Staton Techiya, LLC et al v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al

Filing 973

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER (Motion(s) 952 terminated). Signed by District Judge Rodney Gilstrap on 8/29/2024. (CH)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
STATON TECHIYA, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,
INC.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:21-CV-00413-JRG
(LEAD CASE)
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:22-CV-00053-JRG
(MEMBER CASE)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Opposed Motion for Entry of Bill of Costs (the “Motion”) filed by
Defendants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (collectively,
“Samsung”). (Dkt. No. 952.) Having considered the Motion, the Court finds it should be and
hereby is GRANTED-IN-PART, DENIED-IN-PART, and CARRIED-IN-PART.
I.

BACKGROUND
On November 5, 2021, Plaintiff Staton Techiya, LLC (“Techiya”) and Synergy IP

Corporation (“Synergy”) 1 filed suit against Samsung, alleging infringement of several patents.
(Dkt. No. 1.) The Court held a bench trial on March 26 and 27, 2024. Following the bench trial,
on May 9, 2024, the Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, finding that
Techiya’s asserted patent claims are unenforceable against Samsung based on unclean hands. (Dkt.
No. 923.) Subsequently, the Court entered a Final Judgment awarding Samsung its costs as the
prevailing party and directing Samsung to file its proposed Bill of Costs. (Dkt. No. 950.) That

On May 29, 2024, the Court adopted Magistrate Judge Payne’s Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 700) and
dismissed Synergy’s claims against Defendants with prejudice. (Dkt. No. 934.)
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proposed Bill of Costs is now at issue before the Court.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or

a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the
prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Rule 54(d) affords courts discretion in awarding costs
to prevailing parties. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 565 (2012). Additionally,
Section 1920 enumerates specific expenses that a federal court may tax as costs under the
discretionary authority found in Rule 54(d) to include:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for
use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where
the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and
salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section
1828 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1920. While a court may decline to award costs listed in the statute, it may not award
costs omitted from the statute. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42
(1987).
Upon determining the “prevailing party” within the meaning of Rule 54(d)(1), courts must
then determine what costs, if any, should be awarded to the prevailing party. Marx v. General
Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 375 (2013). The issue of costs raises a procedural issue not unique
to patent law, and therefore is governed by regional circuit law. In re Ricoh Co., Ltd. Patent
Litigation, 661 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Fifth Circuit has noted that a district court
“may neither deny nor reduce a prevailing party’s request for costs without first articulating some
good reason for doing so.” Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 793–94 (5th Cir. 2006). Indeed, there

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is a “strong presumption” that the prevailing party will be awarded costs, and a denial is “in the
nature of a penalty.” Id. (quoting Schwarz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 131 (5th Cir. 1985)).
III.

DISCUSSION
Techiya does not dispute that Samsung is the prevailing party but argues that Samsung’s

Bill of Costs is excessive. Techiya also argues that equitable factors require reassessing and/or
apportioning Samsung’s requested costs. First, Techiya argues that Synergy should bear most of
Samsung’s costs because Synergy is responsible for the misconduct that gave rise to the Court’s
unclean hands finding. (Dkt. No. 958 at 9-10; Dkt. No. 970 at 4-5.) Second, Techiya contends that
it should not bear any costs related to its patent claims because the Court affirmed the merits of
those claims. (Dkt. No. 958 at 10-11; Dkt. No. 970 at 4-5.)
A.

Techiya’s Equitable Arguments
1.

