Hitachi Maxell, Ltd. v. Top Victory Electronics (Taiwan) Co Ltd et al

Filing 78

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER -. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roy S. Payne on 11/10/2015. (ch, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
HITACHI MAXELL, LTD.,
Plaintiff,

v.
TOP VICTORY ELECTRONICS
(TAIWAN) CO. LTD., TPV INT’L (USA),
INC., ENVISION PERIPHERALS, INC.,
TOP VICTORY ELECTRONICS (FUJIAN)
CO. LTD., TPV ELECTRONICS (FUJIAN)
CO. LTD., TPV TECHNOLOGY LTD.,
AND TPV DISPLAY TECHNOLOGY
(XIAMEN) CO., LTD.

Case No. 2:14-cv-01121-JRG-RSP

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the opening claim construction brief of Hitachi Maxell, Ltd. (“Plaintiff”)
(Dkt. No. 53, filed on August 26, 2015),1 the response of Top Victory Electronics (Taiwan) Co. Ltd.,
TPV International (USA), Inc., Envision Peripherals, Inc., Top Victory Electronics (Fujian) Co. Ltd.,
TPV Electronics (Fujian) Co. Ltd., TPV Technology Ltd., and TPV Display Technology (Xiamen)
Co., Ltd. (collectively, “Defendants”) (Dkt. No. 58, filed under seal on September 9, 2015), and the
reply of Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 60, filed on September 16, 2015). The Court held a hearing on the issues
of claim construction and claim definiteness on October 7, 2015. Having considered the arguments
and evidence presented by the parties at the hearing and in their briefing, the Court issues this Order.

1

In this order, citations to the parties’ filings in this case are to the filing’s number in the docket
(Dkt. No.) and pin cites are to the page numbers assigned through ECF.
1

Table of Contents
I. 

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 3 

II. 

LEGAL PRINCIPLES ..................................................................................................... 4 

III. 

CONSTRUCTION OF AGREED TERMS .................................................................... 4 

IV. 

CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS ............................................................... 16 

A.  The ’412 Patent – “input picture signal”........................................................................... 16 
B.  The ’197 Patent – The “video processor sections” Terms ................................................ 24 
C.  The ’366 Patent ................................................................................................................. 31 

V. 

1.  The “mounting side” Terms ........................................................................................ 31 
2.  The “horizontal direction” Terms ............................................................................... 44 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 48 

2

I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges infringement of U.S. Patents No. 6,037,995 (the “’995 Patent”), No.

6,144,412 (the “’412 Patent”), No. 6,388,713 (the “’713 Patent”), No. 7,924,366 (the “’366
Patent”), No. 8,009,375 (the “’375 Patent”), and No. 8,913,197 (the “’197 Patent”) (collectively,
the “Asserted Patents”).
In general, the Asserted Patents are directed to systems and methods for displaying or
processing picture signals. The ’995 Patent is entitled “BROADCASTING AND
COMMUNICATION RECEIVER APPARATUS.” It issued on March 14, 2000 and claims
priority to a Japanese patent application filed on April 19, 1996. The ’412 Patent is entitled
“METHOD AND CIRCUIT FOR SIGNAL PROCESSING OF FORMAT CONVERSION OF
PICTURE SIGNAL.” It issued on November 7, 2000 and claims priority to a Japanese patent
application filed October 15, 1996. The ’713 Patent is entitled “IMAGE DISPLAY
APPARATUS, AND METHOD TO PREVENT OR LIMIT USER ADJUSTMENT OF
DISPLAYED IMAGE QUALITY.” It issued on May 14, 2002 and claims priority to a Japanese
patent application filed on July 14, 1997. The ’366 Patent is entitled “IMAGE DISPLAYING
APPARATUS.” It issued on April 12, 2011 and claims priority to Japanese patent applications
filed on September 28, 2007. The ’375 Patent is entitled “APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR
RECEIVING AND RECORDING DIGITAL INFORMATION.” It issued on August 30, 2011
and claims priority to Japanese patent applications filed as early as July 6, 1990. The ’197 Patent
is entitled “DIGITAL BROADCAST RECEIVER UNIT.” It issued on December 16, 2014 and
claims priority to a Japanese application filed on August 21, 1997.
The Court has previously considered the ’995 Patent, the ’412 Patent, the ’713 Patent,
and the ’375 Patent, and construed claims from those patents. Hitachi Consumer Elecs. Co. v.

3

Top Victory Elecs. (Taiwan) Co., et al., No. 2:10-cv-260-JRG, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162106
(E.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2012). In that same proceeding, the Court considered two patents related to
the ’197 Patent, namely, U.S. Patent No. 6,549,243 (the “’243 Patent”) and U.S. Patent No.
7,889,281 (the “’281 Patent”). The ’197 Patent is related to the ’243 Patent and to the ’281 Patent
through a series of continuation applications, and therefore shares a substantially identical
specification, apart from the claims.
II.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. Claim Construction
“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention

to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start
by considering the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1313; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388
F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc.,
262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the
specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at
861. The general rule—subject to certain specific exceptions discussed infra—is that each claim
term is construed according to its ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d
at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Azure
Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“There is a heavy
presumption that claim terms carry their accustomed meaning in the relevant community at the
relevant time.”) (vacated on other grounds).

4

“The claim construction inquiry . . . begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of
the claim.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
“[I]n all aspects of claim construction, ‘the name of the game is the claim.’” Apple Inc. v.
Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998). First, a term’s context in the asserted claim can be instructive. Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1314. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the claim’s
meaning, because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id.
Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For
example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that
the independent claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314–15.
“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id.
(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am.
Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But, “‘[a]lthough the specification may aid the
court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments and
examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.’” Comark
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v.
Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1323. “[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the
specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the

5

intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v.
Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim
construction because, like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the
PTO and the inventor understood the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. However, “because the
prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather
than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is
less useful for claim construction purposes.” Id. at 1318; see also Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v.
Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (ambiguous prosecution history may be
“unhelpful as an interpretive resource”).
Although extrinsic evidence can also be useful, it is “‘less significant than the intrinsic
record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1317 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a
court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might
use claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too
broad or may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly,
expert testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining
the particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert’s conclusory, unsupported
assertions as to a term’s definition are entirely unhelpful to a court. Id. Generally, extrinsic
evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read
claim terms.” Id. The Supreme Court recently explained the role of extrinsic evidence in claim
construction:
In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s
intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for
6

example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art
during the relevant time period. See, e.g., Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 546
(1871) (a patent may be “so interspersed with technical terms and terms of art that
the testimony of scientific witnesses is indispensable to a correct understanding of
its meaning”). In cases where those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will
need to make subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic evidence. These are
the “evidentiary underpinnings” of claim construction that we discussed in
Markman, and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on
appeal.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
B. Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term
There are “only two exceptions to [the] general rule”2 that claim terms are construed
according to their plain and ordinary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts
as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term
either in the specification or during prosecution.” Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758
F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d
1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d
1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he specification and prosecution history only compel departure
from the plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal.”). The standards for
finding lexicography or disavowal are “exacting.” GE Lighting Solutions, 750 F.3d at 1309.
To act as his own lexicographer, the patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the
disputed claim term,” and “clearly express an intent to define the term.” Id. (quoting Thorner,
669 F.3d at 1365); see also Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. The patentee’s lexicography must
appear “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249.
To disavow or disclaim the full scope of a claim term, the patentee’s statements in the
specification or prosecution history must amount to a “clear and unmistakable” surrender. Cordis
2

Some cases have characterized other principles of claim construction as “exceptions” to the general rule,
such as the statutory requirement that a means-plus-function term is construed to cover the corresponding
structure disclosed in the specification. See, e.g., CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1367.

