Margetis et al v. Furgeson et al
Filing
96
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Defendants' Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. 34) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are PROHIBITED from filing any additional complaints or documents in any court against the Defendants named in this suit without first seeking le ave of this court. Further, Defendants are ORDERED to file briefing regarding their attorneys fees and costs with the court on or before October 28, 2015. The Defendants shall have until November 13, 2015 to file a response. The court will assess a reasonable attorneys' fee and reasonable costs to be paid by Plaintiffs and for which they will be jointly and severally liable. Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion to Continue (Dkt. 82) is DENIED; Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (Dkt. 84) is DENIED; Plaintiffs' Motion for Clarification (Dkt. 88) is GRANTED; Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Docketing (Dkt. 92) is DENIED. Signed by Judge Richard A. Schell on 9/29/2015. (kls, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
JOHN MARGETIS and
ALAN E. BARON,
Plaintiffs,
§
§
§
§
v.
§
§
HON. WILLIAM ROYAL FURGESON, JR., §
HON. STACEY G.C. JERNIGAN, LUKE
§
CHASTAIN, JOHN BARRON, and
§
DOES 1-20,
§
Defendants.
§
Case No. 4:12-cv-753
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS
Pending before the court is Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. 34), Plaintiffs’
Response (Dkt. 40), Defendants’ Reply (Dkt. 41), and Plaintiffs’ Sur-Reply (Dkt. 45). Also
before the court is Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion Filing This Supplemental Objections to
Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. 93) 1 and Defendants’ Response (Dkt. 94). The United
States Magistrate Judge, in his Report and Recommendation on this matter (Dkt. 27), also
recommended that this court consider sanctioning Plaintiffs for violating Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11. The court held a hearing on Defendants’ motion on March 21, 2014. However,
due to the court’s docket and high courtroom hours, the court has not been able to return to this
case and finalize this lengthy order until now. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’
Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. 34) is GRANTED.
For the purposes of the record, Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Continue (Dkt. 82) is
DENIED. Also pending before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages
1
While Plaintiffs titled this filing as a “motion,” it is simply additional briefing in opposition to Defendants’ motion
for sanctions. Plaintiffs did not seek leave of court to file the additional briefing. Nevertheless, the court will address
the issues raised in Dkt. 93 as explained herein.
1
(Dkt. 84), which is DENIED, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Clarification (Dkt. 88), which is
GRANTED, Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Docketing (Dkt. 92), which is DENIED, and
Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion Filing This Supplemental Objections to Defendant’s Motion for
Sanctions (Dkt. 93) and Defendants’ Response (Dkt. 94), which is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
It is important to begin a summary of this case with a brief description of some events
that occurred before its filing. Plaintiff John Margetis’s mother, Mickey Margetis, previously
appeared before Judge Jernigan when she filed bankruptcy in the Northern District of Texas.
John Margetis appeared on his mother’s behalf during a hearing in that case. Plaintiff Alan
Baron’s son, Jeffrey Baron, has appeared before both Judge Furgeson and Judge Jernigan in
litigation related to a business contract dispute in the Northern District of Texas. Both cases were
particularly contentious.
Plaintiff Margetis, upset about events in his mother’s bankruptcy case, began his
campaign against Judge Jernigan in 2011. In March 2011, John Margetis and Mickey Margetis
filed a judicial misconduct complaint against Judge Jernigan complaining of Judge Jernigan’s
conduct during a December 2007 hearing. 2 The complaint was dismissed as frivolous in April
2011. 3 In the dismissal order, Chief Judge Jones cautioned that “[j]udicial misconduct
proceedings are not a substitute for the normal appellate review process, nor may they be used to
obtain reversal of a decision or a new trial.” 4 John Margetis and Mickey Margetis filed a petition
for review of that decision in June 2011. 5 The dismissal was affirmed. 6
2
Dkt. 34-3.
Dkt. 34-4.
4
Dkt. 34-4 at 3.
5
Dkt. 34-5.
6
Dkt. 34-6.
3
2
In June 2011, Mr. Margetis’s campaign continued when he and his mother together filed
an adversary complaint in bankruptcy proceedings naming Judge Jernigan as a defendant. 7 The
adversary complaint was dismissed by in September 2011. The bankruptcy court explained that
John Margetis lacks standing to complain of the Bankruptcy Judges’ conduct. He
was not a creditor in either of his mother’s prior bankruptcy cases. While he is
upset about what he perceives as mistreatment that his mother allegedly received
by the Bankruptcy Judge, he is not a person aggrieved by that conduct such that
he has legal standing to sue. And, while the claims asserted by John Margetis
purport to arise from the Bankruptcy Judge’s handling of the 2005 Case and the
2007 bankruptcy case filed by his mother, both cases were dismissed long ago
which ends bankruptcy jurisdiction as discussed above.
