Davis v. GECESC Associates LLC

Filing 20

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Rodney Gilstrap on 1/23/2015. (ch, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION

CHELSEA L. DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.

GECESC ASSOCIATES LLC,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-cv-01065

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Defendant GECESP Associates, LLC’s (“Defendant” or “GECESP”)
Motion to Dismiss the Title VII Complaint (“ Pl.’s Compl.”) filed by Plaintiff Chelsea L. Davis
(“Davis”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Davis’s Response (Dkt. No. 18)
to Defendant’s Motion did not address any of the issues presented by Defendant’s Motion. For
the reasons set forth below, the Defendant’s Motion (Dkt. No. 13) is GRANTED and it is
ORDERED that Davis’s claims as set forth in her Complaint are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
This is the eleventh action that Chelsea Davis has filed over the last 16 months relating to
her brief employment with the law firm of McKool Smith. P.C. The current Defendant,
GECESP, is a limited liability company associated with McKool Smith. Davis was never
employed by GECESP nor did she ever have any kind of business relationship with GECESP.
Despite this, Davis now alleges that GECESP violated her civil rights. See Pl. Compl. at ¶ 1, Dkt.
No. 1.
Previously, Davis filed suit against McKool Smith in the 298th Judicial District Court of

Dallas County, Texas (the “State Court Judgment”) asserting various claims arising out of her
employment with McKool Smith. Dkt. No. 13-3. The State Court concluded that “Davis’s
abuse of the judicial system through the filing of groundless pleadings and motions for an
improper purpose, and her bad faith and harassing actions and misconduct detailed by the
evidence, threaten the integrity of the judicial system, and demonstrate her flagrant bad faith and
callous disregard for court orders.” Dkt. No. 13-3. As a result, her action was dismissed. Id.
Undeterred, Davis then filed two more lawsuits in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, asserting the same violations of Title VII, FSLA, and § 1981. In the
first action (“First Northern District Judgment”), United States District Judge Godbey dismissed
Davis’s claims, holding that the State Court Judgment was res judicata. Dkt. No. 13-7. In the
second action (“Second Northern District Judgment”), Judge Godbey again dismissed Davis’s
claims (which this time were filed against GECESP and McKool Smith), and entered final
judgment against Davis for a second time on res judicata grounds. Dkt. No. 13-11.
AUTHORITY
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents a party from litigating claims that either were or
should have been litigated in a prior suit. Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559,
571 (5th Cir. 2005), cert denied, 547 U.S. 1055 (2006). Res judicata is intended to, among other
things, “bring an end to litigation, prevent vexatious litigation, … [and] promote judicial
economy.” Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 445 (Tex. 2007).
Under both federal and Texas law, res judicata applies when the following elements are
satisfied: (1) a prior final judgment on the merits has been entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) the prior case involved the same parties or those in privity with them; and (3) the
same claim or cause of action is involved in both cases. Ellis v. Amex Life Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 935,
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937 (federal); Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. Grp., Inc., 250 S.W.3d 78, 86 (Tex. 2008) (state).
ARGUMENT
Davis’s claims against GECESP, before this Court, are barred by res judicata, for multiple
reasons.
First, the Second Northern District Judgment expressly dismissed, with prejudice, Davis’s
Title VII, FLSA, and § 1981 claims against GECESP. These claims are the same claims pled in
this action against the same defendant. Ex., Pl.’s Compl. at ¶¶ 9–25. When a prior court enters a
dismissal “with prejudice,” this constitutes an adjudication on the merits for res judicata purposes.
Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993). Accordingly,
Davis is precluded by the Second Northern District Judgment from re-litigating her claims against
GECESP.
Second, Davis’s claims are barred based on the State Court Judgment and the First
Northern District Judgment. Davis clearly alleges that GECESP is in privity with McKool Smith
by alleging, for example, that GECESP is liable for the conduct of McKool Smith. See Pl.’s
Compl. at ¶ 3 (“GECES[P] Associates LLC is a common employer of Chelsea Davis and may be
held liable independently or as an obligor for the conduct of McKool Smith P.C. and its
partners, employees and shareholders.”) Under either Texas or federal law, res judicata applies
to the face of Davis’s complaint, which shows that all three elements—namely, (1) a prior final
judgment on the merits has been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the prior case
involved the same parties or those in privity with them; and (3) the same claim or cause of action is
involved in both cases—are alleged by Davis. Ellis, 211 F.3d at 937 (federal); Igal, 250 S.W.3d at
86 (Tex. 2008) (state). Therefore, Davis is barred from bringing these claims by the State Court
Judgment and the First Northern District Judgment, as well. Id.
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Finally, Davis appears to assert a claim for wrongful injunction under 42 U.S.C. §§1981–
83. See Pl.’s Compl. at ¶¶ 26–30. This claim is barred on the same grounds as noted above, but
even assuming that it was not, Davis has failed to plead any factual matter sufficient to state such a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ascroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Her
asserted claims are simply unintelligible.
Davis, as a licensed and practicing attorney, should have been aware of the facts and law
noted above. Accordingly, this Court holds her to a higher standard than it does a typical pro se
plaintiff. Davis is forewarned—as she was in other federal courts in Texas—that if she continues
to file frivolous pleadings in this District, she risks imposition of harsh sanctions up to and
including sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and being barred from
filing future cases and notices of removal in the Eastern District of Texas. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
(providing that the presentation to the court of a pleading, written motion, or other paper by a party
constitutes a certification that, to the best of the person’s knowledge, (1) it is not being presented
for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the
cost of litigation; (2) the claims are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; and (3) the factual
contentions have evidentiary support or will likely have such support upon further investigation).
For the forgoing reasons, the Court ORDERS that Davis’s claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
CONCLUSION
Davis’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. In addition, any and all further
relief requested by Davis in this action is DENIED, including Davis’s request for a refund. (Dkt.
No. 19).
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SIGNED this 19th day of December, 2011.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 23rd day of January, 2015.

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RODNEY GILSTRAP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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