SEVEN Networks, LLC v. Google Inc.

Filing 342

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. Signed by District Judge Rodney Gilstrap on 10/23/2018. (nkl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
SEVEN NETWORKS, LLC

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§
v.
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GOOGLE LLC
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____________________________________ §
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SEVEN NETWORKS, LLC
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v.
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SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,
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INC. and SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., §
LTD.
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§

CASE NO. 2:17-CV-442-JRG
(Lead Case)

CASE NO. 2:17-CV-441-JRG
(Consolidated Case)

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Opening Claim Construction Brief (Google/Samsung, 1 Dkt.
No. 191) filed by Plaintiff SEVEN Networks, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “SEVEN”). Also before the
Court are the Amended Responsive Claim Construction Brief filed by Defendant Google LLC

1

The present Claim Construction Memorandum and Order refers to the Eastern District of Texas proceedings (Civil
Action Nos. 2:17-CV-442 (Lead), -441 (Consolidated)) as “Google/Samsung” and refers to related Northern District
of Texas proceedings (Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-1495) as “ZTE.” ZTE is discussed further herein.

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(“Google”) (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263) 2 and Plaintiffs’ reply (Google/Samsung, Dkt.
No. 279). 3
Further before the Court are Plaintiff’s Opening Claim Construction Brief (ZTE, Dkt.
No. 77), Defendant ZTE (USA), Inc.’s (“ZTE’s”) 4 Corrected Opening Claim Construction Brief
(ZTE, Dkt. No. 85, Ex. A), Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief (ZTE, Dkt. No. 88),
ZTE’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief (ZTE, Dkt. No. 86), and Plaintiff’s Reply Claim
Construction Brief Regarding “Common Channel” and “Non-Common Channel” (ZTE, Dkt.
No. 148).
The Northern District of Texas and the Eastern District of Texas held a concurrent claim
construction hearing in the Google/Samsung and ZTE proceedings on September 12, 2018. (See
Mar. 22, 2018 Order on Concurrent Markman Hearing (ZTE, Dkt. No. 101; Google/Samsung, Dkt.
No. 138).)

2
Google filed an Amended Responsive Claim Construction Brief pursuant to the Court’s July 19, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 234) and Google’s subsequent July 22, 2018 Notice
of Election Regarding Claim Construction Disputes (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 239). Defendants Samsung
Electronics America, Inc. and Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd (collectively, “Samsung”) have stated that this
Amended Responsive Claim Construction Brief includes all arguments relevant to Samsung. (See Google/Samsung,
Dkt. No. 268.) The Court therefore treats the Amended Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Google/Samsung,
Dkt. No. 263) as having superseded the original Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No.
208) as to both Google and Samsung.
3

Plaintiff’s Reply to [Defendants’] Amended Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No.
279) supersedes Plaintiff’s Reply Claim-Construction Brief (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 225).
4

The Court herein uses the term “Defendants” to refer to some or all of Google, Samsung, and ZTE.

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Table of Contents
I. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 4
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ........................................................................................................... 5
III. AGREED TERMS................................................................................................................. 9
IV. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 9,516,127 ........................... 10
A. “backlight” and “backlight status” ...................................................................................... 10
B. “delay a timing of one or more triggers” ............................................................................ 14
C. “adjust a timing of activities . . . to reduce usage of at least one resource” ........................ 17
D. “wakelock[s]” ..................................................................................................................... 19
E. “optimize background traffic,” “receive a selection from a user whether to optimize
traffic,” and “optimizes the use of battery, CPU and memory resources” ......................... 22
V. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 9,247,019............................. 29
F. “content requests,” “delay content requests,” and “align content requests” ....................... 29
G. “backlight status” ................................................................................................................ 36
VI. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 9,516,129 ........................... 37
H. “block” ................................................................................................................................ 37
I. “executing in a background,” “executing in background,” and “executing in a
foreground” ......................................................................................................................... 40
J. “backlight [status]”............................................................................................................... 44
K. “battery charge status” ........................................................................................................ 45
VII. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 9,351,254.......................... 47
L. “not critical to user experience” and “wherein the application is non-critical” .................. 48
M. “system wakelock” ............................................................................................................. 51
VIII. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 9,325,600 ........................ 54
N. “non-transitory computer readable media . . . comprising: blocking . . .; offloading . . .;
monitoring . . .; unblocking . . .; re-blocking . . .” .............................................................. 55
O. “common channel” and “non-common channel” ............................................................... 57
P. “monitoring the application traffic of the application” ....................................................... 66
IX. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 9,553,816 ........................... 68
Q. “first application is inactive,” “determining whether the first application is inactive
based on the time the first application was last accessed,” and “an application . . . is
inactive” .............................................................................................................................. 69
R. “blocking” ........................................................................................................................... 69
X. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 8,811,952............................. 70
S. “periodicity” and “the periodicity of the synchronization requests occur at a frequency
according to remaining battery power on the mobile device” ............................................ 71
XI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 72
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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has alleged infringement of United States Patents No. 9,516,127 (“the ’127
Patent”), 9,247,019 (“the ’019 Patent”), 9,516,129 (“the ’129 Patent”), 9,351,254 (“the ’254
Patent”), 9,325,600 (“the ’600 Patent”), 9,553,816 (“the ’816 Patent”), 8,811,952 (“the ’952
Patent”), 9,386,433 (“the ’433 Patent”), 8,078,158 (“the ’158 Patent”), and 9,444,812 (“the ’812
Patent”) 5 (collectively, “the patents-in-suit”). (See Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 1, Exs. 1–6.)
The ’127 Patent, the ’019 Patent, the ’129 Patent, the ’254 Patent, the ’600 Patent, the ’816
Patent, and the ’952 Patent are asserted against Google, Samsung, and ZTE. Many of the claim
construction disputes presented in ZTE have been incorporated by reference in Google/Samsung. 6
Although the parties’ briefing in Google/Samsung includes arguments regarding disputed
terms in the ’158 Patent, the ’433 Patent, and the ’812 Patent, the present Claim Construction
Memorandum and Opinion does not address those terms because Plaintiff has withdrawn all
asserted claims of those patents. (See Google/Samsung, Dkt. Nos. 259 & 305.)

5

The patents-in-suit are listed here in the order set forth in Plaintiff’s Opening Claim Construction Brief (and in the
order attached thereto in Exhibits B–K) in Google/Samsung. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 1 n.1.)
6

Google and Samsung have asserted: “For these terms, SEVEN incorporates by reference the briefing in SEVEN’s
case against ZTE. SEVEN is taking a shortcut to save on page limits, when Defendants in this case never had the
opportunity to respond to those arguments in the ZTE Case and therefore lack the same shortcut.”
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 4 n.6.) The Court already addressed this issue in its May 23, 2018 Order on
Conduct of Claim Construction. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 175, at 1‒2 (“the Court expects that the Defendants in
this case will, through their own claim construction briefing, in accordance with the requirements of P.R. 4-5,
identify those positions with which they agree with ZTE, those positions they disagree with ZTE (and why), and
address any additional disputed claims present in the patents at issue only in this case”).) The Court further
addressed related issues in a Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on July 19, 2018. (Google/Samsung, Dkt.
No. 234.)

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II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Claim construction is clearly an issue of law for the court to decide. Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
It is understood that “[a] claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the
patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using or selling the protected
invention.” Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
“In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic
evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background
science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period.” Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015) (citation omitted). “In cases where those
subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about that
extrinsic evidence. These are the ‘evidentiary underpinnings’ of claim construction that we
discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal.”
Id. (citing 517 U.S. 370).
To ascertain the meaning of claims, courts look to three primary sources: the claims, the
specification, and the prosecution history. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The specification must
contain a written description of the invention that enables one of ordinary skill in the art to make
and use the invention. Id. A patent’s claims must be read in view of the specification, of which
they are a part. Id. For claim construction purposes, the description may act as a sort of dictionary,
which explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims. Id. “One purpose for
examining the specification is to determine if the patentee has limited the scope of the claims.”
Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

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Nonetheless, it is the function of the claims, not the specification, to set forth the limits of
the patentee’s invention. Otherwise, there would be no need for claims. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita
Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). The patentee is free to be his own
lexicographer, but any special definition given to a word must be clearly set forth in the
specification. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Although the specification may indicate that certain embodiments are preferred, particular
embodiments appearing in the specification will not be read into the claims when the claim
language is broader than the embodiments. Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc.,
34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
This Court’s claim construction analysis is substantially guided by the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Phillips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In Phillips,
the court set forth several guideposts that courts should follow when construing claims. In
particular, the court reiterated that “the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee
is entitled the right to exclude.” Id. at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water
Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To that end, the words used in a claim
are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. Id. The ordinary and customary
meaning of a claim term “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in
the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent
application.” Id. at 1313. This principle of patent law flows naturally from the recognition that
inventors are usually persons who are skilled in the field of the invention and that patents are
addressed to, and intended to be read by, others skilled in the particular art. Id.
Despite the importance of claim terms, Phillips made clear that “the person of ordinary
skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in

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which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the
specification.” Id. Although the claims themselves may provide guidance as to the meaning of
particular terms, those terms are part of “a fully integrated written instrument.” Id. at 1315
(quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). Thus, the Phillips court emphasized the specification as being
the primary basis for construing the claims. Id. at 1314–17. As the Supreme Court stated long
ago, “in case of doubt or ambiguity it is proper in all cases to refer back to the descriptive portions
of the specification to aid in solving the doubt or in ascertaining the true intent and meaning of the
language employed in the claims.” Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878). In addressing the role of
the specification, the Phillips court quoted with approval its earlier observations from Renishaw
PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998):
Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and
confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and
intended to envelop with the claim. The construction that stays true to the claim
language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention
will be, in the end, the correct construction.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Consequently, Phillips emphasized the important role the specification
plays in the claim construction process.
The prosecution history also continues to play an important role in claim interpretation.
Like the specification, the prosecution history helps to demonstrate how the inventor and the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) understood the patent. Id. at 1317. Because
the file history, however, “represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant,”
it may lack the clarity of the specification and thus be less useful in claim construction proceedings.
Id. Nevertheless, the prosecution history is intrinsic evidence that is relevant to the determination
of how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention during
prosecution by narrowing the scope of the claims. Id.; see Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys.,

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Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that “a patentee’s statements during
prosecution, whether relied on by the examiner or not, are relevant to claim interpretation”).
Phillips rejected any claim construction approach that sacrificed the intrinsic record in
favor of extrinsic evidence, such as dictionary definitions or expert testimony. The en banc court
condemned the suggestion made by Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193
(Fed. Cir. 2002), that a court should discern the ordinary meaning of the claim terms (through
dictionaries or otherwise) before resorting to the specification for certain limited purposes.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319–24. According to Phillips, reliance on dictionary definitions at the
expense of the specification had the effect of “focus[ing] the inquiry on the abstract meaning of
words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.” Id. at 1321.
Phillips emphasized that the patent system is based on the proposition that the claims cover only
the invented subject matter. Id.
Phillips does not preclude all uses of dictionaries in claim construction proceedings.
Instead, the court assigned dictionaries a role subordinate to the intrinsic record. In doing so, the
court emphasized that claim construction issues are not resolved by any magic formula. The court
did not impose any particular sequence of steps for a court to follow when it considers disputed
claim language. Id. at 1323–25. Rather, Phillips held that a court must attach the appropriate
weight to the intrinsic sources offered in support of a proposed claim construction, bearing in mind
the general rule that the claims measure the scope of the patent grant.
The Supreme Court of the United States has “read [35 U.S.C.] § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a
patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled
in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). “A determination of claim indefiniteness is a

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legal conclusion that is drawn from the court’s performance of its duty as the construer of patent
claims.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Nautilus, 134
S. Ct. 2120.
III. AGREED TERMS
In their May 15, 2018 Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 1–2), 7 the parties set forth agreements as to the following terms
in the patents-in-suit:
Term
“on a periodic basis”

Agreement
“at recurring approximately regular intervals”

(’952 Patent, Claim 26)
“suppressing the aligned content
requests”

“preventing content requests that have been aligned from
being sent”

(’019 Patent, Claim 1)
“offloading application traffic of
an application onto a second
channel”

“diverting application traffic of an application onto a
second channel”

(’600 Patent, Claim 7)
“alarms”

“time-based triggers used by applications to schedule
tasks”

(’127 Patent, Claims 11, 18)
“the digital content”

“the digital content” refers to the “available digital
content”

(’433 Patent, Claims 1–9, 16, 19–
22, 25, 27, 29–30)

7

The parties in ZTE presented no other agreed-upon constructions. (See ZTE, Dkt. No. 61, at 1 (“The parties do not
agree on any constructions.”).)

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IV. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 9,516,127
The ’127 Patent, titled “Intelligent Alarm Manipulator and Resource Tracker,” issued on
December 6, 2016, and bears an earliest priority date of March 25, 2013. Plaintiff submits that
“[t]he ’127 Patent claims systems and methods that conserve network and mobile-device
resources.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 1.) The Abstract of the ’127 Patent states:
Systems and methods for tracking resources used by triggers such as alarms and
timers that are used by mobile applications to schedule tasks and intelligently
manipulating the timing of the triggers to optimize usage of resources such as, but
not limited to: network, battery, CPU and/or memory are disclosed. In one
embodiment, an intelligent alarm manipulator and resource tracker tracks triggers
from multiple applications on a mobile device and corresponding use of resources
resulting from the triggers on a mobile device. The intelligent alarm manipulator
and resource tracker further determines correlations between the triggers and the
corresponding use of the resources on the mobile device and manipulates, based on
the correlations, timing or frequency of some or all of the triggers to optimize the
use of the resources on the mobile device.
A. “backlight” and “backlight status”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

“[the status of] an illumination device
positioned behind a viewing surface” 8

“[the status of] an illumination device that
provides light behind a non-emissive
display” 9

(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 2; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 12 & 13;
Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 1.) The parties submit that these terms appear in Claims 10
and 17. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 6‒7; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 12
& 13.)

