Stone Basket Innovations LLC v. Cook Medical LLC

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roy S. Payne on 03/25/2016. (nkl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION

STONE BASKET INNOVATIONS LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
COOK MEDICAL LLC,
Defendant.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

Case No. 2:15-CV-464-JRG-RSP

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On March 18, 2016, the Court held a hearing to determine the proper construction of the
disputed claim terms in United States Patent No. 6,551,327 (“the ’327 Patent”). After
considering the arguments made by the parties at the hearing and in the parties’ claim
construction briefing (Dkt. Nos. 32, 34, and 36), the Court issues this Claim Construction
Memorandum and Order.

Page 1 of 17

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 3

II.

APPLICABLE LAW .......................................................................................................... 6

III.

CONSTRUCTION OF AGREED TERMS ........................................................................ 8

IV.

CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS ..................................................................... 9
1. “first end portion” and “second end portion” ................................................. 9

V.

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 17

Page 2 of 17

I.

BACKGROUND

The ’327 Patent generally relates to an endoscopic stone extraction device that “includes
a handle that supports a sheath, and a filament such as a wire slidably disposed in the sheath.”
See ’327 Patent at Abstract.1 The specification states that these devices are used “for extracting
stones such as ureteral stones, calaceal stones and other calculus and the like from the renal or
biliary systems.” Id. at 1:7–9. Figure 1 of the ’327 Patent illustrates an exemplary embodiment
of the endoscopic stone extraction device.

Id. at Figure 1. The specification states that “[a] typical stone extraction basket includes a wire

1

The Abstract of the ’327 Patent follows:
An endoscopic stone extraction device includes a handle that supports a sheath,
and a filament such as a wire slidably disposed in the sheath. One end of the wire
is mounted to the handle for rotation with respect to the handle and the other end
of the handle supports a stone extraction basket. A manipulator is provided on the
wire to allow a user to rotate the filament and therefore the basket with respect to
the handle. The basket can have a side-facing opening or a rear-facing opening. In
either case, a stone retention region is provided with relatively small openings
sized to retain stones smaller than two millimeters in diameter. 

Page 3 of 17

basket carried by one end of a wire that is received within the lumen of a sheath.” Id. at 1:19–22.
The specification further states that “[t]he end of the wire opposite the basket is secured to a
handle that is used to slide the sheath over the wire, thereby moving the basket into and out of
the lumen of the sheath.” Id. at 1:22–24. The specification adds that “[w]hen the basket is out of
the sheath, it expands to receive a stone.” Id. at 1:24–25. The specification concludes that “[t]he
sheath is then moved toward the basket to reduce the size of the basket openings, and the basket
and the enclosed stone are removed from the body.” Id. at 1:25–28.
According to the specification, “[c]onventional stone extraction baskets are not optimized
for the extraction of shattered stone fragments.” Id. at 1:33–35. Figure 9 of the ’327 Patent
illustrates an exemplary embodiment of the stone retention basket used in embodiments of the
device.

Id. at Figure 9. The specification states that the stone extraction basket “includes a stone entrance
region 100 and a stone retention region 102.” Id. at 4:32–33. The specification adds that “[t]his

Page 4 of 17

basket is formed by a set of longitudinal basket wires 104 and a set of lateral basket wires 106.”
Id. at 4:35–36. The specification further states that “[t]he longitudinal basket wires 104 form a
larger opening 108 in the stone entrance region 100, and the basket wires 104, 106 cooperate to
form a number of smaller openings 110 in the stone retention region 102.” Id. at 4:36–40. The
specification adds that “the larger opening 108 is sized to admit a stone that is at least two
millimeters in diameter, and the smaller openings 110 are sized to retain a stone smaller than two
millimeters in diameter.” Id. at 4:40–44.
Plaintiff brings suit alleging infringement of claims 1 and 2 of the ’327 Patent. Claim 1 of
the ’327 Patent is an exemplary claim and recites the following elements (disputed term in
italics):
1. An endoscopic stone-extraction device comprising:
a support filament comprising a first end portion and a second
end portion;
a sheath comprising a lumen, the support filament disposed in
the lumen such that the sheath is slideable with respect to
the support filament;
a collapsible stone-extraction basket carried by the first end
portion of the support filament and receivable within the
lumen of the sheath;
a handle comprising a sheath movement element, wherein
movement of the sheath movement element in a first
direction advances the sheath and causes the basket to at
least partially collapse inside the lumen of the sheath, and
wherein movement of the sheath movement element in a
second direction retracts the sheath and causes the basket
to expand to an operational shape outside the lumen of the
sheath;
the basket, when expanded to the operation shape outside the
lumen of the sheath, comprising a stone-entrance region
and a stone-retention region, the stone-entrance region
comprising a first opening sized to admit a stone into the
basket, the stone-retention region comprising a plurality of
second openings, all of the second openings being smaller
than the first opening;
the first opening facing the first end portion of the support
filament, the stone-retention region positioned on a side of