7

Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Thorner, 669 F.3d at
1366 (“The patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed
meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or
restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.”) “Where an applicant’s statements are
amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and unmistakable.”
3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
C. Functional Claiming and 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (pre-AIA) / § 112(f) (AIA) 3
A patent claim may be expressed using functional language. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6;
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347–49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in
relevant portion). Section 112, Paragraph 6, provides that a structure may be claimed as a “means
. . . for performing a specified function” and that an act may be claimed as a “step for performing
a specified function.” Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
But § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply to all functional claim language. There is a rebuttable
presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies when the claim language includes “means” or “step for”
terms, and that it does not apply in the absence of those terms. Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326;
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. The presumption stands or falls according to whether one of
ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim with the functional language, in the context
of the entire specification, to denote sufficiently definite structure or acts for performing the
function. See Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 2014-1218, 2015 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15767, at *10 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 4, 2015) (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when “the claim
language, read in light of the specification, recites sufficiently definite structure” (quotation
marks omitted) (citing Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349; Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769
3

Because the applications resulting in the asserted patents were filed before September 16, 2012,
the effective date of the America Invents Act (“AIA”), the Court refers to the pre-AIA version of
§ 112.
8

F.3d 1094, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2014))); Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply
when “the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have
sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure”); Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326 (§ 112,
¶ 6 does not apply when the claim includes an “act” corresponding to “how the function is
performed”); Personalized Media Communications, L.L.C. v. International Trade Commission,
161 F.3d 696, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when the claim includes
“sufficient structure, material, or acts within the claim itself to perform entirely the recited
function . . . even if the claim uses the term ‘means.’” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
When it applies, § 112, ¶ 6 limits the scope of the functional term “to only the structure,
materials, or acts described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and
equivalents thereof.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347. Construing a means-plus-function limitation
involves multiple steps. “The first step . . . is a determination of the function of the means-plusfunction limitation.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303,
1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “[T]he next step is to determine the corresponding structure disclosed in
the specification and equivalents thereof.” Id. A “structure disclosed in the specification is
‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or
associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Id. The focus of the “corresponding
structure” inquiry is not merely whether a structure is capable of performing the recited function,
but rather whether the corresponding structure is “clearly linked or associated with the [recited]
function.” Id. The corresponding structure “must include all structure that actually performs the
recited function.” Default Proof Credit Card Sys. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d 1291,
1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005). However, § 112 does not permit “incorporation of structure from the

9

written description beyond that necessary to perform the claimed function.” Micro Chem., Inc. v.
Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
For mean-plus-function limitations implemented by a programmed general purpose
computer or microprocessor, the corresponding structure described in the patent specification
must include an algorithm for performing the function. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech.,
184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The corresponding structure is not a general purpose
computer but rather the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed
algorithm. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
D. Definiteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (pre-AIA) / § 112(b) (AIA) 4
Patent claims must particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded
as the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. A claim, when viewed in light of the intrinsic evidence,
must “inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”
Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). If it does not, the claim
fails § 112, ¶ 2 and is therefore invalid as indefinite. Id. at 2124. Whether a claim is indefinite is
determined from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art as of the time the application
for the patent was filed. Id. at 2130. As it is a challenge to the validity of a patent, the failure of
any claim in suit to comply with § 112 must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at
2130 n.10. “[I]ndefiniteness is a question of law and in effect part of claim construction.” ePlus,
Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 517 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
When a term of degree is used in a claim, “the court must determine whether the patent
provides some standard for measuring that degree.” Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.,
4

Because the applications resulting in the asserted patents were filed before September 16, 2012,
the effective date of the America Invents Act (“AIA”), the Court refers to the pre-AIA version of
§ 112.
10

783 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Likewise, when a subjective
term is used in a claim, “the court must determine whether the patent’s specification supplies
some standard for measuring the scope of the [term].” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc.,
417 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005); accord Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d
1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1351).
In the context of a claim governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, the claim is invalid as
indefinite if the claim fails to disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform the claimed
functions. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351–52. The disclosure is inadequate when one of ordinary
skill in the art “would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it
with the corresponding function in the claim.” Id. at 1352.
III.

CONSTRUCTION OF AGREED TERMS
The parties have agreed to the following constructions set forth in their Joint Claim

Construction Chart (Dkt. No. 62), as modified at the October 7, 2015 hearing:
Term5
“to thereof”


’412 Patent Claim 1

“motion coefficient of picture”


plain and ordinary meaning

’197 Patent Claims 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35

“video signal formats”


“one or more coefficients of motion of the
picture to be displayed”

’412 Patent Claim 3

“processing”



Agreed Construction
“to the signal selected by the first selector”

“number of scan lines and whether the lines are
progressive or interlaced”

’197 Patent Claims 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35

5

For all term charts in this order, the claims in which the term is found are listed with the term
but: (1) only the highest level claim in each dependency chain is listed, and (2) only claims
identified in the parties’ Joint Claim Construction Chart (Dkt. No. 62) are listed.
11

Term5
“video processing sub software programs”


’197 Patent Claims 31, 33, 35

“plurality of video processing sub software
programs”


“a size of the first display zone”

’995 Patent Claim 1

“receiver means for receiving programassociated information including a title, a
start time, and an end time of a broadcast
program together with a video signal and an
audio signal”



plain and ordinary meaning

’366 Patent Claim 5

“a magnitude of the first display zone”



plain and ordinary meaning

’366 Patent Claim 1

“not to be connected”


plain and ordinary meaning

’366 Patent Claim 7

“not being connected”


plain and ordinary meaning

’366 Patent Claim 3

“when a rear side of said display apparatus is
pushed”


plain and ordinary meaning

’197 Patent Claims 31, 33, 35

“when a rear surface of said projection
portion is pushed”


Agreed Construction
plain and ordinary meaning

This term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.6
Claimed Function


’995 Patent Claim 1

“receiving program-associated information
including at title, a start time, and an end
time of a broadcast program together with
a video signal and an audio signal”

Disclosed Structure


6

a receiver (118), and equivalents thereof

For patent applications filed earlier than Sept. 16, 2012, the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 112
is applicable and the means-plus-function provision is § 112, ¶ 6. For patent applications filed on
or after Sept. 16, 2012, the AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is applicable and the means-plusfunction provision is § 112(f). The provisions are substantially identical.
12

Term5
“decoder means for decoding the programassociated information from the received
signal”


’995 Patent Claim 1

Agreed Construction
This term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
Claimed Function


“decoding the program-associated
information from the received signal”

Disclosed Structure

“display controller means for controlling the
display screen based on the input signal”



an information decoder (107), and
equivalents thereof

This term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
Claimed Function

’995 Patent Claim 1



“controlling the display screen based on the
input signal”

Disclosed Structure

“command receiver means for receiving an
input signal from a remote controller or from
a key or keys provided to a main body of the
receiver apparatus”



a display controller (109), and equivalents
thereof

This term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
Claimed Function


’995 Patent Claim 1

“receiving an input signal from a remote
controller or from a key or keys provided
to a main body of the receiver apparatus”

Disclosed Structure

“data quantity comparator means for
comparing a magnitude of the first display
zone with a quantity of display data …”



’995 Patent Claim 1

a command receiver (106), and equivalents
thereof

This term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
Claimed Function


“comparing a magnitude of the first display
zone with a quantity of display data”

Disclosed Structure


13

a comparator (112), and equivalents thereof

Term5
“display means for displaying the decoded
program-associated information on a display
screen”


’995 Patent Claim 1

Agreed Construction
This term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
Claimed Function


“displaying the decoded program-

associated information on a display screen”
Disclosed Structure


“a plurality of character strings”


“one or more of the plurality of character
strings”

’995 Patent Claim 1

“enabler/disabler”


“two or more sets of letters, numbers, spaces,
and/or punctuation marks”

’995 Patent Claim 1

“the character string”


a television screen (105), and equivalents
thereof”

“a circuit that enables and disables an
operation”

’713 Patent Claim 1

“enabler/disabler means for selectively
This term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
preventing said user adjustment control
means from adjusting at least said portions of Claimed Function
said displayed image containing said
 “selectively preventing said user
information image based on said control
adjustment control means from adjusting at
signal”
least said portions of said displayed image
containing said information image based
 ’713 Patent Claim 8
on said control signal”
Disclosed Structure


“said portions” in the phrase “adjusting at
least said portions of said displayed image
containing said information image based on
said control signal”


(1) changeover switch 13, changeover
switch 13b, short-circuiting switch 13c, or
changeover switch 13d, and equivalents
thereof; or (2) bypass circuit 15 together
with changeover switch 13a, and
equivalents thereof

“each portion”

’713 Patent Claims 1, 8, 15

14

Term5
“detection means for detecting a portion of
said displayed image containing said
information image and outputting a control
signal according to said detected portion”