Techiya is Liable for Samsung’s Recoverable Costs

Techiya argues that Synergy, not Techiya, should bear most of Samsung’s costs related to
Samsung’s non-patent counterclaims and equitable defense of unclean hands. (Dkt. No. 958 at 9;
Dkt. No. 970 at 4-5.) Specifically, Techiya argues that “because Synergy is responsible for the
misconduct that primarily gave rise to the Court’s finding of unclean hands and the dismissal of
the action, Synergy (not Techiya) should bear the bulk of Samsung’s costs related to the non-patent
counterclaims/unclean hands defense.” (Dkt. No. 958 at 10; see also Dkt. No. 970 at 4-5.) Techiya
contends that the Court should apply joint and several liability and apportion the taxable costs
between Techiya and Synergy, with the Court assessing a “bulk” against Synergy. (Dkt. No. 958
at 9-10; Dkt. No. 970 at 4-5.) Samsung argues that “[t]he Court’s Final Judgment stat[ing] that
‘Samsung is the prevailing party in this case and shall recover their costs from Plaintiff Techiya’”
ends the inquiry that Techiya is liable for Samsung’s costs, especially considering there is no
judgment against Synergy. (Dkt. No. 964 at 1 (quoting Dkt. No. 952 at 2) (emphasis in original).)
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Samsung also argues that Techiya’s assertion that Synergy, not just Techiya, should be liable for
Samsung’s costs contradicts Techiya’s prior positions in the case, specifically Techiya’s motion
to drop Synergy as a plaintiff and counter-defendant. (Dkt. No. 952 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 964 at 1-2.)
The Court can only assess costs against the party whom Samsung prevailed against.
“[A] prevailing party is one that has obtained a judgment on the merits, a consent decree, or some
similar form of judicially sanctioned relief.” El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R., 591 F.3d 417,
422 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Bare Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001)). Techiya does not dispute that
Samsung is the prevailing party. (See Dkt. No. 958; see also Dkt. No. 970.) However, the Court
terminated Synergy’s claims in the above-captioned case before Samsung obtained any relief, let
alone a judgment on the merits, against Synergy. Samsung is not a prevailing party against
Synergy. As a result, the Court cannot assess taxable costs against Synergy. Accordingly, Techiya
is liable for all of Samsung’s properly taxable costs in the above-captioned case.
2.

Techiya is Liable for the Costs Related to the Entire Litigation

Techiya also argues that it should not bear costs related to its meritorious patent claims.
(Dkt. No. 958 at 10-11; Dkt. No. 970 at 5.) Samsung argues that Techiya is liable for the costs
related to the entire case, not just the costs stemming from Samsung’s unclean hands defense. (Dkt.
No. 952 at 3; Dkt. No. 964 at 3-4.) Samsung contends that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
do not parse the prevailing party’s entitlement to costs in such a fashion. (Dkt. No. 952 at 3; Dkt.
No. 964 at 3-4.)
As the prevailing party, Samsung is prima facie entitled to all its costs. Pacheco, 448 at
793. Techiya argues that the Court should not award Samsung the costs it incurred defending
against Techiya’s patent claims because “Techiya’s patent infringement claims were (and remain)
meritorious.” This argument fails. Under Fifth Circuit authority, a court “may neither deny nor
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reduce a prevailing party’s request for costs without first articulating some good reason for doing
so.” Schwarz, 767 at 131; see also Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pgimentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A. de
C.V., 464 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“In fact, apportioning costs according to the relative
success of parties is appropriate only under limited circumstances, such as when the costs incurred
are greatly disproportionate to the relief obtained.”). The Fifth Circuit has also concluded that a
“case must be viewed as a whole” and a party need not prevail on every issue to deserve
costs. Fogleman v. ARAMCO, 920 F.2d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 1991). Techiya’s belief its patent claims
were “meritorious” is not a compelling basis to reduce an award of costs. 2 Meritorious or not, in a
vacuum, Techiya’s patent claims have been foreclosed by Samsung’s successful unclean hands
defense. (Dkt. No. 923.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Techiya is liable for Samsung’s cost
related to the entire case, not just the unclean hands defense.
B.

Recoverable Costs
1.

Uncontested Recoverable Costs

The parties have agreed that $48,703.09 is taxable as costs against Techiya, as follows:
•

$11,331.73 in hearing transcripts fees; 3

•

$8,897.50 in statutory witness fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1821;

•

$20,401.28 in conversion of documents to TIFF fees; and

•

$8,072.58 in compensation of court-appointed experts.

(Dkt. No. 958 at 9 n.3; see also Dkt. No. 970 at 1-3.) Accordingly, the Court awards Samsung the
aforementioned uncontested costs.

Even if some apportionment were appropriate, Techiya has not suggested a workable way to apportion these costs.
Techiya proposes reducing Samsung’s costs that Techiya deems are recoverable after its objections by half, but that
reduction is unrealistic. (Dkt. No. 958-1 ¶¶ 31-33.)
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While Samsung originally sought costs for expediting hearing transcripts and videoconferencing fees (Dkt. No. 952
at 5), Samsung submitted an updated Bill of Costs with its Reply to narrow these disputes (Dkt. Nos. 964, 964-3). As
such, Techiya does not dispute Samsung’s new request for hearing transcript fees. (See Dkt. No. 970.)
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2.

