Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. et al

Filing 437

MEMORANDUM ORDER re 296 Opposed SEALED MOTION Rule 702 and Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Opinions of Dr. Douglas A. Chrissan. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roy S. Payne on 4/11/2019. (nkl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II
LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
SPRINT SPECTRUM, L.P. ET AL,
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:17-cv-00662-JRG-RSP

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Sealed Daubert Motion to Exclude the Expert
Opinions of Dr. Douglas A. Chrissan. (Dkt. No. 296.) Having considered the Motion, and
for the reasons described herein, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion.
Defendants argue that Chrissan is not sufficiently qualified to perform patent
valuations

as

he

does

not

have

any

“experience

with

patent

valuation

whatsoever.” (Dkt. No. 296 at 6.) This ignores the fact that Chrissan served in a similar
role in a case (“the 577 case”) between some of the same parties a few months ago.
See Motion to Exclude Chrissan, Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T Mobile USA, Inc. et al,
2:17-cv-00577-JRG (Dkt. No. 211). Defendants raised the same challenge to the
qualifications in the 577 case as they do here, including an argument that Chrissan had
no “experience with patent valuation whatsoever.” (Id. at 5.) The Court eventually
concluded that Chrissan was sufficiently qualified in the 577 case to perform an analysis
that is very similar to the analysis conducted here, and Defendants have not provided

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any reason why the Court should conclude differently in this case, especially when
Chrissan has even more experience than he did before. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that Chrissan is sufficiently qualified to serve as an expert at trial and will not
exclude his opinions on that basis.
Further, while Defendants challenge the reliability of Chrissan’s opinions, the Court
concludes that cross-examination is the appropriate mechanism to raise these challenges
and that Defendant’s have not shown that Chrissan’s opinions are so unreliable that
they should be excluded. Again, this Court recently denied the similar Daubert Motion
in the 577 case, and the differences between Chrissan’s testimony in that case and in this
case are not so substantial as to make his opinions unreliable here. (See 2:17-cv-00577,
Dkt. No. 211.)
While Defendants assert that Chrissan’s analysis adds an additional step to the
previous analysis that makes it unreliable, this issue would be more appropriately
resolved through cross examination. Chrissan evaluates the technical value of a group of
Ericsson patents, a group of patents that were asserted in the 577 case, and the
presently asserted patents. (Dkt. No. 296 ¶¶ 8–167, 175– 87, 189–201.) Chrissan compares
the technical value of the Ericsson patents to the technical value of the patents asserted in
the 577 case. (Dkt. No. 296 at ¶¶ 208–09.) Chrissan then compares the Malibu patents to
the presently asserted patents to reach a technical valuation for the presently asserted
patents, which Defendants argue is an additional step of analysis that did not exist in the
previous case. (Dkt. No. 296-5 at ¶¶ 210–11.) The Court concludes that this additional
step does not make Chrissan’s opinions unreliable and that any concerns with his
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approach are more appropriate for cross examination. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. No.
296) is DENIED.

SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2012.

SIGNED this 11th day of April, 2019.

____________________________________
ROY S. PAYNE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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