Agreed Construction
This term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
Claimed Function


’713 Patent Claim 8

“detecting a portion of said displayed
image containing said information image
and outputting a control signal according to
said detected portion”

Disclosed Structure


“said displayed image”



“said EPG or PPV selection menu”

’713 Patent Claims 6, 13, 20

“display means for selectably displaying at
least two of: a picture image without an
information image; said information image
without said picture image; and said picture
image simultaneously with said information
image”


“the image to be displayed”

’713 Patent Claims 1, 8

“said selection menu”



a decoder (4 or 1206), an EPG processor
(1204), a CPU (1220), or a separator (7c),
and equivalents thereof

This term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
Claimed Function


“selectably displaying at least two of: a

picture image without an information
image; said information image without said
picture image; and said picture image
simultaneously with said information
image”

’713 Patent Claim 8

Disclosed Structure

“user adjustment control means for allowing
user adjustment of an image quality of a
displayed image”


’713 Patent Claim 8

a cathode ray tube (or CRT), a display, or a
screen, and equivalents thereof

This term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
Claimed Function


“allowing user adjustment of an image
quality of a displayed image”

Disclosed Structure


15

an adjusting section circuit (Ra) and an
image quality adjusting circuit (7a), and
equivalents thereof

Term5
“error-detection information”


Agreed Construction
plain and ordinary meaning

’375 Patent Claim 1

“control signal information”



“data used to control a recording or playback
process”

’375 Patent Claim 31
Having reviewed the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence of record, the Court hereby adopts

the parties’ agreed constructions.
IV.

CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
The parties’ positions and the Court’s analysis as to the disputed terms are presented

below.
A.

The ’412 Patent – “input picture signal”

Disputed Term
“input picture signal”


Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction
“picture signal before format
conversion”

Defendants’ Proposed
Construction
“video signal received from
an input source”

’412 Patent Claims 1,
15, 17, 19
The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff submits that the input picture signal is the signal that is inputted to the

format-conversion circuit or process. Dkt. No. 53 at 14. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’
proposed construction improperly focuses on the display apparatus as a whole, as opposed to the
format-conversion circuit that is the subject invention of the ’412 Patent. Id. at 14–15. According
to Plaintiff, the patent consistently uses “input picture signal” to refer to the picture signal before
it is processed by the format-conversion circuit, and does not use to the term to refer to the
source signal. Id. at 15–17. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ proposed construction improperly
threatens to exclude a preferred embodiment, in which the source signal undergoes pre-

16

processing before being input into the format-conversion circuit. Id. at 17–19 (citing ’412 Patent
Figure 8 and accompanying description).
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic evidence to
support its position: ’412 Patent col.2 ll.9–37, col.6 ll.26–44, col.6 ll.53–64, col.7 ll.2–16, col.15
l.40 – col.16 l.15, col.16 ll.35–39, col.16 l.57, col.19 ll.51–54, col.23 ll.11–15, fig.1, fig.8, fig.9,
fig.13, fig.17.
Defendants respond that the invention, and claims, of the ’412 Patent are directed to
receiving video signals from a variety of sources and processing the signal “so that it can be
properly displayed on the picture output device.” Dkt. No. 58 at 9–10. Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s proposed construction is based on an improper restriction of the “format conversion”
of the patent to conversion of the scanning method (e.g., interlaced scanning to progressive
scanning). Id. at 12. According to Defendants, the “format conversion” of the patent includes
“color space conversion” and “inverse gamma conversion.” Id. And Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s proposed construction would improperly exclude the “input signals” from the various
sources depicted in Figure 8. Id. at 11–12.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic evidence to
support their position: ’412 Patent col.1 ll.21–25, col.1 ll.45–47, col.16 ll.35–39, col.13 ll.24–61,
col.16 ll.12–21, fig.8, fig.21.
Plaintiff replies that the ’412 Patent is directed specifically at converting the format of
video signals, not simply processing signals from a variety of sources. Dkt. No. 60 at 6. Plaintiff
further replies that contrary to Defendants’ contention, Plaintiff’s proposed construction does not
exclude the source signals of Figure 18. Id. at 6–7. Rather, Plaintiff argues, those source signals
are “picture signal[s] before format conversion.” Id. at 7. And although the source signals

17

undergo some pre-processing before being input into the format-conversion circuit, they do not
undergo any format conversion until being processed by the format-conversion circuit. Id.
Plaintiff also replies that the format conversion contemplated by the ’412 Patent is scan
conversion and scaling, and that the gamma and color conversion are part of the picture quality
improvement that happens after the format of the input signal is converted. Id. Finally, Plaintiff
argues that if Defendants’ proposed construction requires raw source signal input into the
format-conversion circuit, it will improperly exclude the embodiment of Figure 8, which
describes processing of source signals before they are input into the format-conversion circuit
labeled 49-1. Id. at 8.
Plaintiff cites further intrinsic evidence to support its position: ’412 Patent col.3 ll.27–
31, col.4 ll.8–13, col.4 ll.33–34, col.4 ll.66–67, col.6 ll.20–26, 46, 48, & 49, col.7 ll.29, 33, & 51,
col.8 ll.18 & 31, col.15 ll.11–27, col.16 ll.57, 61, & 65, col.17 l.28, col.20 ll.51, 54, & 62, col.23
ll.12 & 15, fig.7.
Analysis
The parties’ dispute distills to whether “input picture signal” should be defined by the
signal’s source or its destination. The term is properly defined by its destination—the claimed
format-conversion circuit or process to which the picture signal is an input.
The ’412 Patent is directed to methods and circuits for taking a picture signal that is
inputted into the method or circuit, and converting the format of the signal into a format
compatible with a display device. ’412 Patent col.1 ll.6–13. The patent describes several formatconversion signal-processing circuits, and their methods of operation. See, e.g., id. at col.6 l.19 –
col.7 l.45 (describing Figure 1), col.16 l.46 – col.17 l.23 (describing Figure 9), col.20 ll.39–64
(describing Figure 13), col.22 l.63 – col.23 l.25 (describing Figure 17). Figure 1 is reproduced

18

here and annotated by the Court. Each embodiment is designated as “a format conversion signal
processing

circuit”

or

“a

format

’412 Patent Figure 1

conversion circuit.” Id. at col.6 ll.20–21,
col.16 ll.47–48, col.20 ll.40–41, col.22
ll.64–65. In each of these embodiments an
“input picture signal S1 (comprising
component

luminance

and

color

difference signals . . . ) is inputted to [an element of the circuit].” Id. at col.6 ll.26–29 (in yellow
in the annotated Figure 1), col.16 ll.57–60, col.20 ll.51–54, col.23 ll.12–15.
The ’412 Patent consistently describes a signal entering a circuit, circuit element, or
process as an “input” or “inputted” signal, independent of the ultimate source of such signal. See,
e.g., id. at col.1 ll.39–44 (“format conversion is performed by signal processing and pictures are
displayed by converting inputted signals of pictures into signals of display formats of picture
output devices”), col.7 ll.4–16 (describing a circuit element as having an “input side” and a
circuit element that “inputs” a signal that is outputted from another element), col.9 ll.21–27 (“an
input signal to the delay unit”), col.10 ll.25–31 (“an input signal to the memory unit”), col.15
ll.11–22 (describing a “signal . . . inputted to a
luminance processing unit” and a “signal . . .
inputted to a picture element interpolation unit”).
That is, a signal is an input signal because it is
inputted into a circuit, element, or process.
The claim language itself indicates that
the “input picture signal” is the signal inputted to

19

’412 Patent

the format-conversion circuit or method. For instance the circuit of Claim 1, reproduced here and
annotated by the Court, is for “converting a format of an input picture signal.” The input picture
signal is used or manipulated by various circuit components: the scanning convertor, the first
selector, and the control unit. The circuit components convert the format of the input picture
signal by converting the signal’s scanning method from interlace scanning to progressive
scanning and by compressing or expanding the picture in the horizontal and vertical directions.
This “input picture signal” is the picture signal that is inputted to, and converted by, the Claim 1
circuit.
The format-conversion circuits of the ’412 Patent are described with respect to the format
of the “input picture signal,” not with respect to the source of the “input picture signal.” For
example, the description of the first embodiment (Figure 1) includes a description of various
formats of picture signal, namely interface scanning signals (TV) and progressive scanning
signals (EDTV, PC, HDTV). Id. at col.6 ll.45–52. This discussion does not define the “input
picture signal” by its source. Rather, it explains that the format-conversion signal processing is
configured according to the input signal’s format by using a format detector (0, in green in
annotated Figure 1), a control unit (11, in cyan in annotated Figure 1), and a selector (4, in red in
annotated Figure 1). Id. at col.6 ll.45–52, col.7 ll.27–43. Configuring the format-conversion
processing according to the format of the input signal is further described with reference to
Figures 21, 22, and 23. Id. at col.13 l.24 – col.15 l.10. In these figures, the “input signal” is
identified according to its format, e.g., 525/60/2:1 (an “NTSC” signal), not according to its
source. Id. The “input picture signal” is a picture signal that is inputted to the format-conversion
circuit or process, regardless of the signal’s source.