8

Plaintiff previously proposed: “The term ‘backlight,’ when considered in light of the broader phrase ‘exiting the
power save mode when the backlight of the mobile device turns off’ is used consistent with its plain and ordinary
meaning (i.e., ‘exit[ing] the power save mode when the screen of the mobile device turns on’).” (Google/Samsung,
Dkt. No. 172, at 6–7.)

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Defendants previously proposed: “the status of an illumination device positioned behind a non-emissive display.”
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 6–7.)

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(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ’127 Patent (like the other patents-in-suit) never refers to
displays as being ‘emissive’ or ‘non-emissive’ displays, and it certainly never teaches that the
inventions are limited to devices with non-emissive displays.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191,
at 2.) Plaintiff also submits an extrinsic technical dictionary definition. (Id., at 3.)
Defendants argue that “SEVEN’s construction attempts to sweep in display types that do
not require or use a ‘backlight,’ and would be inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the term.”
(See Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 1 (citation omitted).) Defendants submit that “[t]he patent
uses both ‘backlight’ and generic terms such as ‘screen’ or ‘display,’ confirming a distinction
between a generic screen or display and one that uses a backlight.” (Id. (citations omitted).)
Plaintiff replies that “[t]he particular technology used for the screen . . . is not critical to
the invention.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 1.) Plaintiff argues that “[t]he backlight
limitation is satisfied by any screen technology where the viewing surface is illuminated from
behind.” (Id.) Further, Plaintiff submits that “Defendants want the backlight to be behind an
undefined ‘display[,]’ adding another limitation to the claim that is unsupported by the
specification and that creates confusion.” (Id.)
(2) Analysis
On one hand, the specification refers to a “backlight” as well as a “screen” or a “display,”
and the specification does not state that these terms are being used interchangeably. See, e.g., ’127
Patent at 1:23 (“device screen”). Also, Defendants have pointed out that Plaintiff’s expert has
cited extrinsic evidence explaining that an LCD “requires a backlight to reproduce a picture.”
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, Ex. 4, Torben Rasmussen, OLED vs. LCD.) Defendants’ expert
has opined:

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The backlight is a subcomponent of the display, so a system monitoring display
status could yield a different status than a system monitoring the backlight status.
Indeed, the power going to the backlight is distinct from the power going to the
graphics card and the LCD.
(Id., Ex. 1, May 18, 2018 Pattison Decl., at ¶ 45.)
Plaintiff has submitted Samsung documents that refer to OLED displays (which Plaintiff
states are emissive) as having “backlights.” (See Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, Exs. T–W.).
Yet, these do not appear to be technical documents.

See Vasudevan Software, Inc. v.

MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[l]anguage used in marketing materials
directed to potential customers can mean something quite different from the language used in a
patent directed to persons skilled in the art”).
Defendants have also submitted other extrinsic evidence that backlights are commonly
used with non-emissive displays, such as LCDs. (See Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, Ex. 2,
Shunuski Kobayahi, et al., LCD Backlights 4 (“The backlight unit is a light source for LCDs which
are not self-luminous.”); see also id., Ex. 3, Mi-Yeon Yu, et al., Correlation Between the Optical
Performance of the Reflective Polarizer and the Structure of LCD Backlight 256 (similar).
Defendants’ expert has cited additional, similar extrinsic evidence. (Id., Ex. 1, May 18, 2018
Pattison Decl., at pp. 9–10 nn.1–4; see, e.g., id., p. 35 of 63, Shunsuke Kobayashi, et al., LCD
Backlights, Preface (“There are two categories of electronic information displays: one is an
emissive type such as CRTs, PDPs, ELDs, OLEDs, LEDs, and FEDs, and the other is a nonemissive type such as LCDs, electronic-papers and hard copy printings.”) (GOOGLE-SEVENCC-00000059).)
On the other hand, the specification refers to a broad range of display types:
The display device can include, by way of example but not limitation, a cathode
ray tube (CRT), liquid crystal display (LCD), or some other applicable known or
convenient display device.
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’127 Patent at 20:53–57. Plaintiff has cited the opinion of its expert that such displays are not
limited to “non-emissive” displays. (See Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, Ex. L, May 18, 2018
Goodrich Decl., at ¶¶ 59–70; see also id., at ¶ 69 (“. . . OLED displays are backlights in the
ordinary sense of the word (i.e., a source of light behind a translucent or transparent viewing
surface.”).)
Moreover, an extrinsic dictionary submitted by the parties refers to “backlit” in terms of
illumination from behind rather than in terms of a “non-emissive display” as Defendants have
proposed:
back-lit or backlit adj. Having a source of light, such as a lamp or LED behind a
(usually translucent) viewing surface, in order to illuminate the surface.
back-lit display or backlit display n. Something illuminated from behind, rather
than by a light source above or to the front.
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, Ex. Q, Microsoft Computer Dictionary 48 (5th ed. 2002).)
Plaintiff has pointed out that these definitions do not state that the viewing surface must be “nonemissive.” Further, the specification refers to “observing . . . backlight status” as an example of
“observ[ing] user activity,” which thus frames the purpose of observing backlight status in a
context in which the type of the display does not appear to be significant. ’127 Patent at 7:60–67.
The above-reproduced technical definitions do, however, state that the illumination is from behind.
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, Ex. Q, Microsoft Computer Dictionary 48 (5th ed. 2002).)
Finally, at the September 12, 2018 hearing, Defendants alternatively suggested that
Plaintiff’s proposal of “viewing surface” could be replaced with “display,” but the parties’ oral
arguments demonstrated that a dispute would likely arise as to the meaning of “display” in this
context. In particular, the parties disputed whether a “display” can itself encompass illumination
sources (such that no illumination source would be “behind” the display). This dispute is
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essentially the same as the one regarding “non-emissive.” Defendants’ argument at the hearing,
that OLED technology is fundamentally different from “backlit” technology (such as LCD), is
unavailing. Although Defendants identified differences in the technology, Defendants have not
shown that any of those differences are necessarily relevant to how the term “backlight” is used in
the claims. On balance, “viewing surface” properly resolves the dispute, is readily understandable,
and is consistent with the above-discussed technical dictionary that both sides have cited. (See
Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 3; see also Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 2.)
Based on all of the foregoing, the Court hereby construes “backlight” to mean “an
illumination device that provides light behind a viewing surface.” The Court further hereby
finds that the term “backlight status” has its plain meaning apart from the Court’s construction
of “backlight.” See, e.g., Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (“only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary
to resolve the controversy”).
B. “delay a timing of one or more triggers”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary. The phrase is used “move the timing of one or more triggers to a
consistent with its plain and ordinary meaning later point of time”
(i.e., “defer a timing of one or more triggers”).
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 4; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 14;
Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 2.) The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 10
and 17. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 7; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 14.)

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(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ proposed construction should be rejected because
“[r]ewording ‘delay’ as ‘move to a later point of time’ does not clarify its meaning, which is neither
unclear nor ambiguous.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 4.)
Defendants respond that “SEVEN criticizes Defendants’ construction as excluding
indefinite delays, but the plain meaning of ‘delay’ implies a lag between the planned time for an
event and an actual time.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 3.)
Plaintiff replies that “the patent contemplates that timing can be delayed indefinitely and
nowhere suggests that the timing must be delayed for a predetermined time.” (Google/Samsung,
Dkt. No. 279, at 1–2 (citing ’127 Patent at 12:34–36).)
(2) Analysis
The specification discloses that the timing of triggers can be modified:
In one implementation, the method comprises manipulating some or all of the
triggers by delaying the first and subsequent [t]riggers to fire off at the same time
as the last trigger. In another implementation, the method comprises manipulating
some or all of the triggers by delaying at least one trigger and accelerating at least
one trigger.
In one implementation, the method comprises identifying a specific type of trigger
from the triggers, and based on the associations and the specific type of trigger,
delaying the specific type of trigger for a time period.
’127 Patent at 3:38–47; see id. at 12:29–36 (“temporally move communications”; “Traffic
scheduler 124 may also decide to delay transmission of data that is not relevant at a given time (for
example, when the device is not actively used).”), 13:13–20 (“manipulate the timing of triggers”),
18:16–22 (“manipulate timing of alarms/timers by delaying at least one alarm/timer or accelerating
at least one alarm/timer to synchronize the alarms/timers”) & 19:24–43 (“alarms/timers can be

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manipulated (e.g., modified, delayed, accelerated, etc.) to cause the alarms/timers to fire off or be
triggered all the [sic, all at the] same time”).
Plaintiff has also cited disclosure in the specification regarding preventing triggers from
firing:
In one implementation, the mobile device can determine, from the tracking, patterns
in which the triggers fire off, and use the patterns in manipulating the timing of
some of the triggers to prevent the triggers from firing off when user activity is not
predicted or when the battery level is below a threshold.
’127 Patent at 4:14–19 (emphasis added). Plaintiff has not shown, however, how this disclosure
regarding “prevent[ing]” overrides the above-discussed context in which the specification uses the
term “delay” with reference to a time period.
This understanding is also consistent with dictionary definitions submitted by Defendants
in which “delay” refers to a time period or to a later time. (See Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263,
Ex. 6, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 304 (10th ed. 2002) (defining “delay” as to “put
off,” to “postpone,” or “to stop, delay, or hinder for a time”); see also id., Ex. 15, Cambridge
Academic Content Dictionary 241 (2009) (defining “delay” as “to cause to be late or to cause to
happen at a later time, or to wait before acting”).
Thus, on balance, Plaintiff has not adequately supported its assertion that the disputed term
could refer to delaying a trigger indefinitely. Nonetheless, this term does not necessarily require
a showing that the trigger actually occurs. Some intervening circumstance could arise that prevents
the occurrence, such as if a user powers down a device.
With that understanding, the Court hereby construes “delay a timing of one or more
triggers” to mean “move the timing of one or more triggers to a time after the trigger(s) were
originally scheduled.”

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C. “adjust a timing of activities . . . to reduce usage of at least one resource”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary. The phrase
“adjust a timing of activities . . . to reduce
usage of at
least one resource” is used consistent with its
plain and ordinary meaning.

“move a timing of activities . . . to reduce
usage of at least one resource of the mobile
device” 10

(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 4; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 18.) The parties
submit that this term appears in Claims 33 and 42. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 8;
Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 18.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff urges that Defendants’ proposed construction should be rejected because “adjust”
does not mean “move,” and Plaintiff argues that the patentee did not give the term “adjust” a
special definition. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 5.)
Defendants argue this term together with the term “delay a timing of one or more triggers,”
which is addressed above. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 3.)
Plaintiff replies that “there is no basis for redefining ‘adjust’ to mean ‘move’ . . . .”
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 2.)
(2) Analysis
Defendants have not demonstrated any need to construe “adjust” to mean “move.” The
dictionary definitions cited by Plaintiff suggest that introducing the word “move” would not serve
to clarify the meaning of the disputed term. (Compare Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, Ex. O, The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 22 (4th ed. 2000) (defining “adjust” to

10

Defendants previously proposed: “move a timing of activities . . . to reduce usage of at least one resource on the
mobile device.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 2–3 (emphasis added).)

- 17 -

mean “[t]o change so as to match or fit; cause to correspond,” “[t]o bring into proper relationship,”
and “[t]o adapt or conform, as to new conditions”) with id., Ex. P, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 761 (10th ed. 1993) (defining “move” as “to change the place or position of” and “to
dislodge or displace from a fixed position”).)
Further, Plaintiff persuasively argues that Defendants’ proposal of “move” might exclude
adjustments to frequency, such as increasing or decreasing an amount of time that elapses between
occurrences of an activity.
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ proposed construction. No
further construction is necessary. See U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical
scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use
in the determination of infringement. It is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.”); see also
O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“[D]istrict courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation present in a
patent’s asserted claims.”).
Nonetheless, to whatever extent Plaintiff is proposing that “adjust a timing of activities”
could encompass eliminating the activities, Plaintiff has not supported such an interpretation.
Likewise, Defendants have not shown that adjusting a timing of activities necessarily requires that
all activities actually occur. These issues are addressed further above as to the “delay a timing
. . .” term.
With that understanding, the Court hereby construes “adjust a timing of activities . . . to
reduce usage of at least one resource” to have its plain meaning.

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D. “wakelock[s]”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

“a software-based mechanism for indicating
that an application needs the mobile device to
stay awake”

“a software-based mechanism for bringing the
mobile device out of sleep mode” 11

(ZTE, Dkt. No. 77, at 12; ZTE, Dkt. No. 86, at 16; ZTE, Dkt. No. 88, at 12; Google/Samsung, Dkt.
No. 246, Ex. A at 15; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 3.) The parties submit that this term
appears in Claims 10 and 17 of the ’127 Patent. (ZTE, Dkt. No. 61, at 4; Google/Samsung, Dkt.
No. 172, at 7; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 15.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues: “The key point is that alarms, not wakelocks, bring the device out of sleep
mode. Wakelocks associated with the alarms perform the separate function of keeping the device
awake after it has been brought out of sleep mode.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 88, at 13 (emphasis in
original).)
ZTE adopts the arguments presented by Google and Samsung. Google and Samsung
respond that their proposal is consistent with the specification’s only description of wakelocks.
(See Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 3–4.) Google and Samsung also argue that “SEVEN’s
proposal is based almost exclusively on extrinsic evidence relating to the accused Android
products, which is improper.” (Id., at 4.)
Plaintiff replies by reiterating that “[w]akelocks are not alarms, nor do they bring
applications out of sleep mode.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 2.)

