Knoles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al
Filing
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER re 10 First MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Patrick Knoles. Within five (5) days after service of the magistrate judges report, as stipulated by the parties, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C.A. 636(b)(1)(C). Signed by Magistrate Judge Don D. Bush on 3/8/12. (cm, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
PATRICK KNOLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. and
GOVERNMENT NATIONAL
MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION,
Defendants.
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Case No. 4:12-CV-68
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
On March 6, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order with Brief
in Support” (docket entry #10). Thereafter, the Defendants filed their “Response in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order” (docket entry #13). The District Court referred
the Plaintiff’s motion to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a hearing and a report
and recommendation as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). In accordance with the District
Court’s referral order, this Court conducted a hearing on the Plaintiff’s motion for temporary
restraining order on this date. Having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Court
finds that the motion should be denied.
The Plaintiff’s motion seeks to restrain the Defendants from executing any writs of
possession that would dispossess the Plaintiff from his home. However, based on the evidence
presented at the hearing on the Plaintiff’s motion, the Court lacks jurisdiction to enter a temporary
restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the Writ of Possession.
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This mortgage dispute involves property located at 2601 Preston Road, Unit 5205, Plano,
Texas. Apparently on March 1, 2011, Wells Fargo purchased the property made the subject of this
suit at a non-judicial foreclosure sale. After providing written notice to the Plaintiff to vacate the
property, and after the Plaintiff failed to so vacate, Wells Fargo filed a forcible detainer action
against the Plaintiff in the Justice Court, Precinct 4, Collin County, Texas. On April 28, 2011, the
Justice Court entered judgment for possession in favor of Wells Fargo. Thereafter, the Plaintiff
appealed the judgment of the Justice Court to the Collin County Court at Law Number 6. On
December 2, 2011, the County Court at Law entered judgment in favor of Wells Fargo, awarding
Wells Fargo possession of the premises, the issuance of a writ of possession and all costs of court.
The Plaintiff did not appeal the judgment of the County Court at Law.
The Plaintiff subsequently filed the instant lawsuit in the 429th Judicial District Court of
Collin County, Texas, seeking damages for wrongful foreclosure, conversion, violations of Chapter
51 of the Texas Property Code, and violations of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. The
Defendants removed the Plaintiff’s lawsuit to this Court on February 9, 2012. As noted previously,
the Plaintiff filed his motion for temporary restraining order on March 6, 2012.
Prior to reaching the merits of the Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order, the
Court must first address a jurisdictional concern. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court
does not have the authority to interfere with a state court proceeding. Chamberlain v. 625 Orleans,
LP, 2011 WL 1627080, *4 (E.D. Tex. 2011). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the federal
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Id., citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct.
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1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Since the Plaintiff’s requested relief would be a direct bar to the
eviction ordered by the Justice Court and the County Court at Law, it is evident that the Plaintiff is
directly attacking the underlying state court orders. See id. Further, the Plaintiff’s claims are
inextricably intertwined with the state court orders. See id. “Rooker-Feldman precludes federal
district courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over collateral attacks on state court
judgments.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court finds that the Plaintiff is asserting a collateral attack
on the orders of the Justice Court and the County Court at Law; therefore, this Court does not have
jurisdiction to grant the requested temporary restraining order. See id.
For these reasons, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s “Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order with Brief in Support” (docket entry #10) should be DENIED. Within five (5) days after
service of the magistrate judge’s report, as stipulated by the parties, any party may serve and file
written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C.A. 636(b)(1)(C).
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained
in this report within five days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from de novo review by the
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district court of the proposed findings and recommendations and from appellate review of factual
findings accepted or adopted by the district court except on grounds of plain error or manifest
injustice. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th
Cir. 1988).
SIGNED this 7th day of March, 2012.
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____________________________________
DON D. BUSH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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