISPUTED PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT
a. Definition of Royalty Base
For purposes of the final judgment, the parties agree that ongoing royalty rates should
apply to products sold by Innolux that are directly or indirectly shipped into the United States by
Innolux or on behalf of Innolux, and which qualify as “Infringing Products.” However, the
parties dispute what constitutes an “Infringing Product.” Innolux submits that the final judgment
should be narrowly tailored to encompass only those products that were identified in the
Infringement Contentions previously served in this case and specifically found by the jury verdict
to be infringing. (Dkt. No. 32, at 3) (“Those computer monitors and televisions that were accused
at trial, and those that are essentially the same as those monitors and televisions accused at trial
with respect to the infringed claims.”) Mondis seeks a broader definition, which would include
“all computer monitors and televisions that comply with or implement any VESA, DDC2B, EDID,
Plug-and-Play, or DDC/DI standard, or the Microsoft Windows Logo program.” (Dkt. No. 32,
Exh. 18.)
Consistent with the jury verdict in this case, the Court finds that “Infringing Products”
should be defined as those computer monitors and televisions that were actually accused at trial,
and those that are not colorably different from those monitors and televisions accused at trial with
respect to the infringed claims. The Court declines to adopt Mondis’ proposal because the
asserted claims require specific combinations of hardware (processors, communication
controllers, and memory) and software (programmed capabilities and stored data) that may, or
may not, be required to implement various VESA or other standards now and in the future.
Neither the evidence of record nor the jury’s verdict supports a finding that Mondis has proven that
all implementations of various VESA or other standards would necessarily infringe the asserted
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patents. Additionally, the Court modifies Innolux’s proposed language to recite “not colorably
different from” rather than “essentially the same as” those monitors and televisions accused at
trial. Such language has previously been utilized in at least two prohibitive injunction cases.
See, e.g., TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Comm. Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 667 (E.D. Tex. 2006), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part on other grounds and remanded, 516 F.3d 1290; ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v.
Verizon Comm. Inc., 2:10-cv-248, 2011 WL 5878365, at *9 (E.D. Va. Nov. 23, 2011).
Accordingly, for purposes of establishing a basis for determining ongoing royalties,
Infringing Products shall be defined as: “those computer monitors and televisions that were
accused at trial, and those that are not colorably different from the computer monitors and
televisions that were accused at trial, with respect to the infringed claims.”
b. Timing and Frequency of Reports and Payments
Both Mondis and Innolux have requested that the Court specify the frequency and timing
of ongoing royalty reports and payments. Innolux proposes quarterly reports and payments that
are due 60 days after the close of each quarter, which is the standard practice in the Eastern District
of Texas. Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., Case No. 2:04-cv-211-DF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
61600 (E.D. Tex. August 16, 2006); Creative Internet Advertising Corp. v. Yahoo! Inc., 674 F.
Supp.2d 847, 862 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (ordering defendant Yahoo to make quarterly payments for
ongoing royalty payments); see also z4 Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444
(E.D. Tex. 2006) (requiring Microsoft to file quarterly reports indicating the number of infringing
units sold).
Mondis seeks a monthly schedule, with both the report and payment due 30 days from the
close of each month. Mondis contends that such a schedule is justified by “press reports from
Taiwan [that] show that Innolux is in financial trouble and that it is in urgent debt restructuring
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talks.” (Dkt. No. 23, Exh. A2) (“‘The latest T$5.6 billion [debt] is a lot of money to Chimei. If it
repaid the whole debt, its liquidity would become very tight,’ the [Ministry of Economic Affairs]
official said.”) Mondis further seeks a monthly reporting schedule based upon its belief that
Innolux intends to transfer its monitor business to a corporate affiliate, Hon Hai. In sum, Mondis
argues that a confluence of rapidly evolving circumstances justifies a shorter reporting period.
After carefully considering the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that the facts and
circumstances of this case do not warrant a deviation from this District’s established practice of
requiring quarterly reporting.
The process of compiling and preparing sales reports is
time-consuming, and the Court is concerned that imposing a monthly reporting obligation on
Innolux would be unduly burdensome. Moreover, Innolux has committed that it will inform
Mondis of any material change in circumstances related to its monitor or television business,
which is sufficient to mitigate any prejudice that Mondis may suffer due to Innolux’s possible sale
of its monitor business to Hon Hai.
