Capozelli et al v. Allstate Insurance Company, et al
Filing
51
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION ORDER - Karri-Ann Capozzelli terminated.Signed by Judge Rodney Gilstrap on 02/24/2014. (nkl, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
MARK A. CAPOZZELLI
and KARRI-ANN CAPOZZELLI
Plaintiffs,
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY and ENCOMPASS
INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA,
Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-00260-JRG
§
§
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Allstate Insurance Company’s (“Allstate”) 1 Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs Mark Capozzelli and Kari-Ann Capozzelli’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) claims
against Allstate pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
(Dkt. No. 20.)
Having considered the parties’ written submissions, the Court
GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Allstate’s Motion.
I.
Background
Plaintiffs, a married couple, filed the original complaint against Defendants, alleging
disability discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act
1
Defendant Encompass Insurance Company of America (“Encompass”) is allegedly a division of All State Insurance
Company.
1
(“TCHRA”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Mark Capozzelli, the husband, was employed by Allstate as an
insurance adjuster starting in January, 1997. In 2010, Mr. Capozzelli allegedly suffered from
heart problems, went through a triple bypass surgery and was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease.
On March 7, 2011, Mark Capozzelli’s employment with Allstate was terminated in a telephone
conference between himself and his supervisors. Mr. Capozzelli subsequently filed a charge of
disability discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
accusing Allstate of violating the ADA. The Dallas EEOC completed its investigation and
dismissed Mr. Capozzelli’s charge of discrimination on January 15, 2013.
It issued Mr.
Capozzelli a notice of the right to file a civil action on the same day.
In this case, upon a first motion to dismiss filed by Allstate, Plaintiffs amended the original
complaint, dropping the FMLA and the retaliation claims, and pleading, in the alternative, a
common-law wrongful termination claim. (See Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 18.) Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint presents two theories of recovery under the ADA and the TCHRA: Plaintiffs
first allege that Allstate/Encompass discriminated against and subsequently discharged Mark
Capozzelli as a result of his alleged disability, despite his ability to perform his job functions at
Allstate/Encompass (the “employment discrimination claim”), see 42 U.S. § 12112(b)(1);
Plaintiffs further allege that Allstate has refused to extend “reasonable accommodation” to Mark
Capozzelli’s alleged disability, by rejecting his request to have Karri-Ann Capozzelli drive him to
his job assignments (the “reasonable accommodation claim”), see 42 U.S. § 12112(b)(5). (See
Dkt. No. 18 at ¶ 28.) Thereafter, Allstate filed a second motion to dismiss directed at Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).2
2
By this motion, Allstate moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ ADA and TCHRA claims under 12(b)(1), or alternatively under
12(b)(6), for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. As explained subsequently, this Court follows Fifth Circuit
authorities which treat failure to exhaust administrative remedies as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, and
accordingly adjudicates Allstate’s request to dismiss Plaintiffs’ ADA and TCHRA claims under Rule 12(b)(1).
2
II.
Applicable Law
Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to
challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Lack of
subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2)
the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts. Ramming v.
United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Barrera–Montenegro v. United States, 74
F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)). The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on
the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. Accordingly, “the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of
proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Id. (citing Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d
507, 511 (5th Cir.1980)).
III.
Analysis
Here, Allstate argues that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for
two reasons: First, Plaintiff Karri-Ann Capozzelli lacks standing to bring claims against Allstate
under the ADA and the TCHRA; and second, Plaintiff Mark Capozzelli has failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies for his ADA and TCHRA claims. The Court now addresses each of
these arguments in turn.
a. Plaintiff Karri-Ann Capozzelli Lacks Standing to Bring Claims Against
Allstate Under the ADA and the TCHRA
Plaintiff Karri-Ann Capozzelli’s claims are premised on allegations contained in Count I
for Disability Discrimination under the ADA and the TCHRA. (See Dkt. No. 18 at ¶ 29.)
Plaintiffs allege that as a “direct and proximate result” of Allstate’s alleged discriminating
conduct, both Mark and Karri-Ann Capozzelli have suffered damages including loss of back pay,
front pay, loss of benefits, etc. It is undisputed that Karri-Ann Capozzelli had no employment
3
relationship with Allstate, nor has she herself been discriminated against.
Plaintiffs’ sole
argument supporting Karri-Ann Capozzelli’s standing is based on her purported community
property interest in Mark Capozzelli’s lost wages and job related benefits. (See Dkt. No. 21 at 4.)