11

ZTE previously proposed: “Plain and ordinary meaning.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 85, Ex. A, at 14). After the close of
briefing but prior to the September 12, 2018 hearing, ZTE adopted the proposal set forth by Google and Samsung.

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(2) Analysis
The specification discloses:
In one implementation, the resource usage pattern detector 218 can detect or
determine a pattern of firing off of alarms/timers. For example, some alarms/timers
may be triggered during a certain period of time such as during night time, or when
the backlight of the mobile device is off. For example, in the Android platform,
some applications use alarms associated with wake locks (WakeLock) to bring the
device out of sleep mode. When such a pattern is detected, the alarm/timer
manipulator 222 can align multiple alarms/timers associated with wake locks to
trigger at the same time or approximately the same time, such that all the scheduled
tasks can be done without waking up the mobile device repeatedly. This aligning
of multiple alarms/timers based on detected pattern can conserve battery power,
improve CPU efficiency, and the like.
’127 Patent at 18:23‒37 (emphasis added); see id. at 17:12–15 (“some applications can use alarms
to wake up the mobile device 150 from a sleep mode to do a task”).
This disclosure distinguishes between “wakelocks” and “alarms/timers.” Further, Google
and Samsung have cited the disclosure that “in the Android platform, some applications use alarms
associated with wake locks (WakeLock) to bring the device out of sleep mode.” ’127 Patent at
18:27–30; see id. at 17:12‒15 (quoted above). Such disclosure of alarms “associated with”
wakelocks tends to refute, rather than support, Google and Samsung’s suggestion that wakelocks
are used to bring a device out of sleep mode.
Also, during prosecution, the examiner found that certain prior art “teaches the use of wake
locks by applications to prevent a device from entering a sleep or power-saving mode.” (ZTE,
Dkt. No. 78, Ex. G, Aug. 15, 2016 Notice of Allowability, at 2 (P. App. 151).) This understanding
of the examiner, though not framed as a definition, weighs in support of Plaintiff’s proposed
interpretation because “[s]tatements about a claim term made by an Examiner during prosecution
of an application may be evidence of how one of skill in the art understood the term at the time the
application was filed.” Salazar v. Procter & Gamble Co., 414 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005);

- 20 -

see Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
abrogated on other grounds by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); see also PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff further notes that the specification refers to the “Android” operating system. See
’127 Patent at 18:27–30 (reproduced above). Plaintiff submits extrinsic evidence of a website for
Android developers that explains that “[a] wake lock is a mechanism to indicate that your
application needs to have the device stay on.”

(ZTE, Dkt. No. 78, Ex. L,

PowerManager.WakeLock (P. App. 298); see id., Ex. K, Paul Deitel, et al., Android for
Programmers: An App-Driven Approach 305 (2012) (P. App. 296) (releasing the wakelock
“indicat[es] that we no longer need to prevent the device from sleeping and the device can return
to its normal power level”); see also ZTE, Dkt. No. 89, Ex. S, PowerManager.WakeLock (P. Resp.
App. 40) (“Class [that] lets you say that you need to have the device on.”).) Also of note,
disclosures in the ’254 Patent refer to wakelocks as preventing “deep sleep.” See ’254 Patent at
1:14–20 (“Wakelocks are power-managing software programs that may, in certain circumstances,
prohibit a mobile device from going into deep dormancy.”) & 4:49–51 (“Applications can request
wakelocks when they need to be certain that they execute the code. The wakelocks guarantee that
CPU is not put to deep sleep while a wakelock is held.”).
Google and Samsung counter that “SEVEN’s proposal is based almost exclusively on
extrinsic evidence relating to the accused Android products, which is improper.”
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 4.) As a general matter, “[a] claim is construed in the light of
the claim language, the other claims, the prior art, the prosecution history, and the specification,
not in light of the accused device.” SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107,
1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985). As noted above, however, the specification refers to Android, and the

- 21 -

extrinsic evidence cited by Plaintiff is consistent with the meaning of the term that is apparent in
the above-cited intrinsic evidence.
The Court finds that Defendants’ proposed construction imposes a limitation on the term
“wakelock” that is not supported by the intrinsic or the extrinsic record.
Therefore, the Court hereby construes “wakelock” to mean “a software-based
mechanism for indicating that an application needs the mobile device to stay awake.”
E. “optimize background traffic,” “receive a selection from a user whether to optimize
traffic,” and “optimizes the use of battery, CPU and memory resources”
“optimize background traffic”
(Claims 33, 42)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

The phrase “optimize background traffic” is
not indefinite, and it is used consistent with
its plain and ordinary meaning (i.e., “adjust
background traffic to conserve network or
mobile device resources”).

Indefinite

“receive a selection from a user whether to optimize traffic”
(Claims 33, 42)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

The phrase “receive a selection from a user
whether to optimize traffic” is not indefinite,
and it is used consistent with its plain and
ordinary meaning (i.e., “receive a selection
from a user whether to adjust traffic to
conserve network or mobile device
resources”).

Indefinite

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“optimizes the use of battery, CPU and memory resources”
(Claims 13, 30, 38, 48)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

The phrase “optimizes the use of battery,
CPU and memory resources” is not indefinite,
and it is used consistent with its plain and
ordinary meaning (i.e., “conserves the use of
battery, CPU, and memory resources”).

Indefinite

(ZTE, Dkt. No. 77, at 20; ZTE, Dkt. No. 85, Ex. A, at 11‒12 & 13; ZTE, Dkt. No. 86, at 13; ZTE,
Dkt. No. 88, at 18; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 16, 17 & 18; Google/Samsung, Dkt.
No. 263, at 4; see Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 8.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “[t]he specification . . . repeatedly and consistently discloses
embodiments of the invention that optimize the use of . . . resources and that do so by conserving
them.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 77, at 21.)
ZTE argues that the term “optimize” is “indefinite for failing to provide a clear meaning”
because “[t]he term ‘optimize’ is a term of degree” that “is not defined in the claims or in the
specification of the patent,” “optimize” “is not even mentioned once in the entire specification,”
and “there is absolutely no basis revealed in the patent by which one would be able to determine
what constitutes ‘optimize traffic.”

(ZTE, Dkt. No. 85, Ex. A, at 12‒13.)

ZTE presents

substantially the same arguments as to the term “optimize background traffic.” (See id., at 13‒14.)
As to “optimize,” Plaintiff responds by citing the opinion of its expert that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would understand that optimizing simply means improving or making more
efficient. (ZTE, Dkt. No. 88, at 20.) As to “traffic,” Plaintiff submits that “ZTE again confuses
breadth with indefiniteness.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would
- 23 -

understand from reading the specification that the claimed ‘traffic’ refers to ‘network traffic.’”
(Id., at 21.) Plaintiff concludes that “the description of the invention and its embodiments in the
specification show that optimizing traffic (i.e., improving network traffic or making network traffic
more efficient) means adjusting it to conserve network or mobile device resources.” (Id., at 22
(footnote omitted).)
ZTE responds that the term “optimize” is indefinite because “the specification uses the
word ‘optimize’ but fails to describe the objective boundaries associated with this specified term
of degree.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 86, at 13.)
Google and Samsung similarly respond that “[t]hese terms are indefinite because the claim
language and specification fail to provide any objective measure as to what constitutes
‘optimization’ of traffic or device resources.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 4.)
Plaintiff replies that “[r]eading the terms in the context of the specification, a person of
ordinary skill in the art would understand that ‘optimize’ means ‘to improve the performance of’
or ‘to make more efficient’—neither of which depends on individual preferences or
requirements—and that improving network traffic or making it more efficient means adjusting it
to conserve network or mobile device resources.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 2.)
At the September 12, 2018 hearing, ZTE stated that it is no longer asserting that the word
“traffic” is indefinite, but all Defendants maintained their indefiniteness arguments as to
“optimize.”
(2) Analysis
The Supreme Court of the United States has “read [35 U.S.C.] § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a
patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled

- 24 -

in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014).
Further, “[t]he claims, when read in light of the specification and the prosecution history,
must provide objective boundaries for those of skill in the art.” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL,
Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Indeed, “a term of degree fails to provide sufficient
notice of its scope if it depends on the unpredictable vagaries of any one person’s opinion.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, “[c]laim language employing terms
of degree has long been found definite where it provided enough certainty to one of skill in the art
when read in the context of the invention.” Id. at 1370.
In some cases, “[w]hether the patents-in-suit are invalid because the definition of [a claim
term] fails to provide one skilled in the art with any objective standards for determining [when a
claim term is met] is a matter more appropriately addressed on summary judgment.” Mannatech,
Inc. v. Techmedia Health, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-813, 2009 WL 3614359, at *15 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29,
2009). Here, however, the parties have presented a dispute that can be readily resolved at this
stage, and the determination as to definiteness or indefiniteness “is a legal conclusion that is drawn
from the court’s performance of its duty as the construer of patent claims.” Datamize, LLC v.
Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. 2120.
Claim 33, for example, recites (emphasis added):
33. A mobile device, comprising:
a memory;
a processor in communication with the memory and configured to execute
instructions stored in the memory to:
receive a selection from a user whether to optimize traffic of a first
application executing in a background of the mobile device;
optimize background traffic of the first application;

- 25 -

receive a selection from a user whether to enter a power save mode, where
the power save mode is based on a battery level of the mobile device;
upon selection to enter the power save mode, adjust a timing of activities of
a second application executing in the background of the mobile device to reduce
usage of at least one resource of the mobile device;
exit the power save mode, wherein the power save mode is exited based on
a battery level or in response to the user directing the mobile device to exit the
power save mode.
Defendants reiterated at the September 12, 2018 hearing that the claims provide no context
for understanding the meaning of “optimize,” in particular as to, in Defendants’ words, what
“trade-offs” are being made. However, the specification uses the term “optimize” with reference
to conserving resources (such as “battery power consumption, radio use, [and] processor/memory
use”). For example:
The traffic can be managed such that network consumption, for example, use of the
cellular network is conserved for effective and efficient bandwidth utilization. In
addition, the host server 100 can manage and coordinate such traffic in the system
such that use of device-side resources (e.g., including but not limited to battery
power consumption, radio use, processor/memory use) are optimized with a general
philosophy for resource conservation while still optimizing performance and user
experience.
***
The proxy system distributed among the host server 100 and the device 150 can
further track alarms/timers implemented by applications on a device and resources
used by such alarms/timers to determine associations using which the proxy system
can manipulate the alarms/timers to occur at an optimal time to reduce resource
usage.
’127 Patent at 7:50–59 & 9:12–18 (emphasis added); see id. at 6:8–25 (“optimized trigger profile”)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 10:4‒11, 10:59–63 (“In general, the disclosed distributed proxy
and cache system allows optimization of network usage, for example, by serving requests from the
local cache 185, the local proxy 175 reduces the number of requests that need to be satisfied over
the network 106.”) (emphasis added), 10:63‒11:18, 12:29‒33, 14:25‒27 (“In one embodiment, a
signaling optimizer reduces network requests to a minimum by caching content in the client and
- 26 -

letting its own server poll for changes in the network.”) (emphasis added) & 18:8‒15 (“For
example, if alarm 1 from application 202 uses a network resource every one minute, and alarm 2
from application 204 uses the same network resource every two minutes, based on the two
associations, the alarm/timer manipulator 222 can manipulate alarms 1 and 2 to fire off at the same
time every one and a half minutes (average of 1 minute and 2 minutes), or every two minutes
(maximum of 1 minute and 2 minute), thereby optimizing the use of network resources.”)
(emphasis added).
Plaintiff’s expert likewise opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would
understand ‘optimization’ to be directed at conserving resources rather than achieving the
mathematically absolute best usage of such resources.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 78, Ex. H, Jan. 15, 2018
Goodrich Decl., at ¶ 138; see id., at ¶ 137 nn.110–11 (citing technical dictionary definitions of
“optimize” that refer to improving performance).) The general-purpose dictionary definition cited
by Google and Samsung, which defines “optimize” as “to make as perfect, effective or functional
as possible,” does not override the context provided by the above-cited intrinsic evidence.
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, Ex. 6, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 815 (10th ed.
2002).)
On balance, the above-cited disclosures in the specification provide sufficient context and
reasonable certainty for understanding how the patentee used the word “optimize” in the present
disputed terms, bearing in mind that “absolute or mathematical precision is not required.” Interval
Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1370; see also id. at 1373 (“We recognize that a patent which defines a
claim phrase through examples may satisfy the definiteness requirement.”) (citing Enzo Biochem,
Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).

