Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Intel Corporation
Filing
143
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roy S. Payne on 9/12/2018. (nkl, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
GODO KAISHA IP BRIDGE 1,
Plaintiff,
v.
INTEL CORPORATION,
Defendant.
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No. 2:17-CV-00676-RWS-RSP
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OPINION AND ORDER
This lawsuit concerns eight United States patents relating to semiconductor technology: U.S. Patents 6,197,696; 6,346,736; 6,387,824; 6,602,802; 6,709,950; 6,967,409;
7,279,727; and RE 41,980. The parties have agreed to constructions for certain terms from
six of these patents. See Part II infra.
Terms from three of the patents remain disputed. The ’736 Patent, titled “Trench
Isolated Semiconductor Device,” discloses a device with a dielectric film between the wiring and substrate of a semiconductor to reduce the capacitance between them. The ’824
Patent and ’802 Patent teach methods of forming wiring structures using a porous film
between the wiring, which also reduces internal capacitance of the device. The lower the
capacitance between the wiring and the substrate (in the case of the ’736 Patent) and the
wiring in the devices (in the case of the ’824 and ’802 Patents), the higher the operating
speed.
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I.
GENERAL LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
Claim Construction
“[T]he claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the
right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
As such, if the parties dispute the scope of the claims, the court must determine their meaning. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996), aff’g, 52
F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc); Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,
503 F.3d 1295, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
When construing claims, “[t]here is a heavy presumption that claim terms are to be
given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Aventis Pharm. Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd.,
715 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13). Courts must
therefore “look to the words of the claims themselves . . . to define the scope of the patented
invention.” Id. (citations omitted). The “ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term
is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question
at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.”
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. This “person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the
claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id.
Intrinsic evidence is the primary resource for claim construction. See Power-One,
Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d
at 1312). For certain claim terms, “the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood
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by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted
meaning of commonly understood words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. But for claim terms
with less-apparent meanings, courts consider “those sources available to the public that
show what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to
mean . . . [including] the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.” Id.
II.
AGREED CONSTRUCTIONS
The parties agree to the following constructions, which the Court hereby adopts.
Joint Cl. Constr. & Prehearing Statement [Dkt. # 85] at 2–3; Notice of Supplement to Joint
Cl. Constr. Statement [Dkt. # 103].
Claim Term
Agreed Construction
using the [first resist pattern/second resist
pattern and the mask pattern/patterned
third insulating film] as a mask
using the [first resist pattern/second resist
pattern and the mask pattern/patterned
third insulating film] to define areas for
etching
(’696 Patent, cl.13)
step order
(’696 Patent, cl.13)
interlayer insulating film
(’980 Patent, cl.18, 33, 35, 50)
small dielectric constant
(’980 Patent, cl.18, 35)
steps (a)–(k) must be performed in the order listed.
an insulating film located between but not
within layers
a dielectric constant not greater than that
of silicon dioxide
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said bonding pad in said opening and said
second dielectric film of said surface protecting film completely cover said first dielectric film so as not to expose said first
dielectric film
(’980 Patent, cl.18)
the bonding pad and the second dielectric
film each covers a portion of the first dielectric film, and the bonding pad and the
second dielectric film collectively cover
the first dielectric film so that it is not exposed to above
wherein said bonding pad covers said
opening
plain and ordinary meaning
(’980 Patent, cl.35)
a surface protecting film
plain and ordinary meaning
(’980 Patent, cl.18, 35)
a conductor pad which is provided on the
gate interconnect part
plain and ordinary meaning
(’727 Patent, cl.10)
wherein the gate contact is in contact with
wherein the gate contact is physically
the conductor pad
touching the conductor pad
(‘727 Patent, cl.10)
a second trench portion filled with an insulating material formed to separate a plurality of dummy semiconductor portions in
said isolation region
plain and ordinary meaning
(’736 Patent, cl.6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 16)
resistor film
(’736 Patent, cl.13, 14, 16)
forming . . . on
(’950 Patent, cl.1, 17)
formed on
(’409 Patent, cl.1, 25, 26, 64)
plain and ordinary meaning
forming . . . directly or indirectly on
formed directly or indirectly on
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III.
CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
A.
“dielectric film” (’736 Patent, cl.6–8)
Godo Kaisha’s
Proposed Construction
plain and ordinary meaning
Intel’s
Proposed Construction
a dielectric film for reducing the capacitance between the wire and the substrate
FIG. 19 of the ’736 Patent (see below) shows a prior-art trench-isolated semiconductor device having an active region (6) of a silicon substrate (1), a gate electrode (4), and
source/drain regions (5). An isolation region (7) surrounds the active region (6) and includes multiple trench portions (8), each filled with a silicon oxide film. Semiconductor
portions (9) are between the trench portions (8). A polysilicon wire (10) is on one trench
portion (8). A gate oxide film (2) and gate electrode (4) are on the substrate (1) over the
active region (6). An interlayer insulating film (12) covers the surface of the substrate (1),
and a metal wire (13) is on the insulating film (12). ’736 Patent at 1:35–51.