While Mickey Margetis has standing to sue the Bankruptcy Judge since she was
the person allegedly aggrieved by the Bankruptcy Judge’s handling of her cases,
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear those claims due to the
dismissal of both of her bankruptcy cases which, as noted previously, ended this
Court’s jurisdiction. 8
Undeterred, John Margetis and Mickey Margetis filed a second judicial misconduct
complaint against Judge Jernigan, 9 which they supplemented in September 2011. 10 The
complaint was dismissed as frivolous and because it related directly to the merits of Judge
Jernigan’s decisions. 11 Chief Judge Jones added in her order,
“[t]his is the Margetises’ second merits-related and frivolous judicial misconduct
complaint against Judge Jernigan in less than four months. Mickey K. and John A.
Margetis are WARNED that should they jointly or separately file a further meritsrelated or frivolous complaint, their right to file complaints may be suspended
7
In re: Mickey K. Margetis, Debtor, Case No. 11-03376-bjh, Compl. at 7 (Dkt. 1) (“Judge
Stacey G.C. Jernigan allowed Mickey Margetis’ attorney, James Polk to resign, and Mickey
Margetis was left without counsel. And because of the untruthful opinion published by Judge
Stacey Jernigan, which was done with bias and prejudice, has made it impossible as of the
moment to obtain effective legal counsel. Judge Stacey Jernigan did not allow Mickey Margetis
her fair day in Court with the agreed pretrial Order after she re-opened the above bankruptcy
case. Judge Stacey Jernigan has been asked several times to recuse herself and she decided every
time not to do so.”). The complaint alleged claims of fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1001), Conspiracy
against rights (18 U.S.C. § 241), civil conspiracy (42 U.S.C. § 1985).
8
Dkt. 34-8 at 5 (emphasis added).
9
Dkt. 34-9.
10
Dkt. 34-10.
11
Dkt. 34-11.
3
and, unless they are able to show cause why they should not be barred from filing
future complaints, the suspension will continue indefinitely.” 12
On November 21, 2011, Judge Jernigan received a death threat at both her home and
chambers. She immediately notified the United States Marshals Service, and the Marshals began
an investigation. Jeffrey Baron and John Margetis were among the individuals investigated.
During the course of their investigation, the Marshals interviewed Plaintiffs John Margetis as
well as Alan Baron and his wife, Donna Baron, regarding their son, Jeffrey Baron.
This suit originated when the Barons filed suit in May 2012 against the United States
Marshals Service in United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 13 Judge Jernigan
and Judge Furgeson were not listed as Defendants in that suit, but the complaint contained
allegations related to rulings the judges made in Mickey Margetis’s bankruptcy and Jeffrey
Baron’s cases. 14 The plaintiffs failed to timely serve the defendants in that action, and the case
was dismissed without prejudice.
In October 2012, Margetis and Alan Baron filed a petition in Texas state court seeking
pre-suit discovery from Judge Jernigan, Judge Furgeson, and the two United States Marshals
named in this suit (Luke Chastain and John Barron). Essentially the same allegations were
alleged in the state court suit that the Barons had alleged in their initial suit. The state-court
petition states, “Jernigan was judge presiding over a bankruptcy proceeding over the estate of
Mickey Margetis, during which proceeding Jernigan made rulings that adversely affected
12
Dkt. 34-11 at 4.
Michael Briscoe, Alan E. Baron, and Donna S. Baron v. United States Marshals Service,
United States Department of Justice, Case No. 1:12-cv-00849 (D.D.C. May 3, 2012).
14
Dkt. 34-15 ¶ 8 (“On information and belief, Jernigan made unlawful rulings against Margetis’
interest with the intent to enrich others at the expense of harming Margetis.”); Id. ¶ 9 (“In the
proceeding involving JBaron, Furgeson made threats of death to JBaron by means of the
combined forces of the United States armed services and allegedly committed numerous
unlawful acts against JBaron’s financial interests and civil rights, ordering Mr. Baron not to hire
any lawyer.”).
13
4
Mickey Margetis and John Margetis’ (“Margetis”) financial interest.” 15 Defendants removed the
suit to this court on October 31, 2012 (Case No. 4:12-cv-686) and filed a motion to dismiss. 16 On
November 26, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their own motion to dismiss the suit “in the interest of
conserving judicial resources” 17 and did not respond to Defendants’ motion. On November 29,
2012, Assistant United States Attorney, Bradley Visosky, attorney for Defendants, sent Plaintiffs
a letter reiterating the arguments presented in Defendants’ motion to dismiss and warning
Plaintiffs that any future suit “will be viewed as nothing more than an effort to harass the federal
officials and not to pursue legitimate claims” that would result in a request for sanctions. 18 On
December 4, 2012, eight days after moving to dismiss their previous action, Plaintiffs filed the
instant suit.