Disputed Expedited Deposition Transcripts

Techiya argues that Samsung improperly requests costs associated with expediting
deposition transcripts. (Dkt. No. 958 at 3-4; Dkt. No. 970 at 1-2.) Techiya identifies two invoices
that identify the transcript as being expedited but do not break out expediting fees. (Dkt. No. 958
at 3 (citing Dkt. No. 958-2); see also Dkt. No. 970 at 1.) Techiya argues that expediting fees are
included in the per-page charge for expedited deposition transcripts. (Dkt. No. 958 at 3; Dkt. No.
970 at 1-1.) Techiya contends that the standard per-page price for non-expedited transcripts is
$4.00 and requests that the Court limit Samsung’s deposition transcripts costs accordingly. (Dkt.
No. 958 at 3; Dkt. No. 970 at 1-2.) Samsung argues that expedited transcripts may be taxable
whereas, here, “the special character of the litigation necessities” it. (Dkt. No. 964 at 4 (quoting
Fogleman, 920 at 285).) Samsung also argues that Techiya offers no legal support for its contention
that Samsung is not permitted to recover the actual per-page costs it incurred for expedited
deposition transcripts. (Dkt. No. 964 at 4.)
As to the expediting fees, Samsung has failed to produce a sufficient argument that it is
entitled to recover the costs associated with the expedited deposition transcripts. Samsung is
correct that there is an exception to the general rule that expedited delivery charges are not
recoverable if “the special character of the litigation necessitates” expedited receipt of the
transcript. However, Samsung has the burden of showing that taxation of these costs is necessary
under the exception. Realtime Data, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2013 WL 12156681, at *1 (E.D.
Tex. May 1, 2013) (citing Holmes v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 63, 64 (5th Cir. 1994)). Samsung
has not established that the exception to the general rule applies here. Nevertheless, while Techiya
identified two invoices that contain expedited delivery charges that Samsung did not remove from
the costs it seeks, the Court does not find that Samsung is seeking to recover expedited delivery
charges for all deposition transcripts in its Bill of Costs.
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For the deposition transcript per-page costs, the Court is persuaded that Samsung is entitled
to recover the actual per-page deposition transcript costs minus any fees that Samsung paid to
expedite those transcripts. The Court appreciates that different court reporters may structure their
charges differently for expedited transcripts. Therefore, the Court is not persuaded that the Court
should limit Samsung’s recovery to $4.00 per page. 4
Since the Court is finds that Samsung is entitled to its base cost (excluding any added costs
for expediting), the Court grants leave to Samsung to supplement its request by removing the costs
associated with expediting deposition transcripts. The base costs minus any added charge for
expediting are recoverable under Section 1920. Samsung must file any supplemental information
within ten (10) days from the date of this order.
3.

Disputed Incidental Deposition Costs

Samsung contends that it removed the cost of real-time transcription, shipping, extra
copies, rough drafts, and processing fees from its requested costs. (Dkt. No. 952 at 5.) In its SurReply, Techiya appears to dispute this contention. (Dkt. No. 970 at 2.) Specifically, Techiya
identifies and complains about two specific invoices. (Dkt. No. 970 at 2 (citing Dkt. No. 958-2).)
The invoice for the Dr. Suengho Ahn deposition separates the costs associated with Realtime
($735), ASCII ($436.80), exhibits ($137.50), XMEF file ($150), processing ($45), and shipping
and handling ($49). (Dkt. No. 958-2 at 3.) In its Bill of Costs, Samsung removed these incidental
costs from the amount it seeks to recover. (Compare Dkt. No. 958-2 at 3 with Dkt. No. 964-3 at
9.) However, the invoice for the Soon Ho Baek deposition does not separately identify these
incidental costs.

It is noteworthy that the invoice that Techiya identifies as its sole support for the $4.00 per-page charge is from a
court reporter that the parties used for only a single deposition in this case. (Dkt. No. 958 (citing Dkt. No. 958-3)
(identifying a U.S. Legal Support invoice); Dkt. No. 952-2 (listing a single U.S. Legal Support deposition invoice as
a taxable cost).
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The Court is persuaded that Samsung is entitled to at least a portion of these costs.
Accordingly, the Court grants leave to Samsung to supplement its request with information
sufficient to support Samsung’s contention that it removed the incidental costs associated with
depositions that are not recoverable under Section 1920. Samsung must file any supplemental
information within ten (10) days from the date of this order.
4.

