Saint Lawrence Communications LLC v. Apple Inc. et al

Filing 170

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. Signed by Judge Rodney Gilstrap on 7/5/17. (mrm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
SAINT LAWRENCE
COMMUNICATIONS LLC,
v.
APPLE INC., et al.

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CASE NO. 2:16-CV-82-JRG

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Saint Lawrence Communications LLC’s (“Plaintiff’s”)
Opening Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. No. 100). Also before the Court are Defendants Apple
Inc., AT&T Mobility LLC, and Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless’s (“Defendants’”)
response (Dkt. No. 109) and Plaintiffs’ reply (Dkt. No. 117).
The Court held a claim construction hearing on March 3, 2017.

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Table of Contents
I. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 3
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ........................................................................................................... 5
III. AGREED TERMS............................................................................................................... 10
IV. DISPUTED TERMS ............................................................................................................ 10
A. “[synthesized] [weighted] wideband [speech] signal” ........................................................ 10
B. “fixed denominator” ............................................................................................................ 16
C. “A [device/method] for enhancing periodicity of an excitation signal produced in
relation to a pitch codevector and an innovation codevector for supplying a signal
synthesis filter in view of synthesizing a wideband speech signal” ................................... 18
D. “low frequency portion” ..................................................................................................... 21
E. “high frequency content”..................................................................................................... 24
F. “wherein γ2 is set equal to μ” ............................................................................................... 26
G. “said excitation signal” ....................................................................................................... 28
H. “means for comparing an innovative codebook gain g computed during encoding of the
wideband signal to a threshold given by the initial modified gain from the past
subframe g–1 as follows: if g < g–1 then g0=g x 1.19 bounded by g0<g–1, and if g>g–
1 then g0=g/1.19 bounded by g0>g–1” .............................................................................. 31
I. “means for determining said smoothing gain through the following relation: gs =
Sm*g0+(1–Sm)*g” ................................................................................................................ 33
J. Additional Terms.................................................................................................................. 35
V. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................... 39

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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings suit alleging infringement of United States Patents No. 6,795,805 (“the
’805 Patent”), 6,807,524 (“the ’524 Patent”), 7,151,802 (“the ’802 Patent”), 7,191,123 (“the ’123
Patent”), and 7,260,521 (“the ’521 Patent”) (collectively, the “patents-in-suit”). Plaintiff submits
that “[a]ll of the asserted patents in this case relate to the transmission of wideband speech signals,”
and “[a]ll five patents have been declared essential to the AMR-WB [(Adaptive Multi-Rate
Wideband)] [audio coding] standard . . . .” (Dkt. No. 100, at 1 & 2.)
The ’805 Patent, titled “Periodicity Enhancement in Decoding Wideband Signals,” issued
on September 21, 2004, and the Abstract states:
An alternative approach by which periodicity enhancement of an excitation signal
is achieved through filtering an innovative codevector by an innovation filter to
reduce low frequency content of the innovative codevector and enhance the
periodicity at low frequencies more than high frequencies.
The ’524 Patent, titled “Perceptual Weighting Device and Method for Efficient Coding of
Wideband Signals,” issued on October 19, 2004, and the Abstract states:
A perceptual weighting device for producing a perceptually weighted signal in
response to a wideband signal comprises a signal pre-emphasis filter, a synthesis
filter calculator, and a perceptual weighting filter. The signal pre-emphasis filter
enhances the high frequency content of the wideband signal to thereby produce a
pre-emphasized signal. The signal pre-emphasis filter has a transfer function of the
form: P(z) = 1–μz–1, wherein μ is a pre-emphasis factor having a value located
between 0 and 1. The synthesis filter calculator is responsive to the pre-emphasized
signal for producing synthesis filter coefficients. Finally, the perceptual weighting
filter processes the pre-emphasized signal in relation to the synthesis filter
coefficients to produce the perceptually weighted signal. The perceptual weighting
filter has a transfer function, with fixed denominator, of the form: W(z) = A (z/γ1)
/ (1–γ2z–1) where 0<γ2<γ1≤1.
The ’802 Patent, titled “High Frequency Content Recovering Method and Device for OverSampled Synthesized Wideband Signal,” issued on December 19, 2006, and the Abstract states:
In a method and device for recovering the high frequency content of a wideband
signal previously down-sampled, and for injecting this high frequency content in
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an over-sampled synthesized version of the wideband signal to produce a fillspectrum synthesized wideband signal, a random noise generator produces a noise
sequence having a given spectrum. A spectral shaping unit spectrally shapes the
noise sequence in relation to linear prediction filter coefficients related to the downsampled wideband signal. A signal injection circuit finally injects the spectrallyshaped noise sequence in the over-sampled synthesized signal version to thereby
produce the full-spectrum synthesized wideband signal.
The ’123 Patent, titled “Gain-Smoothing in Wideband Speech and Audio Signal Decoder,”
issued on March 13, 2007, and the Abstract states:
The gain smoothing method and device modify the amplitude of an innovative
codevector in relation to background noise present in a previously sampled
wideband signal. The gain smoothing device comprises a gain smoothing
calculator for calculating a smoothing gain in response to a factor representative of
voicing in the sampled wideband signal, a factor representative of the stability of a
set of linear prediction filter coefficients, and an innovative codebook gain. The
gain smoothing device also comprises an amplifier for amplifying the innovative
codevector with the smoothing gain to thereby produce a gain-smoothed innovative
codevector. The function of the gain-smoothing device improves the perceived
synthesized signal when background noise is present in the sampled wideband
signal.
The ’521 Patent, titled “Method and Device for Adaptive Bandwidth Pitch Search in
Coding Wideband Signals,” issued on August 21, 2007, and the Abstract states:
An improved pitch search method and device for digitally encoding a wideband
signal, in particular but not exclusively a speech signal, in view of transmitting, or
storing, and synthesizing this wideband sound signal. The new method and device
which achieve efficient modeling of the harmonic structure of the speech spectrum
uses several forms of low pass filters applied to a pitch codevector, the one yielding
higher prediction gain (i.e. the lowest pitch prediction error) is selected and the
associated pitch codebook parameters are forwarded.
The ’805 Patent, the ’524 Patent, the ’802 Patent, and the ’521 Patent all list a foreign
priority document dated October 27, 1998, namely Canadian Patent Application No. 2,252,170.
The ’123 Patent lists a foreign priority document dated November 18, 1999, namely Canadian
Patent Application No. 2,290,037. Defendants submit: “The Asserted Patents generally share the

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same figures and specification, with minor differences that relate to the specific claims of each
patent.” (Dkt. No. 109, at 2.)
The patents-in-suit were previously construed by this Court in Saint Lawrence
Communications LLC v. ZTE Corp., et al., No. 2:15-CV-349, Dkt. No. 236 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24,
2016) (“ZTE”).
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
It is understood that “[a] claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which
the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using or selling the protected
invention.” Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Claim construction is clearly an issue of law for the court to decide. Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
“In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic
evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background
science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period.” Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015) (citation omitted). “In cases where those
subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about that
extrinsic evidence. These are the ‘evidentiary underpinnings’ of claim construction that we
discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal.”
Id. (citing 517 U.S. 370).
To ascertain the meaning of claims, courts look to three primary sources: the claims, the
specification, and the prosecution history. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The specification must
contain a written description of the invention that enables one of ordinary skill in the art to make
and use the invention. Id. A patent’s claims must be read in view of the specification, of which

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they are a part. Id. For claim construction purposes, the description may act as a sort of dictionary,
which explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims. Id. “One purpose for
examining the specification is to determine if the patentee has limited the scope of the claims.”
Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Nonetheless, it is the function of the claims, not the specification, to set forth the limits of
the patentee’s invention. Otherwise, there would be no need for claims. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita
Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). The patentee is free to be his own
lexicographer, but any special definition given to a word must be clearly set forth in the
specification. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Although the specification may indicate that certain embodiments are preferred, particular
embodiments appearing in the specification will not be read into the claims when the claim
language is broader than the embodiments. Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc.,
34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
This Court’s claim construction analysis is substantially guided by the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Phillips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In Phillips,
the court set forth several guideposts that courts should follow when construing claims. In
particular, the court reiterated that “the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee
is entitled the right to exclude.” 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water
Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To that end, the words used in a claim
are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. Id. The ordinary and customary
meaning of a claim term “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in
the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent
application.” Id. at 1313. This principle of patent law flows naturally from the recognition that