Plaintiffs alleged claims of (1) defamation; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress;
(3) conspiracy; (4) violations of RICO; and (5) unlawful deprivation of constitutional rights
against Defendants Judge Furgeson, Judge Jernigan, and United States Marshals John Barron and
Luke Chastain, and Does 1-20. Margetis and Baron allege that Judge Jernigan and Judge
Furgeson were engaged in criminal activities that form the basis of their claims. The only
criminal activity listed anywhere in their original complaint is the threadbare allegation that
“Plaintiffs observed Furgeson and Jernigan extorting individuals, including Plaintiffs’ family
members, using fraud and deceit to unlawfully misappropriate money to funnel to Furgeson and
Jernigan’s friends and relatives.” 19 Plaintiffs have not provided any factual content to support
this allegation, such as who, what, when, or where this alleged extortion occurred. Plaintiffs then
15
Dkt. 34-17 ¶ 11.
Dkt. 4.
17
Dkt. 5.
18
Dkt. 34-19.
19
Judge Bush sua sponte struck paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 from Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint
(Dkt. 27 at 2) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(1) (“The court may strike from a pleading an
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”).
16
5
allege that Defendants retaliated against them for reporting these criminal activities to the media
and law enforcement. Plaintiffs similarly fail to allege what “criminal activities” they reported
and to whom. Plaintiffs allege Judge Jernigan fabricated the death threat she received in
November 2011, and that Judge Jernigan had the Marshals question (“harass” and “intimidate”)
them, on several occasions, about the death threat in retaliation for their “whistleblowing.”
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss 20 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
Plaintiffs failed to file a response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, even after being granted
additional time in which to do so. 21 Instead, three days after their response was due and three
days before they were due to appear in front of United States Magistrate Judge Bush and explain
why venue was proper in this court, they filed an out-of-time Amended Complaint (Dkt. 24)
without first seeking leave of court.
Judge Bush ordered the parties to appear and show why venue was appropriate in this
district and to respond to the arguments in Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on May 9, 2013. 22
Mr. Margetis appeared at the hearing and explained that he was “under extreme mental duress” 23
because his mother had been intubated and was near death. He requested a continuance of the
hearing due to his mother’s health and because he had filed an amended complaint. Judge Bush
20
Dkt. 16.
At the sanctions hearing, Mr. Margetis claimed that “the reason we didn’t respond when they
filed the motion to dismiss, I was absolutely positively an emotional wreck” because of the death
of his mother. According to the faded death certificate Mr. Margetis filed in this case, his mother,
Mickey Margetis passed away on May 9, 2013, which unfortunately was the day he was
scheduled to appear at the hearing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. However, a response was
due to the motion to dismiss on May 3, 2013. The court also notes that Plaintiffs managed to file
an amended complaint (Dkt. 24) three days before the hearing on May 6, 2013.
22
See Dkt. 5. Defendants waived their objection to venue at the May 9, 2013 hearing before
Judge Bush. Bradley Visosky, the Assistant United States Attorney representing Defendants,
indicated that he believes venue “probably is proper in any case because . . . the plaintiffs bring
tort claims. And if any plaintiff resides in the district, venue is proper” under the Federal Torts
Claims Act (FTCA). See Dkt. 32.
23
Dkt. 32, Hr’g Tr. at 3:7, May 9, 2013.
21
6
initially denied Margetis’s request for a continuance, but then, a few minutes later, at Mr.
Margetis’s request, excused Mr. Margetis from the hearing and indicated that if he needed to
hear from Mr. Margetis further, he would call him back. 24 Ultimately, Defendants waived their
objections to venue and Judge Bush stated that he would consider the merits of the motion to
dismiss based on what had been filed. The hearing lasted a total of six minutes. 25 The same day
of the hearing, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 26).
Judge Bush issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order and Report and Recommendation
(Dkt. 27) on September 13, 2013. Judge Bush recommended that Defendants’ Motion to Strike
the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 26) be granted because Plaintiffs failed to respond and failed to
seek leave of court to file their untimely amended complaint. Judge Bush then addressed the
motion to dismiss the original complaint. He sua sponte struck paragraphs 13, 14, 15 from the
complaint under Rule 12(f), and recommended granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the
remainder of the complaint in its entirety. Judge Bush found that
this suit was purely motivated by spite and animosity. There were no grounds to
support Plaintiffs’ allegations of crimes. Further, based on the pleadings filed,
there are certainly inconsistencies in what these Plaintiffs were claiming. Because
the Court finds that the conduct is so egregious, the Court refers this to the U.S.