In every federal case, the party bringing the suit must establish standing to prosecute the
action. Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). The jurisprudence of
standing contains two strands: Article III standing, which enforces the Constitution’s
case-or-controversy requirement; and prudential standing, which embodies “judicially
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction,” including “the general prohibition on a
litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights…and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint
fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Id. at 11-12. Lack of standing is
a defect in subject matter jurisdiction, and may be raised at any time by a party or the court.
Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan, 883 F.2d 345, 348 (5th Cir.
1989).
In the context of employment discrimination, a plaintiff lacks standing to state a viable
claim, under either the ADA or TCHRA, where the plaintiff is not in an employment relationship
with, or an applicant for employment with, the defendant. See Brennan v. Mercedes Benz USA,
388 F.3d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court’s granting of summary judgment on
student’s ADA claims against school because no employment relationship existed between them);
Ridgway’s, Inc. v. Payne, 853 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Ct. App. Tex. 1993) (holding that spouse lacked
standing in her individual capacity to bring suit of age discrimination under TCHRA, because
“[o]nly the person whose primary legal right has been breached may seek redress for that injury.”)
(citing Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex. 1976)); see also Patton v. United Parcel
Service, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1250, 1278 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (“[S]pouses of individuals who have been
4
victimized by employment discrimination cannot be said to fall within the class of persons Title
VII or TCHRA was intended to protect.”)
Here, Plaintiff Karri-Ann Capozzelli was never employed by Allstate, nor did she at any
time apply for employment with Allstate. Her only connection with this case is through her
community property interest which is solely derived from her marriage with Mark Capozzelli, who
was allegedly victimized by Allstate’s discriminating conduct. Plaintiffs have failed to cite to,
and this Court is unaware of, any authority holding that a marital relationship alone affords a
litigant standing to sue in federal court for employment discrimination directed at his or her
spouse. To the contrary, the case law is clear that, absent an actual or potential employment
relationship with the defendant, a spousal plaintiff lacks standing to state a viable ADA or TCHRA
claim. See Brennan, 388 F.3d at 135. Therefore, Plaintiff Karri-Ann Capozzelli lacks standing
to bring employment discrimination claims against Allstate based on the alleged discriminating
conduct directed at her husband. The Court accordingly DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE
Plaintiff Karri-Ann Capozzelli from this case.3
b. Plaintiff Mark Capozzelli Has Not Exhausted The Administrative
Remedies For His Reasonable Accommodation Claim Under the ADA
Allstate next argues that Plaintiffs’ reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA
should be dismissed, because Mark Capozzelli has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
by asserting such claim in a charge of discrimination. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Capozzelli did
exhaust the administrative remedies because his EEOC charge included the phrase “reasonable
accommodation.”
3
Plaintiff Karri-Ann Capozzelli has not asserted her community property interest in the lost wages under the common
law wrongful discharge claim. (See Dkt. No. 18 at 8-9.) Even if she did, however, Plaintiffs have failed to provide
any authority holding that a litigant secures standing to sue based solely on the alleged wrongful discharge of his/her
spouse. Cf. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 12 (holding that the prudential standing requirement embodies “the general
prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights.”).
5
It is axiomatic within the Fifth Circuit that a complainant must first have exhausted his
administrative remedies before filing a civil action under the ADA. See Tolbert v. United States,
916 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1990) (examining a Title VII claim); see also Atkins v. Kempthorne,
353 F. App’x 934, 936 (5th Cir. 2009) (same) (citing Tolbert, 916 F.2d at 247). Failure to comply
with this requirement deprives the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
Tolbert, 916 F.2d at 247 (citing Brown v. Dept. of Army, 854 F.2d 77, 78 (5th Cir. 1988); Porter v.
Adams, 639 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1981)). The requirement that a complainant must first
exhaust the administrative remedies, “broadly speaking, in effect limits the civil action to that
range of issues that would have been the subject matter of the conciliation efforts between the
EEOC and the employer.” Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 467 (5th Cir. 1970).
In other words, “the scope of the judicial complaint is limited to the scope of the EEOC
investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Id.
at 466.
Therefore, to determine whether Plaintiff Mark Capozzelli has exhausted the
administrative remedies for his reasonable accommodation claim, the Court must determine
whether such claim is within the scope of the EEOC investigation which “can reasonably be
expected to grow out of” Mr. Capozzelli’s charge of discrimination. Id.