Page 5 of 17

the basket opposite the first end portion of the support
filament;
wherein the basket comprises a set of longitudinal basket
filaments radiating from the first end portion of the
support filament and a set of lateral basket filaments
extending between the longitudinal basket filaments, the
lateral basket filaments positioned substantially entirely in
the stone-retention region of the basket.
II.

APPLICABLE LAW
A. Claim Construction

“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention
to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start
by considering the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1313. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group,
Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims
themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R.
Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 861. Courts give claim terms their ordinary and accustomed meaning as
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the
entire patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
The claims themselves provide substantial guidance in determining the meaning of
particular claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. First, a term’s context in the asserted claim
can be very instructive. Id. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the
claim’s meaning because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id.
Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For

Page 6 of 17

example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that
the independent claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314–15.
“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id.
(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am.
Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of New York v.
Symantec Corp., No. 2015-1146, 2016 WL 386068, slip op., at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2016). This
is true because a patentee may define his own terms, give a claim term a different meaning than
the term would otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow the claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1316. In these situations, the inventor’s lexicography governs. Id. The specification may also
resolve ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words used
in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the
words alone.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. But, “‘[a]lthough the specification may aid the
court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments and
examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.’” Comark
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v.
Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1323. The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim
construction because a patent applicant may also define a term in prosecuting the patent. Home
Diagnostics, Inc., v. Lifescan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of the
specification, a patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent.”).

Page 7 of 17

Although extrinsic evidence can be useful, it is “‘less significant than the intrinsic record
in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317
(quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court
understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use
claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad or
may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert
testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the
particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert’s conclusory, unsupported
assertions as to a term’s definition are entirely unhelpful to a court. Id. Generally, extrinsic
evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read
claim terms.” Id.
III.

CONSTRUCTION OF AGREED TERMS

The parties agreed to the construction of the following term:
Claim Term/Phrase
“end portion”

Agreed Construction
“the end of a structure such as a filament along
with the adjacent portion of the structure”

Dkt. No. 37 at 2. In view of the parties’ agreement on the proper construction of the
identified terms, the Court hereby ADOPTS the parties’ agreed construction.

Page 8 of 17

IV.

CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS

The parties’ dispute focuses on the meaning and scope of two terms in the ’327 Patent.
“first end portion” and “second end portion” 2

1.
Disputed Term
“first end portion”

Plaintiff’s Proposal
no construction is necessary

“second end portion”

no construction is necessary

Defendant’s Proposal
“the proximal end (i.e., the end
closer to the physician)”
“the distal end of the support
filament (i.e., the end further
from the physician)”3

a) The Parties’ Positions
The parties dispute whether the terms “first end” and “second end” require construction.
Plaintiff argues that the words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary
meaning. “In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language . . . may be readily apparent
even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application
of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” (Dkt. No. 32 at 9) (citing
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). Plaintiff contends that
an ordinary person would immediately appreciate that a “filament” necessarily has two ends.
(Dkt. No. 32 at 8.) Plaintiff argues that the claim identifies one end as the “first end,” and the
other end as the “second end.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff further argues that the patentee did not act as
2

The Court notes that Defendant proposed “first end” and “second end” for construction.
Plaintiff contends that the claims recite a “first end portion” and a “second end portion.” (Dkt.
No. 36 at 4.) Plaintiff argues that the term “end portion” is defined in the specification, and that
the parties agreed to that construction. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, all that remains for claim
construction is the meaning of the terms “first” and “second.” (Id.) The Court agrees, and will
consider the terms “first end portion” and “second end portion,” in light of the parties’ agreed
construction for “end portion.”
3