Disputed Video Deposition Costs are Taxable

Techiya argues that the Court should reduce Samsung’s request for deposition videotapes
by $32,311.25 for the deposition videos of Samsung’s own witness and Techiya’s expert
witnesses. (Dkt. No. 958 at 4; Dkt. No. 970 at 2.) Techiya argues that deposition videos of
Samsung’s own fact and expert witnesses were not necessary because Samsung had control over
these witnesses and Samsung needed to produce them live at trial. (Dkt. No. 958 at 4.) Techiya
contends that if Samsung was forced to call a witness by deposition it could have used written
transcripts to provide cross-designations that Techiya could incorporate in the video Techiya
played for the Court. (Id.) Samsung argues that the expenses it incurred to obtain deposition videos
were reasonable and necessary. (Dkt. No. 952 at 4-5; Dkt. No. 964 at 4.) Samsung also argues that
“the Fifth Circuit has ‘consistently held that . . . [i]f, at the time it was taken, a deposition could
reasonably be expected to be used for trial preparation, rather than merely for discovery, it may be
included in the costs of the prevailing party.’” (Dkt. No. 964 at 4 (quoting Fogleman, 920 at 285).)
The Court finds that Samsung is entitled to recover the costs associated with the deposition
videotapes because Samsung necessarily obtained them for presentation of this case, and not
merely for discovery. The Court’s standing order is particularly instructive: “costs may be allowed
for video tapes of depositions.” (Chief Judge Rodney Gilstrap’s Standing Order Regarding Bills
of Costs at 3 (collecting cases).) Expenses for videotaped depositions are taxable—even if printed
transcripts are also available. See SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 2011 WL 4591893, at *2
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(E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011) (“Defendants argue that the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2)
allows recovery for deposition transcripts or electronic video recording, not both. The Court
disagrees.”). Accordingly, Samsung is entitled to recover the full $56,162.65 5 in costs for
videotaped depositions.
5.

Disputed Printing Costs

Techiya argues that the Court should reduce Samsung’s printing costs request by
$29,581.35 because Samsung impermissibly includes costs for printing multiple copies of
documents. (Dkt. No. 958 at 6-7; Dkt. No. 970 at 2-3.) Techiya also argues that Samsung’s invoices
fail to provide sufficient detail to determine whether the copying was necessary. (Dkt. No. 958 at
6-7; Dkt. No. 970 at 2-3.) Samsung responds that it is unclear how Techiya arrived at the amount
it requests the Court to deduct from Samsung’s printing costs. (Dkt. No. 964 at 5.) Samsung, in
conjunction with its reply, submitted an attorney declaration providing additional detail to support
some of the printing costs it requests. (Dkt. No. 964-1 ¶ 4.) Techiya disputes that Samsung’s
attorney declaration provides the necessary detail, arguing that “it is impossible to determine how
much of this [printing] was necessary, as opposed to being obtained for the convenience of
counsel.” (Dkt. No. 970 at 2.)
The Court agrees that Samsung’s printing descriptions fall short of what is necessary to
inform Techiya or the Court that those items represent recoverable costs. While courts do not
“expect a prevailing party to identify every Xerox copy made for use in the course of legal
proceedings,” they do “require some demonstration that reproduction costs necessarily result from
that litigation.” Fogleman, 920 F.2d at 286. Samsung is entitled to recover its “fees for
exemplification and the costs for making copies” that were “necessarily obtained for use in the

In Samsung’s Updated Bill of Costs, Samsung requests $56,162.65 for deposition videography services. (See Dkt.
No. 964-3.)

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litigation,” however, “[c]harges for multiple copies of documents . . . are not recoverable.” (See
this Court’s Standing Order Regarding Bills of Costs at 4.) Samsung’s descriptions do not state
with particularity what documents were prepared and that any printing that was done was limited
to single copies. For example, Samsung admits that at least one invoice it seeks costs for includes
costs for creating twelve binders. (Dkt. No. 964-1 ¶ 4.) Further, Samsung’s Bill of Costs merely
identifies who conducted the printing, not why they were reasonably needed. (Dkt. No. 964-3 at
32.) While Samsung submitted an attorney declaration to provide additional information for some
printing services, that declaration continues to fall short when it comes to what documents were
printed and why. (See Dkt. No. 964-1 ¶ 4.) There is no representation that the printing costs
Samsung requests are limited to single copies. (See id.) Also, while Samsung’s attorney declaration
provides additional information for six printing services, there are ten printing services for which
Samsung seeks its costs. (See id.)
The Court is persuaded that Samsung is entitled to at least a portion of these costs; however,
it is Samsung’s burden to justify such with reasonable particularity. As such, the Court grants leave
to Samsung to supplement its request with information sufficient to make an adequate showing
and remove the non-taxable costs, as discussed herein. Samsung must file any supplemental
information within ten (10) days from the date of this order.
6.

Disputed Interpreter Fees
a.