District Judge with the recommendation to determine whether a show cause
hearing be held and sanctions against Baron and Margetis imposed for filing an
unjustified, vitreous, and frivolous lawsuit.
Plaintiffs objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. 26 The
objection did not address the merits of the Motion to Dismiss or the Report and
Recommendation except to say that “the Federal Tort Claims Act is not relative to this situation
as these people acted outside their duties as federal employees and your court does not have
24
Dkt. 25-1.
Dkt. 25-1.
26
Dkt. 30.
25
7
jurisdiction.” 27 Plaintiffs also stated that “[i]t must truly be noted that never in the history of the
United States has such an abuse to the judiciary occurred in my 82 year old Mother’s
proceedings as well as in Jeffrey Baron’s case . . . These activities were, and are so criminal and
so corrupt that every American should be afraid to sleep at night.” 28 While Plaintiffs had not
specifically alleged in their complaint that their allegations arose out of Jeffrey Baron’s litigation
and Mickey Margetis’s bankruptcy proceedings, this statement in their objection seems to make
that clear. 29 This court adopted the Report and Recommendation on January 10, 2014. 30
On October 18, 2013, Defendants filed a Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. 34). The court set a
hearing on the motion for sanctions and ordered Plaintiffs to “be prepared to show cause why
they should not be sanctioned for violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b).” 31
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike 32 the exhibits submitted by Defendants with their motion for
sanctions was denied. 33 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery 34 related to the
27
Dkt. 30 at 3.
Dkt. 30 at 3.
29
Plaintiffs’ second complaint filed in Texas state court alleging essentially the same claims also
makes clear that the claims originate from actions taken by the judges in their judicial capacity.
See, e.g., Dkt. 34-17 ¶ 11 (“Jernigan was judge presiding over a bankruptcy proceeding over the
estate of Mickey Margetis, during which proceeding Jernigan made rulings that adversely
affected Mickey Margetis and John Margetis’ (“Margetis”) financial interest.”); Dkt. 34-17 ¶ 17
(“Furgeson assumed a seemingly high degree control over the bankruptcy case under authority
unclear to Petitioners.”).
30
Dkt. 51.
31
While normally a movant would bear the burden of proof and persuasion on a motion, the
court included the show cause language out of caution because of Judge Bush’s recommendation
that the court conduct a hearing to determine whether Plaintiffs should be sanctioned prior to the
Defendants’ motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3) explains that “the court may order an attorney, law
firm, or party to show cause why conduct specifically described in the order has not violated
Rule 11(b).”
32
Dkt. 40.
33
Dkt. 52.
34
Dkt. 39.
28
8
motion for sanctions was denied. 35 Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal of the dismissal of their
claims on the merits. 36
The hearing to determine whether sanctions should be imposed was originally scheduled
on February 11, 2014. 37 Plaintiffs filed their first Emergency Motion to Continue the sanctions
hearing on January 27, 2014 38 stating that they needed more time to prepare. The court granted
the motion and reset the hearing for February 25, 2014. 39 On February 19, 2014, Defendants
filed an Emergency Motion to Quash 40 relating to subpoenas issued by Plaintiffs for witnesses to
appear at the hearing. Plaintiffs, in response, filed a second Emergency Motion to Continue 41
asking for additional time to respond to the motion to quash and prepare for the hearing.
Plaintiffs were given until March 7, 2014, to file a response to the motion to quash and all
pending subpoenas in the case were stayed pending a ruling on the motion to quash. The
sanctions hearing was rescheduled for March 21, 2014. 42 Plaintiffs filed their response to the
motion to quash on March 7, 2014, and attempted to include over 1,000 pages of documents as
exhibits. The District Clerk’s office refused the documents under Local Rule CV-3(b), which
prohibits pro se litigants from filing more than twenty pages without first seeking permission
from the court. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to file the excess pages was then filed on March 11,
2014. 43 On March 12, Plaintiffs’ filed a third Emergency Motion to Continue. 44 The court
granted Defendants’ motion to quash, denied Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file excess pages,
35
Dkt. 52.
Dkt. 58.
37
Dkt. 52.
38
Dkt. 55.
39
Dkt. 59.
40
Dkt. 61.
41
Dkt. 62.
42
Dkt. 64.
43
Dkt. 73.
44
Dkt. 74.