Defendant states that in the Joint Claim Construction Statement (Dkt. No. 30-1), it
inadvertently described its proposed construction of “second end” as the “distal portion of the
support filament,” rather than the “distal end of the support filament.” (Dkt. No. 34 at 6 n.1)
(emphasis in original).
Page 9 of 17

his own lexicographer, and did not make a clear and unequivocal disclaimer of the full scope of
the plain and ordinary meaning of these terms. (Id. at 10.) Therefore, according to Plaintiff, the
claim language is clear on its face, and no additional construction is needed. (Id. at 7.)
Defendant argues that the specification refers to the “first end” as the end of the support
filament that is “rotatably secured to the grip” on the handle of the device. (Dkt. No. 34 at 8)
(citing ’327 Patent at 2:33–35). Defendant further contends that the specification repeatedly uses
the term “first end” to refer to this location in describing the claimed invention. (Dkt. No. 34 at
8) (citing ’327 Patent at 2:31–38, 3:31–33, 4:14–16, Fig. 2). According to Defendant, a person
skilled in the art would understand from the specification that the “first end” of the support
filament is on the “proximal end” of the device (i.e., the end closest to the physician during use).
(Dkt. No. 34 at 8.)
Defendant also argues that the specification describes the term “second end” as the end of
the support filament that “supports a stone extraction basket.” (Id. at 8) (citing ’327 Patent at
2:36 38). Defendant contends that the specification repeatedly uses the term “second end” to
refer to this specific location in describing the claimed invention. (Dkt. No. 34 at 9) (citing ’327
at 2:31–38, 4:55–57, 5:1–5, Figs. 1, 9-11). According to Defendant, a person skilled in the art
would understand from the specification that the “second end” of the support filament is the
“distal end” of the device (i.e., the end furthest from the physician during use). (Dkt. No. 34 at
9.)
Regarding Plaintiff’s position, Defendant argues that it is directly contrary to the meaning
of the terms provided in the specification. (Id. at 10.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff has
provided no guidance as to which end of the claimed invention is the “first end,” and which end
is the “second end.” (Id. at 11.) Defendant argues that the claim language merges two terms

Page 10 of 17

defined in the specification (“first end” and “end portion”) to create an entirely new term (“first
end portion”) that is not defined or even mentioned in the specification. (Id.)
Plaintiff replies that the only substantive claim term related to this claim construction
dispute is “end portion.” (Dkt. No. 36 at 4.) Plaintiff notes that the term “end portion” was
defined explicitly in the specification, and that the parties agreed to that construction. (Id. at 4.)
According to Plaintiff, all that remains for claim construction is the meaning of the terms “first”
and “second.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues the plain and ordinary meaning of these terms as they relate
to a “support filament” is clear to a person of ordinary skill in the art, to a lay judge, and to a
jury. (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff also argues that it is widely understood by courts and practitioners that the terms
“first” and “second” in a patent claim are modifiers, used to delineate multiple instances of the
same or similar structure. (Id. at 7.) According to Plaintiff, “first” and “second” are merely
modifiers to distinguish between the two ends of a filament, and that there is no basis to import a
spatial location of “first” from the specification into the claims. (Id. at 8.)
Plaintiff further argues that the plain meaning of the claim language is entirely consistent
with the specification. (Id.) Plaintiff contends claim 1 states that the stone-extraction basket is
carried by the first end portion, and that the stone-extraction device comprises a handle. (Id.)
Plaintiff argues that every description in the specification, and every figure illustrating the
invention clearly shows that the stone-extraction basket and the handle are at opposite ends of
the support filament. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff further argues that Defendant’s constructions exclude all
embodiments, makes the claim invention inconsistent with the specification and inoperable, and
improperly imports additional limitations into the claims. (Id. at 5.)
Finally, Plaintiff argues that under Defendant’s constructions, the endoscopic extraction

Page 11 of 17

device would be designed to be used so that the “handle” is inserted into a patient’s body for the
retrieval of stones, while the physician holds the “stone-extraction basket.” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff
contends that this would be in direct contravention to the described use of the invention in the
specification, and the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. (Id. at 11-12.)
Plaintiff further argues that Defendant’s constructions improperly import the limitations of a
“physician” and orientation of the apparatus relative to the physician into the claims. (Id. at 12.)
For the following reasons, the Court finds that the terms “first end portion” and
“second end portion” do not require construction.
b) Analysis
To begin its analysis, the Court turns to the language of the claims. The term “first end
portion” appears in claims 1 and 2 of the ’327 Patent, and the term “second end portion” appears
in claim 1 of the ’327 Patent. Specifically, claim 1 recites “a support filament comprising a first
end portion and a second end portion.” Claim 1 further recites that a collapsible stone-extraction
basket is “carried by the first end portion of the support filament.” Considering this claim
language, the Court finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “first”
and “second” are used in claim 1 to delineate each end of the support filament.
It is widely understood that the terms “first” and “second” in a patent claim are modifiers,
used to delineate multiple instances of the same or similar structure. See 3M Innovative Props.
Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The use of the terms
“first” and “second” is a common patent-law convention to distinguish between repeated
instances of an element or limitation.”); Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323
F.3d 989, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[F]irst and second opposed ends”). Here, the parties agreed to a
construction for the term “end portion” based on an explicit definition provided by the patentee