- 27 -

Also, the district court decisions cited by Google and Samsung are not binding on this
Court and are unpersuasive in light of the context provided by the above-cited intrinsic evidence.
See Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Coopervision, Inc., No. 04-CV-6485T, 2008 WL 4890245, at *9
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2008) (“[T]he term ‘optimize,’ unlike the term ‘minimize,’ incorporates
subjective considerations.”); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 131668, 2016 WL 4363485, at *11 (D. Del. Aug. 12, 2016) (“The cited portions of the specification,
however, do not provide adequate guidance as to the meaning of ‘optimize,’ nor do they rectify
the indefiniteness of the portions of the specification indicating that QoS [(Quality of Service)] is
subjective and varies by user.”). Further, the Federal Circuit’s affirmance of the Intellectual
Ventures decision does not affect the proper outcome here because the word “optimize” is used in
a different context and “claims of unrelated patents must be construed separately.” e.Digital Corp.
v. Futurewei Techs., Inc., 772 F.3d 723, 727 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
T-Mobile USA, Inc., 902 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Therefore, the Court hereby construes these disputed terms as set forth in the following
chart: 12
Term

Construction

“optimize background traffic”

“adjust background traffic to conserve
network or mobile device resources”

“receive a selection from a user whether to
optimize traffic”

“receive a selection from a user whether to
adjust traffic to conserve network or
mobile device resources”

12

The Court does not construe the term “optimizes the use of battery, CPU and memory resources,” which the parties
have submitted appears in Claims 13, 30, 38, and 48 of the ’127 Patent, because Plaintiff is no longer asserting those
claims.

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V. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 9,247,019
The ’019 Patent, titled “Mobile Application Traffic Optimization,” issued on January 26,
2016, and bears an earliest priority date of July 26, 2010. Plaintiff submits that “[t]he ’019 Patent
claims a mobile device configured to reduce traffic in a wireless network by manipulating the
timing of content requests made by applications on the device.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191,
at 5.) The Abstract of the ’019 Patent states:
A system with distributed proxy for reducing traffic in a wireless network to satisfy
data requests made by a mobile application the system [sic] is provided. The system
includes a mobile device having a local proxy for intercepting a data request made
by the mobile application where the local proxy simulating [sic, simulates]
application server responses for the mobile application on the mobile device for
data requests where responses are available in the local cache. A proxy server is
coupled to the mobile device and an application server to which the data request is
made. The proxy server is able to communicate with the local proxy where the
local proxy forwards the data request to the proxy server for transmission to the
application server for a response to the data request. The proxy server queries the
application server independent of activities of the mobile application for any
changes to the data request that the mobile application has previously made and
notifies the local proxy of such changes.
F. “content requests,” “delay content requests,” and “align content requests”
“content requests”
(Claims 1, 5, 20)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary. The term “content Indefinite
requests” is not indefinite, and it is used
consistent with its plain and ordinary meaning
(i.e., “data requests”).

- 29 -

“delay content requests”
(Claim 1)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary. The term “delay
content requests” is used consistent with its
plain and ordinary meaning (i.e., “defer
content requests”).

“move content requests to a later point of
time”

“align content requests”
(Claim 1)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary. This phrase is
“adjust polling intervals of content requests to
clear and unambiguous, and all of the terms in coincide regularly”
it are being used consistent with their plain
and ordinary meanings (i.e., “adjust a timing
of content requests to occur at approximately
the same time”).

(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 6; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 2, 3 & 5;
Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 5, 7 & 8.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ proposed constructions “improperly limit the claims to
content requests that have already been established” and “improperly imply that there must be a
definite time at which the content requests are ultimately transmitted.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt.
No. 191, at 7 & 8.) Plaintiff also argues that “the content requests can be aligned to occur just
once, at a single point in time.” (Id., at 7.)
Google and Samsung respond:
The claimed meaning of “content requests” is not discernible. It is not enough, as
SEVEN does, to cobble together a definition for “content requests” using dictionary
definitions of the constituent words in isolation with isolated selections from the
- 30 -

written description. What matters is the meaning of “content requests” as used in
the claim, and that usage is indefinite.”
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 5.) As to “delay content requests,” Google and Samsung argue
that “the plain language of the claim recites delaying requests ‘made by multiple mobile
applications,’ which shows that the request must be ‘made’ before it is ‘delayed.’” (Id., at 7.)
Google and Samsung also argue that “SEVEN’s construction allowing a ‘delay’ to be ‘indefinite’
would render the term indefinite because a POSITA could not determine the scope of the claim.”
(Id., at 7.) Finally, as to “align content requests,” Google and Samsung argue that their proposal
is consistent with disclosure in a related provisional patent application to which the ’019 Patent
claims priority. (Id., at 8.) As to the specification of the ’019 Patent itself, Google and Samsung
submit that “[w]hile not explaining what it means to ‘align content requests,’ the specification
consistently, and solely, describes the alleged benefits of ‘aligning content requests’ as minimizing
the number of times polling requests are made, and therefore reducing, e.g., battery usage and
network traffic.” (Id. (citations omitted).)
Plaintiff replies that the claim is clear as to which content requests are delayed, aligned,
and suppressed. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 2–3.) Plaintiff also argues that “delay” does
not require moving to a particular point in time, and “[n]either the claim nor the specification
provides a basis for limiting the claim to content requests that have already been made.” (Id., at 3.)
As to “align,” Plaintiff replies: “The claim states that the requests are aligned so they can be
transmitted together, one time, at the end of the suppression period. Since those requests are not
later retransmitted, there is no basis for construing the term to require regular, recurring
transmissions.” (Id.)

- 31 -

(2) Analysis
On one hand, Google and Samsung properly submit that defining individual words within
a term does not necessarily lead to a proper construction. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 (in
rejecting approach that placed too much reliance on dictionaries, explaining that “[t]he main
problem with elevating the dictionary to such prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on the
abstract meaning of words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the
patent”).
On the other hand, “[i]n some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood
by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction
in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of
commonly understood words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
Here, the specification confirms that “content” has a broad scope that may include, for
example, audio, video, text, e-mail, messages, or application data. See ’019 Patent at 4:19–35,
13:24–45, 14:4–7, 14:42–45, 16:31–37, 21:33–40 & 24:33–25:8. This scope may be broad, but
“breadth is not indefiniteness.” BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (quoting SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
Google and Samsung argue that “[t]he phrase ‘content requests’ is referenced seven times
in claim 1, with no clear antecedent basis for the later occurrences of ‘content requests,’” and
“[w]hile claim 1 requires several actions to be performed on some putative ‘content requests,’ the
claim is hopelessly ambiguous as to which particular ‘content requests’ on which to perform each
action.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 5–6.)
Claim 1 of the ’019 Patent recites (emphasis added):

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1. A mobile device configured for reducing traffic in a wireless network, the device
configured to
delay content requests made by multiple mobile applications;
align content requests using observed activity of a user of the mobile device
that includes a time since a last key press and mobile device properties;
poll in accordance with the aligned content requests to satisfy content
requests of at least some of the multiple mobile applications,
monitor the time since a last key press, and, when the time
exceeds a predetermined time period, locally adjust the
mobile device by suppressing the aligned content
requests at the mobile device for a first suppression
period, and after expiration of the first suppression
period, transmit any aligned content requests,
suppress subsequent content requests at the mobile device
for a second suppression period, where the second
suppression period is longer than the first suppression
period.
The antecedent basis for “the aligned content requests” and “aligned content requests” is
the content requests in the limitation of “align content requests.” Also, the recital of “content
requests of at least some of the multiple mobile applications” refers back to the “content requests
made by multiple mobile applications.” As to the “subsequent content requests,” no antecedent
basis is required, and Defendants have not demonstrated any confusion. The disclosure in a related
provisional patent application cited by the parties is also informative. (See Google/Samsung, Dkt.
No. 263, Ex. 7, United States Provisional Patent Application No. 61/416,020, at
SEVENLIT0000153–55.)

The opinions of Defendants’ expert as to indefiniteness are

unpersuasive. (See id., Ex. 5, May 18, 2018 Jeffay Decl., at ¶¶ 37–49.)
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness argument. No
further construction is necessary. See U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568 (“Claim construction is a
matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to
explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement. It
is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.”); see also O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362; Finjan, Inc.

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v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Unlike O2 Micro, where the
court failed to resolve the parties’ quarrel, the district court rejected Defendants’ construction.”);
ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commcn’s, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 802 F.3d 1283, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff has not, however, adequately supported its assertion that the term “delay content
requests” could refer to delaying indefinitely. The specification discloses that events can be
“accumulate[d] for batch transfer” (’019 Patent at 19:47–64), but Plaintiff has not shown support
for an indefinite time. Extrinsic dictionary definitions submitted by Defendants further reinforce
that “delay” refers to moving to a later point in time. (See Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, Ex. 6,
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 304 (10th ed. 2002) (defining “delay” as to “put off,”
to “postpone,” or “to stop, delay, or hinder for a time”); see also id., Ex. 15, Cambridge Academic
Content Dictionary 241 (2009) (defining “delay” as “to cause to be late or to cause to happen at a
later time, or to wait before acting”). Also, to whatever extent Plaintiff is arguing that “delay
content requests” encompasses delaying the creation of content requests, Plaintiff’s proposal
would essentially read out the recital that there must be “content requests.” The Court therefore
rejects Plaintiff’s proposal as to this term. 13
As to “aligning content requests,” the specification discloses adjusting the timing of content
requests so as to coincide:
For example, based on detected behavior of multiple applications, the traffic
shaping engine 255 can align content requests made by at least some of the
applications over the network (wireless network) (e.g., via the alignment module
256). The alignment module can delay or expedite some earlier received requests
to achieve alignment. When requests are aligned, the traffic shaping engine 255
13
To whatever extent the terms “delay” and “suppress” (in Claim 1 of the ’019 Patent) share a common meaning,
using different terms to convey substantially the same meaning may be disfavored but is not prohibited. See Bancorp
Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“it is not unknown for different words
to be used to express similar concepts, even though it may be poor drafting practice”).

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can utilize the connection manager to poll over the network to satisfy application
data requests. Content requests for multiple applications can be aligned based on
behavior patterns or rules/settings including, for example, content types requested
by the multiple applications (audio, video, text, etc.), mobile device parameters,
and/or network parameters/traffic conditions, network service provider
constraints/specifications, etc.
’019 Patent at 16:23–37 (emphasis added). A related provisional patent application likewise
discloses:
The client needs to adjust the polling intervals in a favorable way. To make these
times coincide regularly, one approach is to cause the times to be a multiple of a
common factor or denominator.
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, Ex. 7, United States Provisional Patent Application No.
61/416,020, at SEVENLIT0000154; see id. (referring to making a decision between rounding up
and rounding down).)
To the extent that this provisional application and the specification refer to regular polling
periods, however, this is a specific feature of particular disclosed embodiments that should not be
imported into the claims. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. The Court therefore rejects Defendants’
proposal of “regularly.”
Based on all of the foregoing, the Court hereby construes these disputed terms as set forth
in the following chart:
Term

Construction

“content requests”

Plain meaning

“delay content requests”

“move content requests to a later point in
time”

“align content requests”

“adjust a timing of content requests so as
to coincide”

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G. “backlight status”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

“the status of an illumination device
positioned behind a viewing surface” 14

“the status of an illumination device
positioned behind a non-emissive display” 15

(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 8; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 1.) The parties submit
that this term appears in Claim 12. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 4‒5; Google/Samsung,
Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 6.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff submits that this term presents substantially the same dispute as the term
“backlight” in the ’127 Patent, addressed above. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 8.)
Defendants respond as to this term together with the same term in the ’127 Patent and the
’129 Patent. (See Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 1–2.)
Plaintiff replies as to this term together with the same term in the ’127 Patent and the ’129
Patent. (See Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 1.)
(2) Analysis
The parties agree that this term in the ’019 Patent presents substantially the same issues as
the same term in the ’127 Patent. For example, the specification refers to “observing . . . backlight
status” as an example of “observ[ing] user activity.” ’019 Patent at 5:66–6:2; see id. at 10:47–51,
27:20–27 & 28:30–40; see also id. at 29:31 (“device screen goes idle”) & 29:34 (“device screen
turns on”). Also, at the September 12, 2018 hearing, Plaintiff noted that one of the cited references

14

Plaintiff previously proposed: “The term ‘backlight status,’ when considered in light of the broader phrase ‘observed
activity includes backlight status’ is used consistent with its plain and ordinary meaning (i.e., ‘observed activity
includes whether a screen of the mobile device is on’).” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 4–5.)
15

Defendants previously proposed: “the status of an illumination device positioned behind a non-emissive display.”
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 4–5.)

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in the ’019 Patent refers to “backlit displays, such as LCD, LED type or organic LED type
displays.” United States Patent No. 7,786,623 at 7:35–39. The Court therefore reaches the same
conclusions for substantially the same reasons.
The Court accordingly hereby construes “backlight” to mean “an illumination device
that provides light behind a viewing surface.” The Court further hereby finds that the term
“backlight status” has its plain meaning apart from the Court’s construction of “backlight.”
VI. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 9,516,129
The ’129 Patent, titled “Mobile Application Traffic Optimization,” issued on December 6,
2016, and bears an earliest priority date of July 26, 2010. Plaintiff submits that “[t]he ’129 Patent
claims mobile devices configured to satisfy data requests made by mobile applications while at the
same time reducing network traffic.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 77, at 23 (footnote omitted).) The Abstract
of the ’129 Patent states:
A method for reducing traffic in a cellular network used to satisfy data requests
made by a mobile application is provided. The method includes intercepting a data
request made by the mobile application on a mobile device, querying a local
repository on the mobile device to determine if any locally stored response is valid,
and querying a remote proxy for any remotely stored response if the locally stored
response is invalid. Either the locally stored response or the remotely stored
response is provided to the mobile device without the mobile device needing to
access the cellular network. A related system is also disclosed.
H. “block”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary. The term “block”
is used consistent with its plain and ordinary
meaning.