36
9
and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to continue. 45 The court’s order also prohibited Plaintiffs from
serving or having anyone else serve on their behalf subpoenas without first seeking leave of
court. 46 Three days before the hearing, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for Clarification 47
inquiring as to whether they could serve subpoenas on non-government employee witnesses, and
the court clarified that they could. 48 That same day, Plaintiffs notified the court that they had
filed a judicial misconduct complaint against the undersigned. 49 On March 21, 2014, at 8:14a.m.,
Plaintiffs filed another Emergency Motion to Continue 50 the sanctions hearing, which was
scheduled to commence at 10:00a.m. The court orally denied plaintiffs’ motion to continue at the
start of the hearing, and the hearing was conducted as scheduled on March 21, 2014.
During the hearing, Plaintiffs made two oral motions: a motion in limine and a motion to
recuse. Both motions were denied. Mr. Margetis stated during the hearing that he wanted to
make a motion in limine because a United States marshal was following him. The basis of the
motion to recuse was Plaintiffs’ belief that the court had become prejudiced and had violated
some judicial canons by quashing Plaintiffs’ subpoenas to witnesses that would offer “crucial”
evidence. The court considered Plaintiffs’ proffer of what evidence those witnesses would offer,
and ultimately again determined the testimony would be irrelevant to a determination of
sanctions. The court’s decision to quash Plaintiffs’ subpoenas was entirely based on the fact that
Plaintiffs were unable to proffer that the witnesses could offer any relevant testimony as to why
Plaintiffs should not be sanctioned.
45
Dkt. 76.
Despite the court’s order staying the subpoenas, Plaintiffs continued to attempt to enforce and
issue subpoenas. Plaintiffs have filed three “Notice[s] of Compliance” indicating that they have
attempted to comply with the Touhy provisions despite the stay issued by the court pending a
ruling on the motion to quash. See Dkts. 65, 69, and 77.
47
Dkt. 78.
48
Dkt. 81.
49
Dkt. 80.
50
Dkt. 82
46
10
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 11 authorizes a court to impose sanctions if: (1) a document has been presented for
an improper purpose (Rule 11(b)(1)), (2) the claims or defenses of the signer are not supported
by existing law or by a good faith argument for an extension or change in existing law (Rule
11(b)(2)), or (3) the allegations and other factual contentions lack evidentiary support and are
unlikely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for investigation or discovery
(Rule 11(b)(3)). A violation of any one of these provisions can merit sanctions, i.e. each
provision provides an independent basis for sanctions. 51 The central purpose of Rule 11 “is to
deter baseless filings in district court and . . . streamline the administration and procedure of the
federal courts.” 52 A court may impose sanctions on a pro se party. 53
In evaluating Plaintiffs’ actions, the court may consider: “(1) the time available to prepare
the pleading; (2) the plausibility of the legal argument; (3) the pro se status of the litigant; and
(4) the complexity of the legal and factual issues raised in the case.” 54 “A sanction imposed
under [Rule 11] must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable
conduct by others similarly situated.” 55 The sanction imposed should be the least severe sanction
adequate to the purpose of Rule 11. 56 “An order imposing a sanction must describe the
sanctioned conduct and explain the basis for the sanction.” 57
51
F.D.I.C. v. MAXXAM, Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 577 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Whitehead v. Food Max
of Miss., 332 F.3d 796, 802 (5th Cir.2003)).
52
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990).
53
See Saunders v. Bush, 15 F.3d 64, 68 (5th Cir. 1994).
54
McCampbell v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 982 F. Supp. 445, 448 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
55
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4).
56
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988).
57
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(6).
11
III.
ADMISSIBILITY OF PLAINTIFFS’ EXHIBITS AT THE SANCTIONS HEARING
On March 21, 2014, Mr. Baron appeared at 10:04a.m., and Mr. Margetis appeared at
10:20a.m. for the hearing that was scheduled to begin at 10:00a.m. Before he came to the
courtroom, Mr. Margetis stopped in the Clerk’s office and delivered Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave
to File Excess Pages 58 along with over 1,000 pages of exhibits he intended to offer at the
hearing. Mr. Margetis indicated to the court that he had fallen that morning and as a result, the
exhibits that he brought to the hearing were out of order. The court allowed a recess for Mr.
Margetis and Mr. Baron to organize their exhibits. Some of Plaintiffs’ exhibits were offered at
the hearing, but none were admitted. Ultimately, Mr. Margetis and Mr. Baron were unable
organize and present a full set of the exhibits they intended to put forth at the hearing, but
indicated that the Clerk’s office was in possession of a complete set.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court told the parties that the set of exhibits given to
the Clerk’s office would be reviewed in camera after the hearing to determine if they were
relevant and otherwise admissible. The court has reviewed those exhibits and finds that all of the
exhibits submitted are inadmissible. The following chart indicates the court’s reason for
declining to consider each exhibit. A few of the exhibits are duplicative.