FIG. 19 of the ’736 Patent
Generally, these types of trench-isolation techniques improve some operating characteristics relative to other devices, but tend to increase the wire-to-substrate capacitance
because of the smaller distances between the wire (13) and substrate (1) in the regions
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between the trenches (8). See generally ’736 Patent at 2:48–3:24. These higher capacitances negatively affect operating speed. Id. at abst. (“What results is a semiconductor device having lower total wiring-to-substrate capacitance and a higher operating speed.”).
To compensate, the ’736 Patent teaches reducing the capacitance between the wiring
and substrate, relative to the prior art, by interposing a dielectric film between the semiconductor portions (9) of the isolation region (7) and the interlayer insulating film (12).
For example, FIG. 12 of the ’736 Patent (see below) shows an underlying insulating film
(81) made of a silicon oxide film formed over the semiconductor portions (9) and trench
portions (8) of the isolation region (7). This insulating film (81) covers the polysilicon wire
(10), which results in reduced capacitance between the wire (13) and substrate (1) relative
to the wiring-to-substrate capacitances of the embodiment shown in FIG. 19. Id. at 23:2–
33.
FIG. 12 of the ’736 Patent
Claim 6 recites “a dielectric film” interposed between the dummy semiconductor
portions (9) of the isolation region (7) and the interlayer insulating film (12). The parties
agree that the “dielectric film” is the underlying insulating film (81) shown in FIG. 12, but
dispute the proper construction for the term.
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Intel argues “the claimed ‘dielectric film’ must be able to reduce the capacitance
between the claimed ‘wire’ and ‘substrate’ layers.” Def.’s Resp. [Dkt. # 106] at 25. “[T]hat
ability constitutes the purported inventive aspect of the claims,” id., which warrants the
inclusion of the purpose of the dielectric film in the Court’s construction. Godo Kaisha
argues (1) the patentee never expressed an intent to depart from the plain meaning of the
term; (2) intent is not an element of patent infringement; and (3) Intel’s proposed construction fails to make clear to what reference the capacitance must be reduced. Pl.’s Br. [Dkt.
# 102] at 5–8.
The Court sees no compelling reason to adopt Intel’s construction. Claim 6 covers
structure rather than function or purpose. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,
909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what
a device does.”). The patentees clearly recited the limitation with only structural language
using a term well known in the art. Moreover, there is no dispute about whether interposing
the dielectric film reduces the capacitance between the wire and the substrate. See Hr’g Tr.
[Dkt. # 137] at 51:21–23 (Intel’s agreement that the correct comparison about whether the
device reduces capacitance is to a device without dielectric film); see id. at 52:12–19 (Intel’s agreement that, using that comparison, any dielectric film interposed as required by
Claim 6 reduces the capacitance between the wire and the substrate). Thus, introducing a
statement of intended purpose does not resolve any dispute over claim scope and unnecessarily complicates an otherwise straight-forward claim limitation.
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Intel relies heavily on Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
which addressed the proper construction of “flow restrictor.” The district court’s construction merely required the flow restrictor “to restrict the rate of flow.” Praxair, 543 F.3d at
1322–23. The appellate court, however, looked to the “fundamental object of the invention
disclosed by the [asserted] patent specification” and concluded mere restriction of flow
was not sufficient. Id. at 1324. The appellate court instead construed the term as “a structure
that serves to restrict the rate of flow sufficiently to prevent a hazardous situation.” Id.
(emphasis added). Thus, Praxair addressed a dispute about claim scope—the degree to
which the flow rate must be restricted by the structure.
Praxair is distinguishable for two reasons. First, the parties in this case have no
dispute about the scope of “dielectric film” or the result of interposing the dielectric film
in the manner recited by Claim 6. The parties, for example, agree the correct comparison
for reduction of capacitance is to a device without dielectric film (as opposed to a device
with a different dielectric film). Hr’g Tr. [Dkt. # 137] at 51:21–23. The parties also agree
that, using that comparison, any dielectric film interposed as required by Claim 6 reduces
the capacitance between the wire and the substrate. See id. at 52:12–19.