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inventors are usually persons who are skilled in the field of the invention and that patents are
addressed to, and intended to be read by, others skilled in the particular art. Id.
Despite the importance of claim terms, Phillips made clear that “the person of ordinary
skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in
which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the
specification.” Id. Although the claims themselves may provide guidance as to the meaning of
particular terms, those terms are part of “a fully integrated written instrument.” Id. at 1315
(quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). Thus, the Phillips court emphasized the specification as being
the primary basis for construing the claims. Id. at 1314–17. As the Supreme Court stated long
ago, “in case of doubt or ambiguity it is proper in all cases to refer back to the descriptive portions
of the specification to aid in solving the doubt or in ascertaining the true intent and meaning of the
language employed in the claims.” Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878). In addressing the role of
the specification, the Phillips court quoted with approval its earlier observations from Renishaw
PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998):
Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and
confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and
intended to envelop with the claim. The construction that stays true to the claim
language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention
will be, in the end, the correct construction.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Consequently, Phillips emphasized the important role the specification
plays in the claim construction process.
The prosecution history also continues to play an important role in claim interpretation.
Like the specification, the prosecution history helps to demonstrate how the inventor and the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) understood the patent. Id. at 1317. Because
the file history, however, “represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant,”

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it may lack the clarity of the specification and thus be less useful in claim construction proceedings.
Id. Nevertheless, the prosecution history is intrinsic evidence that is relevant to the determination
of how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention during
prosecution by narrowing the scope of the claims. Id.; see Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys.,
Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that “a patentee’s statements during prosecution,
whether relied on by the examiner or not, are relevant to claim interpretation”).
Phillips rejected any claim construction approach that sacrificed the intrinsic record in
favor of extrinsic evidence, such as dictionary definitions or expert testimony. The en banc court
condemned the suggestion made by Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193
(Fed. Cir. 2002), that a court should discern the ordinary meaning of the claim terms (through
dictionaries or otherwise) before resorting to the specification for certain limited purposes.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319–24. According to Phillips, reliance on dictionary definitions at the
expense of the specification had the effect of “focus[ing] the inquiry on the abstract meaning of
words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.” Id. at 1321.
Phillips emphasized that the patent system is based on the proposition that the claims cover only
the invented subject matter. Id.
Phillips does not preclude all uses of dictionaries in claim construction proceedings.
Instead, the court assigned dictionaries a role subordinate to the intrinsic record. In doing so, the
court emphasized that claim construction issues are not resolved by any magic formula. The court
did not impose any particular sequence of steps for a court to follow when it considers disputed
claim language. Id. at 1323–25. Rather, Phillips held that a court must attach the appropriate
weight to the intrinsic sources offered in support of a proposed claim construction, bearing in mind
the general rule that the claims measure the scope of the patent grant.

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The Supreme Court of the United States has “read [35 U.S.C.] § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a
patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled
in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). “A determination of claim indefiniteness is a
legal conclusion that is drawn from the court’s performance of its duty as the construer of patent
claims.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Nautilus, 134
S. Ct. 2120.
In general, prior claim construction proceedings involving the same patents-in-suit are
“entitled to reasoned deference under the broad principals of stare decisis and the goals articulated
by the Supreme Court in Markman, even though stare decisis may not be applicable per se.”
Maurice Mitchell Innovations, LP v. Intel Corp., No. 2:04-CV-450, 2006 WL 1751779, at *4 (E.D.
Tex. June 21, 2006) (Davis, J.); see TQP Development, LLC v. Intuit Inc., No. 2:12-CV-180, 2014
WL 2810016, at *6 (E.D. Tex. June 20, 2014) (Bryson, J.) (“[P]revious claim constructions in
cases involving the same patent are entitled to substantial weight, and the Court has determined
that it will not depart from those constructions absent a strong reason for doing so.”); see also
Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 839–40 (“prior cases will sometimes be binding because of issue preclusion
and sometimes will serve as persuasive authority”) (citation omitted); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV
Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting “the importance of uniformity in the
treatment of a given patent”) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390
(1996)).

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III. AGREED TERMS
In their December 2, 2016 Amended Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement,
the parties set forth agreements as to the following terms in the patents-in-suit (Dkt. No. 99, at 2):
Term

Agreement

“means for transmitting the encoded wideband This term is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(6).
signal”
Function: transmitting an encoded wideband
(Claims 53 and 69 of the ’123 Patent)
signal
Corresponding Structure: transmission circuit;
and equivalents thereof
“means for receiving a transmitted encoded This term is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(6).
wideband signal”
Function: receiving a transmitted encoded
(Claims 53 and 69 of the ’123 Patent)
wideband signal
Corresponding Structure: receiving circuit;
and equivalents thereof
The parties have also reached agreements as to the application of the Court’s ZTE
constructions in the above-captioned case. (See Dkt. No. 93, Joint Motion for Entry of Prior Claim
Construction Order as to Certain Specified Terms; see also Dkt. No. 95, Nov. 21, 2016 Order; Dkt.
No. 145, Joint Notice Regarding Prior Claim Construction Briefing.)
IV. DISPUTED TERMS
A. “[synthesized] [weighted] wideband [speech] signal”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

“a [synthesized] [weighted] [speech] signal
that spans a wider bandwidth than
Alternatively:
traditional telephone signals and that has a
“a [synthesized] [weighted] [speech] signal frequency range of 50–7000 Hz sampled at
that spans a wider bandwidth than traditional 16000 samples/sec”
telephone signals and that has a frequency range
of approximately 50–7000Hz”
No construction is necessary.

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(Dkt. No. 99, Ex. A, at 1; id., Ex. B, at 1; Dkt. No. 100, at 4; Dkt. No. 109, at 3; Dkt. No. 117, at 1;
Dkt. No. 118, Ex. B, at 1–2.) The parties submit that this term appears throughout the claims of
the patents-in-suit. (See Dkt. No. 99, Ex. A, at 1; id., Ex. B, at 1; Dkt. No. 118, Ex. B, at 1–2.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “[t]he term ‘wideband signal’ has been well-known and commonlyused by those of ordinary skill in the art for years and need not be construed.” (Dkt. No. 100, at 4.)
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ proposal should be rejected because “[a] wideband signal is
not strictly limited to the range of 50–7,000 Hz,” and “Defendants’ addition of the phrase ‘sampled
at 16000 samples/sec’ is also improper” because “the specification repeatedly refers to downsampled signals as being ‘wideband’ signals.” (Id., at 6 & 9.)
Defendants respond that the specification expressly defines the disputed term as requiring
sampling at 16,000 samples/sec. (Dkt. No. 109, at 4 (citing ’805 Patent at 2:12–14).) Defendants
argue that “[t]his explicit definition confirms both (a) the established ordinary meaning requires
not only a specific bandwidth, but also a specific sampling rate, and (b) a wideband signal downsampled to 12,800 samples/sec is no longer a wideband signal.” (Dkt. No. 109, at 5.)
Plaintiff replies, for example, that “signal ‘S’ in Figure 1 . . . is defined in the patent as the
‘wideband signal input speech vector (after down-sampling, pre-processing, and preemphasis).’”
(Dkt. No. 117, at 2 (quoting ’802 Patent at 7:58–59) (emphasis Plaintiff’s).)
At the March 3, 2017 hearing, Plaintiff also noted its alternative proposal in supplemental
briefing in the ZTE case that “wideband” means “a signal that spans a wider bandwidth than
traditional telephone signals and that has a frequency range of approximately 50–7000 Hz,
including a signal down-sampled from 16 kHz to 12.8 kHz.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 453.)