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
1
Teri Whitcraft email Jeff Baron
and John Margetis case
2
58
Teri Whitcraft email Update
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
1/30/13 Email written by
Margetis to Teri Whitcraft at
ABC News re: Jeff Baron and
John Margetis case
12/1/12 Email written by
Margetis to Teri Whitcraft at
ABC News re: update
Dkt. 84.
12
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
3
Mickey Margetis picture with
Newt Gingrich
4
Teri Whitcraft email Please Call
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Teri Whitcraft email Jeff Baron
Hearsay (FED.
and John Margetis Case
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Teri Whitcraft email Judicial
Hearsay (FED.
Corruption part 2/3
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Teri Whitcraft email Judicial
Hearsay (FED.
Corruption part 1/3
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Teri Whitcraft email Re: meeting Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Teri Whitcraft email Judge Bob
Hearsay (FED.
Carroll
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Teri Whitcraft email recently filed Hearsay (FED.
motion
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Teri Whitcraft email Sanctions
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
10/16/12 Email response from
Teri Whitcraft indicating that
she has not reviewed material
submitted by Margetis; Reply
by Margetis re: Please call
10/11/12 Email written by
Margetis to Teri Whitcraft
attaching photos of his mother
with Newt Gingrich
1/18/12 Email written by
Margetis to Teri Whitcraft re:
Judicial Corruption – exhibits
part 2/3
1/18/12 Email written by
Margetis to Teri Whitcraft re:
Judicial Corruption – exhibits
part 1/3
1/18/12 Email written by
Margetis to Jennifer
Swinchatt re: meeting;
attempting to schedule an
appointment
1/22/11 Email written by
Margetis to Bob Warneke
(includes string of other
emails written by Margetis to
various individuals) (14 pgs.)
3/25/10 Email written by
Margetis to Teri Whitcraft re:
Recently Filed Motion
3/24/10 Email written by
Margetis to Teri Whitcraft re:
Sanctions
13
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
12
Teri Whitcraft email Scope of
Corruption in Ellis County
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
13
Becky Oliver email Attn:
Criminal Investigation
Department
14
Fax from Judge Greg Wilhelm
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
15
Motion to vacate Default
Judgment
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
16
Glenda Pinkston Court Copies
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
17
Order, Judge Jernigan August 30,
2011
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
18
Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, Jernigan, 12/14/2007
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
19
05-C-3554 Plaintiffs’ Original
Petition
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
3/23/10 Email written by
Margetis to Teri Whitcraft re:
Scope of Corruption in Ellis
County
3/22/12 Email written by John
Margetis and sent to
donna.ressl@foxtv.com Attn:
Criminal Investigation
Department (handwritten
signature of Margetis on
printout)
12/4/09 fax to Attorney Rea
of an Order in Neystel v.
Margetis, Cause No. 05-C3554, Ellis County Court at
Law No. 1
12/7/09 copy of Motion to
Vacate Default Judgment in
Neystel v. Margetis, Cause
No. 05-C-3554, Ellis County
Court at Law No. 1
11/27/08 Copies of court
documents from In re the
Guardianship of Willie
Howard Hubacek, Cause No.
07-G-1018, Ellis County
Court at Law 1
8/30/11 Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and
Order Regarding Motion to
Annul the Automatic Stay
(Dkt. 148), Case No. 0537345-SGJ-13, In re: Mickey
K. Margetis, Debtor
12/14/07 Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Case No.
07-33657-SGJ-13, In re:
Mickey K. Margetis, Debtor
8/4/05 Plaintiffs’ Original
Petition, Cause No. 05-C3554, Neytel v. Margetis, Ellis
County Court at Law No. 1
14
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
20
Affidavit to Judge Wilhelm
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
21
Plaintiffs’ Original Petition
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
22
Order James Polk
23
Amended Motion for relief
against void judgment
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
24
Writ of Execution
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
25
Court Transcripts Charletta
Middleton
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
26
Becky Oliver Email
27
Renie McClellan Complaint
Attorney General of Texas
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
28
Becky Oliver Email
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
12/7/09 Affidavit from John
Margetis and Mickey
Margetis re: Neystel suit
2/28/05 Plaintiffs’ Original
Petition, Cause No. 69561,
Neystel v. Margetis, 404th
District Court, Ellis County
3/30/10 Cover letter and
proposed order to James Rea
in Neystel v. Margetis, Cause
No. 05-C-3554, Ellis County
Court at Law No. 1
3/18/10 Amended Motion for
Relief Against Void
Judgment, Cause No. 05-C3554, Neystel v. Margetis,
Ellis County Court at Law No.
1
3/1/10 Ellis County Sheriff’s
Office Notice re: Court Order
in Cause No. 05-C-3554
9/30/05 Transcript of Default
Judgment Hearing in Cause
No. 05-C-3554, Neystel v.