20

Defendants’ argument that the embodiment of Figure 8 of the ’412 Patent mandates that
“input picture signal” refers to the signal

’412 Patent Figure 8

received from a source is unpersuasive.
Figure 8, reproduced here and annotated
by the Court, depicts an example of a
television receiver that has a formatconversion circuit. Id. at col.15 l.40 –
col.16 l.45. The various sources of the signals received by the receiver are shown as: (1) a PC,
(2) a terrestrial broadcast wave, (3) a package system (e.g., CD-ROM, video tape), (4) a satellite
broadcast wave, and (5) a digital broadcast wave. Id. at col.15 l.47 – col.16 l.10. These sources
are denoted using words distinct from the format-denoting words found elsewhere in the patent,
such as in Figures 21, 22, and 23 and the accompanying description. Thus, while each source
signal will necessarily be of some format, the signal’s “source” and “format” should not be
conflated as Defendants argue.
The source signals of Figure 8 are processed by various circuits (40–47, in green) before
being output from the switcher (48) to the format-conversion circuits (49-1 and 49-2, in cyan).
Id. at col.15 l.47 – col.16 l.21. This processing includes receiving the source signal and
converting the signal to luminance and color signals through YC (luminance and color)
separation, demodulation, or color space conversion. Id. The picture processing units (49-1 and
49-2, in cyan) each are the “format conversion signal processing circuit” of Figure 1 or,
alternately, of Figure 9, 13, or 17. See id. at col.16 ll.12–21, col.16 ll.35–49, col.20 ll.39–41,
col.22 ll.63–66. As set forth above, the input to the Figure 1 format-conversion circuit is the
“input picture signal.” Thus, the output of the switcher (48) in Figure 8 is the “input picture

21

signal,” irrespective of whether the source signals were received and processed before reaching
the switcher. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants’ construction, to the extent it is
meant to define the “input picture signal” as the raw source signal, would exclude the Figure 8
embodiment. And a “construction that excludes a preferred embodiment is rarely, if ever,
correct.” C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Claim 14, reproduced here and annotated by the Court, further supports that the input
picture signal is the picture signal inputted to the

’412 Patent

claimed format-conversion circuit or method.
The claimed television receiver includes the
circuit of Claim 1. And as discussed above, the
circuit of Claim 1 converts the format of the “input picture signal.” Claim 14 further includes a
“picture output device” that displays the signal “outputted from” the format-conversion circuit of
Claim 1. Thus, the format-conversion circuit has both an input and an output: the signal inputted
to the circuit has its format converted according to the circuit of Claim 1 and the formatconverted signal output from the circuit of Claim 1 is displayed on the output device. But there is
nothing in Claim 14 that supports Defendants’ position that the “input picture signal” must be
that signal received from the picture source. In fact, such a construction would improperly read
in limitations from the Figure 8 embodiment, namely the processing elements 40–47 by which
the source signal is processed for input to the format-conversion circuit. The “input picture
signal” is not defined by an input source, as Defendants’ contend, it is defined by its destination,
i.e., the claimed format-conversion circuit or method.
While the Court rejects Defendants’ proposed construction, it also rejects Plaintiff’s
proposed construction. There is insufficient basis to conclude that “format conversion” or

22

“converting the format” are restricted to scanning and scaling conversion, as Plaintiff argues. A
patent’s “specification and prosecution history only compel departure from the plain meaning [of
a claim term] in two instances: lexicography and disavowal. . . . [and] the standards for finding
lexicography and disavowal are exacting.” See GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750
F.3d 1304, 1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669
F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). “To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set
forth a definition of the disputed claim term,’ and ‘clearly express an intent to define the term.’”
Id. (quoting Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365). “Similarly, disavowal requires that ‘the specification or
prosecution history make clear that the invention does not include a particular feature.’”
(quotation modification marks omitted) (quoting SciMed Life Sys. Inc. v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). There is no lexicography or
disavowal that supports Plaintiff’s argued special definition of “format conversion” as scanning
or scaling conversion.
Because there is nothing in the intrinsic evidence of record here that supports limiting the
’412 Patent’s format conversion to scanning or scaling conversion, Plaintiff’s proposed
construction limiting the “input picture signal” to “picture signals before format conversion” is
improper. The preferred exemplary “input picture signal” is a “component signal[] . . .
comprising luminance signals and two color difference signals.” ’412 Patent col.3 ll.45–54, col.6
ll.26–29, col.16 ll.57–60, col.20 ll.51–54, col.23 ll.12–15. As described above, the exemplary
television receiver of Figure 8 converts a received source signal to a luminance/color-difference
component signal by, for example, a color space conversion. Id. at col.15 l.47 – col.16 l.21.
While this is not a scanning or scaling format conversion (Plaintiff’s argued understanding of
“format conversion”), it is still a conversion of the format of the signal. So the patent describes

23

an instance in which a signal undergoes some format conversion before entering the claimed
format-conversion circuit or process—something that would fall outside the scope of the claims
under Plaintiff’s proposed construction. And a “construction that excludes a preferred
embodiment is rarely, if ever, correct.” C.R. Bard, 388 F.3d at 865.
Ultimately, neither party’s proposed construction comports with the intrinsic evidence.
The intrinsic evidence indicates that the “input picture signal” is the picture signal that enters the
format-conversion circuit or process, regardless of the source of the signal or any processing,
format conversion or otherwise, that the signal undergoes before entering the claimed formatconversion circuit or process. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (“‘The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with
the patent’s description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.’” (quoting
Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998))).
Accordingly, the Court construes “input picture signal” as follows:


“input picture signal” means “picture signal inputted to the circuit or method for
signal processing of format conversion.”

B.

The ’197 Patent – The “video processor sections” Terms

Disputed Term
“video processor sections”


’197 Patent Claims 25,
27, 29

“plurality of video
processor sections”


Plaintiff’s Proposed
Defendants’ Proposed
Construction
Construction
Plain meaning, no construction “segregated processor
necessary.
sections that can process a
video signal”

two or more video processor
sections

’197 Patent Claims 25,
27, 29

24

“two or more segregated
processor sections that can
process a video signal”

Because the parties’ arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms
are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff submits that “video processor sections” should be given its plain and ordinary
meaning, as Defendants agreed in Hitachi Consumer Elecs. Co. v. Top Victory Elecs. (Taiwan)
Co., et al., No. 2:10-cv-260-JRG (E.D. Tex.) (the “260 Action”)—and as the Court there
construed the term—with respect to patents related to the ’197 Patent. Dkt. No. 53 at 19–20.
Plaintiff further submits that the “plurality of” language does not affect or alter the Court’s
previous construction of “video processor sections.” Id. at 19. Plaintiff argues that Defendants
should be judicially estopped from arguing a position different than that which Defendants
agreed to in the 260 Action, in which the Court construed “video processor sections” in U.S.
Patents No. 6,549,243 and No. 7,889,281, both of which “share the same specification in all
relevant respects” with the ’197 Patent. Id. at 19–20. Plaintiff further argues that there is nothing
in the intrinsic record of the ’197 Patent that justifies straying from the Court’s previous
construction of “video processor sections.” Id. at 20. Moreover, Plaintiff submits Defendants’
proposed construction would improperly limit the claims to a single exemplary embodiment and
ignore an exemplary embodiment in which the video processor sections are “separate” but are
not necessarily “segregated.” Id. at 21–22 (citing the separate encoders 141, 142, 143 of Figure 1
as the video processor sections).
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic evidence to
support its position: ’197 Patent col.4 l.65 – col.5 l.18, fig.1, fig.3, fig.5, fig.6; U.S. Patent No.
6,549,243 (Plaintiff’s Ex. 16, Dkt. No. 53-17); U.S. Patent No. 7,889,281 (Plaintiff’s Ex. 17,
Dkt. No. 53-18).