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Defendants responded that the word “approximately,” which was introduced by the ZTE
construction, is unclear and lacks support in the specification.
(2) Analysis
In ZTE, the Court construed this disputed term to mean “a [synthesized] [weighted]
[speech] signal that spans a wider bandwidth than traditional telephone signals and that has a
frequency range of approximately 50–7000Hz.”
Here as in ZTE, the Court finds construction is appropriate. See ZTE at 107–113. The
Court thus rejects Plaintiff’s proposal that no construction is necessary.
Also, as in ZTE, the Court finds that the disputed term refers to an approximate frequency
range, not a precise frequency range. See id. Further, although Defendants have argued that the
word “approximately” lacks support, the specification discloses that “[a] bandwidth in the range
50–7000 Hz was found sufficient for delivering a face-to-face speech quality.” ’802 Patent at
1:25–27 (emphasis added). Because the term “bandwidth” itself refers to a band of frequencies,
the phrase “in the range” can be readily interpreted as referring to an approximate range rather
than an exact range. The Court hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ proposal of an exact
frequency range of 50–7000 Hz.
The remaining issue, namely whether this term requires a sampling rate of 16,000
samples/sec (16 kHz), was not raised in the ZTE claim construction proceedings.
The ’805 Patent discloses:
In the telephone band, the sound signal is band-limited to 200–3400 Hz and
sampled at 8000 samples/sec. In wideband speech/audio applications, the sound
signal is band-limited to 50–7000 Hz and sampled at 16000 samples/sec.
’805 Patent at 2:9–13. This reference to particular “applications,” however, does not rise to the
level of a clear definition of the term “wideband signal.” See CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,

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288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he claim term will not receive its ordinary meaning if
the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim
term in either the specification or prosecution history.”) (emphasis added); see also Sinorgchem
Co., Shandong v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 511 F.3d 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“the drafter clearly,
deliberately, and precisely defined the term”).
On one hand, the ’802 Patent discloses, for example, that “[a]t the decoder, the high
frequency contents of the signal needs to be reintroduced to remove the low pass filtering effect
from the decoded synthesized signal and retrieve the natural sounding quality of wideband
signals.” ’802 Patent at 2:53–61. Defendants’ expert likewise submits that down-sampling results
in reduction of signal bandwidth. (Dkt. No. 109, Dec. 21, 2016 Kotzin Decl., at ¶ 46.)
On the other hand, the patents-in-suit refer to down-sampled signals—that is, signals with
a sampling rate that is less than 16 kHz—as “wideband” signals. For example, Claim 1 of the ’802
Patent recites “receiving an encoded version of a wideband signal previously down-sampled
during encoding,” and the specification discloses down-sampling “from 16 kHz to 12.8 kHz.” ’802
Patent at 8:33–34. Although Defendants argue that this claim recites merely “an encoded version”
rather than a wideband signal itself, the same limitation of the claim refers to “said encoded
wideband signal version.” A fair reading of this limitation is that this “version” of the signal is
nonetheless still recited as a “wideband” signal. Further, the claim also recites “an oversampler
responsive to said synthesized wideband signal for producing an over-sampled signal version of
the synthesized wideband signal.” Overall, the recital in the claim of a “wideband” signal that has
been down-sampled and that is then synthesized and oversampled, coupled with the disclosed
example of down-sampling from 16 kHz to 12.8 kHz, weighs against Defendants’ proposal that

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the term “wideband” is limited to 16 kHz signals. See also, e.g., id. at 1:10–11 (“a wideband signal
previously down-sampled”) & 3:5–6 (same).
As to extrinsic evidence, Defendants have cited several technical articles that refer to
wideband signals having a sampling rate of 16 kHz. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 109, Ex. A-2, Richard V.
Cox, Current Methods of Speech Coding, International Journal of High Speed Electronics and
Systems 16 (vol. 8, no. 1, 1997) (“when we refer to wideband speech, we mean speech with a
bandwidth of 50–7000 Hz and a sampling rate of 16 kHz”); id., Ex. A-3, U.S. Pat. No. 5,235,669
(“Ordentlich”) at 1:44–47 (“wideband speech is assigned the band 50 to 7000 Hz and is sampled
at a rate of 16000 Hz for subsequent digital processing”); id., Ex. A-4, Jürgen Paulus, et al.,
Wideband Speech Coding for the GSM Fullrate Channel? 11 (1996) (“a wideband coding scheme
would require a sampling rate of 16 kHz”).)
Similarly, Defendants have cited an article referring to “extract[ing] the 0-6 kHz lower
subband from the input wideband (7 kHz) signal and reduc[ing] the sampling rate from 16 kHz to
12 kHz . . . .” (Id., Ex. A-8, Jürgen Schnitzler, A 13.0 kbit/s Wideband Speech Codec Based on
SB-ACELP 157–58 (1998) (emphasis added).)
This extrinsic evidence, however, does not override the above-discussed context provided
by the disclosure of down-sampling in the intrinsic evidence. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318
(noting that “extrinsic evidence in general [is] less reliable than the patent and its prosecution
history in determining how to read claim terms”).
Further, it is noteworthy that the frequency band of the signal is limited by the sampling
rate in accordance with what the parties submit is known as the “Sampling Theorem” or “Nyquist
Theorem,” which holds that the maximum frequency component of a signal can be no greater than
half of the sampling rate. (See Dkt. No. 100-14, Dec. 2, 2016 Ogunfunmi Decl., at ¶ 21(c); see

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also Dkt. No. 109-20, Dec. 21, 2016 Kotzin Decl., at ¶ 36; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. H, U.S. Pat. No.
6,615,169 (“Ojala”) at 2:1–3 (“According to the Nyquist theorem, a speech signal with a sampling
rate Fs can represent a frequency band from 0 to 0.5 Fs.”).) For example, for the bandwidth of a
signal to extend up to 7000 Hz, the sampling rate must be at least 14,000 Hz (14,000 samples per
second). Thus, whereas Defendants argue that the construction of the disputed term should specify
a sampling rate, the ZTE construction already inherently includes a sampling rate limitation by
way of the Sampling Theorem.
Finally, as noted above, Plaintiff has alternatively proposed construing “wideband” as
“including a signal down-sampled from 16 kHz to 12.8 kHz” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 453). In some
circumstances, “[a] patent claim should be construed to encompass at least one disclosed
embodiment in the written description portion of the patent specification.” Johns Hopkins Univ.
v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see Accent Packaging, Inc. v. Leggett &
Platt, Inc., 707 F.3d 1318, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Here, however, Plaintiff’s alternative claim construction proposal would risk improperly
invading the province of the finder of fact as to whether a particular accused instrumentality meets
the “wideband” limitations. See Am. Piledriving Equip., Inc. v. Geoquip, Inc., 637 F.3d 1324,
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“It is well settled that the role of a district court in construing claims is not
to redefine claim recitations or to read limitations into the claims to obviate factual questions of
infringement and validity but rather to give meaning to the limitations actually contained in the
claims, informed by the written description, the prosecution history if in evidence, and any relevant
extrinsic evidence.”); see also Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d
1322, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting rule against “tailoring a claim construction to fit the
dimensions of the accused product or process and to reach a preconceived judgment of

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infringement or noninfringement”); Markman, 517 U.S. at 384 (“determining whether
infringement occurred * * * is a question of fact, to be submitted to a jury”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Moreover, as discussed above, the construction of the disputed term
need not set forth any explicit limitation as to sampling rate because the Court’s construction
includes an inherent sampling rate limitation.
The Court therefore hereby construes “[synthesized] [weighted] wideband [speech]
signal” to mean “a [synthesized] [weighted] [speech] signal that spans a wider bandwidth
than traditional telephone signals and that has a frequency range of approximately 50–
7000Hz.”
B. “fixed denominator”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction is necessary.