The Court does believe, however, that the facts and
circumstances of this case do warrant condensing the typical 60 day reporting and payment
window after the close of each quarter to 30 days. Therefore, the Court orders that payments and
reports will be due on or before 30 days after the close of each quarter. Further, Innolux is
ordered to provide notice to Mondis of any material change to its business of importing or selling
televisions and/or computer monitors within 14 days of such change becoming known to Innolux.
c. Prejudgment Interest on Supplemental Damages
In a September 30, 2011 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court awarded Mondis
$1,971,810 in supplemental damages for the first two quarters of 2011 (the “Supplemental
Damages”). (Dkt. No. 1, at 13.) The parties dispute whether prejudgment interest should be
2 Taiwan’s Chimei Innolux Seeks Govt Aid to Extend Loans, published January 11, 2012 accessed from
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USL3E8CB3PY20120111, last accessed on January 23, 2012.
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assessed on that Supplemental Damages award.
Mondis argues that because the Court
specifically awarded prejudgment interest on the initial $15 million jury verdict, logic and
common sense require an award of prejudgment interest based on the same interest rate on the
supplemental damages. Innolux contends that prejudgment interest is not warranted because the
Court previously declined – inherently in its September 30, 2011 Order – the opportunity to award
Mondis prejudgment interest on the Supplemental Damages award and because Mondis never
sought reconsideration of that decision.
After considering the parties written submissions and the Supplemental Damages Order,
the Court finds that the previous order of September 30, 2011 did not consider or take up the
question of whether prejudgment interest should be awarded. The Order awarding Supplemental
Damages could have specifically taken up the issue by explaining whether prejudgment interest
were, or were not, included in the Supplemental Damages award. It did not. This silence
indicates that the Court acting on September 30, 2011 did not reach the question of prejudgment
interest and whether it should be assessed with regard to the Supplemental Damages award. Now
turning to the question of prejudgment interest, the Court finds that such interest should be applied
to the Supplemental Damages award.
Prejudgment interest was previously established on the underlying $15 million jury verdict
by calculating interest using the 90 day commercial paper rate and conceptualizing the verdict as a
lump-sum award. Mondis proposes that prejudgment interest on the Supplemental Damages be
calculated in exactly the same fashion. Innolux disagrees and argues that if prejudgment interest
is awarded, it should be calculated on a running royalty and not a lump sum basis.
An award of supplemental damages is simply recognition that, at the time the verdict was
entered, the jury did not have access to all of the sales data. From a conceptual standpoint, the
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Supplemental Damages awarded on September 30, 2011 are no different than the $15 million jury
award. Such Supplemental Damages simply recognize that if the jury had the benefit of real-time
sales data when it reached its verdict, it would have included such supplemental damages
($1,971,810) as part of its December 31, 2007 lump-sum award. Accordingly, the Court holds
that prejudgment interest on the Supplemental Damages should be calculated on the full
$1,971,810 (conceptualized as a lump-sum) from December 31, 2007 through the date of this
Order.
In the Court’s August 30, 2011 final judgment, the Court awarded $560,847 in prejudgment
interest on the damages award of $15,000,000. Using this same formula, the prejudgment interest
on the supplemental damages award of $1,971,810 that accrued from December 31, 2007 through
August 30, 2011 is found to be $73,725. The Court further awards additional prejudgment
interest at the annual rate of 0.57%, which is an average of the monthly average data for the A2/P2
Nonfinancial 90-day commercial paper rate for the period of October 2011 to March 2012. This
additional prejudgment interest, accrued from September 1, 2011 through April 30, 2012, amounts
to $7,442.
d. Taiwanese Tax Withholding
The parties also dispute whether the final judgment should specifically require Innolux to
satisfy the judgment “without any reductions or withholdings.” Innolux finds this language
problematic because it is required, according to its understanding of Taiwainese tax law and the
double-taxation treaty between the United Kingdon (Mondis’ domicile) and Taiwan (Chimei
TW’s domicile), to withhold a 20% tax on all royalty payments, with Mondis being entitled to a
50% refund of such withheld taxes. (Dkt. No. 32, at 9.)
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One of the two Innolux entities in this suit is a United States corporation, and the jury
award runs against both Defendants jointly and severally. This Court has previously held that
where foreign and U.S. entities are jointly and severally liable, U.S. judgments must be paid in full,
regardless of foreign withholding taxes. See QinetiQ Ltd. v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., L.P., No.
2:03-cv-22, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47881 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2005).