“intercept”

(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 9; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 19;
Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 9.) The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 1
and 17. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 8; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 19.)
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(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ proposed construction should be rejected because “while
‘intercept’ and ‘block’ might be related in some contexts, they are not the same.”
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 9.)
Google and Samsung respond: “As with ‘delay content requests,’ SEVEN takes the
implausible position that the ordinary meaning of ‘block’ covers interrupting data transmissions
that do not yet exist—completely inconsistent with the intrinsic evidence (which SEVEN does
not address).” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 9.)
Plaintiff replies that “Defendants’ proposed construction excludes devices that block data
requests by preventing them from being transmitted in the first place, which is another way to
block them.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 4.) Plaintiff argues that “there is no basis for
limiting the claims to ‘intercepting’ data requests that have already been transmitted.” (Id.)
(2) Analysis
Claim 1 of the ’129 Patent, for example, recites (emphasis added):
1. A mobile device which improves network resource utilization in a wireless
network, the mobile device, comprising:
a radio;
user interface;
a memory unit having instructions stored thereon;
a processor configured to:
enter a first power management mode, wherein to enter the
first power management mode is based on input from a
user;
while in the first power management mode, block
transmission of outgoing application data requests for at
least one application executing in a background of the
mobile device and allow transmission of outgoing
application data requests for at least one application
executing in a foreground of the mobile device;
enter a second power management mode, wherein entry
into the second power management mode is based on a
detected activity status, wherein the detected activity
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status is based on a backlight status of the mobile
device being off;
while in the second power management mode, block
transmission of outgoing application data requests for at
least one application executing in background of the
mobile device for a predetermined period of time.
Plaintiff argues that “[n]either the claims nor the specification redefine the term ‘block’
to mean only interrupting data transmissions that are already in progress.” (Google/Samsung,
Dkt. No. 191, at 9.) To the extent that Plaintiff is proposing that a device can “block” “outgoing
application data requests” by preventing the creation of such requests, such an interpretation
would read out the recital that there must be “outgoing application data requests.”
As to the proper construction, Defendants’ proposal of “intercept” appears to find support
in at least some disclosures in the specification:
One embodiment of the local proxy 275 further includes a request/transaction
manager 235, which can detect, identify, intercept, process, [and] manage, data
requests initiated on the device 250, for example, by applications 210 and/or 220,
and/or directly/indirectly by a user request.
’129 Patent at 12:53–57 (emphasis added); see id. at 26:55–56 (“In process 702, a data request
made by a mobile application is intercepted.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 16:3–10, 16:20–
51, 19:46–56, 23:30–44 & 23:56–67 & Fig. 7.
Plaintiff urged at the September 12, 2018 hearing, however, that the word “intercept”
would improperly connote that transmission has already begun. Plaintiff argued that, in the
context of surrounding claim language, the term “block” refers to preventing transmission
because the claim recites that a processor is configured to “block transmission of outgoing
application data requests.” Plaintiff’s arguments are persuasive that to “block transmission”
means to prevent transmission.

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This understanding is consistent with an extrinsic technical dictionary definition, cited by
both sides (see Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 9; see also Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263,
at 10), that defines the verb “block” as meaning “[t]o prevent a signal from being transmitted.”
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, Ex. Q, Microsoft Computer Dictionary 64 (5th ed. 2002); see
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (“We have especially noted the help that technical dictionaries may
provide to a court ‘to better understand the underlying technology’ and the way in which one of
skill in the art might use the claim terms.”).)
The Court therefore hereby construes “block” to mean “prevent.”
I. “executing in a background,” “executing in background,” and “executing in a
foreground”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary. These phrases are
not indefinite, and are used consistent with
their plain and ordinary meanings.

Indefinite

(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 10; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 21 & 22;
Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 10.) The parties submit that these terms appear in Claims 1 and
17. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 8‒9; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 21 & 22.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that
applications executing in the foreground are able to exchange information directly with a user, and
applications executing in the background do not have direct access to input and output functions.”
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 10 (footnote omitted).) 16

16

Plaintiff similarly states that “‘foreground’ refers to scenarios, applications, or processes capable of user interaction,
and ‘background’ refers to scenarios, applications, or processes incapable of user interaction.” (Id., at 11.)

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Google and Samsung respond that “[i]n the context of the intrinsic evidence, ‘background’
and ‘foreground’ lack reasonable certainty because the terms are used in different and inconsistent
ways.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 10.) Google and Samsung argue that Plaintiff’s
proposed interpretation, as set forth in its opening brief, is unworkable because “[a]n application,
for instance, may consist of multiple processes, some of which might be ‘capable’ of user
interaction and some of which may not.” (Id., at 11.)
Plaintiff replies that “[t]he ’129 Patent consistently refers to applications running in the
foreground as being capable of user interaction and applications in the background as being
incapable of user interaction.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 4 (citing ’129 Patent at 5:10–
14, 12:1–8 & 13:19–24).)
(2) Analysis
Defendants argue that, for example, “a music application not visible but playing music, or
a browser overlapped by a map application, can be characterized as being in both the ‘foreground’
and the ‘background.’” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 10.) Defendants conclude that the
terms “foreground” and “background” lack objective boundaries. (Id.)
Defendants likewise submit that the specification discloses what Defendants characterize
as a “sliding scale” (id.) between “background” and “foreground” operation:
The logic for automatically adding content sources/application servers (e.g.,
including URLs/content) to be monitored can also check for various factors like
how often the content is the same, how often the same request is made (is there a
fixed interval/pattern?), which application is requesting the data, etc. Similar rules
to decide between using the cache and request the data from the original source
may also be implemented and executed by the local proxy and/or server.
For example, when the request comes at an unscheduled/unexpected time (user
initiated check), or after every (n) consecutive times the response has been provided
from the cache, etc., or if the application is running in the background vs. in a more
interactive mode of the foreground.

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ʼ129 Patent at 5:1–14. This disclosure describes the foreground as being more interactive than the
background, but Defendants have not shown how this amounts to a “sliding scale” between
foreground and background. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 10.)
Defendants have also cited disclosure regarding maximizing and minimizing:
In one embodiment, user activity module 215 can detect and track user activity with
respect to applications, documents, files, windows, icons, and folders on the device
250. For example, the user activity module 215 can detect when an application or
window (e.g., a web browser) has been exited, closed, minimized, maximized,
opened, moved into the foreground, or into the background, multimedia content
playback, etc.
’129 Patent at 12:1–8; see id. at 30:44–45 (“. . . if a user selects ‘exit’ or minimizes (sends to
background) . . .”).
This distinction between maximizing and moving into the foreground (and between
minimizing and moving into the background) does not suggest a sliding scale but rather suggests
merely that an application could be moved into the foreground without necessarily being
maximized and could be moved into the background without necessarily being minimized.
On balance, the opinion of Plaintiff’s expert is persuasive that “‘background’ refers to
scenarios, applications, or processes without user interaction, and ‘foreground’ refers to scenarios,
applications, or processes capable of user interaction’” (albeit with the understanding that this
refers to a current state of execution rather than an application’s capabilities more generally).
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, Ex. L, May 18, 2018 Goodrich Decl., at ¶ 297.) 17

17

Plaintiff has also submitted an extrinsic “Encyclopedia” document that explains “foreground/background” as
follows (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, Ex. R):
A priority assigned to programs running in a multitasking environment. The foreground contains
the applications the user is working on, and the background contains the applications that are behind
the scenes, such as certain operating system functions, printing a document or accessing the network.
Users may find all sorts of programs running in the background that they are not aware of . . . .

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Google and Samsung have suggested an example of a music application that might not
currently be visible to a user but that might nonetheless respond to user input such as the user
pressing volume control buttons. At the September 12, 2018 hearing, Defendants similarly
suggested an example of an e-mail application icon (which the user might see on a home screen)
indicating availability of new e-mail without the user actually selecting the e-mail application.
Yet, Defendants have not identified any such disclosures in the intrinsic evidence. Any
dispute that may arise in this regard presents factual issues regarding infringement rather than any
legal question for claim construction. See Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 806 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (“[A] sound claim construction need not always purge every shred of ambiguity. The
resolution of some line-drawing problems . . . is properly left to the trier of fact.”) (citing PPG
Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“after the court has defined
the claim with whatever specificity and precision is warranted by the language of the claim and
the evidence bearing on the proper construction, the task of determining whether the construed
claim reads on the accused product is for the finder of fact”)); see also Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC
v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d 1314, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Acumed and
PPG).
The Court therefore hereby construes these disputed terms as set forth in the following
chart:
Term
“executing in a background”

Construction
“executing without user interaction”

“executing in background”
“executing in a foreground”

“executing with user interaction”

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J. “backlight [status]”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

“[the status of] an illumination device
positioned behind a viewing surface” 18

“the illumination device that provides light
behind a non-emissive display”

(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 11; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 24 & 25.) The
parties submit that this term appears in Claims 1, 2, 3, 17, 18, and 19. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No.
172, at 9‒10; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 24 & 25.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff submits that this term presents substantially the same dispute as the same term in
the ’127 Patent and the ’019 Patent. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 11.)
Defendants respond as to these terms together with the same terms in the ’127 Patent and
the ’019 Patent. (See Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 1–2.)
Plaintiff replies as to these terms together with the same terms in the ’127 Patent and the
’019 Patent. (See Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 1.)
(2) Analysis
The parties agree that this term in the ’129 Patent presents substantially the same issues as
the same term in the ’127 Patent. For example, the specification refers to “observing . . . backlight
status” as an example of “observ[ing] user activity.” ’129 Patent at 6:38–39; see id. at 11:28–32,
33:11–18 & 34:23–33; see also id. at 35:28 (“device screen goes idle”) & 35:31 (“device screen
turns on”). The Court therefore reaches the same conclusions for substantially the same reasons.

18

Plaintiff previously proposed that this term, as used as part of broader phrases, is used consistent with its plain and
ordinary meaning. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 9–10.)

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The Court accordingly hereby construes “backlight” to mean “an illumination device
that provides light behind a viewing surface.” The Court further hereby finds that the term
“backlight status” has its plain meaning apart from the Court’s construction of “backlight.”
K. “battery charge status”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

“battery level”

“status of the battery’s charge state” 19

(ZTE, Dkt. No. 77, at 24; ZTE, Dkt. No. 85, Ex. A, at 16; ZTE, Dkt. No. 86, at 18; ZTE, Dkt.
No. 88, at 23; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 26; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 11
n.13.) The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 6 and 22. (ZTE, Dkt. No. 61, at 6;
Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 10.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that its proposed construction “adds clarity and is supported by the
specification.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 77, at 25.)
Defendants propose “status of the battery’s charge state” because “this proposed definition
makes the most sense in the context of the claims and the specification.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 85, Ex.
A, at 17.)
Plaintiff responds that “it is clear from the way the specification uses ‘battery level’ that
the term is synonymous with the claim term ‘battery charge status.’” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 88, at 24‒25

19

Google and Samsung previously proposed: “Plain and ordinary meaning.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, App’x
B, at 25; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 26.) Google’s Amended Responsive Claim Construction Brief,
however, states that “Google adopts ZTE’s alternate construction briefing for this term.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No.
263, at 11 n.13; see Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 268 (Samsung).) ZTE had argued that this term is indefinite because
“a POSITA would not have reasonable certainty as to the scope of the invention, even after reviewing the specification
and prosecution history.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 85, Ex. A, at 16.) Prior to the September 12, 2018 hearing, ZTE’s counsel
informed the Court by e-mail that this term is no longer disputed as to ZTE because Plaintiff is no longer asserting the
applicable claims against ZTE. Google and Samsung, however, maintained their adoption of ZTE’s arguments as to
ZTE’s alternative proposed construction.

- 45 -

(footnote omitted).) As to Defendants’ proposal, Plaintiff responds that “‘status of the battery’s
charge state’ is cumbersome, redundant, and more difficult for a lay jury to understand.” (Id., at
25.)
Defendants respond that “SEVEN’s proposed definition ‘battery level’ is incorrect because
it endorses a construction that lacks a proper antecedent basis, and because it would render a term
that is actually used within the specification meaningless.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 86, at 18.)
(2) Analysis
The specification discloses:
In addition, the local proxy 175 can identify and retrieve mobile device properties
including, one or more of, battery level, network that the device is registered on,
radio state, whether the mobile device is being used (e.g., interacted with by a user).
***
For example, when congestion is detected in a user’s network service area, content
requests can be aligned for [when] the network is less congested. For example,
when user is inactive, or when the battery is low, alignment may be performed more
aggressively.
***
The local proxy can delays or modifies [sic] data prior to transmission to the proxy
serve[r] and can additionally identify and retrieve mobile device properties
including, one or more of, battery level, network that the device is registered on,
radio state, [and] whether the mobile device is being used.
’129 Patent at 8:46–50, 25:52–56 & 26:18–22 (emphasis added); see id. at 29:63–30:2 (“polling
for battery level”) & 35:46–49 (same).
Defendants have pointed to disclosures regarding not going into a power save mode when
the device is plugged in to a charger, and Claim 6 seemingly recites a similar limitation that “entry
into the first power management mode is based on a battery charge status.” See id. at 34:34–35
(“Devices should come out of and not go into power save mode if they are ‘plugged in’ to

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charge.”); see also id. at 25:17–18 (“In one embodiment, power save mode is not applied when
the device is plugged into a charger.”). Nonetheless, the specification distinguishes between the
battery “level” and whether the battery is being charged, and a fair reading is that the term “battery
charge status” refers to the former rather than the latter.
Indeed, Claim 4 already separately recites a limitation that “entry into the first power
management mode is further based on whether the mobile device is plugged into an external power
source.” At the September 12, 2018 hearing, Defendants argued that Claim 4 does not support
Plaintiff’s proposal because the device could be charging in some fashion other than being
“plugged in,” but Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive in light of the absence of any disclosure
regarding wireless charging or any other charging method besides being “plugged in.” See ’129
Patent at 25:17–18 & 34:34–35 (quoted above).
The intrinsic evidence thus supports Plaintiff’s proposal of “battery level,” and the disputed
term is reasonably clear. See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129. Based on all of the foregoing, the Court
hereby construes “battery charge status” to mean “battery level.”
VII. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 9,351,254
The ’254 Patent, titled “Method for Power Saving in Mobile Devices by Optimizing
Wakelocks,” issued on May 24, 2016, and bears an earliest priority date of January 22, 2014.
Plaintiff submits that “[t]he ’254 Patent claims a mobile device designed to conserve battery power
when the device is in a power-optimization state by releasing the system wakelock when the
application(s) holding the wakelock are not critical to the user’s experience (not identified on a
‘whitelist’).” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 11–12.) The Abstract of the ’254 Patent states:
A method for conserving device and/or network resources is provided herein. The
method includes detecting a wakelock operating on a mobile device and
determining a consumption of one of a power or radio usage attributed to the
detected wakelock. The method further includes determining a criticality related
- 47 -

to user experience for the detected wakelock and releasing the detected wakelock
based on the determined consumption and criticality. Related systems and mobile
devices are also disclosed.
L. “not critical to user experience” and “wherein the application is non-critical”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary. These phrases are
defined by the claim language itself, which
makes it clear that an application is “not
critical to user experience” when the
application is “not identified on a whitelist.”