“a denominator that does not vary in time
with the LP parameters ai”

Alternatively:
“a denominator that does not vary in time with
the LP parameters ai”
To the extent the Court is inclined to give the term
a specific construction, [Plaintiff] submits that
also including the example filter with a fixed
denominator recited in the ’524 Patent would be
helpful to the Jury in applying the construction.
This perceptual weighting filter has the form:
𝑊(𝑧) = 𝐴(𝑧/𝛾1 )/(1 − 𝛾2 𝑧 −1 )
where
0<γ2<γ1≤1.
(Dkt. No. 99, Ex. A, at 3; id., Ex. B, at 4; Dkt. No. 100, at 11; Dkt. No. 109, at 11; Dkt. No. 117,
at 7; Dkt. No. 118, Ex. B, at 2.) The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 1 and 8 of the
’524 Patent. (Dkt. No. 99, Ex. A, at 3; id., Ex. B, at 4; Dkt. No. 118, Ex. B, at 2.)

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(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “[f]ixing the denominator of the perceptual weighting filter is
specifically discussed in the AMR-WB standard, and as such, a person of ordinary skill in the art
would readily understand the meaning of the term ‘fixed denominator’ in the context of claims 1
and 8.” (Dkt. No. 100, at 11.)
Defendants respond that they are willing to stipulate to Plaintiff’s alternative proposed
construction, “[b]ut [Plaintiff has] declined to stipulate to its own alternative construction.” (Dkt.
No. 109, at 12.)
Plaintiff replies that “a specific construction for ‘fixed denominator’ increases the risk of
Jury confusion. Instead of evaluating a two-word term that is commonly used in the art, the Jury
would be required to evaluate a much longer construction, adding unnecessary layers of analysis
to the infringement inquiry.” (Dkt. No. 117, at 7.)
At the March 3, 2017 hearing, Plaintiff stated that it did not dispute the technical accuracy
of Defendants’ proposed construction. Plaintiff maintained, however, that including its proposed
example would be helpful.
(2) Analysis
Construction of the disputed term will be helpful to the finder of fact to the extent that
Defendants have agreed with Plaintiff’s original alternative proposed construction. See TQP Dev.,
LLC v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., No. 2:08-CV-471, 2012 WL 1940849, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 29,
2012) (Bryson, J.) (“some construction of the disputed claim language will assist the jury to
understand the claims”). Defendants’ proposal is also consistent with prosecution history cited by
Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 100, at 11 (discussing id., Ex. K., Jan. 23, 2004 Reply Under 37 C.F.R. §
1.111, at 7 (SLFH00001618)).) As to Plaintiff’s proposal of including an example, Plaintiff has

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not shown that any potential benefit would outweigh the risk of confusion or the risk that the finder
of fact might perceive the example as limiting.
The Court therefore hereby construes “fixed denominator” to mean “a denominator that
does not vary in time with the LP parameters ai.”
C. “A [device/method] for enhancing periodicity of an excitation signal produced in relation
to a pitch codevector and an innovation codevector for supplying a signal synthesis filter in
view of synthesizing a wideband speech signal”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

This term is the preamble to asserted claims in the Preamble is limiting
’805 Patent. As such, the term is not limiting.
(Dkt. No. 99, Ex. A, at 1–2; id., Ex. B, at 5; Dkt. No. 100, at 12; Dkt. No. 109, at 13; Dkt. No. 117,
at 7; Dkt. No. 118, Ex. B, at 2–3.) The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 1 and 11 of
the ’805 Patent. (Dkt. No. 99, Ex. A, at 1–2; id., Ex. B, at 4; Dkt. No. 118, Ex. B, at 2.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “claims 1 and 11 of the ’805 Patent contain similar elements and each
define a structurally complete invention in the respective claim bodies.” (Dkt. No. 100, at 12.)
Plaintiff urges that “the preamble merely states the intended purpose of the invention: namely,
enhancing the periodicity of a produced excitation signal in order to supply it to a signal synthesis
filter that synthesizes a wideband speech signal.” (Id., at 13.)
Defendants respond: “First, several elements in the body of the claim depend on the
preamble for antecedent basis”; “[s]econd, the claim body is not structurally complete without the
preamble”; and third, during prosecution the examiner required as a “condition for allowance” that
the claims be amended to specify a wideband “speech” signal. (Dkt. No. 109, at 13–15.)

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Plaintiff replies that regardless of whether the preamble provides antecedent basis,
nonetheless the preamble merely states the intended purpose of the invention. (Dkt. No. 117, at 7–
8.)
At the March 3, 2017 hearing, Defendants reiterated that the preamble is limiting because
it provides antecedent basis. Plaintiff responded by reiterating that the preamble is not limiting
because it merely sets forth an intended use or purpose.
(2) Analysis
Claims 1 and 11 of the ’805 Patent are similar, except that whereas Claim 1 recites a device,
Claim 11 recites a method. Claim 1 of the ’805 Patent, for example, recites:
1. A device for enhancing periodicity of an excitation signal produced in relation
to a pitch codevector and an innovative codevector for supplying a signal synthesis
filter in view of synthesizing a wideband speech signal, said periodicity enhancing
device comprising:
a) a factor generator for calculating a periodicity factor related to the
wideband speech signal; and
b) an innovation filter for filtering the innovative codevector in relation to
said periodicity factor to thereby reduce energy of a low frequency portion of the
innovative codevector and enhance periodicity of a low frequency portion of the
excitation signal.
ZTE found that the preamble of Claim 1 of the ’805 Patent is not limiting. See ZTE at 78–
80. There, the ZTE defendants had argued that the preamble set forth a means-plus-function
limitation governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. See id. at 78–79. Plaintiff submitted proposed
constructions for consideration “[t]o the extent the Court finds that the preamble is limiting and
subject to § 112(6).” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 171, at 13.) The ZTE defendants responded by re-urging
their 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 argument, but they did not counter Plaintiff’s apparent suggestion that
the preamble is not limiting. (ZTE, Dkt. No. 206, at 16–17.)
Here, Defendants urge that the body of each claim relies upon the preamble for antecedent
basis for “the wideband speech signal,” “the innovative codevector,” and “the excitation signal.”
- 19 -

In particular, Defendants argue that the preamble provides further detail as to “the excitation
signal” by reciting “an excitation signal produced in relation to a pitch codevector and an
innovative codevector.” See ’805 Patent at 1:46–50 (“An excitation signal is determined in each
subframe, which usually consists of two components: one from the past excitation (also called
pitch contribution or adaptive code book or pitch codebook) and the other from an innovative
codebook (also called fixed code book).”).
Nonetheless, Defendants have not shown that the recital of “enhancing periodicity” is
anything other than a statement of purpose as to what is recited in the body of each claim. See
Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“a
preamble is not limiting where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim
body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention”) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Marrin v. Griffin, 599 F.3d 1290, 1294–95 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (referring to “the presumption against reading a statement of purpose in the preamble
as a claim limitation”).
Finally, Defendants have cited an examiner’s amendment during prosecution that replaced
“wideband signal” with “wideband speech signal” because the claims were “unclear as to what is
being synthesized.” (Dkt. No. 109, Ex. A-16, Apr. 29, 2004 Interview Summary; id., Notice of
Allowability, at 2.) Because the body of the claim also recites “the wideband speech signal,” this
amendment does not affect the analysis as to whether the preamble is limiting.
Thus, in light of the different arguments presented here as compared to ZTE, the Court
hereby finds that the preambles of Claims 1 and 11 of the ’805 Patent are limiting only as to “an
excitation signal produced in relation to a pitch codevector and an innovative codevector.”