Page 12 of 17

in the specification. See ’327 Patent at 5:61–63 (“The term ‘end portion’ is intended broadly to
encompass the end of structure such as a filament along with an adjacent portion of the
structure.”). Given this definition, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the
terms “first” and “second” were added to “end portion” to indicate that the recited filament has
two different “end portions.”
Indeed, claim 1 recites that the stone-extraction basket is carried by the “end portion” of
the support filament labeled “first,” as opposed to the “end portion” of the filament labeled
“second.” The Court further notes that Defendant agreed at the claim construction hearing that
this was a common sense reading of claim 1. Accordingly, the Court finds the claim language on
its face is unambiguous, and indicates that the disputed terms do not require construction.
Turning to the specification, the Court finds that the claim language is consistent with the
specification. For example, every disclosed embodiment indicates that the support filament has a
first end that is opposite the second end. See, e.g., ’327 Patent at 1:20–28 (“A typical stone
extraction basket includes a wire basket carried by one end of a wire that is received within the
lumen of a sheath. The end of the wire opposite the basket is secured to a handle that is used to
slide the sheath over the wire, thereby moving the basket into an out of the lumen of the
sheath.”). Moreover, every disclosed embodiment illustrates that the collapsible stone-extraction
basket is secured to one end of the filament, and that the handle is secured to the opposite end of
the filament. See, e.g., ’327 Patent at 2:31-38, 3:31-33, 4:14-16, Figs. 1 and 2. Indeed, Defendant
agreed at the claim construction hearing that the “first end” and “second end” were intended to
refer to opposite ends of the support filament.
Defendant argues that the specification, not the claims, refers to the “first end” as the end
of the support filament that is “rotatably secured to the grip” on the handle of the device (i.e., the

Page 13 of 17

end closest to the physician during use). (Dkt. No. 34 at 8) (citing ’327 Patent at 2:33–35).
According to Defendant, a person skilled in the art would understand from the specification that
the “first end” of the support filament is on the “proximal end” of the device (i.e., the end closest
to the physician during use). (Dkt. No. 34 at 8.) Defendant also argues the specification describes
the term “second end” as the end of the support filament that “supports a stone extraction
basket.” (Dkt. No. 34 at 8) (citing ’327 Patent at 2:36–38). According to Defendant, a person
skilled in the art would understand from the specification that the “second end” of the support
filament is the “distal end” of the device (i.e., the end furthest from the physician during use).
(Dkt. No. 34 at 9.) The Court disagrees with Defendant’s analysis.
As an initial matter, claim 1 recites a “first end portion” and a “second end portion.” In
contrast, Defendant cites to portions of the specification that refer to a “first end” and a “second
end.” Defendant does not argue, and the Court does not find that the patentee acted as his own
lexicographer, or disclaimed the full scope of the plain and ordinary meaning of “first” and
“second.” Instead, the patentee provided an explicit definition for “end portion,” without limiting
the terms “first” or “second,” or changing their plain and ordinary meaning.
Moreover, contrary to Defendant’s suggestion, the use of “first end” or “second end” in
the claim language is consistent with the specification. Like claim 1, the specification indicates
that the filament has a first end and a second end. ’327 Patent at 2: 31–32 (“The device also
includes a filament 22 having a first end 24 (FIG. 2) and a second end 26 (FIG. 1).”). Likewise,
the specification further indicates that the collapsible stone-extraction basket is secured to one
end of the filament, and that the handle is secured to the opposite end filament. See, e.g., ’327
Patent at 2:31-38, 3:31-33, 4:14-16, Figs. 1 and 2. Accordingly, the Court finds that the claim
language is unambiguous, and that the specification does not indicate that the claim terms