25

Defendants respond that every exemplary embodiment described in the ’197 Patent
includes segregated video processor sections. Dkt. No. 58 at 14. Defendants argue that the
exemplary embodiments each include: (1) separate video encoders (141, 142, and 143), which
are necessarily segregated video processor sections, or (2) a single video encoder (14), which is
expressly described as having segregated sub-programs or processing areas that are segregated
video processing sections. Id. Defendants further argue that the claim language itself indicates
that the video processor sections are segregated, in that the claims recite a “plurality of video
processor sections, with respective video processor sections providing different video
processing.” Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). Defendants contend that, therefore, each video
processing section provides “different and distinct video signal processing” and “would require
its own dedicated components to process each of these unique video signals.” Id. Defendants
argue that they should not be judicially estopped from seeking construction of “video processor
sections.” Id. at 13. Although they agreed in the 260 Action that “video processor sections” had
its “plain and ordinary meaning,” Defendants contend that after the Court so construed the
claims a dispute arose regarding the plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 16–18 (citing expert
reports regarding infringement submitted in the 260 Action). Thus, Defendants argue, the Court
should construe the term to resolve the dispute. Id.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence to support their position. Intrinsic evidence: ’197 Patent col.2 ll.35–53, col.3 ll.20–30,
col.4 l.65 – col.5 l.8, fig.1, fig.3, fig.4, fig.5, fig.7, fig.8. Extrinsic evidence: Encarta World
Dictionary (1999) (“section”) (Defendants’ Ex. A, Dkt. No. 58-2 at 6); Expert Report of Harley
R. Myler, Ph.D., P.E., Hitachi Consumer Elecs. Co. v. Top Victory Elecs. (Taiwan) Co., et al.,
No. 2:10-cv-260-JRG (Defendants’ Ex. B, Dkt. No. 58-3); Rebuttal Expert Report of Dr. Cliff

26

Reader, Hitachi Consumer Elecs. Co. v. Top Victory Elecs. (Taiwan) Co., et al., No. 2:10-cv260-JRG (Defendants’ Ex. C, Dkt. No. 58-4).
Plaintiff replies that Defendants’ proposed construction is improper not only because it
attempts to limit the claims to an exemplary embodiment, but also because it attempts to read in
a segregated hardware requirement. Plaintiff argues the “segregated” embodiment describes
segregation of hardware or software components. Dkt. No. 60 at 8–9. Plaintiff contends that “not
a single embodiment is limited to a single chip having dedicated and segregated hardware
components.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff further replies that there was not a dispute over the plain and
ordinary meaning in the 260 Action because Defendants characterized the dispute as one of
infringement, not of claim scope. Id. at 10 (citing Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law, Hitachi Consumer Elecs. Co. v. Top Victory Elecs. (Taiwan) Co.,
et al., No. 2:10-cv-260-JRG, Dkt. No. 366 (E.D. Tex. May 31, 2013)).
Plaintiff’s Reply cites further intrinsic evidence to support its position: ’197 Patent fig.7,
fig.8.
Analysis
The main dispute over these terms centers on the meaning of “section.” The Court is not
persuaded that the dispute over the meaning of “video processor sections” is resolved by simply
stating that the term has its “plain and ordinary meaning.” But the Court rejects Defendants’
proposed construction because importing a “segregated” limitation is not justified. The parties
agreed to the Court’s construction at the October 7, 2015 hearing.
Judicial Estoppel. Since the parties agreed to the Court’s construction, the Court need
not now determine whether to invoke judicial estoppel to bind Defendants to a construction of

27

“plain and ordinary meaning” based on Defendants’ claim-construction position regarding the
related ’243 and ’281 Patents that the parties previously litigated in the 260 Action.
The Meaning of “Video Processor Sections.” The parties agree that the exemplary
video processors described in the ’197 Patent are, or include, the various video encoders labeled
141, 142, 143 in Figures 1, 7, 8, 9, and 10 and labeled 14 in Figures 3, 5, and 6. Figures 1 and 3
are reproduced here and annotated by the Court. Thus, there are two main exemplary video
processors described in the ’197 Patent.
In the first exemplary video processor, the encoders labeled 141, 142, and 143 (colored in
the annotated figure as cyan, red, and green

’197 Patent Figure 1

respectively) are each configured to process a
digital video signal of a specific type, to convert
the digital video signal to an analog video
signal for display. ’197 Patent col.3 ll.20–30,
col.3 ll.47–63. For example, encoder 141 (blue)
converts an NTSC signal having 525 interlaced
scanning lines, encoder 142 (red) converts a
progressive signal having 525 sequential scanning lines (“525P” signal), and encoder 143 (green)
converts an HDTV signal having 1080 interlaced scanning lines. Id. The particular encoder that
processes the digital video signal is a function of the signal’s scanning method. Id. at col.2 ll.17–
20, col.4 ll.21–42. The other encoders may be selectively enabled or disabled to reduce power
consumption and heat generation from unnecessary operation of an encoder. Id. Therefore, the
Court understands that the encoders 141, 142, and 143 are dedicated circuits each distinguishable
from the others based on the video processing function it performs. See id. at col.4 l.67 – col.5 l.2

28

(“The embodiment of FIG. 3 differs from the embodiment of FIG.1 in that the configuration of
the video encoder 14 is a singular circuit . . . .”). These distinct encoder circuits are each “video
processor sections.” See, e.g., col.11 ll.24–26, col.11 ll.36–40.
In

the

second

exemplary

video
’197 Patent Figure 1

processor, the encoder 14 is a single circuit
“which versatilely permits processing of any of
the NTSC signals, 525[P] signals or HDTV
signals.” Id. at col.4 l.67 – col.5 l.4. This singlecircuit encoder may be a sub-processor or an
application specific-integrated circuit (ASIC).
Id. at col.5 ll.4–9. The encoder may have
“segregated processing sub-programs or processing areas which can be selectively
enabled/disabled to permit processing according to an appropriate scanning method.” Thus, the
contemplated video processor may comprise, for example, a sub-processor with distinct subprograms or an ASIC with distinct processing areas. Id. And each sub-program or processing
area is distinguishable from the other based on the video processing function it performs. The
distinct sub-programs and the distinct processing areas are video processor sections.
The common trait to the embodiments of the “video processor sections” is not that they
are necessarily hardware or that they are “segregated,” but rather that they are distinguishable
from other portions of the video processor by, for example, the processing function they perform.
This comports with the ordinary meaning of “section.” See, e.g., Encarta World English
Dictionary 1620 (1999) (defining “section” as “a distinct part that can be separated or considered
separately from the whole of something”). And it also comports with the claim language, “a

29

plurality of video processor sections, with respective video processor sections providing
different video processing.” See, e.g., ’197 Patent col.11 ll.24–27 (Claim 25) (emphasis added).
Defendants have not established that “video processor sections” includes a “segregated”
limitation. “The patentee is free to choose a broad term and expect to obtain the full scope of its
plain and ordinary meaning unless the patentee explicitly redefines the term or disavows its full
scope.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1367; see also GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750
F.3d 1304, 1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“the specification and prosecution history only compel
departure from the plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal” (citing Thorner,
669 F.3d at 1365)). And “the standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are exacting.”
GE Lighting, 750 F.3d at 1309. Defendants have not established either lexicography or
disavowal by arguing that all the exemplary embodiments have “segregated” processor sections.
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“we have expressly rejected the contention that if a patent
describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited
to that embodiment”); see also, Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366 (“It is likewise not enough that the
only embodiments, or all of the embodiments, contain a particular limitation. We do not read
limitations from the specification into claims; we do not redefine words. Only the patentee can
do that.”). Indeed, the word “segregated” is not used to describe all the embodiments in the ’197
Patent, it used solely with respect to the single-circuit encoder (14 in Figure 3).
Accordingly, the Court construes the “video processor sections” terms as follows:


“video processor sections” means “distinct hardware or software portions of a
video processor”; and



“plurality of video processor sections” means “two or more distinct hardware or
software portions of a video processor.”