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D. “low frequency portion”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary and the term should be Indefinite
given its plain and ordinary meaning.
(Dkt. No. 99, Ex. A, at 2; id., Ex. B, at 5; Dkt. No. 100, at 13; Dkt. No. 109, at 18; Dkt. No. 118,
Ex. B, at 3.) The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 1 and 11 of the ’805 Patent. (Dkt.
No. 99, Ex. A, at 2; id., Ex. B, at 5–6; Dkt. No. 118, Ex. B, at 3.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “the term ‘low frequency portion’ is part of a ‘whereby clause’ that
does not actually limit the claims in which it appears.” (Dkt. No. 100, at 14.) Alternatively,
Plaintiff submits that “application of the innovation filters recited in the ’805 Patent’s specification
would define the scope of the ‘low frequency portion’ with reasonable certainty.” (Id., at 15
(citations omitted).)
Defendants respond that “[b]ecause the specification offers inconsistent teachings of what
‘high’ and ‘low’ frequencies mean, a person of skill in the art cannot reasonably ascertain the scope
of ‘low frequency portion.’” (Dkt. No. 109, at 18–19.) Defendants also submit that, as the Court
found in ZTE, what follows the “thereby” clause in the claim is a limitation because it imposes
“additional limitations on the manner of [the claimed] filtering.” (Id., at 19 (quoting ZTE at 119)
(alteration Defendants’).)
Plaintiff replies that Defendants have failed to demonstrate any inconsistency because the
terms “low frequency portion” and “high frequency content” appear in different patents, namely
the ’805 Patent and the ’524 Patent, respectively. (Dkt. No. 117, at 8.)
At the March 3, 2017 hearing, the parties presented no oral arguments as to this term.

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(2) Analysis
Claim 1 of the ’805 Patent, for example, recites (emphasis added):
1. A device for enhancing periodicity of an excitation signal produced in relation
to a pitch codevector and an innovative codevector for supplying a signal synthesis
filter in view of synthesizing a wideband speech signal, said periodicity enhancing
device comprising:
a) a factor generator for calculating a periodicity factor related to the
wideband speech signal; and
b) an innovation filter for filtering the innovative codevector in relation to
said periodicity factor to thereby reduce energy of a low frequency portion of the
innovative codevector and enhance periodicity of a low frequency portion of the
excitation signal.
ZTE rejected Plaintiff’s argument that this disputed term appears in a non-limiting portion
of the claims, and the Court reaches the same conclusion here. See ZTE at 118–20.
Likewise, the Court reaches the same conclusion here as in ZTE that the word “low” does
not give rise to indefiniteness because the relative bandwidths and the precise manner of filtering
are implementation-specific details.

See id. at 118–21; see also ’805 Patent at 14:6–30;

Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (regarding
a chair leg portion “so dimensioned as to be insertable through the space between the doorframe
of an automobile and one of the seats thereof,” finding that “[t]he patent law does not require that
all possible lengths corresponding to the spaces in hundreds of different automobiles be listed in
the patent, let alone that they be listed in the claims”); see also Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2128 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 2128 n.5 (citing Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ontario
Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 58, 65-66 (1923) (Taft, J.), as “upholding as definite a patent for an
improvement to a paper-making machine, which provided that a wire be placed at a ‘high’ or
‘substantial elevation,’ where ‘readers . . . skilled in the art of paper making and versed in the use
of the . . . machine’ would have ‘no difficulty . . . in determining . . . the substantial [elevation]
needed’ for the machine to operate as specified”) (ellipses and square bracketed text the Court’s);
- 22 -

id. at 2129 (“The definiteness requirement . . . mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute
precision is unattainable.”); Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“We do not understand the Supreme Court to have implied in Nautilus . . . that terms of
degree are inherently indefinite.”). The opinions of Plaintiff’s expert are also persuasive. (Dkt.
No. 100-14, Dec. 2, 2016 Ogunfunmi Decl. at ¶¶ 23–42.) Finally, although Defendants argue that
the specification fails to adequately distinguish between “high” and “low,” it is noteworthy that
the disputed terms “low frequency portion” and “high frequency content” appear in different
claims in different patents.
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness argument. No
further construction is necessary. See U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical
scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use
in the determination of infringement. It is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.”); see also
O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“[D]istrict courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation present in a
patent’s asserted claims.”); Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 806 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“The resolution of some line-drawing problems . . . is properly left to the trier of fact.”) (citing
PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“after the court has
defined the claim with whatever specificity and precision is warranted by the language of the claim
and the evidence bearing on the proper construction, the task of determining whether the construed
claim reads on the accused product is for the finder of fact”)); Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver
Spring Networks, 815 F.3d 1314, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing PPG).

- 23 -

The Court accordingly hereby construes “low frequency portion” to have its plain
meaning.
E. “high frequency content”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary and the term should be Indefinite
given its plain and ordinary meaning.
(Dkt. No. 99, Ex. A, at 3; id., Ex. B, at 6; Dkt. No. 100, at 15; Dkt. No. 109, at 15; Dkt. No. 118,
Ex. B, at 3.) The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 1 and 8 of the ’524 Patent. (Dkt.
No. 99, Ex. A, at 3; id., Ex. B, at 6; Dkt. No. 118, Ex. B, at 3.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “the term ‘high frequency content’ does not impose any structural
limitations on the preemphasis filter, and instead recites its intended use,” and therefore “the term
‘high frequency content’ is not a limitation.” (Dkt. No. 100, at 15–16.) Alternatively, Plaintiff
submits that “[t]he ‘high frequency content’ term refers to the output of the preemphasis filter, and
the application of the preemphasis filter disclosed in the ’524 Patent would define the scope of the
‘high frequency portion’ with reasonable certainty.” (Id., at 16 (citation omitted).)
Defendants respond that “the specification contains conflicting teachings that were not
presented to the Court in the prior cases, leaving uncertainty about the scope of the ‘high’ and
‘low’ frequency claim terms.” (Dkt. No. 109, at 16.) Defendants also submit that, for the reasons
set forth in ZTE, “for enhancing a high frequency content” is a limitation. (Id., at 18.)
Plaintiff replies as to this term together with “low frequency portion,” which is addressed
separately above. (See Dkt. No. 117, at 8–9.)
At the March 3, 2017 hearing, the parties presented no oral arguments as to this term.

- 24 -

(2) Analysis
Claim 1 of the ’524 Patent, for example, recites (emphasis added):
1. A perceptual weighting device for producing a perceptually weighted signal in
response to a wideband speech signal in order to reduce a difference between the
wideband speech signal and a subsequently synthesized wideband speech signal,
said perceptual weighting device comprising:
a) a signal preemphasis filter responsive to the wideband speech signal for
enhancing a high frequency content of the wideband speech signal to thereby
produce a preemphasised signal;
b) a synthesis filter calculator responsive to said preemphasised signal for
producing synthesis filter coefficients; and
c) a perceptual weighting filter, responsive to said preemphasised signal and
said synthesis filter coefficients, for filtering said preemphasised signal in relation
to said synthesis filter coefficients to thereby produce said perceptually weighted
signal, said perceptual weighting filter having a transfer function with fixed
denominator whereby weighting of said wideband speech signal in a formant region
is substantially decoupled from a spectral tilt of said wideband speech signal.
ZTE rejected Plaintiff’s argument that this disputed term appears in a non-limiting portion
of the claims, and the Court reaches the same conclusion here. See ZTE at 122–23.
The Court hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness argument for substantially
the same reasons set forth in ZTE. See ZTE at 117–23. The opinions of Plaintiff’s expert are also
persuasive. (See Dkt. No. 100-14, Dec. 2, 2016 Ogunfunmi Decl., at ¶¶ 43–49.) Finally, although
Defendants argue that the specification fails to adequately distinguish between “high” and “low,”
it is noteworthy that the disputed terms “low frequency portion” and “high frequency content”
appear in different claims in different patents.
No further construction is necessary. See U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568; see also O2
Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362; Acumed, 483 F.3d at 806; Eon, 815 F.3d at 1318–19.
The Court accordingly hereby construes “[enhanced] / [enhancing a] high frequency
content” to have its plain meaning.