Margetis, Ellis County Court
at Law No. 1
Same as Exhibit 13 except
that it is sent at 2:05p.m.
instead of 3:05p.m. and does
not contain handwritten
signature of Margetis
8/14/11 Letter from Mickey
Margetis to Attorney General
of Texas re: Complaint on
newly hired assistant attorney
Renie McClellan In the child
support division and Judge
Bob Carroll
3/22/12 email written by
Margetis re: More
Information
15
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
29
Federal Ethics Center
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
30
Jeff Baron Victim of Judicial
Corruption
31
In America, how can a Federal
Judge…Letter
32
Becky Oliver email Elderly
Abuse and Judicial Corruption
33
Becky Oliver Email, Basic cover
letter detailing corruption
34
Johnny Sutton Email, Requested
Information
35
Judge Jernigan Complaint of
Misconduct 06/27/11
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
36
Judge Jernigan Complaint of
Misconduct 05/27/11
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
37
Judge Jernigan Complaint of
Misconduct 03/02/11
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
4/9/12 Letter from David B.
Nolan, Esq., Legal Director of
Federal Ethics Center to
Members of Congress re:
Judicial Activism in United
States 5th Circuit
Document written by
Margetis entitled “Jeff Baron
Victim of Judicial
Corruption”
Document written by
Margetis and David Nolan re:
Jeff Baron litigation
4/17/12 Email written by
Margetis to
donna.ressl@foxtv.com
attaching photo of his mother
with Newt Gingrich
3/22/12 Email written by John
Margetis re: Basic Cover
Letter Detailing Corruption
4/18/12 Email written by
Margetis to
jsutton@ashcroftlawfirm.com
re: Requested Information
6/27/11 Complaint of Judicial
Misconduct or Disability
against Judge Jernigan by
Mickey and John Margetis
5/27/11 Complaint of Judicial
Misconduct or Disability
against Judge Jernigan by
Mickey and John Margetis
3/2/11 Complaint against
Judge Jernigan by John and
Mickey Margetis
16
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
38
Supplemental Complaint Judge
Jernigan
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
39
Hillary Clinton Letter, March 4,
2011
40
Letter to Clifford White, Ramona
Elliot, Lanny Breuer 12/06/11
41
Jeff Baron, Victim of Judicial
Corruption
42
Letter to Stacia Hylton March 16,
2012
43
Letter of Introduction to Members Hearsay (FED.
of Congress March 01, 2011
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
Document signed by Mickey
Margetis and John Margetis
re: Mickey Margetis
bankruptcy case
3/4/11 Letter from Mickey
Margetis to Hillary Clinton
12/6/11 Letter to Clifford
White, Ramona Elliott, and
Lanny Breuer re: Judicial
Corruption; 12/5/11 Letter
from Sharon Rondeau to
Criminal Enforcement Unit,
Executive Office for U.S.
Trustee re: Judicial
Corruption
Document written by
Margetis re: Jeff Baron
litigation
3/16/12 Letter from Margetis
to Stacia Hylton re: Official
report of crimes and
misconduct against victims
and witnesses in the Northern
District of Texas.
3/1/11 Letter from Margetis to
Members of Congress re: Jeff
Baron litigation
17
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
44
Letter to Ramona Elliott July 19,
2011
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
45
Dee Dee Arnold Complaint
Furgeson 11/06/2004
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
46
Dee Dee Arnold Complaint
Furgeson 01/08/2005
47
Narcosphere Judge Furgeson
48
Dee Dee Arnold Complaint
Furgeson 03/11/05
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
7/19/11 Letter from Margetis
to Ramona Elliott re: Mickey
Margetis bankruptcy; 12/6/11
Letter to Clifford White,
Ramona Elliott, Lanny Braaur
re: Judicial Corruption;
7/19/11 Letter from John
Margetis and Mickey
Margetis re: Mickey Margetis
bankruptcy (2 copies – 1
handwritten labeled “Ramona
Elliott” and 1 labeled “FBI”;
1/29/12 Letter from John
Margetis to Don Freese re:
Mickey Margetis bankruptcy;
6/8/12 Letter from Margetis to
Ron Holland re: Mickey
Margetis bankruptcy and Jeff
Baron litigation
11/6/04 Complaint of Judicial
Misconduct from Andrea D.
Arnold re: Judge Furgeson,
Judge Garza, Judge Jolly and
Judge Smith re: Hatteberg v.
Red Adair Co., Inc.
Employees’ Profit Sharing
Plan and its Related Trust,
No. 00-51109
1/8/05 Petition for Review of
Chief Judge’s Disposition of
Complaint of Judicial
Misconduct from Andrea D.