30

C.

The ’366 Patent
1.

The “mounting side” Terms

Disputed Term

Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction
“a projection portion, being “a projection portion, being
disposed higher above a
disposed higher above a
surface of said power source surface of said power source
board than a circuit element board than a circuit element of
of said power source board
said power source board and
and not being connected
not being connected with a
with a member opposing to member opposing to the side
a mounting side of said
of said power source board on
circuit element, is provided which said circuit element is
on the surface of said power mounted, is provided on the
source board where said
surface of said power source
circuit element is mounted” board where said circuit
element is mounted”
 ’366 Patent Claim 1

Defendants’ Proposed
Construction
Indefinite

“when a rear surface of said
projection portion is pushed,
the circuit element of said
power source board is
prevented from contacting
the member positioned
opposing to the mounting
side of said circuit element
by said projection portion”

Indefinite



“when a rear surface of said
projection portion is pushed,
the circuit element of said
power source board is
prevented from contacting the
member positioned opposing
to the side of said power
source board on which said
circuit element is mounted, by
said projection portion”

’366 Patent Claim 3

31

Disputed Term
“wherein the member
opposing to the mounting
side of said circuit element
is a rear chassis of said
display panel”


’366 Patent Claim 4

“wherein the member facing
to the mounting side of said
circuit element is a rear
chassis of said display
panel”


Plaintiff’s Proposed
Defendants’ Proposed
Construction
Construction
“wherein the member
Indefinite
opposing to the side of said
power source board on which
said circuit element is mounted
is a rear chassis of said display
panel”
“wherein the member facing to
the side of said power source
board on which said circuit
element is mounted is a rear
chassis of said display panel”

Indefinite

’366 Patent Claims 8, 10
Because the parties’ arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms

are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff submits that given the context of the claim language and the entire specification
of the ’366 Patent, “mounting side” in the claims refers to the side of the circuit board on which
the circuit elements are mounted. Dkt. No. 53 at 27, 30, 32. Plaintiff further submits that the
patent examiner understood “mounting side” this way. Id. at 28–29. And Plaintiff argues that
interpreting the “mounting side” as a side of a circuit element would be inconsistent with the
specification and with the ordinary meaning of “mounting.” Id. at 29. Plaintiff argues that the
member opposing the side of the circuit element that is connected to the board is the board, so
interpreting “mounting side” as the side of the circuit element would result in the claim
nonsensically requiring the claims’ “projection portion” be both connected and not connected
with the board. Id.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence to support its position. Intrinsic evidence: ’366 Patent col.1 l.10 – col.3 l.13, col.4
32

ll.22–32, col.5 ll.43–65, col.6 l.56 – col.7 l.33, col.7 l.66 – col.8 l.30, fig.5(b), fig.5(c), fig.7;
’366 Patent File Wrapper August 6, 2010 Notice of Allowability (Plaintiff’s Ex. 19, Dkt. No. 5320). Extrinsic evidence: American Heritage College Dictionary (4th ed. 2007) (“mounting” and
“mount”) (Plaintiff’s Ex. 20, Dkt. No. 53-21 at 13).
Defendants respond that the “mounting side” language renders the claims unworkable,
and therefore indefinite. Dkt. No. 58 at 22, 25–27. According to Defendants, the claim language
“mounting side of said circuit element” clearly refers to the side of the circuit element that is
mounted to another component. Id. at 24. Defendants argue that the “member opposing to a
mounting side of said circuit element” is the power supply board. Id. at 22–23. Thus, Defendants
argue, the claim language unambiguously and nonsensically requires that the claims’ “projection
portion” is both “provided on the surface of the power supply board” and not “connected with”
the power supply board. Id. at 23–25. Defendants further argue that construing “mounting side”
as a surface of a board would eviscerate the distinction between Claim 1 and Claim 5, in
violation of the doctrine of claim differentiation. Id. at 23–24. And Defendants argue that the
Court should not adopt Plaintiff’s construction as doing so would violate the proscription against
courts redrafting claims. Id. at 24–25.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic evidence to
support their position: ’366 Patent col.6 l.56 – col.7 l.43, fig.5(c).
Plaintiff replies that it would be improper to construe “mounting side” as a side of a
circuit element as Defendants advocate because doing so would exclude a preferred embodiment.
Dkt. No. 60 at 13. Plaintiff further replies that that the doctrine of claim differentiation does not
require Claim 5 and Claim 1 to have a different scope, especially when application of the
doctrine would render a claim indefinite. Id. at 14–15. According to Plaintiff, in the course of

33

prosecuting the application that issued as the ’366 Patent, the patentee clarified that Claim 5 was
added to “define the invention from a different perspective” and the patentee did not intend
Claim 1 and Claim 5 to have the difference in scope that Defendants advocate. Id. And, Plaintiff
argues, Claim 4’s recitation of “wherein the member opposing to the mounting side of said
circuit element is a rear chassis of said display panel” establishes that the “mounting side” is a
surface of the power supply board. Id. at 14.
Plaintiff cites further intrinsic evidence to support its position: ’366 Patent File Wrapper
November 8, 2010 Amendment (Plaintiff’s Ex. 25, Dkt. No. 60-2).
Analysis
The parties’ dispute expressly centers on the meaning of “mounting side of said circuit
element” but resolution of the dispute hinges on the meanings of the terms “facing to” and
“opposing to.” The Court is not persuaded that the clear claim language “mounting side of said
circuit element” should be rewritten as “mounting side of said power supply board” as Plaintiff
argues. But neither is the Court persuaded by the parties’ understanding of “opposing to” the
mounting side, which understanding would render the claim self-contradictory, and indefinite.
The ’366 Patent is directed to “thin”
’366 Patent Figure 2
display apparatuses, such as liquid crystal
displays and plasma displays. ’366 Patent
col.1

ll.12–16,

exemplary

col.2

embodiment

ll.22–32.
of

a

An

display

apparatus is shown in Figure 2, reproduced
here and annotated by the Court. The
apparatus is described as having a liquid

34

crystal display (100) mounted to a frame (110, in cyan) that is in turn mounted to support
members (600, in red). Id. at col.4 ll.22–28, col.4 ll.51–54, col.5 l.56 – col.6 l.12. The support
members are described as attached to reinforcement portions (112) of the frame and “directing
into the vertical direction (i.e., crossing a pair of reinforcement portions opposing to each other,
which are formed on the outer periphery of the flange portion).” Id. at col.5 l.56 – col.6 l.12.
The patent further describes two circuit boards, namely, a signal board (500, in blue) and
a power source board (510, in green). Id. at col.6 ll.37–47. These circuit boards are attached to
the support members “within a narrow space . . . on the rear surface side of [the] panel module.”
Id. An exemplary power source board, assembled as part of the display apparatus, is shown in
Figure 5(c), reproduced here and annotated by the Court. Id. at col.7 ll.13–21. The power source
board includes an insulated substrate (in green) and circuit elements (dashed-line boxes, in
amber). Id. The circuit elements are described as “mounted” on the substrate (also referred to as
the “board”). See, e.g., id. at Abstract, col.3 ll.30–31, col.7 ll.13–17. The power source board
further includes pins (520 and 530, in magenta) that extend further from the surface of the
insulated substrate than do the circuit elements. Id. at col.7 ll.21–43. The pins prevent the circuit
elements from contacting the rear surface of the frame (110, in cyan), even if the substrate flexes
toward the frame. Id.
The Court rejects Plaintiff’s position that “mounting side of said circuit element” means
“the side of said power source board

’366 Patent Figure 5(c)

on which said circuit element is
mounted.” The claim clearly states that
the “mounting side” is “of said circuit
element”—it does not state that it is the mounting side “of the board.” Effectively, Plaintiff urges