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F. “wherein γ2 is set equal to μ”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary and the term should be Indefinite
given its plain and ordinary meaning.
(Dkt. No. 99, Ex. A, at 3; id., Ex. B, at 7; Dkt. No. 100, at 17; Dkt. No. 109, at 19; Dkt. No. 117,
at 9; Dkt. No. 118, Ex. B, at 3–4.) The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 7, 14, 21,
35, and 42 of the ’524 Patent. (Dkt. No. 99, Ex. A, at 3; id., Ex. B, at 7; Dkt. No. 118, Ex. B, at 3–
4.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff submits that “Defendants do not allege that all instances of the term ‘wherein γ2
is set equal to μ’ in the ’524 Patent are indefinite.” (Dkt. No. 100, at 17.) “Additionally, the
specification adequately defines what ‘μ’ means in the term ‘wherein γ2 is set equal to μ.’” (Id.,
at 18.)
Defendants argue that “[t]he term ‘μ’ has no antecedent basis within the phrase ‘wherein
γ2 is set equal to μ’ in dependent Claims 7, 14, 21, 35, and 42 of the ’524 Patent (the ‘challenged
claims’), rendering those claims indefinite.” (Dkt. No. 109, at 20.)
Plaintiff replies that because the specification explains the meaning of “μ,” the Court
should reject Defendants’ argument that each claim itself must define “μ.” (Dkt. No. 117, at 9.)
At the March 3, 2017 hearing, the parties presented no oral arguments as to this term.
(2) Analysis
Claim 7 of the ’524 Patent, for example, depends from Claim 6, which in turn depends
from Claim 1. Claims 6 and 7 of the ’524 Patent recite (emphasis added):
6. A perceptual weighting device as defined in claim 1, wherein said perceptual
weighting filter has a transfer function of the form:
𝑊(𝑧) = 𝐴(𝑧/𝛾1 )/(1 − 𝛾2 𝑧 −1)
- 26 -

where 0<γ2< γ1≤1 and γ2 and γ1 are weighting control values.
7. A perceptual weighting device as defined in claim 6, wherein γ2 is set equal to μ.
Claim 7 thus recites μ without reciting any definition or antecedent basis. By contrast,
Claim 5 of the ’524 Patent depends from Claim 4, which in turn depends from Claim 2, and Claim
2 recites that “μ is a preemphasis factor”:
2. A perceptual weighting device as defined in claim 1, wherein said signal
preemphasis filter has a transfer function of the form:
𝑃(𝑧) = 1 − 𝜇𝑧 −1
wherein μ is a preemphasis factor having a value located between 0 and 1.
The specification discloses:
In a preferred embodiment of the preemphasis filter 103, the signal sp(n) is
preemphasized using a filter having the following transfer function:
𝑃(𝑧) = 1 − 𝜇𝑧 −1
where μ is a preemphasis factor with a value located between 0 and 1 (a typical
value is μ=0.7). A higher-order filter could also be used.
’524 Patent at 7:66–8:6.
Plaintiff has not shown that this disclosure in the specification amounts to a lexicography.
See, e.g., CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366 (“the claim term will not receive its ordinary meaning if
the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim
term in either the specification or prosecution history”) (emphasis added). On the contrary, the
above-quoted disclosure explicitly refers to “a preferred embodiment.” Further, Defendants’
expert has opined that μ “is not a term of art in the relevant technology” (see Dkt. No. 109-20,
Dec. 21, 2016 Kotzin Decl., at ¶ 98; see also id., at ¶¶ 101–03), and Plaintiff has not presented any
evidence to the contrary.
On balance, because no antecedent basis is present for μ in Claims 7, 14, 21, 35, and 42 of
the ’524 Patent—and because no lexicography or reasonably ascertainable meaning is present for
μ in the instances in which no antecedent basis is present—those claims “fail to inform those
- 27 -

skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, 134 S. Ct.
at 2129.
The Court therefore finds that “wherein γ2 is set equal to μ,” as used in Claims 7, 14, 21,
35, and 42 of the ’524 Patent, is indefinite.
G. “said excitation signal”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary and the term should “the excitation signal produced by
be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
combining said pitch codevector and said
innovative codevector in step (d)/[step (iv)]”
-or“the excitation signal produced by
combining said pitch codevector and said
innovative
codevector
in
element
(d)/[element (iv)]”
(Dkt. No. 99, Ex. A, at 4; id., Ex. B, at 8; Dkt. No. 100, at 18; Dkt. No. 109, at 22; Dkt. No. 117,
at 9; Dkt. No. 118, Ex. B, at 4.) The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 1, 9, and 25
of the ’802 Patent. (Dkt. No. 99, Ex. A, at 4; id., Ex. B, at 8; Dkt. No. 118, Ex. B, at 4.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that whereas “Defendants’ construction appears to construe the term ‘said’
from this larger phrase,” “Defendants’ construction is unnecessary in light of the existing claim
language and fails to provide any meaningful guidance to the Jury.” (Dkt. No. 100, at 18.)
Defendants respond that “each claim first recites ‘an excitation signal’ followed by ‘said
excitation signal,’ and Defendants seek to confirm that they are both referring to the same
‘excitation signal.’” (Dkt. No. 109, at 22.)

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Plaintiff replies that Defendants “merely rearrange[] the existing words of the claim
without providing any clarification of its meaning or articulating the substance of [Defendants’]
alleged dispute.” (Dkt. No. 117, at 9.)
At the March 3, 2017 hearing, Defendants submitted that the specification discloses an
enhanced excitation signal as distinct from a mere excitation signal. Plaintiff responded that
although the claims at issue do not require enhancement, for example by filtering and amplifying,
the claims do not preclude such enhancement.
(2) Analysis
Claim 1 of the ’802 Patent, for example, recites (emphasis added):
1. A decoder for producing a synthesized wideband signal, comprising:
a) a signal fragmenting device for receiving an encoded version of a
wideband signal previously down-sampled during encoding and extracting from
said encoded wideband signal version at least pitch codebook parameters,
innovative codebook parameters, and linear prediction filter coefficients;
b) a pitch codebook responsive to said pitch codebook parameters for
producing a pitch codevector;
c) an innovative codebook responsive to said innovative codebook
parameters for producing an innovative codevector;
d) a combiner circuit for combining said pitch codevector and said
innovative codevector to thereby produce an excitation signal;
e) a signal synthesis device including a linear prediction filter for filtering
said excitation signal in relation to said linear prediction filter coefficients to
thereby produce a synthesized wideband signal, and an oversampler responsive to
said synthesized wideband signal for producing an over-sampled signal version of
the synthesized wideband signal; and
f) a high-frequency content recovering device comprising:
i) a random noise generator for producing a noise sequence
having a given spectrum;
ii) a spectral shaping unit for shaping the spectrum of the noise
sequence in relation to linear prediction filter coefficients
related to said down-sampled wideband signal; and
iii) a signal injection circuit for injecting said spectrally-shaped
noise sequence in said over-sampled synthesized signal
version to thereby produce said full-spectrum synthesized
wideband signal.

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On its face, the antecedent basis for “said excitation signal” in element (e) is “an excitation
signal” recited in element (d). See, e.g., Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 802 F.3d
1283, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (as to “said one or more preprocessing parameters,” finding that “use
of the term ‘said’ indicates that this portion of the claim limitation is a reference back to the
previously claimed ‘pre-processing parameters’”).
Defendants have expressed concern that Plaintiff may attempt to “put forth at trial an
infringement case that maps ‘an excitation signal’ and ‘said excitation signal’ to two different
excitation signals respectively.” (Dkt. No. 109, at 23.)
In the context here at issue as to “excitation signal” and “said excitation signal,” whether a
modified “excitation signal” is nonetheless the same “excitation signal” presents questions of fact
as to particular implementation details. To the extent that Defendants are arguing that “said
excitation signal” cannot have undergone any modifications or enhancements, Defendants have
not identified any claim language or legal precedent that would support such a rigid interpretation.
See Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“the patentee’s mere use of a term with an antecedent does not require that both terms have
the same meaning”).
On balance, Defendants’ concern relates not to any issue of claim construction but rather
to how Plaintiff purportedly may apply the claims to the accused instrumentalities. See PPG, 156
F.3d at 1355 (“[A]fter the court has defined the claim with whatever specificity and precision is
warranted by the language of the claim and the evidence bearing on the proper construction, the
task of determining whether the construed claim reads on the accused product is for the finder of
fact.”); see also Eon, 815 F.3d at 1318–19 (citing PPG).