Second, in Praxair, the district court, the parties, and the appellate court all proposed
or adopted constructions that included functional language. Both parties’ initial constructions for “flow restrictor” included non-structural language. Praxair proposed “a structure
in the form of a tube with multiple narrow passages that exhibit capillary action and can
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restrict flow.” Joint Cl. Constr. Statement [Dkt. # 90], No. 03-1158-SLR (D. Del) at 4 (emphasis added). ATMI proposed “an elongated cylindrical structure with at least two uniformly shaped bores . . . such that friction significantly impedes the mass flow rate of gas
through the bores.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the dispute was not whether to use nonstructural language in the construction, but rather which non-structural language to use.
The Court rejects Intel’s proposed construction as unnecessary. Moreover, because
the Court sees no other dispute between the parties about the meaning of “dielectric film,”
the Court will not further construe the term at this time.
B.
“form . . . a porous film” (’824 Patent, cl.3); “forming a porous film”
(’802 Patent, cl.1–2)
Godo Kaisha’s
Proposed Construction
Intel’s
Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Alternatively, “form[ing] . . . a film with fine holes having a dielectric constant of 2 or less”
“form[ing] . . . a film having pores”
Like the ’736 Patent, the ’824 and ’802 Patents disclose manufacturing methods that
reduce capacitance between internal components of semiconductor devices to increase operating speed. ’824 Patent at 1:18–20; ’802 at Patent 1:23–25. Specifically, these patents
teach achieving this result with a specific method of forming a porous film to be used as
an inter-layer dielectric between wires. ’824 Patent at 1:21–26; ’802 Patent at 1:26–31.
The parties dispute the proper construction for “porous film.” In arguing for a construction that includes “fine holes,” Intel stresses that the specification uses that term 37
times to describe formation of the porous film. Def.’s Br. [Dkt. # 106] at 18. Moreover, the
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specifications describe an “object of the present invention” as “allow[ing] the formation of
a porous film having a dielectric constant of 2 or less in a simple process at low cost.” ’824
Patent at 2:18–21; see also id. at 1:26–28 (“[P]orous film is only the film capable of providing a dielectric constant of 2.0 or lower.”). Intel claims these aspects of its construction
provide needed objective anchors from the specification for the term. Def.’s Br. [Dkt.
# 106] at 13–19. When the term is “a relative term of degree,” says Intel, the Court should
look to the specification for the proper benchmark. Id. at 17 (citing Network-1 Sec. Sols.,
Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 632, 644 (E.D. Tex. 2010)).
The Court rejects Intel’s proposed construction for three reasons. First, the Court is
not convinced that “porous film” is a term of degree or that, even if it is, one of ordinary
skill could not ascertain the scope of the claim from the specification. Porous films are
well-known in the art. Indeed, the patents themselves recognize the use of porous film as
interlayer dielectrics instead of then-conventional silicon oxide film. See, e.g., ’824 Patent
at 1:23–26 (recognizing that porous film has been studied as a replacement for conventional
silicon oxide film). Moreover, it is clearly from the claim language that the porous film is
the output of the plasma process, and is thus somewhat self-defining. In other words, the
porous film is the film created by the removal of the organic component of the organicinorganic hybrid film.
Second, as for the dielectric constant, the patents describe Embodiment 6 as forming
a porous film with a dielectric constant greater than 2 using the method. See id. at 12:29–
33. The patent explains a lower dielectric constant is not necessary because there are no
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metal wires in the layer to cause parasitic capacitance. Id. at 12:34–42. The same hydrogen
plasma process operates on adjacent film to yield a dielectric constant of 1.7, and the different porosity is solely a function of the ratio of the organic to inorganic components of
the two hybrid films. That is consistent with the object of the invention, which is to allow,
but not necessarily require, formation of a porous film having a dielectric constant of 2. Id.
at 2:18–21. The patents’ use of “porous film” in this manner rebuts any implication that
the patentees defined “porous film” as only film having a dielectric constant of 2 or less.
1
Third, although the patents repeatedly use “fine holes” to describe the process of
creating the porous film, there is no suggestion or support for the notion that all porous
film has “fine holes.” Moreover, the Court does not see how “fine holes” provides the objective anchor that Intel claims is necessary, as the dispute then shifts to the meaning of
“fine” and “holes.”
Having rejected Intel’s proposed construction, the Court affirms its preliminary position that no further construction is necessary for this term.
C.
step order (’824 Patent, claim 3)
Godo Kaisha’s
Proposed Construction
Intel’s
Proposed Construction
The claimed steps do not need to be per- All steps in claim 3 must be performed in
formed in the order recited.
the order recited in the claim.