Page 14 of 17

require further construction.
Turning to Defendant’s constructions, the Court rejects Defendant’s constructions
because they contradict the intrinsic evidence, and would exclude every disclosed embodiment.
Defendant’s constructions require the “first end [portion]” to be the end “closer to the
physician,” and the “second end [portion]” to be the end “further from the physician.” Thus,
under Defendant’s constructions, the “stone-extraction basket” would be located at the “proximal
end (i.e., the end closer the physician),” and the handle would be at the “the distal portion of the
support filament (i.e., the portion further from the physician).” In other words, Defendant’s
constructions would require inserting the “handle” into a patient’s body for the retrieval of
stones, while the physician holds the “stone-extraction basket.” This is not how a person of
ordinary skill in the art would interpret the intrinsic evidence. Indeed, Defendant agreed at the
claim construction hearing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not read the intrinsic
evidence in this manner.
Instead, Defendant argued at the claim construction hearing that claim 1 includes a
drafting error, because the patentee flipped the use of “first” and “second” in the claims, from the
use of “first” and “second” in the specification. The Court disagrees that claim 1 includes a
drafting error, and finds that Defendant’s constructions would import unwarranted limitations
into the claim. Defendant proposes construing “first end” as the “proximal end,” and “second
end” as the “distal end.” The Court finds that the words “proximal” and “distal” do not appear
anywhere in the specification.”4 In fact, the word “proximally” appears only once in the
specification, and it is used to describe the relative position of the basket to a stone. ’327 Patent
4

During the claim construction hearing, Defendant indicated that the phrase “(i.e., the end
closer to the physician)” in its construction for “first end,” and the phrase “(i.e., the end further
from the physician)” in its construction for “second end,” were not necessary and could be
deleted.
Page 15 of 17

at 5:7–10 (“Also, the basket 28’ may be positioned proximally of a stone prior to lithothripsy to
prevent stone fragments from migrating up the ureter.”). Accordingly, the Court rejects
Defendant’s constructions because they would read limitations into the claims that do not appear
anywhere in the intrinsic evidence.
Moreover, there is not one instance in the intrinsic evidence where the end portion that
secures the collapsible stone-extraction basket is identified as “the proximal end (i.e., the end
closer to the physician).” In fact, the intrinsic evidence consistently indicates that the end that
secures the collapsible stone-extraction basket is the end of the filament that is inserted into the
patient, and is not the end closer to the physician. As discussed, the specification states that the
handle and the stone-extraction basket are located at opposite ends of the support filament. ’327
Patent at 2:31–34. The specification further indicates that the physician grasps the handle during
use, and that the stone-extraction basket is intended to be inserted into the body of a patient to
extract a stone. Id. at 4:30–64. Defendant’s constructions would require the exact opposite result.
Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant’s constructions because they are inconsistent with the
intrinsic evidence, and would exclude every disclosed embodiment from the scope of the claims.
See Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“A claim construction that
excludes the preferred embodiment ‘is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly
persuasive evidentiary support.’”), quoting Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co.,
616 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639
F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]here is a strong presumption against a claim construction
that excludes a disclosed embodiment.”); Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527
F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[O]ur court has cautioned against interpreting a claim term in
a way that excludes disclosed embodiments, when that term has multiple ordinary meanings

Page 16 of 17

consistent with the intrinsic record.”); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575,
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“We share the district court’s view that it is unlikely that an inventor
would define the invention in a way that excluded the preferred embodiment, or that persons of
skill in this field would read the specification in such a way.”).
In sum, the Court finds that claim 1 recites that the stone-extraction basket is carried by
the “end portion” of the support filament identified as the “first end portion,” as opposed to the
“end portion” of the filament identified as the “second end portion.” The intrinsic evidence does
not require more, and Defendant’s unwarranted limitations will not be read into the claims.
c) Court’s Construction
In light of the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court finds that the terms “first
end portion” and “second end portion” are unambiguous and do not require construction.
V.

CONCLUSION

.
The Court adopts the above constructions. The parties are ordered to not refer, directly or
indirectly, to each other’s claim construction positions in the presence of the jury. Likewise, the
parties are ordered to refrain from mentioning any part of this opinion, other than the definitions
adopted by the Court, in the presence of the jury. However, the parties are reminded that the
testimony of any witness is bound by the Court’s reasoning in this order but any reference to
claim construction proceedings is limited to informing the jury of the definitions adopted by the
Court.
It is SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2012.
SIGNED this 25th day of March, 2016.

____________________________________
ROY S. PAYNE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Page 17 of 17