- 30 -

Based on the foregoing, no construction of “said excitation signal” is necessary. See U.S.
Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568 (“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and
technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims,
for use in the determination of infringement. It is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.”); see
also O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362.
The Court therefore hereby construes “said excitation signal” to have its plain meaning.
H. “means for comparing an innovative codebook gain g computed during encoding of the
wideband signal to a threshold given by the initial modified gain from the past subframe g–
1 as follows: if g < g–1 then g0=g x 1.19 bounded by g0<g–1, and if g>g–1 then g0=g/1.19
bounded by g0>g–1”
Plaintiff submits that this term appears in Claims 35, 67, and 83 of the ’123 Patent. (Dkt.
No. 100, at 19.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “the claim itself recites the specific algorithm used to perform the
recited function, and thus recites sufficient structure.” (Dkt. No. 100, at 20.) Plaintiff concludes
that “[b]ecause th[is] . . . term[] recite[s] sufficient structure in the claim itself in the form of the
disclosed algorithm[], [Plaintiff] respectfully submits that [this term is] not subject to § 112(6).”
(Id.)
Defendants respond: “Defendants take no position on th[is] term[] beyond what was
already briefed and incorporated by reference pursuant to [Dkt. No.] 93, Order Granting the
Parties’ Joint Motion for Entry of Prior Claim Construction Order as to Certain Specified Terms.”
(Dkt. No. 109, at 24.)
At the March 3, 2017 hearing, the parties presented no oral arguments as to this term. (See
Dkt. No. 145, at 1-2; see also id., at App’x 2.)

- 31 -

(2) Analysis
The present disputed term was not at issue in ZTE. (See Dkt. No. 93, at 4 (“the parties
identify eight ‘means for’ terms in Appendix C not addressed in the Prior Claim Construction
Order”) & App’x C; see also ZTE, Dkt. No. 67, Nov. 25, 2016 Amended Joint Claim Construction
and Prehearing Statement; id., Dkt. No. 74, Defs.’ Responsive Claim Construction Brief Pursuant
to P.R. 4-5(b); id., Dkt. No. 80, Dec. 23, 2016 Joint Claim Construction Chart Pursuant to
P.R. 4-5(d).)
Defendants’ above-noted reference to the ZTE briefing (Dkt. No. 109, at 24) thus appears
to be a general reference to the ZTE defendants’ arguments regarding purported lack of disclosure
of a computer or processor. Yet, the parties here have agreed that the ZTE findings as to disclosure
of a computer or processor will apply in the present case. (See Dkt. No. 93, at 4; see also Dkt. No.
95, at 3.)
“[T]he word ‘means’ in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112, para. 6
applies,” and Plaintiff has not overcome the presumption. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792
F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Although the disputed term sets forth a mathematical

relationship, the claims do not themselves recite a processor.
The parties have agreed as follows:
To the extent the Court finds that the term is subject to 35 U.S.C. 112(6), the parties
agree that the claimed function is “comparing an innovative codebook gain g
computed during encoding of the wideband signal to a threshold given by the initial
modified gain from the past subframe g-1,” and that the specification links this
function to the following disclosure: “if g < g–1 then g0 = g*1.19 bounded by g0 <
g–1, and wherein if g > g–1 then g0 = g/1.19 bounded by g0 > g–1.”
(Dkt. No. 93, App’x C, at p. 3 of 5.)
The Court therefore hereby construes this disputed term as set forth in the following chart:

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Term

Construction

“means for comparing an innovative
codebook gain g computed during encoding
of the wideband signal to a threshold given
by the initial modified gain from the past
subframe g–1 as follows: if g < g–1 then
g0=g x 1.19 bounded by g0<g–1, and if g>g–
1 then g0=g/1.19 bounded by g0>g–1”

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies.
Function:
“comparing an innovative codebook
gain g computed during encoding of the
wideband signal to a threshold given by the
initial modified gain from the past subframe
g-1”
Corresponding Structure:
“a processor configured such that if g <
g–1 then g0 = g*1.19 bounded by g0 < g–1,
and wherein if g > g–1 then g0 = g/1.19
bounded by g0 > g–1”

I. “means for determining said smoothing gain through the following relation: g s =
Sm*g0+(1–Sm)*g”
Plaintiff submits that this term appears in Claims 36, 68, and 84 of the ’123 Patent. (Dkt.
No. 100, at 19.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “the claim itself recites the specific algorithm used to perform the
recited function, and thus recites sufficient structure.” (Dkt. No. 100, at 20.)
Defendants respond: “Defendants take no position on th[is] term[] beyond what was
already briefed and incorporated by reference pursuant to [Dkt. No.] 93, Order Granting the
Parties’ Joint Motion for Entry of Prior Claim Construction Order as to Certain Specified Terms.”
(Dkt. No. 109, at 24.)
At the March 3, 2017 hearing, the parties presented no oral arguments as to this term. (See
Dkt. No. 145, at 1-2; see also id., at App’x 2.)

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(2) Analysis
The present disputed term was not at issue in ZTE. (See Dkt. No. 93, at 4 (“the parties
identify eight ‘means for’ terms in Appendix C not addressed in the Prior Claim Construction
Order”) & App’x C; see also ZTE, Dkt. No. 67, Nov. 25, 2016 Amended Joint Claim Construction
and Prehearing Statement; id., Dkt. No. 74, Defs.’ Responsive Claim Construction Brief Pursuant
to P.R. 4-5(b); id., Dkt. No. 80, Dec. 23, 2016 Joint Claim Construction Chart Pursuant to
P.R. 4-5(d).)
Defendants’ above-noted reference to the ZTE briefing (Dkt. No. 109, at 24) thus appears
to be a general reference to the ZTE defendants’ arguments regarding purported lack of disclosure
of a computer or processor. Yet, the parties here have agreed that the ZTE findings as to disclosure
of a computer or processor will apply in the present case. (See Dkt. No. 93, at 4; see also Dkt. No.
95, at 3.)
“[T]he word ‘means’ in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112, para. 6
applies,” and Plaintiff has not overcome the presumption. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. Although
the disputed term sets forth a mathematical relationship, the claims do not themselves recite a
processor.
The parties have agreed as follows:
To the extent the Court finds that the term is subject to 35 U.S.C. 112(6), the parties
agree that the claimed function is “determining said smoothing gain,” and that the
specification links this function to the following disclosure: “gs=Sm*g0+(1−S
m)*g.”
(Dkt. No. 93, App’x C, at p. 4 of 5.)
The Court therefore hereby construes this disputed term as set forth in the following chart:

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Term

Construction

“means for determining said smoothing 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies.
gain through the following relation: gs =
Function:
Sm*g0+(1–Sm)*g”
“determining said smoothing gain”
Corresponding Structure:
“a processor configured such that gs =
Sm*g0+(1–Sm)*g”

J. Additional Terms
Plaintiff’s opening brief also addresses the following six terms:
Term

Plaintiff’s Position

“spectral shaping unit for shaping the spectrum Plaintiff submits that this term appears in
of the noise sequence in relation to linear Claims 1, 9, and 25 of the ’802 Patent. (Dkt.
prediction filter coefficients related to said No. 100, at 21.)
down-sampled wideband signal”
Plaintiff argues that “Defendants fail to rebut
(’802 Patent, Claims 1, 9, 25)
the presumption that the terms are not subject
to § 112(6)” because this term “include[s]
substantial additional language that describe[s]
[its] operation and [its] interaction with other
elements.” (Id., at 20 & 21.)
“gain adjustment module, responsive to said Plaintiff submits that this term appears in
white noise sequence and a set of gain Claims 3, 11, 27, and 35 of the ’802 Patent.
adjusting parameters, for producing a scaled (Dkt. No. 100, at 21.)
white noise sequence”
Plaintiff argues that “Defendants fail to rebut
(’802 Patent, Claims 3, 11, 27, 35)
the presumption that the terms are not subject
to § 112(6)” because this term “include[s]
substantial additional language that describe[s]
[its] operation and [its] interaction with other
elements.” (Id., at 20 & 21.)