Indefinite

(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 6; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 12; Google/Samsung,
Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 11; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 11.) The parties submit that these
terms appear in Claims 1, 10, and 28. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 6; Google/Samsung,
Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 11.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “Defendants ignore the following limitation of the claim, which
expressly defines when an application is critical to a user’s experience.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt.
No. 191, at 12.)
Google and Samsung respond that “[t]hese terms are indefinite because they are subjective
on their face, and neither the claim language nor specification provide guidance as to what is noncritical to user experience.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 11–12.)
Plaintiff replies: “Defendants concede that if an application is not on the whitelist, it is not
critical. . . . As a matter of logic, if an application is critical, it is on the whitelist.”
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 4.)

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(2) Analysis
At first blush, the phrase “not critical to user experience” appears to be analogous to the
phrase “aesthetically pleasing” in Datamize, wherein the court found that term to be “completely
dependent on a person’s subjective opinion” and therefore indefinite. 417 F.3d at 1350 (“In the
absence of a workable objective standard, ‘aesthetically pleasing’ does not just include a subjective
element, it is completely dependent on a person’s subjective opinion.”); see Interval Licensing,
766 F.3d at 1371–74 (finding “in an unobtrusive manner that does not distract a user” was
subjective).
Here, however, the claims themselves provide an objective standard by explicitly defining
“non-critical” with reference to a “whitelist.” Claim 1 of the ’254 Patent is representative and
recites (emphasis added): 20
1. A mobile device comprising:
a display screen; a memory, and a processor, the mobile device configured
to:
acquire a system wakelock in response to an application wakelock
acquisition request;
detect an activity state of the mobile device based on a status of the display
screen;
enter a power optimization state based on the detected activity state;
release the system wakelock based upon entering the power optimization
state when the application that made the acquisition request is not critical to user
experience, wherein the application is non-critical when the application is not
identified on a whitelist;
acquire the system wakelock in response to a subsequent wakelock
acquisition request from another application on the mobile device when the another
application making the subsequent wakelock acquisition request is identified on the
whitelist.
A fair reading is that the claims use “non-critical” (as defined by referring to a whitelist)
to define “not critical to user experience.” The reference to a “whitelist” provides an objective

20

The other independent claims of the ’254 Patent contain similar recitations. See ’254 Patent at Cls. 10, 16, 22 &
28.

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standard for determining whether an application is “not critical to user experience,” and the parties
have not presented “whitelist” as a disputed term. Google and Samsung argue that referring to a
“whitelist” is circular because the whitelist simply lists applications that are deemed to be critical
to user experience. (See Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 12–13.) This argument is unavailing.
Even if subjective considerations may be involved in creating the whitelist, the whitelist
nonetheless serves as an objective standard for evaluating whether a particular application is “noncritical.” The opinions of Google and Samsung’s expert to the contrary are unpersuasive. (See
Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, Ex. 5, May 18, 2018 Jeffay Decl., at ¶¶ 128–136.) Also, Plaintiff’s
expert opines that “whitelist” is a well-known term of art, and Defendants have not shown
otherwise. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, Ex. M, May 18, 2018 Smith Decl. at ¶ 48.)
Finally, Google and Samsung argue that the phrase “wherein the application is non-critical
when the application is not identified on a whitelist” does not fully clarify the phrase “not critical
to user experience” because:
If an application is not on the whitelist, it is not critical. But if an application is on
the whitelist, nothing in the claim language requires that the opposite be true (i.e.,
that an application on a whitelist is critical); the whitelisted application could be
critical or non-critical depending on the user’s subjective preferences.
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 12.) At the September 12, 2018 hearing, Defendants similarly
argued that there may be applications that are “critical” that are not on the whitelist and there may
be applications that are not critical that are on the whitelist.
The claims, however, are not directed to these other hypothetical inquiries. Instead, the
limitation here at issue recites evaluating whether an application is “not critical to user experience”
by checking whether the application is not on the whitelist. If the application is not on the whitelist,
then the device concludes that the application is “not critical to user experience.” If the application
is on the whitelist, then the device concludes that the application is not “not critical to user
- 50 -

experience.” The limitation here at issue requires nothing more, and any other hypothetical
inquiries, such as regarding the feelings of a particular user under particular circumstances, are
irrelevant.
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness argument. No
further construction is necessary in light of the above-discussed accompanying explanatory
language recited in the claims. See U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568; see also O2 Micro, 521 F.3d
at 1362; Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1207; ActiveVideo, 694 F.3d at 1326; Summit 6, 802 F.3d at 1291.
The Court accordingly hereby construes “not critical to user experience” and “wherein
the application is non-critical” to have their plain meaning in light of surrounding claim
language.
M. “system wakelock”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

“software-based mechanism for keeping the
CPU awake”

“the actual wakelock controlling the CPU
wakeup state, and is triggered by the
wakelocks set by the applications” 21

(ZTE, Dkt. No. 77, at 27; ZTE, Dkt. No. 85, Ex. A, at 9; ZTE, Dkt. No. 86, at 10; ZTE, Dkt. No. 88,
at 27; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 10; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 13.) This
term appears in Claims 1, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 28, 32, and 33 of the ’254 Patent. (Google/Samsung,
Dkt. No. 172, at 6; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 10; see ZTE, Dkt. No. 61, at 3.)

21

ZTE previously proposed: “Plain and ordinary meaning. No construction necessary.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 85, Ex. A, at
9). After the close of briefing but prior to the September 12, 2018 hearing, ZTE adopted the proposal set forth by
Google and Samsung. Google and Samsung have stated: “To be clear, [Google and Samsung] are arguing that this is
the ordinary meaning of the term, and arguing in the alternative that the patentee acted as his own lexicographer.”
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 13 n.15). At the September 12, 2018 hearing, as well as in the parties’ July 24,
2018 Joint Claim Construction Chart, Google and Samsung have not explicitly proposed a “plain meaning”
construction but rather have proposed that “system wakelock” be construed as stated in the chart in the text.
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 10).

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(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff submits that the dispute regarding this term is similar to the dispute regarding the
term “wakelock” in the above-addressed ’127 Patent, and Plaintiff reiterates that “a person of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood that a wakelock is a
software-based mechanism for indicating that an application needs the mobile device to stay
awake.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 77, at 27.)
ZTE adopts the arguments presented by Google and Samsung. Google and Samsung
respond that the specification expressly defines this term. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 13
(citing ’254 Patent at 5:28–34).) Google and Samsung argue that Plaintiff’s proposed construction
would read out the word “system,” and that “[a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art] would
understand, however, that a ‘system’ wakelock is exactly what it says—a system-level wakelock
that is triggered by the application wakelocks.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 13.)
Plaintiff replies that “[a]s explained in SEVEN’s briefing in the ZTE case, SEVEN’s
construction is consistent with the patent’s use of the term and clarifies the difference between
system wakelocks and application wakelocks.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 5 (emphasis
in original).)
(2) Analysis
The Background section of the specification states: “Wakelocks are power-managing
software programs that may, in certain circumstances, prohibit a mobile device from going into
deep dormancy.” ’254 Patent at 1:14–16. This disclosure essentially aligns with how the term
“wakelock” is used in the above-discussed ’127 Patent, which Plaintiff cites here as well.
Yet, the disputed term here is not merely “wakelock” but rather is “system wakelock.” The
’254 Patent contains explicit disclosure regarding the term “system wakelock”:

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Applications can request wakelocks when they need to be certain that they execute
the code. The wakelocks guarantee that CPU is not put to deep sleep while a
wakelock is held.
***
In some embodiments, a wakelock optimizer is disclosed. The wakelock optimizer
can identify targeted wakelocks for specific applications. The targeted wakelocks
and applications are such that they are considered unnecessary or potentially
unnecessary based on the pre-determined criteria.
In some embodiments, the wakelock optimizer monitors such wakelocks, and once
they are observed to be acquired, releases the system wakelock (which is the actual
wakelock controlling the CPU wakeup state, and is triggered by the wakelocks set
by the applications) while monitoring whether any other, non-targeted, wakelock
is acquired, and restore the system wakelock if they are. The wakelock optimizer
also considers end user activity and screen state as parameters to restore the system
wakelock if needed.
Id. at 4:49–51 & 5:23–36 (emphasis added).
This disclosure, which explicitly sets forth what the system wakelock “is,” rises to the level
of a lexicography. See, e.g., CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
Alternatively, even if this disclosure did not rise to the level of a lexicography, Plaintiff
has agreed that this disclosure, in particular the parenthetical, “provides the basis for understanding
the term’s plain-and-ordinary meaning,” and Plaintiff has stated that “there is no dispute that the
patent describes a ‘system wakelock’ as ‘the actual wakelock controlling the CPU wakeup state.’”
(ZTE, Dkt. No. 88, at 27.) To the extent that the parties agree that the above-reproduced disclosure
merely sets forth the well-known plain meaning of this term (such that arguably this disclosure is

- 53 -

not truly a “lexicography”), 22 construction is nonetheless necessary in light of the parties’ apparent
disagreement as to the plain and ordinary meaning.
Therefore, the Court hereby construes “system wakelock” to mean “the actual wakelock
that controls the CPU wakeup state and that is triggered by the wakelocks set by
applications.”23
VIII. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 9,325,600
The ’600 Patent, titled “Offloading Application Traffic to a Shared Communication
Channel for Signal Optimization in a Wireless Network for Traffic Utilizing Proprietary and NonProprietary Protocols,” issued on April 26, 2016, and bears an earliest priority date of June 11,
2013. Plaintiff submits that “[t]he ’600 Patent claims systems for reducing network traffic between
applications on a mobile device and external servers that communicate with those applications.”
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 12.) The Abstract of the ’600 Patent states:
A method for conserving network and battery usage is provided. The method
includes determining that a device is communicating over at least two overlapping
push channels and blocking one of the push channels to eliminate or reduce overlap
between the at least two overlapping push channels. Related systems are also
provided.

22
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (“[O]ur cases recognize that the specification may reveal a special definition given
to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor’s
lexicography governs.”) (citing CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366).
23
At the September 12, 2018 hearing, Plaintiff indicated that the construction of “wakelock” in the ’127 Patent
(addressed above) should apply in the ’254 Patent. Defendants did not object at the hearing. Although ZTE’s briefing
opposed Plaintiff’s suggestion that “wakelock” has the same meaning in both patents (see ZTE, Dkt. No. 86, at 11),
ZTE did not express this concern at the hearing. The absence of any objection by ZTE was consistent with ZTE
choosing to adopt the arguments presented by Google and Samsung rather than maintain its own proposal. Also, the
’254 Patent contains disclosures that are consistent with how the term “wakelock” is used in the ’127 Patent. See ’254
Patent at 1:14–20 (“Wakelocks are power-managing software programs that may, in certain circumstances, prohibit a
mobile device from going into deep dormancy.”); see also id. at 4:49–51 (“Applications can request wakelocks when
they need to be certain that they execute the code. The wakelocks guarantee that CPU is not put to deep sleep while
a wakelock is held.”). Finally, like the ’127 Patent, the ’254 Patent refers to Android, so the extrinsic evidence
submitted by Plaintiff regarding the meaning of “wakelock” in the context of Android in the ’127 Patent appears to
be similarly applicable to the ’254 Patent. The Court therefore finds that the term “wakelock” has the same
construction in the ’254 Patent as in the ’127 Patent.

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N. “non-transitory computer readable media . . . comprising: blocking . . .; offloading . . .;
monitoring . . .; unblocking . . .; re-blocking . . .”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

The preamble is limiting, it is not indefinite,
and it is used consistent with its plain and
ordinary meaning (i.e., “non-transitory
computer readable media containing
computer code to implement a processor
controlled system for reducing network
traffic, comprising instructions for:”

Indefinite

(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 5–6; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 13; Google/Samsung,
Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 9; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 14.) The parties submit that this term
appears in Claim 7. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 5‒6; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex.
A, at 9.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “this is a system claim that includes functional language” and therefore
is not an indefinite mixed method-apparatus claim. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 14.)
Google and Samsung respond that “[a]s drafted, claim 7 recites the archetypical mixed
method-system claim that has routinely been held invalid for reciting ‘both a system and the
method for using that system.’” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 14 (quoting IPXL Holdings,
L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).) Google and Samsung argue
that, unlike in the precedent cited by Plaintiff, “the claim language here provides no indication that
the system must have the capability of performing the enumerated method steps as opposed to
actually performing these steps.” (Id., at 15.)
Plaintiff replies that “[t]he body of the claim describes what the system is able to do, not
steps that must be performed to infringe.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 5.)