Interpreters used for off-the-record communications

Techiya argues that Samsung is not entitled to recover “interpreter costs for communicating
with its witnesses off the record,” specifically for deposition and trial preparation. (Dkt. No. 958
at 8-9; Dkt. No. 970 at 3.) 6 Samsung argues that Techiya’s decision to sue a Korean company

Techiya also argues that Samsung is not entitled to $2,314.59 for an on-site interpreter as opposed to a remote
interpreter for trial preparation. (Dkt. No. 958 at 8; Dkt. No. 970 at 3.)
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“required Samsung to incur interpretation costs necessary to prepare non-English speakers to
testify at deposition and trial.” (Dkt. No. 964 at 5.)
The Court is not persuaded that Samsung is entitled to recover interpreter costs for off-therecord witness communication. While the Court may award compensation for interpreters
under Section 1920, the prevailing party bears the burden of establishing that such interpretation
services were necessarily incurred. See Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 574-75. Samsung has not
established that such costs were necessarily incurred as opposed to being incurred for counsel’s
convenience. Accordingly, the Court finds that Samsung is not entitled to interpreter costs for offthe-record communication with its witnesses.
b.

Interpretation costs for witnesses who testified in English

Techiya argues that Samsung is not entitled to recover interpreter costs for witnesses who
testified in English, both for depositions and the evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. No. 958 at 8; Dkt. No.
970 at 3.) Samsung argues that the “witnesses are not native English speakers, the parties agreed
to have an interpreter available per the witnesses’ request, and certain witnesses used the
interpretation services, demonstrating its necessity.” (Dkt. No. 964 at 5.)
The Court finds that Samsung is entitled to recover interpreter fees where the witness is
not a native English speaker. However, the Court finds that Samsung is not entitled to recover
interpreter costs for dates where witnesses were not deposed or did not testify (i.e., deposition
preparation or cancellation). Samsung bears the burden of establishing that such interpreter costs
were necessarily incurred. See Leal v. Magic Touch Up, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-00662-O, 2019 WL
162885, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2019). Samsung explained the necessity of an interpreter,
particularly that the witnesses are not native English speakers and the parties agreed to have an
interpreter available. The fact that some witnesses testified in English with little interpreter
assistance does not dispense with the interpreter’s necessity. Accordingly, the Court finds that
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Samsung is entitled to the interpreter costs for witnesses who testified in English, but Samsung is
not entitled to interpreter costs for days during which the witnesses were not deposed or did not
testify.
c.

Interpreter travel costs within the United States

Techiya argues that Samsung is not entitled to recover interpreter travel costs for an
interpreter to travel to the in-person evidentiary hearing because the witnesses, if they were to
testify, would have testified at the hearing over Zoom. 7 (Dkt. No. 958 at 8; Dkt. No. 970 at 3.)
Samsung argues that the interpreter’s travel fees are part of the interpreter’s compensation and are
recoverable. (Dkt. No. 964 at 5.)
The Court is persuaded and finds that Samsung is entitled to the $3,808.68 it seeks in travel
costs for an interpreter to attend an in-person evidentiary hearing. Section 1920(6) allows a
prevailing party to recover “compensation of interpreters.” In technical cases such as this case, a
competent interpreter who can communicate clearly in English as well as in the foreign language
at issue is crucial to understanding the testimony of a witness whose native language is not English.
Understanding only the general gist of such testimony is not good enough. The Court concludes
that an interpreter’s “compensation” properly includes reasonable travel expenses as taxable costs
for in-person evidentiary hearings. Accordingly, the Court finds that Samsung is entitled to the
$3,808.68 in interpreter travel costs.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Court finds Samsung’s Opposed Motion for Entry of Bill of Costs should be and

hereby is GRANTED-IN-PART, DENIED-IN-PART, and CARRIED-IN-PART as

Techiya also argued that Samsung is not entitled to recover the interpreter’s travel costs because the witnesses at
issue previously testified in English. (Dkt. No. 958 at 8.) The Court addressed this argument above. (See supra Section
III.B.6.c.)
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specifically set forth herein. (Dkt. No. 952.) It is ORDERED that Samsung’s Bill of Costs as to
the uncontested costs noted herein, in the amount of $48,703.09 is APPROVED. It is ORDERED
that Samsung’s Bill of Costs as to deposition videotapes in the amount of $56,162.65 is
.
APPROVED. It is further ORDERED that Samsung’s Bill of Costs as to the interpreter’s travel
costs in the amount of $3,808.68 is APPROVED. It is further ORDERED that Samsung’s costs
for interpreters used for off-the-record communications with its witnesses is DISALLOWED. The
Court further finds that where leave has been granted allowing Samsung to supplement its earlier
submissions that such shall be filed within ten (10) days from this order. The Court CARRIES
these matters until such supplemental filings have been submitted and considered by the Court.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 29th day of August, 2024.

____________________________________
RODNEY GILSTRAP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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