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“convolution unit for convolving the pitch Plaintiff submits that this term appears in
codevector with a weighted synthesis filter Claims 5, 14, 32, and 41 of the ’521 Patent.
impulse response signal”
(Dkt. No. 100, at 21.)
(’521 Patent, Claims 5, 14, 32, 41)

Plaintiff argues that “Defendants fail to rebut
the presumption that the terms are not subject
to § 112(6)” because this term “include[s]
substantial additional language that describe[s]
[its] operation and [its] interaction with other
elements.” (Id., at 20 & 21.)

“signal fragmenting device for receiving an
encoded wideband speech signal and
extracting from said encoded wideband speech
signal at least pitch codebook parameters,
innovative codebook parameters, and
synthesis filter coefficients”

Plaintiff submits that this term appears in
Claims 21 and 31 of the ’805 Patent. (Dkt.
No. 100, at 22.)
Plaintiff argues that “Defendants fail to rebut
the presumption that the terms are not subject
to § 112(6).” (Id., at 20.)

(’805 Patent, Claims 21, 31)
“signal fragmenting device for receiving an
encoded version of a wideband signal
previously down-sampled during encoding
and extracting from said encoded wideband
signal version at least pitch codebook
parameters, innovative codebook parameters,
and linear prediction filter coefficients”

Plaintiff submits that this term appears in
Claims 21 and 31 of the ’805 Patent. (Dkt.
No. 100, at 22.)
Plaintiff argues that “Defendants fail to rebut
the presumption that the terms are not subject
to § 112(6).” (Id., at 20.)

(’802 Patent, Claims 1, 9, 25)
“pitch analysis device responsive to the pitch
codevector for selecting, from said sets of pitch
codebook parameters, the set of pitch
codebook parameters associated to the signal
path having the lowest calculated pitch
prediction error”
(’521 Patent, Claim 10)

Plaintiff submits that this term appears in
Claim 10 of the ’521 Patent. (Dkt. No. 100,
at 23.)
Plaintiff argues that “Defendants fail to rebut
the presumption that the terms are not subject
to § 112(6)” because this term “includes
substantial additional language describing the
operation of the components at issue and their
interaction with other components.” (Id.,
at 23.)

“Defendants take no position on these terms beyond what was already briefed and
incorporated by reference pursuant to [Dkt. No.] 93, Order Granting the Parties’ Joint Motion for
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Entry of Prior Claim Construction Order as to Certain Specified Terms.” (Dkt. No. 109, at 24.)
Plaintiff’s reply brief does not address these terms. (See Dkt. No. 117.) At the March 3, 2017
hearing, the parties presented no oral arguments as to these terms. (See Dkt. No. 145, at 1-2; see
also id., at App’x 2.)
These six additional terms were construed by the Court in ZTE. See ZTE at 44, 47–48, 49,
54–55, 64 & 76. The parties have not shown any reason for the Court to depart from the ZTE
constructions. See, e.g., id. at 42–44. The Court therefore hereby construes these disputed terms
as set forth in the following chart:
Term

Construction

“spectral shaping unit for shaping the 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies.
spectrum of the noise sequence in relation to
linear prediction filter coefficients related to Function:
said down-sampled wideband signal”
“shaping the spectrum of the noise
sequence in relation to linear prediction
filter coefficients related to said downsampled wideband signal”
Corresponding Structure:
“a processor configured to filter the
noise wg through a bandwidth expanded
version of the same LP synthesis filter used
in the down-sampled domain (1/Â(z/0.8)),
and equivalents thereof”
“gain adjustment module, responsive to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies.
said white noise sequence and a set of gain
adjusting parameters, for producing a Function:
scaled white noise sequence”
“producing a scaled
sequence”

white

noise

Corresponding Structure:
“a processor configured such that wg =
gtw and equivalents thereof”

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“convolution unit for convolving the pitch 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies.
codevector with a weighted synthesis filter
Function:
impulse response signal”
“convolving the pitch codevector with a
weighted synthesis filter impulse response
signal”
Corresponding Structure:
“a processor configured to convolve the
vectors vf(j) with the impulse response h to
obtain the vectors y(j), where j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
K, and equivalents thereof”
“signal fragmenting device for receiving an
encoded wideband speech signal and
extracting from said encoded wideband
speech signal at least pitch codebook
parameters,
innovative
codebook
parameters,
and
synthesis
filter
coefficients”

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies.
Function:
“receiving an encoded wideband speech
signal and extracting from said encoded
wideband speech signal at least pitch
codebook parameters, innovative codebook
parameters,
and
synthesis
filter
coefficients”
Corresponding Structure:
“a processor configured to demultiplex
the long-term prediction (LTP) parameters
T, b, and j per subframe, the innovation
codebook index k and gain g per subframe,
and the short-term prediction parameters
(STP) Â(z) per frame; and equivalents
thereof”

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“signal fragmenting device for receiving an
encoded version of a wideband signal
previously down-sampled during encoding
and extracting from said encoded wideband
signal version at least pitch codebook
parameters,
innovative
codebook
parameters, and linear prediction filter
coefficients”

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies.
Function:
“receiving an encoded version of a
wideband signal previously down-sampled
during encoding and extracting from said
encoded wideband signal version at least
pitch codebook parameters, innovative
codebook parameters, and linear prediction
filter coefficients”
Corresponding Structure:
“a processor configured to demultiplex
the long-term prediction (LTP) parameters
T, b, and j per subframe, the innovation
codebook index k and gain g per subframe,
and the short-term prediction parameters
(STP) Â(z) per frame; and equivalents
thereof”

“pitch analysis device responsive to the
pitch codevector for selecting, from said sets
of pitch codebook parameters, the set of
pitch codebook parameters associated to the
signal path having the lowest calculated
pitch prediction error”

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies.
Function:
“selecting, from said sets of pitch
codebook parameters, the set of pitch
codebook parameters associated to the
signal path having the lowest calculated
pitch prediction error”
Corresponding Structure:
“a processor configured to select the
parameters b, T, and j, corresponding to the
vT or vf(j) which minimizes the mean squared
pitch prediction error, and equivalents
thereof”

V. CONCLUSION
The Court adopts the constructions set forth in this opinion for the disputed terms of the
patent-in-suit, and in reaching conclusions the Court has considered and relied upon extrinsic
evidence. The Court’s constructions thus include subsidiary findings of fact based upon the

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extrinsic evidence presented by the parties in these claim construction proceedings. See Teva, 135
S. Ct. at 841.
The parties are ordered that they may not refer, directly or indirectly, to each other’s claim
construction positions in the presence of the jury. Likewise, the parties are ordered to refrain from
mentioning any portion of this opinion, other than the actual definitions adopted by the Court, in
the presence of the jury. Any reference to claim construction proceedings is limited to informing
the jury of the definitions adopted by the Court.
Within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the parties
are hereby ORDERED, in good faith, to mediate this case with the mediator appointed herein. As

.
a part of such mediation, each party shall personally appear by counsel and by at least one corporate
officer possessing sufficient authority and control to unilaterally make binding decisions for the
corporation adequate to address any good faith offer or counteroffer of settlement that might arise
during such mediation. Failure to do so shall be deemed by the Court as a failure to mediate in
good faith and may subject that party to such sanctions as the Court deems appropriate. No
participant shall leave the mediation without the approval of the mediator.

SIGNED this 19th day of December, 2011.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 5th day of July, 2017.

____________________________________
RODNEY GILSTRAP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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