The Court reaches the same conclusion here. This is a U.S. case involving infringement
of U.S. patents and one of the two Defendants is a U.S. company that is jointly and severally liable
for all sums awarded. Based on these facts, the Court does not permit the withholding of any
portion of the supplemental damages award or royalty payments based on the tax laws of Taiwan
or any other foreign government. Accordingly, the final judgment entered by this Court will
require that all payments due thereunder shall be made in full in United States dollars and
delivered in the United States, without reductions or withholdings of any kind.
e. Successors-and-Assigns Language
The parties dispute whether the ongoing royalty obligation should extend to Innolux’s
successors and assigns. Neither Mondis nor Innolux have cited authority where another Court
has specifically found that supplemental royalties do or do not extend to the payers successors and
assigns. At least one of the parties contends in its briefing that this is a matter of first impression.3
Innolux claims that ongoing royalties cannot extend to successors and assigns and notes
that several courts have ruled that an ongoing royalty rate is specific to a particular defendant and
the relationship between that plaintiff and defendant – suggesting that an ongoing royalty rate
would not survive to benefit a non-party successor and/or assign. Innolux cites a recent case that
3
“CMI has been unable to locate any case law or other authority on this issue.” (Dkt. No. 32, at 16.)
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notes the importance of the relationship between the parties themselves in setting ongoing
royalties:
The Federal Circuit has made it clear that damages for past
infringement are separate and distinct from damages for future acts
of infringement and may require different royalty rates given the
change in the parties’ legal relationship, among other factors.
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623-24 (E.D. Tex. 2009). Innolux also
contends that when this Court previously entered its order for ongoing royalty payments and
enhanced the ongoing royalty rate, it did so with respect to Innolux and Innolux alone. Innolux
argues that “[g]iven the specificity of the Read factors and their applicability to a particular
defendant it would be impossible, not to mention highly unjust, to apply them to any entity that had
not been a party to this litigation.” (Dkt. No. 32, at 18.)
Mondis reasons that ongoing royalties are equitable in nature and a form of injunctive
relief.
In support, Mondis notes that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) explicitly
contemplates not only orders prohibiting specified acts (i.e., an injunction against further
manufacture of infringing goods), but also orders requiring affirmative acts. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(d)(1)(C); cf. Black’s Law Dictionary, 349 (2d Pocket Ed. 2001) (defining “injunction” as “[a]
court order commanding or preventing an action,” and “mandatory injunction’ as “[a]n injunction
that orders an affirmative act or mandates a specified course of conduct”).
There is no question that the Court’s injunctive power under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(d) extends to those in privity with an infringing defendant, including its successors
and assigns. See, e.g., Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., No. 05-cv-463, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30338, *10 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2008) (“As the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have
noted, injunctions may survive the dissolution of a corporation at which the injunction is directed,
and will continue to bind any successors in interest to the original defendant.”) (quoting Additive
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Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 154 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). The
Federal Circuit has specifically recognized that including “successors in interest and assigns” in an
injunction is appropriate where, as here, the defendant intends to sell items used to manufacture
infringing products. Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1581-83 (Fed. Cir.
1986), overruled on other grounds by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana
Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In Kloster, the defendant sold its assets to a non-party
prior to entry of judgment and a permanent injunction. The district court included language in the
injunction binding the defendants and their “successors in interest and assigns.” Id. at 1569,
1581. The Federal Circuit affirmed, over the objection of the non-party successor, noting that
“[c]ourts have repeatedly found privity where, after a suit begins, a nonparty acquires assets of a
defendant-infringer.” Id., at 1583.
Accordingly, the Court must address whether or not the basis for an ongoing royalty is
derived from the injunction power of Rule 65.
After carefully considering the issue, the Court
finds that it does. “Injunctive relief” is not limited to prohibitions against manufacture and sale.
The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the argument that application of Rule 65 is limited to
prohibitory injunctions:
A short answer to petitioners’ argument might appear to be that,
because the Board’s supplemental order to All American required
only reinstatement and backpay, and not that All American cease
and desist from future unlawful activity, no injunctive relief was
ordered, and therefore Rule 65(d) need not be considered. But we
have previously found Rule 65(d) applicable to mandatory
injunctions and have noted that the court of appeals have applied it
“not only to prohibitive injunctions but to enforcement orders and
affirmative decrees as well.”
Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 178 n.4 (1973) (quoting Int’l Longshoremen’s
Assn. v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Assn., 389 U.S. 64, 75 & n.14 (1967)). In many cases,
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injunctions include or govern a requirement of monetary payment. See Innogentics, N.V. v.
Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1381 & n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (vacating permanent injunction in patent
infringement case under eBay, and remanding to the district court to enter “[a]n injunction
delineating the terms of the compulsory license,” and noting that such a compulsory license could
“clearly condition[] the future sales of the infringing products on payment of the running royalty.”)
For these reasons, the Court is persuaded that an award of ongoing royalties is equitable in
nature and exists as a form of injunctive relief that may properly extend to successors and assigns.