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(2) Analysis
Plaintiff argues: “The subject matter of the claim is not simply non-transitory computer
readable media. It is computer code that implements a system. And the limitations in the body of
the claim recite functions that the system must be able to perform—i.e., blocking, offloading,
monitoring, unblocking, and re-blocking traffic on the claimed common and non-common
channels.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 14.) Claim 7 of the ’600 Patent recites:
7. Non-transitory computer readable media containing computer code to
implement a processor controlled system for reducing network traffic, comprising:
blocking a first channel such that network signaling and battery
consumption are reduced, wherein the first channel includes a non-common
channel;
offloading application traffic of an application onto a second channel,
wherein the second channel includes a common channel;
monitoring the application traffic of the application over the second
channel;
unblocking the first channel based on the monitored application traffic over
the second channel so that the application can perform an action; and
re-blocking the first channel after the action has been completed.
On balance, the claim recites “permissible functional language used to describe capabilities
of the” computer code. MasterMine Software, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 874 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2017); see Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2008)). Despite Defendants’ arguments at the September 12, 2018 hearing as to
purported lack of special necessary language, Defendants have not shown that this claim is
anything other than a typical “Beauregard” claim. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.,
717 F.3d 1269, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“named for In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
. . . [c]laims in Beauregard format formally recite a tangible article of manufacture—a computerreadable medium, such as a computer disk or other data storage device—but such claims also
require the device to contain a computer program for directing a computer to carry out a specified
process”).
- 56 -

Defendants have cited Rembrandt Data Techs., LP v. AOL, LLC, 641 F.3d 1331, 1339–40
(Fed. Cir. 2011), in which the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the patentee’s
request to insert apparatus language to avoid indefiniteness for an apparatus claim that included a
method step Rembrandt, however, involved a series of apparatus limitations followed by a method
step limitation. See id. Here, by contrast, the claim recites computer readable media with computer
code, and a fair reading of the claim as a whole is that the limitations set forth in the body of the
claim refer to computer code. Rembrandt is therefore inapplicable.
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness argument. No
further construction is necessary in light of the above-discussed accompanying explanatory
language recited in the claims. See U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568; see also O2 Micro, 521 F.3d
at 1362; Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1207; ActiveVideo, 694 F.3d at 1326; Summit 6, 802 F.3d at 1291.
The Court accordingly hereby construes “non-transitory computer readable media . . .
comprising: blocking . . .; offloading . . .; monitoring . . .; unblocking . . .; re-blocking . . .” to
have its plain meaning.
O. “common channel” and “non-common channel”
“common channel”
(Claim 7)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

“data channel shared by multiple
applications”

“shared push channel”

- 57 -

“non-common channel”
(Claim 7)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

“application-specific data channel to an
application server”

“an application-specific push channel”

(ZTE, Dkt. No. 77, at 3; ZTE, Dkt. No. 85, Ex. A, at 4 & 7; ZTE, Dkt. No. 88, at 1; Google/Samsung,
Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 6 & 7; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 15.) 24
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “ZTE’s attempt to limit the claims to push channels, one of the several
embodiments disclosed by the specification, is improper and should be rejected.” (ZTE, Dkt. No.
77, at 7.) Plaintiff also submits that the word “push” was removed from the claims during
prosecution. (Id., at 7‒8.) Further, Plaintiff argues claim differentiation as to dependent Claim 8.
(Id., at 8.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that, unlike Defendants’ proposed constructions, Plaintiff’s
proposals clarify that “multiple applications share the common channel” and that “[a]pplicationspecific channels are channels through which applications communicate with the servers that
provide their content.” (Id., at 9‒10.)
ZTE argues that “non-common channel” “should be construed as it is used consistently in
the specification and in the file history – an ‘application specific push channel.’” (ZTE, Dkt.
No. 85, Ex. A, at 6.) Further, ZTE argues that “common channel” “should be construed as it is
used consistently in the specification and in the file history – a ‘shared push channel.’” (Id.)

24
ZTE previously urged that these terms are indefinite. (See ZTE, Dkt. No. 85, Ex. A at 4 & 7). After the close of
briefing, but prior to the September 12, 2018 hearing, ZTE withdrew its indefiniteness arguments as to these terms.
Instead, ZTE is pursuing what it had previously presented as alternative proposed constructions, which are also
proposed by Google and Samsung.

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Plaintiff responds that the prosecution history cited by ZTE does not contain any disclaimer
that would justify ZTE’s proposal of requiring “push” channels. (ZTE, Dkt. No. 88, at 5‒11.)
ZTE responds that “[t]he specification . . . only describes push channels, and a person of
ordinary skill in the art would understand the claimed channels to be push channels when read in
light of the specification.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 86, at 7.) Further, ZTE cites its opening brief arguments
that the patentee “repeatedly and unambiguously distinguished the invention ‘as claimed’ from the
cited prior art (including the Annan reference) based on the presence of a ‘push channel.’” (Id., at
8.) As to claim differentiation, ZTE argues that “because dependent claim 8 adds additional
elements other than the two push channels, the two recited channels in independent claim 7 can be
limited to push channels without violating the doctrine of claim differentiation.” (Id., at 9.)
Finally, ZTE argues that Plaintiff’s proposed constructions “attempt to import extraneous
limitations from select embodiments within the specification . . . .” (Id., at 10.)
Plaintiff replies that ZTE’s expert has not addressed the analysis of Plaintiff’s expert, in
particular as to “why the ’600 Patent’s discussion of polling refers to ‘pull’ channels.” (ZTE, Dkt.
No. 148, at 1.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ expert “provides no support for his opinion that
the ’600 Patent’s reference to ‘polling’ could be for either push or pull channels.” (Id.)
Google and Samsung submit that they agree with ZTE’s proposed constructions.
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 15 n.19.) Google and Samsung argue that “[g]iven the
specification and prosecution history’s repeated descriptions and the explicit disclaimer in the file
history to the same effect, both channels must be ‘push’ channels.” (Id., at 15.)
Plaintiff replies that “[Google and Samsung’s] arguments mirror ZTE’s, and SEVEN
stands on its briefing in ZTE.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 5.)

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(2) Analysis
As a threshold matter, the parties’ arguments at the September 12, 2018 hearing confirmed
that the parties agree that a “common channel” is a shared channel and a “non-common channel”
is an application-specific channel. The specification is consistent with this understanding. See,
e.g., ’600 Patent at 21:59–63 (“Some applications have their own mechanisms for communicating
with the application servers or other third-party servers. For example, these applications can use
their own communication channels to periodically poll their application/third-party servers for
updates.”).
As to whether these channels must be “push” channels, Plaintiff argues claim
differentiation as to Claim 8 of the ’600 Patent, which depends from Claim 7. Claims 7 and 8 of
the ’600 Patent recite (emphasis added):
7. Non-transitory computer readable media containing computer code to
implement a processor controlled system for reducing network traffic, comprising:
blocking a first channel such that network signaling and battery
consumption are reduced, wherein the first channel includes a non-common
channel;
offloading application traffic of an application onto a second channel,
wherein the second channel includes a common channel;
monitoring the application traffic of the application over the second
channel;
unblocking the first channel based on the monitored application traffic over
the second channel so that the application can perform an action; and
re-blocking the first channel after the action has been completed.
8. Non-transitory computer readable media containing computer code to
implement a processor controlled system for reducing network traffic according to
claim 7, wherein the first channel is a first push channel and the second channel is
a second push channel, further including recognizing multiple overlapping push
channels at an application, wherein recognizing multiple overlapping push channels
is performed offline.
First, dependent Claim 8 recites more than simply that the “common channel” and “noncommon channel” are “push” channels. In light of the recital of other additional limitations in this

- 60 -

claim, the doctrine of claim differentiation is of limited weight in the analysis of these disputed
terms. See Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“Claim differentiation, while often argued to be controlling when it does not apply, is clearly
applicable when there is a dispute over whether a limitation found in a dependent claim should be
read into an independent claim, and that limitation is the only meaningful difference between the
two claims.”) (emphasis added).
Second, even if the doctrine of claim differentiation were found to be probative here, the
Federal Circuit has noted that “[a]lthough claim differentiation is a useful analytic tool, it cannot
enlarge the meaning of a claim beyond that which is supported by the patent documents, or relieve
any claim of limitations imposed by the prosecution history.” Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’ship,
778 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Turning to the specification, Plaintiff cites what it characterizes as disclosure of three types
of communication: “push,” “polling” (which Plaintiff characterizes as “pull”), and “hybrid push.”
See ’600 Patent at 11:53–57 (“polling patterns”), 20:51–54 (“poll over the network to satisfy
application data requests”), 21:7–33 (“polling of content from a content source”), 22:2–7 (“hybrid
push or other communication channels”) & 24:56–59 (“align polling requests occurring close in
time”). These disclosures appear to contradict Defendants’ assertions that the specification
discloses only “push” channels, particularly in light of the opinion of Plaintiff’s expert that
“polling” is typically used with “pull” channels. (See ZTE, Dkt. No. 78, Ex. I, Feb. 13, 2017
Goodrich Decl. at ¶¶ 19–21.)
Further, to whatever extent the disclosed embodiments are limited to “push” channels, the
use of “push” channels is a specific feature of particular embodiments that should not be imported

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into the claims. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. The Secure Web case cited by ZTE is unpersuasive
because the specification does not “tout[] [‘push’ channels] as an advantage.” 25
However, Defendants also argue that the patentee’s statements during prosecution warrant
limiting these “channel” terms to being “push” channels. During prosecution of the ’600 Patent,
the independent claims originally recited “push” channels. (See ZTE, Dkt. No. 89, Ex. P, Sept. 2,
2014 Application, at 43–45 (P. Resp. App. 13–15).) In an amendment prior to any rejection, the
patentee removed the word “push” from application claims 1 and 7. (See ZTE, Dkt. No. 78, Ex.
F, June 22, 2015 Amendments to the Claims, at 2–4 (P. App. 138–40).)

The examiner

subsequently rejected the claims based on United States Patent Application Publication No.
2014/036,697 (“Annan”) and other references. (See ZTE, Dkt. No. 89, Ex. Q, Nov. 5, 2015 Office
Action, at 3‒4 (P. Resp. App. 22‒23).) In response to the rejection, the patentee stated as follows
in conjunction with amending the independent claims to include “wherein the first channel
includes a non-common channel” and “wherein the second channel includes a common channel”:
For example, the disclosed i[n]vention provides for offloading or redirecting
application traffic from the application-specific channel to a shared channel, such
as the Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) channel, which can optimize signaling in
the wireless network for traffic utilizing various proprietary and non-proprietary
protocols. . . . Monitoring the application traffic over the second channel and
unblocking the first channel based on the monitored application traffic may include
receiving a push message from an additional push channel (i.e., second channel)
and unblocking the blocked push channel (i.e., first channel) so that the application
can perform an action in response to the message from the additional push channel.
This may include re-blocking the unblocked push channel after the action has
completed, such as denying blocking of the push channel until a radio of the mobile

25

See Secure Web Conference Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 640 F. App’x 910, 914 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 17, 2016) (emphasis
added):
All descriptions of the security device in the intrinsic record are limited to a stand-alone device.
Nothing in the intrinsic record suggests that the patentee intended a broader notion of a security
device. Significantly, at no point does the specification contemplate a security device embedded
within a microprocessor-based device. To the contrary, the specification touts the separate and
stand-alone nature of the security device as an advantage.