35

the Court to construe “circuit element” as “power source board” and “opposing to” as “facing
to.” The Court declines to do so.
The Court presumes that “mounting side of said circuit element” and “mounting side of
said power source board” have different meaning. Courts “presume that the use of . . . different
terms in the claims connotes different meanings.” CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler
GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000). And given that Claim 5 uses the phrase
“mounting surface of said power source board” to claim the mounting side of the board, the
Court presumes that “mounting side of said circuit element” has a different meaning than
“mounting surface of said power source board.”
Further, the Court will not depart from the plain meaning of “mounting side of said
circuit element” because there is no clear lexicography or disavowal that justifies interpreting
“circuit element” as “power source board.” GE Lighting Solutions, 750 F.3d at 1308–09; see also
Thorner, 669 F.3d 1365–66 (requiring that the patentee “clearly express an intent to redefine the
term” or to “deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term”). Plaintiff has
failed to present evidence sufficient to change “circuit element” in the phrase at issue to “power
source board,” or, more specifically, to rewrite “mounting side of said circuit element” to
“mounting side of said power source board.” Indeed, the patent distinguishes between “circuit
element” and “power source board” in that the circuit element is mounted on the board. See, e.g.,
’366 Patent Abstract (“a projection portion . . . is provided on the surface of the power source
board where the circuit element is mounted”).
Even if it were necessary to interpret “mounting side of said circuit element” as
“mounting side of said power source board” to preserve the validity of the claims, the Court
would decline to do so. As the Federal Circuit has explained:

36

[C]ourts may not redraft claims, whether to make them operable or to sustain their
validity. Even a nonsensical result does not require the court to redraft the claims
of [a] patent. Rather, where . . . claims are susceptible to only one reasonable
interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the
claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.
Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quotation marks
and citations omitted). The only reasonable interpretation of “mounting side of said circuit
element” is that it refers to a side of the circuit element mounted on the power source board, not
to a side of the of the power source board. And it refers to the side of the mounted circuit
element that is nearest to the board.
But the Court does not understand the “mounting side of said circuit element” language
to invalidate Claim 1 or any of its dependent claims, as Defendants contend. Specifically, the
Court rejects the parties’ position that Claim 1’s “member opposing to a mounting side of said
circuit element” is the power source board if the “mounting side of said circuit element” is the
side of the mounted circuit element nearest to the board. Here, the parties effectively equate
“opposing to” and “facing to.” The Court does not agree that these terms mean the same thing.

37

The “opposing to” language of Claim 1 is best understood in contrast to the “facing to”
language of Claim 5.7 As set forth above, the Court presumes that different claim language
carries different meaning; therefore, the Court presumes that “opposing to” and “facing to” mean
different things. Indeed, even absent any canon of claim construction, the Court understands
these terms to mean different things. Claim 5 recites “a member facing to said mounting surface
of said power source board.” Claim 1 recites “a member opposing to a mounting side of said
circuit element.” Both these phrases define “a member” in part by its position relative to some

7

The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that “mounting side of said circuit element” must be
construed to render a difference between the scope of Claim 1 and the scope of Claim 5. First,
different claims may have the same scope. Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438
F.3d 1374, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“two claims with different terminology can define the
exact same subject matter”). And second, Defendants urge a construction that they admit leads to
a nonsensical result.
38

other claimed component. But the phrases differ with respect to the position and to the other
claimed component.
The member of Claim 5 is defined as “facing to” the “mounting surface of said power
source board.” The Court understands this to mean the member is facing the side of the power
source board where the circuit element is mounted. That is, the circuit element is between the
power source board and the member. This comports with the language of Claim 7, which recites

’366 Patent

that Claim 5’s projection portion prevents the circuit element from contacting the member. This
also comports with the description of the exemplary embodiment, in which “the flat head pins
520 and 530 [(exemplary projection portions)] . . . maintain the predetermined distance
necessary, between the elements building up those power source circuits and the frame 110, with

39

certainty (i.e., preventing the elements from contacting on the frame).” ’366 Patent col.7 ll.34–
39, fig.5(c).
In contrast to the language of Claim 5, the member of Claim 1 is defined as “opposing
to” the “mounting side of said circuit element.” The “opposing to” language is used in the
patent to refer to positions on the opposite sides of an object. For instance, in describing the
display panel (in the frame 110, cyan in annotated Figure 2 above) as mounted to the support
members (600, red in annotated Figure 2 above), the patent explains:
Thus, as is apparent from FIG. 2 mentioned above, on the rear surface side of the
panel module 100 mentioned above, surrounding the central portion thereof are
attached plural numbers (in this example, three (3) pieces in total) of supporting
members 600, 600 . . . on the outer periphery of the frame 110, directing into the
vertical direction (i.e., crossing a pair of reinforcement portions opposing to
each other, which are formed on the outer periphery of the flange portion).
’366 Patent col.5 l.56 – col.6 l.1 (emphasis added). With reference to Figure 2, it is apparent that
the reinforcement portions (112) crossed by the support members are on opposite sides of the
frame (110, cyan in annotated Figure 2 above). That is, the reinforcement portions are opposing
to each other because they are on opposite sides of the frame. Likewise, the “member” of Claim
1 is “opposing to” the “mounting side of said circuit element” in that it is on the side of the
circuit element that is the side opposite the “mounting side of the circuit element.”
The Court’s understanding of “opposing to” and “facing to” comports with other claim
language and the description of the exemplary embodiments. For example, this allows the
projection portion to be attached to the power source board and simultaneously not connected to
the member. The board is distinct from the member—the mounting side of the circuit element
faces the board, while the member is on the side of the circuit element that is opposite the
mounting side of the circuit element. Similarly, the projection portion prevents the circuit
element from contacting the member, as recited in Claim 3. And the member may be the rear
40

chassis of the display panel, as recited in Claim 4 and as shown in the exemplary embodiment of
Figure 2. Ultimately, the Court’s interpretation of “opposing to” as the antonym of “facing to” is
better than the parties’ proposal that these terms be treated as synonyms, because this
interpretation better aligns with the claim language and the description of the invention. See
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“‘The construction that
stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the
invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.’” (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs
Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
That said, Claims 8 and 10 are problematic—and ultimately indefinite. Claim 8, which
depends from Claim 5, recites: “The display apparatus according to claim 5, wherein the
member facing to the mounting side of said circuit element is a rear chassis of said display
panel.” ’366 Patent col.10 ll.1–3 (emphasis added). But, as explained above, Claim 5 defines the
position of the member relative to the surface of the power source board, not with respect to the
mounting side of the circuit element: “a member facing to said mounting surface of said power
source board.” Id. at col.9 ll.16–17. Here, given the plain meaning of the “facing to” and
“opposing to” claim language, the antecedent basis—and therefore the meaning—of “the
member facing to the mounting side of said circuit element” is not reasonably certain. The claim
is indefinite. See Halliburton Energy Servs. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“a claim could be indefinite if a term does not have proper antecedent basis where such basis is
not otherwise present by implication or the meaning is not reasonably ascertainable”); Nautilus
Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (“a patent’s claims, viewed in light
of the specification and prosecution history, [are required to] inform those skilled in the art about
the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty”). The only component in Claim 5 that is

41

“facing to” the mounting side of a circuit element mounted on the power source board is the
power source board itself. But one of skill in the art would not understand “the member” of
Claim 8 to be the power source board because Claim 8 recites that “the member” is the “rear
chassis of said display panel” and the invention is described as separating the power source
board’s circuit elements from the display panel’s frame rather than using the power source board
as the frame. See ’366 Patent col.5 l.56 – col.7 l.55. And Claim 8’s “the member facing to the
mounting side of said circuit element” cannot be Claim 1’s “a member facing to said mounting
surface of said power source board” because that would require that the member simultaneously
face both the mounting surface of the power source board and the mounting side of the circuit
element. Ultimately, what Claim 8’s “the member” refers to is not sufficiently certain.
Claim 10, which depends from Claim 9,
suffers from the same defect as Claim 8. Claim

’366 Patent

10 recites “the member facing to the mounting
side of said circuit element.” ’366 Patent col.10
ll.21–22 (emphasis added). But, like Claim 5,
Claim 9 defines the position of the member
relative to the surface of the power source board,
not with respect to the mounting side of the
circuit element: “a member positioned facing to
said mounting surface of said power source board.” Id. at col.19–20. For the same reasons
provided for Claim 8 above, the Court determines that Claim 10 is indefinite.
Accordingly, the Court holds that Claims 8 and 10 are indefinite because the meaning of
the language “the member facing to the mounting side of said circuit element is a rear chassis of

42

said display panel” is not reasonably certain. The Court construes the remaining “mounting side”
terms as follows:


“a projection portion, being disposed higher above a surface of said power source
board than a circuit element of said power source board and not being connected
with a member opposing to a mounting side of said circuit element, is provided on
the surface of said power source board where said circuit element is mounted”
means “a projection portion, being disposed higher above a surface of said power
source board than a circuit element of said power source board and not being
connected with a member opposite the side of the circuit element mounted on the
power source board that is the side nearest to the power source board, is provided
on the surface of said power source board where said circuit element is mounted”;



“when a rear surface of said projection portion is pushed, the circuit element of
said power source board is prevented from contacting the member positioned
opposing to the mounting side of said circuit element by said projection portion”
means “when a rear surface of said projection portion is pushed, the circuit
element of said power source board is prevented from contacting the member
positioned opposite the side of the circuit element mounted on the power source
board that is the side nearest to the power source board by said projection
portion”; and



“wherein the member opposing to the mounting side of said circuit element is a
rear chassis of said display panel” means “wherein the member opposite the side
of the circuit element mounted on the power source board that is the side nearest
to the power source board is a rear chassis of said display panel.”