While this Court recognizes that applying ongoing royalties to successors and assigns may conflict
to some degree with the principle that royalties are dependent upon the specific positions and
bargaining power of the parties, the Court believes that the alternative of adopting a blanket rule
that ongoing royalty payments terminate when an infringer changes legal status or sells a portion
of its business would eviscerate the purpose of ongoing royalties as a remedy in lieu of a
prohibitory injunction. Otherwise any adjudicated infringer could simply spin-off or sell its
infringing line of business to a competitor and completely avoid that infringing line of business’
obligation to pay ongoing royalties. The failure to extend ongoing royalties to successors and
assigns would in practice make them a nullity, and every first year law student knows that the law
abhors a nullity and demands that such be avoided wherever possible.
Because the ongoing royalties requirement is an equitable remedy and a form of injunctive
relief, it is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), and will bind Innolux and any
persons or companies who are in active concert or participation with Innolux, as well as the
successors and assigns of Innolux’s computer monitor and/or television business.
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f. Discovery Provisions
Mondis asks this Court to allow additional discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(2) on
two discrete issues: (1) the amount of ongoing royalties owed to Mondis and (2) the effect of an
anticipated transaction involving the computer monitor and television business of Innolux.
Innolux counters that the request for additional discovery should be rejected because (1) it is not
timely; (2) it exceeds the scope of allowable discovery; (3) Mondis had a full and fair opportunity
to conduct discovery during the four-year pendency of fact discovery in the 565 case; (4) Mondis’
newly-requested discovery is unnecessary in view of the evidence and serves only to improperly
burden the Court and Innolux; and (5) Mondis’ request seeks information and a ruling in its favor
when a real party in interest – Hon Hai – is excluded from the process.
The purpose of Rule 69 discovery is to identify assets from which a judgment may be
satisfied. Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(2); British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, 200 F.R.D. 586,
589 (W.D. Tex. 2000). Here, Mondis seeks discovery related to additional products that it would
like to include in the on-going royalty base (Innolux’s panels), the business relationship between
Innolux and Hon Hai, and the wind-down of Innolux’s assembly business. The Court finds that
these topics are not related to assets from which a judgment may be satisfied (pursuant to Rule 69),
but rather relate to entirely new claims. Accordingly, Mondis’ request for additional discovery is
denied.
g. Stay the Court’s Ongoing Royalty Award and Posting of Bond
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62 governs the issuance of a stay delaying the execution of a judgment. A
party taking an appeal from the district court is entitled to a stay of any money judgment, “as a
matter of right,” upon posting a supersedeas bond sufficient to secure the judgment. Am. Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Broadcasting-Paramount Theaters, Inc., 87 S. Ct. 1, 3 (Harlan, Circuit Justice
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1966). In this case, however, the parties dispute whether Rule 62 applies in the context of
ongoing royalties.
The Federal Circuit recently ruled that Rule 62 does indeed apply to an award of ongoing
royalties. See ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 2011-1538, 2012 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6764, at *5 (Fed. Cir. April 2, 2012) (“The fact that the district court regarded the
requirement that Verizon make royalty payments during the six-month sunset period as a
necessary condition for temporarily staying the injunction does not alter the fact that the royalty
payments constitute monetary relief that is normally subject to Rule 62(d)”). In light of this
guidance from the Federal Circuit, the Court hereby stays execution of the judgment pending
appeal on the condition that Innolux post a supersedeas bond in compliance with Local Rule
CV-62, within 21 days of this Order, stating unequivocally as a condition of the supersedeas that
the bonding company will make payment in full in U.S. dollars to Mondis in the United States for
the amount of ongoing royalties.
III.
MOTION TO STAY ACTION IN LIGHT OF PARALLEL ITC INVESTIGATION (DKT. NO. 34)
On March 14, 2012, Innolux filed a motion seeking a stay of this action because Mondis
initiated a Section 337 investigation at the International Trade Commission (ITC) against Innolux.
(Dkt. No. 34.) The parties dispute whether the circumstances of this case warrant a mandatory
stay according to 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a). The Court does not reach this question, however, because
Innolux concedes, in its responsive briefing, that this Court may enter a final judgment if it does
not grant Mondis’ request for discovery or to allow Mondis to pursue new inducement and
third-party liability theories asserted in Mondis’ proposed judgment briefing. (Dkt. No. 44.) As
described above, the Court denies Mondis an opportunity to pursue additional discovery in this
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.
matter. Accordingly, Innolux’s Motion to Stay Action in Light of Parallel ITC Investigation is
denied-as-moot.
IV.
CONCLUSION
A Final Judgment consistent with this Opinion & Order is entered contemporaneously
herewith.
SIGNED this 19th day of December, 2011.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 30th day of April, 2012.
____________________________________
RODNEY GILSTRAP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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