- 62 -

device is powered on. Thus, the method includes blocking a non-common push
channel to offload the communication onto a common push channel. . . .
The cited references, separately or in combination, fail to teach or suggest
(1) offloading application traffic from a non-common push channel to a common
push channel and (2) unblocking the first channel bas [sic] so that the application
can perform an action and reblocking the first channel after the action has been
completed, as claimed. * * *
Most of the steps described in Annan are performed before the first blocking step
recited in claim 1. This includes Annan’s gathering reports from mobile phones
about application usage and determining whether to block an application’s
communications. Nowhere, however, does Annan teach or suggest performing
additional, subsequent determinations about whether to un-block and re-block a
first channel based on monitored communications of a second channel in order for
the application to complete an action. Similarly, nowhere does Annan teach or
suggest that the first channel is a non-common push channel and the second
channel (to which the first channel is offloaded) is a common push channel, as
claimed. * * *
In contrast to Annan, the claims recite offloading application traffic to a common
(i.e., shared) communication channel for signaling optimization in a wireless
network for traffic utilizing both proprietary and non-proprietary protocols. For
this reason, it is respectfully submitted that independent claims 1, 7, and 13 are
patentable over Annan.
The remaining references fail to overcome the shortcomings of Annan. Nowhere
do the cited references teach or suggest offloading application traffic from a noncommon push channel to a common push channel or unblocking the first channel
bas [sic] so that the application can perform an action and re-blocking the first
channel after the action has been completed, as claimed. Claims 2–6, 8–12, and
14–18 depend from independent claims 1, 7, and 13 and are allowable for the same
reasons.
(ZTE, Dkt. No. 80, Ex. G, Feb. 5, 2016 Amendment and Response to Non-Final Office Action,
at 7–10 (emphasis added).) The examiner then issued a Notice of Allowance on March 3, 2016,
without any further comment.
Thus, in this above-reproduced portion of the prosecution history, the patentee definitively
stated that the cited prior art did not teach or suggest offloading application traffic from a noncommon “push” channel to a common “push” channel. These statements should be given effect

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in the Court’s construction even though the patentee may have also distinguished the prior art on
other grounds. See Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (“an applicant’s argument that a prior art reference is distinguishable on a particular ground
can serve as a disclaimer of claim scope even if the applicant distinguishes the reference on other
grounds as well”).
Plaintiff suggests that these references to “push” channels refer to the recitals of “push”
channels in other claims. Plaintiff also argues that the statements at issue pertained only to
application claim 1 and, as a result, any purported disclaimer should be limited to that claim.
Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing because the above-reproduced statements explicitly refer to
all of the claims, not just application claim 1.
Plaintiff further submits that whereas the application claims originally recited “push”
channels, the patentee amended the claim at issue so as to remove the word “push” (and amended
certain dependent claims so as to include the word “push”). (See ZTE, Dkt. No. 89, Ex. P, Sept.
2, 2014 Application, at 43–45 (P. Resp. App. 13–15); see also ZTE, Dkt. No. 78, Ex. F, June 22,
2015 Amendments to the Claims, at 2–5 (P. App. 138–41).) Plaintiff has cited authority that
limitations removed during prosecution should not be reintroduced through claim construction.
See Laryngeal Mask Co. Ltd. v. Ambu, 618 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“‘[I]nsistence upon
this court’s reading back into the claims limitations which were originally there and were removed
during prosecution of the application through the Patent Office cannot be permitted.’”) (quoting
Kistler Instrumente AG v. U.S., 628 F.2d 1303, 1308 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (alteration omitted)).
The Laryngeal Mask case is distinguishable because here the patentee made the abovereproduced statements in the prosecution history after removing the word “push.” The patentee

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explicitly referred to—and thus relied upon—the common and non-common channels being push
channels.
Finally, Plaintiff urges that “the presence or absence of push channels in Annan had nothing
to do with the examiner’s rejection.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 88, at 8 (citing Dkt. No. 89, Ex. Q, Nov. 5,
2015 Office Action, at 3 (P. Resp. App. 31)).) In particular, Plaintiff argues that because the
examiner had stated that Annan disclosed push channels, the patentee could not have distinguished
Annan based on the claimed invention using push channels. (See ZTE, Dkt. No. 89, Ex. Q, Nov. 5,
2015 Office Action, at 4–7 (P. Resp. App. 23–26).) Plaintiff notes that dependent claims, such as
application claims 2 and 8, recited that “the first channel is a first push channel and the second
channel is a second push channel.” (ZTE, Dkt. No. 80, Ex. G, Feb. 5, 2016 Amendment and
Response to Non-Final Office Action, at 2–3.)
Yet, even assuming that Plaintiff is correct, “the scope of surrender is not limited to what
is absolutely necessary to avoid a prior art reference,” and “[t]he question is what a person of
ordinary skill would understand the patentee to have disclaimed during prosecution, not what a
person of ordinary skill would think the patentee needed to disclaim during prosecution.” Tech.
Props. Ltd. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co., 849 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Thus, even if the
patentee’s above-reproduced statements regarding “push” channels were unnecessary or were
made in error, the patentee should be bound by these statements so as to “protect[] the public’s
reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution.” Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d at 1324; see
Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d 989, 995 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the prosecution history contains a disclaimer
that limits the “common channel” and “non-common channel” to being “push” channels, and

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Plaintiff’s above-discussed claim differentiation argument is unavailing. See Omega Eng’g, 334
F.3d at 1324; see also Fenner, 778 F.3d at 1323.
Therefore, the Court hereby construes these disputed terms as set forth in the following
chart:
Term

Construction

“common channel”

“shared push channel”

“non-common channel”

“application-specific push channel”

P. “monitoring the application traffic of the application”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Google’s Proposed Construction 26

No construction necessary. This phrase is
“monitoring the offloaded traffic generated by
clear and unambiguous, and all of the terms in the application”
it are being used consistent with their plain
and ordinary meanings.
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 5; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 24; Google/Samsung,
Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 8; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 30.) The parties submit that this term
appears in Claim 7. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 5; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A,
at 8.)
(1) The Parties’ Positions
Google argues that its proposal “clarifies that ‘the application traffic’ in the phrase
‘monitoring the application traffic of the application’ refers back to the only antecedent found in
claim 7.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 30.)

26

This proposal is listed as “Google’s” rather than “Defendants’” because arguments as to this term appear in Google’s
Amended Responsive Claim Construction Brief and not in the original Responsive Claim Construction Brief. (See
Google/Samsung, Dkt. Nos. 208 & 263.)

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Plaintiff replies that whereas Google’s proposal “would exclude monitoring traffic sent to
the application by the remote server communicating with the application,” “the specification
describes embodiments of the invention in which applications receive push notifications from
remote servers.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 10 (citing ’600 Patent at 21:63–22:2).)
(2) Analysis
Claim 7 of the ’600 Patent recites (emphasis added):
7. Non-transitory computer readable media containing computer code to
implement a processor controlled system for reducing network traffic, comprising:
blocking a first channel such that network signaling and battery
consumption are reduced, wherein the first channel includes a non-common
channel;
offloading application traffic of an application onto a second channel,
wherein the second channel includes a common channel;
monitoring the application traffic of the application over the second
channel;
unblocking the first channel based on the monitored application traffic over
the second channel so that the application can perform an action; and
re-blocking the first channel after the action has been completed.
The use of the definite article, “the,” in the recital of “the application traffic” refers to the
same “application traffic” recited in the preceding limitation of “offloading application traffic of
an application.” See In re Varma, 816 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“For a dog owner to have
‘a dog that rolls over and fetches sticks,’ it does not suffice that he have two dogs, each able to
perform just one of the tasks.”); see also Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (regarding “a logical table,” finding that the limitations at issue were required to
be “in the same logical table”). This understanding is further reinforced by the subsequent recital
of “unblocking the first channel based on the monitored application traffic over the second
channel.”
At the September 12, 2018 hearing, Defendants urged that the recital of “application traffic
of the application” requires that the traffic is generated by the application. Plaintiff persuasively
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countered that nothing in the claim language precludes this traffic from being “of the application”
in the sense that the traffic is being sent to the application. That is, Defendants have not shown
how the word “application” necessarily limits the direction of traffic to being from application to
server rather than from server to application.
With that understanding, the Court hereby finds, as to the term “monitoring the
application traffic of the application,” that the antecedent basis for “the application traffic of
the application” is “application traffic of an application” as recited in the limitation of
“offloading application traffic of an application onto a second channel, wherein the second
channel includes a common channel.”
IX. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 9,553,816
The ’816 Patent, titled “Optimizing Mobile Network Traffic Coordination Across Multiple
Applications Running on a Mobile Device,” issued on January 24, 2017, and bears an earliest
priority date of July 26, 2010. Plaintiff submits that “[t]he ’816 Patent claims a mobile device that
conserves battery power by, among other things, blocking outgoing network traffic from an
application when the application is inactive and the device is not plugged into an external power
source.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 15.) The Abstract of the ’816 Patent states:
A system with distributed proxy for reducing traffic in a wireless network to satisfy
data requests made by a mobile application is provided. The system includes a
mobile device having a local proxy for intercepting a data request made by the
mobile application. The local proxy simulates application server responses for the
mobile application on the mobile device for data requests where responses are
available in the local cache. A proxy server is coupled to the mobile device and an
application server to which the data request is made. The proxy server is able to
communicate with the local proxy. The local proxy forwards the data request to
the proxy server for transmission to the application server for a response to the data
request. The proxy server queries the application server independent of activities
of the mobile application for any changes to the data request.

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Q. “first application is inactive,” “determining whether the first application is inactive based
on the time the first application was last accessed,” and “an application . . . is inactive”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

These phrases are clear and unambiguous,
they are not indefinite, and they are used
consistent with their plain and ordinary
meanings.

Indefinite

(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 15; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 26, 28 & 29;
Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 17.) The parties submit that these terms appear in Claims 9 and
13. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 10‒11; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 26, 28
& 29.)
Prior to the September 12, 2018 hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel informed the Court by e-mail
that the parties have agreed that these terms should be given their plain meaning. In accordance
with this agreement reached by the parties, the Court hereby construes “first application is
inactive,” “determining whether the first application is inactive based on the time the first
application was last accessed,” and “an application . . . is inactive” to have their plain meaning.
R. “blocking”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary. The term
“blocking” is used consistent with its plain
and ordinary meaning.

“intercepting”

(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 16; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 29;
Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 9.) The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 9 and 11.
(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 172, at 11; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 29.)

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(1) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that here as in the ’129 Patent (addressed above), “no construction is
necessary because the patentee did not redefine ‘blocking,’ which is a common, easily understood
term.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 16–17.)
Google and Samsung argue this term together with the term “block” in the ’129 Patent,
addressed above. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 9–10.)
Plaintiff replies as to this term together with the term “block” in the ’129 Patent, addressed
above. (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 279, at 3–4.)
(2) Analysis
This disputed term presents substantially the same dispute as the term “block” in the ’129
Patent, and the Court reaches the same conclusion here for substantially the same reasons. See
’816 Patent at 18:38–42, 22:4–11, 22:21–36, 29:39–50, 34:53–68, 35:12–23, 41:30–35, Fig. 7B &
Fig. 9B.
The Court therefore hereby construes “blocking” to mean “preventing.”
X. DISPUTED TERMS IN UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 8,811,952
The ’952 Patent, titled “Mobile Device Power Management in Data Synchronization Over
a Mobile Network With or Without a Trigger Notification,” issued on August 19, 2014, and bears
an earliest priority date of January 8, 2002. Plaintiff submits that “[t]he ’952 Patent claims mobile
devices that conserve battery power by reducing the frequency at which applications communicate
with remote servers.” (Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 17.) The Abstract of the ’952 Patent
states:
A real-time communication architecture establishes a continuous connection
between an enterprise network and a communication management system. The
connection is continuously held open allowing mobile devices real-time access to
enterprise email systems. The real-time communication architecture can support
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an entire enterprise email system or individual email users. The foregoing and other
objects, features and advantages of the invention will become more readily apparent
from the following detailed description of a preferred embodiment of the invention
which proceeds with reference to the accompanying drawings.
S. “periodicity” and “the periodicity of the synchronization requests occur at a frequency
according to remaining battery power on the mobile device”
“periodicity”
(Claim 26)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary. The term
“periodicity” is used consistent with its plain
and ordinary meaning (i.e., “recurrence”).

“recurrence at approximately regular
intervals”

“the periodicity of the synchronization requests occur at a frequency according to
remaining battery power on the mobile device”
(Claim 26)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

No construction necessary. The term “the
periodicity of the synchronization requests
occur at a frequency determined according to
remaining battery power” is used consistent
with its plain and ordinary meaning, in light
of SEVEN’s construction for “periodicity”
above.

“the recurrence at approximately regular
intervals of the synchronization requests
occur at a frequency that the mobile device
determines according to its remaining battery
power”

(Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 191, at 17–18; Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 246, Ex. A, at 1–2;
Google/Samsung, Dkt. No. 263, at 18–19.)
Prior to the September 12, 2018 hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel informed the Court by e-mail
that the parties have agreed that the larger term should be construed to mean “the recurrence of the
synchronization requests occur at approximately regular intervals and at a frequency determined

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according to remaining battery power on the mobile device.” Plaintiff’s counsel also stated that
the parties have agreed that the term “periodicity” need not be separately construed.
In accordance with this agreement reached by the parties, the Court hereby construes these
terms as set forth in the following chart:
Term

Construction

“periodicity”

Plain meaning apart from the Court’s
construction of “the periodicity of the
synchronization requests occur at a
frequency according to remaining battery
power on the mobile device”

“the periodicity of the synchronization
requests occur at a frequency according to
remaining battery power on the mobile
device”

“the recurrence of the synchronization
requests occur at approximately regular
intervals and at a frequency determined
according to remaining battery power on
the mobile device”

XI. CONCLUSION
The Court ORDERS AND ADOPTS the constructions set forth in this opinion for the
disputed terms of the patents-in-suit, and in reaching conclusions the Court has considered
extrinsic evidence. The Court’s constructions thus include subsidiary findings of fact based upon
the extrinsic evidence presented by the parties in these claim construction proceedings. See Teva,
135 S. Ct. at 841.
The parties are ORDERED that they may not refer, directly or indirectly, to each other’s
claim construction positions in the presence of the jury. Likewise, the parties are ordered to refrain
from mentioning any portion of this opinion, other than the actual definitions adopted by the Court,
in the presence of the jury. Any reference to claim construction proceedings is limited to informing
the jury of the definitions adopted by the Court.

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Within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the parties
are hereby ORDERED, in good faith, to mediate this case with the mediator agreed upon by
the parties. As a part of such mediation, each party shall appear by counsel (with lead and
.
local counsel present and participating) and by at least one corporate officer possessing
sufficient authority and control to unilaterally make binding decisions for the corporation
adequate to address any good faith offer or counteroffer of settlement that might arise during such
mediation. Failure to do so shall be deemed by the Court as a failure to mediate in good faith
and may subject that party to such sanctions as the Court deems appropriate. No participant
shall leave the mediation without the approval of the mediator.

SIGNED this 19th day of December, 2011.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 23rd day of October, 2018.

____________________________________
RODNEY GILSTRAP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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