1
The patents’ statement that “the porous film is only the film capable of providing a dielectric constant of 2.0 or
lower” is problematic for Plaintiff. In the end, however, the Court concludes this awkward language stems from the
translation of the earlier-filed Japanese applications to which the ‘824 and ‘802 Patents claim priority. The Court
believes the patentees intended to note that only porous film, and not conventional silicon oxide film, will allow for
a dielectric constant of 2.0 or less. This harmonizes with the description in Embodiment 6 of a porous film having a
constant of 2.3.
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Generally, “a claim requires an ordering of steps when the claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order written, or the
specification directly or implicitly requires an order of steps.” See Mformation Techs., Inc.
v. Research in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). That is at least partially the case here.
Claim 3 recites the steps of:
[(a)]
depositing, on a substrate, an organic-inorganic hybrid film
having a siloxane skeleton;
[(b)] patterning said organic-inorganic hybrid film to form a wire
groove in said organic-inorganic hybrid film;
[(c)] filling a metal film in said wire groove to form a buried wire
composed of said metal film; and
[(d)] performing a plasma process using a plasma derived from a gas
containing a reducing gas with respect to said organic-inorganic hybrid film to form an inter-layer dielectric which is a
porous film composed of said organic-inorganic hybrid film.
’824 Patent at 15:32–16:9 (emphasis added). Clearly, (b) must come before (c) because a
wire groove cannot be filled unless it has first been formed. And clearly (a) must come
before (b) because the hybrid film must be deposited before it can be patterned and a wire
groove formed in it.
As for step (d), Intel argues the step converts the organic-inorganic hybrid film into
a porous film, after which there is no hybrid film on which the other steps can operate.
H’rg. Tr. [Dkt. # 137] at 117:10–24. Thus, says Intel, step (d) must come last.
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The Court disagrees for three reasons. First, the specification clearly discloses embodiments that perform the plasma process before filling the metal groove. See, e.g., id. at
11:3–17; id. at 11:59–12:28. Thus, step (d) can be performed at least before step (c). Second, nothing in the claim language suggests there is no hybrid film on which to operate
after step (d). To the contrary, step (d) recites its continued existence: “a porous film composed of said organic-inorganic hybrid film.” ’824 Patent at 16:8–9. Third, the Court discerns no technical reason from the specification as to why step (d) must happen after step
(b).
The Court affirms its preliminary construction. The first three steps of this claim
must be performed in the recited order, but the “performing” step can happen any time after
the “depositing” step.
D.
step order (’802 Patent, cl.1)
Godo Kaisha’s
Proposed Construction
Intel’s
Proposed Construction
The claimed steps do not need to be per- All steps in claim 1 must be performed in
formed in the order recited.
the order recited in the claim.
Claim 1 of the ’802 Patent recites
(a) depositing, on a substrate, an organic-inorganic hybrid film having
a siloxane skeleton; and
(b) forming a porous film composed of said organic-inorganic hybrid
film.
Godo Kaisha argues the ’802 Patent discloses performing both steps concurrently and that
nothing in the claim language requires ordering the steps. Pl.’s Br. [Dkt. # 102] at 22–23
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(citing ’802 Patent 2:36–47).
The Court disagrees. The passage cited by Godo Kaisha summarizes both Embodiment 1, which uses plasma-enhanced CVD for deposition on the substrate and a hydrogen
reducing gas, and Embodiment 3, which uses plasma enhanced CVD for deposition on the
substrate and an ammonia reducing gas. See ’802 Patent at 3:42–44. 2 The specification
describes both embodiments as “first” depositing an organic-inorganic hybrid film on a
substrate using plasma enhanced CVD, id. at 6:55–65; id. at 9:1–5, and “subsequently” or
“next” performing a plasma process to decompose the organic component, id. at 7:7–15;
id. at 9:6–14. Further, forming the porous film first would obviate any need to then deposit
an organic-inorganic hybrid film on the substrate, as the porous film would be deposited
directly on the substrate instead.
The Court affirms its preliminary construction: The steps of Claim 1 must be performed in the recited order.
IV.
ORDER
The Court ORDERS that each party must not refer, directly or indirectly, to its own
or any other party’s claim construction positions in the presence of the jury. Likewise, the
Court ORDERS the parties to refrain from mentioning any part of this opinion, other than
the actual positions adopted by the Court, in the presence of the jury. Any reference to
2
Embodiment 2 uses a thermal (rather than plasma) process to form the porous film. ’802
Patent at 8:31–36. Embodiment 4 does not use a plasma enhanced CVD process to deposit
the siloxane skeleton. Embodiments 5–7 relate to forming a wiring structure and therefore
are not relevant to determining the order of steps for Claim 1.
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claim construction proceedings is limited to informing the jury of the positions adopted by
the Court.
SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2012.
SIGNED this 12th day of September, 2018.
____________________________________
ROY S. PAYNE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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