Coats v. United States of America
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re 37 MOTION Seeking Relief From Judgment re 36 Judgment, filed by Andrew Robert Coats. ORDERED that Movant's Motion for Relief from Judgment (docket entry #37) is DENIED. Movant may contact the Clerk of the Court to determine the cost of the records he wishes to obtain. All motions filed by any party not previously ruled upon are DENIED. Signed by Judge Richard A. Schell on 3/24/2015. (kls, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
ANDREW ROBERT COATS, #896938
VS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:11cv20
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 4:09cr47(1)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Movant filed a Motion Seeking Relief from Judgment (docket entry #37). If a motion for
relief from judgment is filed within 28 days of final judgment, Movant’s motion should be filed as
a motion under Rule 59 rather than Rule 60. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Ford v. Elsbury, 32 F.3d 931,
937 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc. 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th
Cir. 1990)). If the motion is served after that time, it falls under Rule 60(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Movant’s motion, filed within 28 days of final judgment, is properly filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.
I. POSTJUDGMENT MOTION FOR RELIEF
The Fifth Circuit has observed that “[a]ny motion that draws into question the correctness
of a judgment is functionally a motion under Civil Rule 59(e), whatever its label.” Harcon Barge
Co. v. D&G Boat Rentals, Inc., 784 F.2d 665, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (citing 9 Moore’s
Federal Practice ¶ 204.12[1] at 4-67 (1985)). “Rule 59(e) serves the narrow purpose of allowing a
party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Templet v.
HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
“Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used
sparingly.” Id. The Fifth Circuit recognizes that Rule 59(e) “favor[s] the denial of motions to alter
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or amend a judgment.” Southern Constructors Group, Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th
Cir. 1993).
II. BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION
In his Rule 59 motion, Movant reasserts the claims that he brought in his § 2255 motion and
in his objections to the Report and Recommendation. However, Movant’s § 2255 motion was
denied based on the waiver to which Movant agreed, which was included in his plea agreement. To
demonstrate that the plea agreement should not be upheld, a movant must show that he did not
understand the nature of a constitutional protection that he was waiving or that he had “such an
incomplete understanding of the charges against him that this plea cannot stand as an admission of
guilt.” James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1995). Thus, if a movant understands the nature
of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea, yet voluntarily chooses to plead guilty,
the plea must be upheld on federal review. Diaz v. Martin, 718 F.2d 1372, 1376-77 (5th Cir. 1983).
The record reveals that Movant’s plea agreement was knowing and voluntary – he understood
the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea, yet pleaded guilty. Id. The
record also rebuts Movant’s claim that he unknowingly pleaded guilty based on his trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness. He has not shown that his counsel “coerced, induced, and lied” to get him to plead
guilty. In fact, when asked at his plea hearing if anyone had forced or threatened him, or made
promises other than that included in the plea agreement, Movant confirmed that his plea was freely
and voluntarily made, without such influences. Formal declarations in open court carry with them
a strong presumption of truth. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.
Ed.2d 136 (1977). The record does not support Movant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of
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counsel. Movant has also failed to show prejudice as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L. Ed.2d 864 (1984).
Additionally, Movant has not shown that he is entitled to relief based on the fairly recent
United States Supreme Court decisions discussing ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea stage,
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 182 L. Ed.2d 398 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 566
U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 182 L. Ed.2d 379 (2012). He has failed to show that counsel advised him
to decline a plea bargain offer, followed by a trial and conviction, resulting in a more severe sentence
than the one offered during plea bargaining. Lafler, 566 U.S. — , 132 S. Ct. 1376. Nor has Movant
shown that counsel failed to communicate a plea offer more favorable than one later accepted. Frye,
566 U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 1399. Because Movant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty, his
waiver included in his plea agreement must be upheld. The remaining issues that Movant raised in
his § 2255 motion were not reserved for review in the plea agreement waiver. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Movant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment (docket entry #37) is DENIED.
Movant may contact the Clerk of the Court to determine the cost of the records he wishes to obtain.
All motions filed by any party not previously ruled upon are DENIED.
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SIGNED this the 24th day of March, 2015.
_______________________________
RICHARD A. SCHELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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