Here, Mr. Capozzelli filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in June 2011, three
months after his employment with Allstate was terminated. (See Dkt. No. 21-1) The charge of
discrimination primarily centered around an alleged phone conversation between Mr. Capozzelli
and his supervisor that preceded his employment termination, as well as Mr. Capozzelli’s physical
conditions that rendered him a “qualified individual” under the ADA. (See Dkt. No. 21.) In the
charge, Mr. Capozzelli accused Allstate of violating the ADA, “in that it is unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability.” (Dkt. No. 21-1 at 3.)
6
Specifically, while “Mr. Capozzelli’s physical or mental disabilities in no way diminish his right to
fully participate in all aspects of society…he has been precluded from doing so as he has a
disability, has been regarded as having a disability, and been subjected to discrimination.” (Id. at
3-4.) The phrase “reasonable accommodation” appears only once in the charge, where Mr.
Capozzelli was described as “a qualified individual with disability inasmuch as he is able, with or
without reasonable accommodation, not just to perform, but to excel in the essential functions of”
his position.4 (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff argues that he had presented a reasonable accommodation claim to the EEOC by
including the term “reasonable accommodation” in the charge of discrimination. This Court
disagrees. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(3), each charge should contain “[a] clear and concise
statement of the facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment
practices.” While the administrative charge, rarely drawn by an attorney, must be viewed “in its
broadest reasonable sense,”
“the only absolutely essential element of a timely charge of
discrimination is the allegation of fact contained therein.” Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 463, 467. In this
case, Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation claim is based on the factual allegation that he had
asked for and had been denied permission to have Karri-Ann Capozzelli drive him to job
assignments, as a reasonable accommodation to his alleged disability. (See Dkt. No. 18 at ¶¶ 17,
28.) Such factual allegation, however, appears nowhere in Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination.
Absent the underlying factual allegation, a passing reference to the phrase “reasonable
accommodation” fails to establish a claim that Allstate refused to accommodate Mr. Capozzelli’s
disability. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(3); Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 463. In other words, Plaintiff’s
charge has failed to put the EEOC on notice about Allstate’s alleged failure to accommodate, and
4
The cited language is the statutory definition of “qualified individual” under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
7
the need to investigate the same. Id. at 463, 466. Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation claim
therefore falls outside “the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to
grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Id. at 466. Such claim must be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, because it has never been properly presented to the EEOC. See id.;
Tolbert, 916 F.2d at 247.
c. Plaintiff’s Reasonable Accommodation Claim Should be Dismissed
Without Prejudice
A claim for discrimination under the ADA may be dismissed without prejudice for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies, when Plaintiff can still cure the defect by amending the
complaint. See Paulino v. United States, 5:08-CV-110, 2010 WL 3339227, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar.
4, 2010) report and recommendation adopted, 5:08-CV-110, 2010 WL 3339234 (E.D. Tex. Aug.
23, 2010). Here, because EEOC investigation is a prerequisite to filing a civil action, whether or
not Plaintiff can cure the defect of failure to exhaust hinges on his ability to present the reasonable
accommodation claim to the EEOC.
Pursuant to 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–5, Plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 180
days (or 300 days when complainant has initially instituted proceedings with a state or local
agency) after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. See Howe v. Yellowbook, USA,
840 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (N.D. Tex. 2011). Allstate’s alleged failure to accommodate took place
no later than March 7, 2011, when Plaintiff Mark Capozzelli was terminated. (See Dkt. No. 18 at
¶ 23.) Having failed to raise the reasonable accommodation claim in his original charge of
discrimination, Plaintiff is now time-barred to file a new charge with the EEOC based on such
claim.
Plaintiff can only attempt to present the reasonable accommodation claim to the EEOC by
amending his original charge of discrimination. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (“A charge may be
8
amended to cure technical defects or omissions ... or to clarify and amplify allegations made
therein. Such amendments ... related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge
will relate back to the date the charge was first received.”). Several district courts within the Fifth
Circuit have held that an EEOC charge cannot be amended where, as here, the EEOC has
terminated the processing of a plaintiff’s charge, issued a right-to-sue letter, and the plaintiff has
filed a civil action. See, e.g., Hazeur v. Fed. Warranty Serv. Corp., No. 99–3156, 2000 WL
365013, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 7, 2000) (holding that in such circumstances, there is “no longer a
viable charge pending before the EEOC that is capable of amendment.”) (citing Balazs v.