43

2.

The “horizontal direction” Terms

Disputed Term
“disposed in a horizontal
direction relative to said
display panel”


Defendants’ Proposed
Construction
Indefinite

“located along the display
panel in the horizontal
direction”

Indefinite

’366 Patent Claim 1

“disposed in a horizontal
direction of said display
panel”


Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction
“located along the display
panel in the horizontal
direction”

’366 Patent Claim 5, 9
Because the parties’ arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms

are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff submits that in the context of the claims, these terms indicate that the
“horizontal” direction is in relation to the display panel. Dkt. No. 53 at 34. And that this
“horizontal” direction is perpendicular to the vertical direction defined by the flow of cooling air
described in the patent. Id. at 34–35.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence to support its position. Intrinsic evidence: ’366 Patent col.5 ll.27–30, col.5 l.56 – col.6
l.12, col.6 ll.37–47, col.7 l.66 – col.8 l.38, fig.1, fig.2, fig.7; ’366 Patent File Wrapper August 6,
2010 Notice of Allowability (Plaintiff’s Ex. 19, Dkt. No. 53-20), December 8, 2010 Notice of
Allowability (Plaintiff’s Ex. 23, Dkt. No. 53-24). Extrinsic evidence: American Heritage
College Dictionary (4th ed. 2007) (“horizontal”) (Plaintiff’s Ex. 20, Dkt. No. 53-21 at 12).
Defendants respond that the meaning of “horizontal,” as it is used in the patent to denote
the disposition of the power source and signal boards relative to the display panel, is indefinite
because the patent provides no guidance as to whether the boards “must be placed side by side,
44

situated within a common plane, arranged parallel to the display panel, or otherwise aligned.”
Dkt. No. 58 at 18–19. Defendants further respond that because display panels may be rotated “to
virtually any angle for display” there is no way to determine what is “horizontal” with respect to
the display, and the claims are indefinite. Id. at 19–20. And Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
proposed construction does nothing to clarify claim scope and should therefore be rejected. Id. at
21.
Plaintiff replies that, as set forth in its opening brief, the ’366 Patent provides ample
guidance as to the meaning of “horizontal” as a direction relative to the display panel. Dkt. No.
60 at 10. Plaintiff argues that Defendants ignore this guidance. Id. Plaintiff further responds that
the ’366 Patent states the patent’s invention is applicable to televisions and that televisions have
well-accepted orientation, with the long direction of the display oriented parallel to the floor—
i.e., horizontally. Id. at 10–11. And Plaintiff argues that “horizontal” is also understood with
respect to the patent’s use of “vertical” to describe the direction that cooling air flows—it rises.
Id. at 11. Finally, Plaintiff notes that the patent does not mention rotatable display, and that
Defendants’ hypothetical rotatable display falls within the scope of the claims because “it is
capable of being operated in a least one infringing configuration.” Id. at 11–12.
Plaintiff cites further intrinsic evidence to support its position: ’366 Patent col.1 ll.17–
20.
Analysis
The dispute over the “horizontal” terms is whether one of ordinary skill in the art would
understand–with reasonable certainty–whether something is disposed horizontally relative to the
display panel. Defendants have not established by clear and convincing evidence that the

45

“horizontal” terms render any claim invalid as indefinite. But the Court is not persuaded that
Plaintiff’s proposed construction clarifies the meaning of these terms.
The ’366 Patent uses “horizontal” and “vertical” according to their ordinary meanings.8
For example, the patent refers to the “outer peripheral sizes” of the frame of the display
apparatus as “the vertical and the horizontal sizes.” ’366 Patent col.5 ll.17–35. And, with
reference to Figure 4 (reproduced here and annotated by the Court), the patent describes pipes
(400) extending in these vertical and horizontal dimensions as connected by an “L”-like
component (420, in yellow). See id. & fig.4. The support members (600, in red in annotated
Figure 2) are “directing into

’366 Patent Figures 2 and 4

the vertical direction (i.e.,
crossing

a

reinforcement

pair

horizontal

of

portions
Figure 4

[(112)] opposing to each
other, which are formed on
the outer periphery of the

vertical

flange portion.)” Id. at col.5
l.56 – col.6 l.1. And the
display

apparatus

Figure 2

is

described has having a “stand” (120) at the lower end of the outer support members or affixed to
the reinforcement portion (112) at the “lower side” of the panel module (100). Id. at col.6 ll.13–
36. Thus, the “vertical” direction is “up and down” and the “horizontal” direction is “side to

8

The Court understands—and the extrinsic evidence establishes—that “horizontal” is
perpendicular to “vertical.” American Heritage College Dictionary 668 (4th ed. 2007) (defining
“horizontal” as “At right angles to a vertical line.”) (Plaintiff’s Ex. 20, Dkt. No. 53-21 at 12).
46

side,” just as “vertical” and “horizontal” are commonly used.
With reference to Figure 7 (reproduced below and annotated by the Court), the patent
further provides that the signal board
’366 Patent Figure 7

(500, in blue) and the power source
board (510, in green) are cooled by
air that: (1) enters lower openings
(301) in the display apparatus’s rear
cover (300), (2) flows “upwards” by
the boards’ circuit elements in the gap

vertical

between the boards and the back
surface of the frame (110, in cyan),

horizontal

and (3) exits upper openings (302) in
the in the rear cover. See id. at col.7 ll.13–43, col.7 l.66 – col.8 l.17. That is, the cooling air flows
upward, “in the vertical direction.” Id. at col.8 ll.5–30. Again, this indicates that “vertical” has its
common meaning (i.e., the up-down direction). And by implication, this indicates that
“horizontal” has its common meaning (i.e., the side-to-side direction).
Thus, the claimed display apparatus has a “horizontal” dimension and a “vertical”
dimension, as “horizontal” and “vertical” are commonly understood. And the signal board and
power source board are “disposed in a horizontal direction relative to said display panel” or
“disposed in a horizontal direction of said display panel” when they are located at different
positions along the horizontal dimension of the display apparatus.
Accordingly, the Court determines that the “horizontal direction” terms do not render
any claim of the ’366 Patent indefinite and construes the “horizontal direction” terms as follows:

47



“disposed in a horizontal direction relative to said display panel” means “located
at different positions along the horizontal dimension of the display apparatus”;
and



“disposed in a horizontal direction of said display panel” means “located at
different positions along the horizontal dimension of the display apparatus.”

.
V.

CONCLUSION
The Court holds that Claims 8 and 10 of the ’366 Patent are invalid as indefinite

and adopts the above constructions set forth in this opinion for the agreed and disputed terms
of the Asserted Patents. The parties are ordered that they may not refer, directly or indirectly,
to each other’s claim construction positions in the presence of the jury. Likewise, the parties are
ordered to refrain from mentioning any portion of this opinion, other than the actual definitions
adopted by the Court, in the presence of the jury. Any reference to claim construction
proceedings is limited to informing the jury of the definitions adopted by the Court.
SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2012.
SIGNED this 10th day of November, 2015.

____________________________________
ROY S. PAYNE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

48