Rockstar Consortium US LP et al v. Google Inc

Filing 285

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Signed by Judge Rodney Gilstrap on 11/18/2014. (ch, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
ROCKSTAR CONSORTIUM US LP, et al.
v.
GOOGLE INC.

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Case No. 2:13-CV-893-JRG-RSP

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Google’s “Objections to the Magistrate’s Memorandum
Opinion and Order Denying Google’s Motion to Transfer Venue” (“Objections”) (Dkt. No. 188).
In the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Google’s Motion to
Transfer Venue (“Memorandum Opinion”) (Dkt. No. 165), the Magistrate Judge issued an order
denying Google’s Motion to Transfer Venue (Dkt. No. 18). After reviewing Defendant’s
objections to the Memorandum Opinion, and finding no part of the order to be “clearly erroneous
or contrary to law,”1 Google’s request for reconsideration of the Memorandum Opinion is
DENIED.
In its objections, Google argues the Memorandum Opinion improperly found both the
private and public interest factors weighed against transfer. (Objections at 2–5.) Further, Google
argues the findings of the Federal Circuit in a recently issued mandamus order2 regarding certain
motions to stay support its contention that the Magistrate Judge’s findings were contrary to the
law. (Reply at 1.) The Court disagrees.
This Court observes that the Magistrate Judge’s opinion weighed the relevant transfer
factors and correctly determined that Google failed to meet its burden by demonstrating to the
Court that the Northern District of California was “clearly more convenient” than the Eastern
1

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a).

2

In re Google, No. 2014-147 (“Mandamus Order”).

District of Texas, as required by In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir.
2008) (en banc). Moreover, the Magistrate Judge’s opinions expressed in the Memorandum
Opinion were neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to the law within the context of the findings
of the Mandamus Order Google relies upon in its briefing. For example, Google cites to portions
of the Mandamus Order discussing the relative weight courts typically ascribe to attorneys as
witnesses in the transfer analysis. (Reply at 2); see Mandamus Order at 8 (citing In re Horseshoe
Entm’t, 337 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2003); Solomon v. Cont’l Am. Life Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 1043 (3d
Cir. 1973); and Jack C. Keir, Inc. v Life Office Mgmt. Ass’n, Inc., No. 92-6163, 1993 WL
283902 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 1993)). Specifically, Google argues that the attorneys Rockstar relies
upon should be given little to no weight in the transfer analysis in light of the Federal Circuit’s
findings. (Reply at 3.) The Court observes, however, that even assuming these witnesses are to
be accorded little to no weight as Google suggests,3 Google has still failed to meet its burden by
demonstrating that the Northern District of California was “clearly more convenient” based upon
the limited information Google provided in its briefing.
It is ultimately Google’s burden to demonstrate that the Northern District of California is
“clearly more convenient” than the Eastern District of Texas. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545
F.3d at 315. The Magistrate Judge cited multiple instances throughout the Memorandum Opinion
that called into question the veracity and completeness of the evidence Google marshalled to
justify transfer. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion at 12 and 15–16. For example, Google
disregards the presence of entities and witnesses within this district in its own analysis. (Reply at
3

The Court notes that the significance of the Rockstar attorneys in the instant suit differs
substantially from their significance in In re Google in that the record before the Court in this
case supports Rockstar’s contention that Google served production requests on several of the
attorneys as third parties to the instant suit. (Reply at 3.) Nevertheless, for the purposes of this
Order, the Court endeavored to re-balance the factors by according little to no weight to these
attorneys consistent with the Federal Circuit’s findings in its Mandamus Order.

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3.) Specifically, Google’s briefing discounts certain entities that have actually produced
documents in response to Google’s discovery requests in the instant suit. (Objections at 2 n.3);
see also (Sur-Reply at 3) (citing entities located within this district that have produced
documents in response to Google’s subpoenas directed to those entities’ offices in or near this
district). Indeed, this information is relevant to the transfer analysis.
Without having a clear account of the facts regarding witnesses both within and outside
of the transferor and transferee venues, Google has not, and cannot, meet its burden. Given the
record before the Magistrate Judge—and even assuming Rockstar’s four attorney witnesses
should be discounted from the analysis as Google suggests—the Court finds the Memorandum
Opinion correctly concluded that Google failed to meet its burden under Fifth Circuit and

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Federal Circuit precedent. See, e.g., In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In
re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2004).
Because the findings of the Magistrate Judge were neither clearly erroneous nor contrary
to the law, the Court need not modify or set aside any part of the Memorandum Opinion in light
of Google’s objections. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). Accordingly, Google’s request for
reconsideration of the Memorandum Opinion should be, and is hereby, DENIED.

SIGNED this 19th day of December, 2011.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 18th day of November, 2014.

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RODNEY GILSTRAP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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