Liebenthal, 32 F.3d 151, 157 (4th Cir. 1994)); Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC, 1:10CV24-A-D,
2010 WL 5232523, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010). However, the Fifth Circuit has not
specifically taken up or spoken to this issue. Moreover, while the issuance of a notice of right to
sue generally terminates any further proceeding on a complainant’s charge of discrimination, the
EEOC has the authority to further process the charge if it has determined that doing so “would
effectuate the purpose of…the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28. Given the absence of direct
authority from the Fifth Circuit, and the possibility that the EEOC may further process Mr.
Capozzelli’s charge pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 “to effectuate the purpose of…the ADA,” this
Court is reluctant to hold, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff is forever precluded from asserting the
reasonable accommodation claim before the EEOC, or that the defect of failure to exhaust cannot
be cured in this case. To do so would essentially amount to this Court, and not the EEOC, making
a determination that such an amendment would not effectuate the purpose or policy of the ADA.
The EEOC is in the best position to make this determination in a fair and reasonable way.
Therefore, the Court DISMISSES
WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s reasonable
accommodation claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff may re-file such
9
claim if and when the EEOC has allowed an amendment to his existing charge of discrimination
and then made a final determination on such amended claim.
d. Plaintiff Mark Capozzelli Has Failed to Exhaust the Administrative
Remedies For His TCHRA Claims
Like the ADA, the TCHRA also imposes on complainants a requirement to first exhaust
the state administrative remedies and to obtain a right to sue letter from the Texas Commission on
Human Rights (“TCHR”), before filing a civil action. See Jones v. Grinnell Corp., 235 F.3d 972,
975 (5th Cir. 2001).
The Fifth Circuit has held that an EEOC right to sue letter is not
interchangeable with a TCHR right to sue letter for purpose of filing a civil action. Id. at 974-75.
In this case, Plaintiff never alleged that he had filed a complaint with TCHR, much less
obtained a TCHR right to sue letter. Plaintiff cannot state a viable claim under the TCHRA
against Allstate, because he has not exhausted the state administrative remedies. See id. at 975.
Unlike the curable failure to exhaust under the ADA, here Plaintiff cannot cure the defect of failure
to exhaust under the TCHRA, because he never filed any complaint with the TCHR and the statute
of limitations for filing a TCHR complaint has run. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.202(a); Specialty
Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. 1996) (“Texas law requires that a
complaint of unlawful employment practices be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission or the Texas Commission on Human Rights within 180 days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims under the TCHRA are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
e. Plaintiff Mark Capozzelli’s Employment Discrimination Claim Under The
ADA And Common Law Claim For Wrongful Termination Properly
Remain in This Case
As noted above, aside from the reasonable accommodation claim, Plaintiff has additionally
asserted an employment discrimination claim under the ADA. Plaintiff alleges that Allstate
10
discriminated against and subsequently discharged him “as a result of his disability, record of said
disability, or because Defendants regarded him as disabled,” despite his ability to perform his job
functions at Allstate. (See Dkt. No. 18 at ¶ 28.) Plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim
falls squarely within the scope of the EEOC charge of discrimination. (See Dkt. No. 21.) A
notice of right to sue has also been issued for such claim. Therefore, Plaintiff has exhausted the
administrative remedies with respect to the employment discrimination claim, and such claim is
properly before this Court. Defendant has recognized such by not seeking dismissal in this
regard.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also pleads, in the alternative, a common law
wrongful termination claim, based on his alleged refusal to commit an illegal act. (See Dkt. No.
18 at 8-9.) Allstate has not moved to dismiss this alternative claim.5
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART
Allstate’s Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Karri-Ann Capozzelli is
hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this case due to her lack of standing. Plaintiff
Mark Capozzelli’s TCHRA claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Plaintiff Mark Capozzelli’s ADA claims, insofar as they are premised
on Allstate’s alleged failure to make reasonable accommodation, are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and he may seek an amendment of
his existing charge of discrimination with the EEOC in this regard. Plaintiff Mark Capozzelli’s
employment discrimination claim under the ADA and his common-law wrongful termination
5
Allstate argues that “Plaintiff cannot state a claim for retaliation under the ADA or the TCHRA because he has failed
to exhaust administrative remedies.” (Dkt. No. 20 at 8.) Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, however, does not include
a claim for retaliation under the ADA or the TCHRA. Any such retaliation claim was abandoned when Plaintiff
amended his complaint and dropped the same.
11
claim remain in place and ongoing in this case.
So Ordered and Signed on this
Feb 24, 2014
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?