Arnold
7/12/09 posting on
narcosphere.com by Bill
Conroy entitled “Cele Castillo
ordered to report to federal
prison”
3/8/05 Order from Fifth
Circuit Judicial Council
dismissing the complaint of
Andrea D. Arnold against
Judges Furgeson, Jolly, Smith,
and Garza
18
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
49
Letter to Chief of Staff, Emanuel
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
50
Letter to Charles Fulbruge
04/25/06
51
Complaint Judge Jernigan March
02, 2011
52
Case MDL No. 2119 Doc. 198
53
The attached 8 Mandates of the
Fifth Circuit
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
54
Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq. Letter
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
55
Letter to Don Freese January 29,
2012
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
Letter from Mickey Margetis
to Chief of Staff Emanuel re:
Judge Sibley and Alicia
Escabar, Nancy J. Petterson
and Rupert Keeping
4/25/06 Letter from HenryDale; Goltz to Charles R.
Fulbruge re: judicial
complaint regarding Judge
Furgeson in United States v.
Henry D. Gotlz
3/2/11 Letter from Mickey
Margetis and John Margetis
re: judicial complaint
regarding Judge Jernigan in
Mickey Margetis bankruptcy
2/2/12 Amicus Curiae
Information Regarding Judge
W. Royal Furgeson, Jr., Dkt.
198, In re: Mortgage
Electronic Registration
Systems (MERS) Litigation,
Case MDL 2119
Cover letter re: mandates from
Fifth Circuit in Jeff Baron
litigation
Document from Dr. Richard
Cordero, Esq. entitled “The
Official Statistics of the
Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts Show the
Systematic Dismissal by
Federal Judges Including the
Justices of the Supreme Court,
of Judicial Misconduct
Complaints Against them
1/29/12 Letter from John
Margetis to Don Freese
19
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
56
Letter to Gary Koenig and
Edward Quintana 12/19/11
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Federal Judge put Internet Pioneer Hearsay (FED.
in Civil Lockdown
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Systemic Failure of Federal Court Hearsay (FED.
System Table of Exhibits
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Email from Barry Golden to Jeff
Hearsay (FED.
Baron
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Letter to Judge Furgeson from
Hearsay (FED.
Gary Schepps 04/01/11
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Letter to Judge Furgeson from
Hearsay (FED.
Gary Schepps 05/06/11
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Letter to Judge Furgeson from
Hearsay (FED.
Gary Schepps 05/03/11
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Motion to Reconsider Stay of
Irrelevant (FED.
District Court Order
R. EVID. 401)
Description
12/19/11 Letter from John
Margetis to Gary Koenig and
Edward Quintana
12/14/12 posting from
washingtonexaminer.com by
Barbara F. Hollingsworth re:
Jeff Baron
Document by John Margetis
re: Judge Jernigan and Judge
Furgeson
12/2/10 Email from Barry
Golden to Jeff Baron, Peter
Vogel, Peter Loh re: Jeff
Baron litigation
4/1/11 Letter from Gary
Schepps to Judge Furgeson re:
Jeff Baron Receivership; Dkt.
423 in Case No. 3:09-cv-988F, N.D. Tex.
5/6/11 Letter from Gary
Schepps to Judge Furgeson re:
Jeff Baron, Dkt. 524 in Case
No. 3:09-cv-00988-F
5/3/11 Letter from Gary
Schepps to Judge Furgeson;
Dkt. 508 in Case No. 3:09-cv00988-F
3/2/11 Motion to Reconsider
Stay of District Court Order
Appointing Receiver Over the
Person and Property of Jeff
Baron; Netsphere, Inc. v.
Baron, Case 10-11202, 5th
Circuit
20
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
64
Special Master Appointed to
Conduct Global Mediation
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
65
Netsphere Brief of Appellant
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
66
Reply Brief for Appellant Jeffrey
Baron
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
67
Receiver’s Notice of Employment
of Gary Lyon
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
68
Brief of Appellants
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
69
Motion for Stay of Receivership
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
70
Preliminary Response to Tenth
Motion for Fees from Vogel’s
Firm
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
71
Order striking affidavit from
record and placing under seal
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
Documents from Case No. 1011202; Jeff Baron litigation,
5th Cir.
3/28/11 Brief of Appellant;
Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, Case
10-11202, 5th Cir.
7/15/11 Reply Brief of
Appellants; Netsphere, Inc. v.
Baron, Case 10-11202, 5th
Cir.
2/14/11 Receiver’s Notice of
Employment of Gary Lyon as
Consultant to Receiver (Dkt.
312), Netsphere, Inc. v.
Baron, Case 3:09-cv-00988-F,
N.D. Tex.
3/28/11 Brief of Appellants,
Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, Case
No. 11-10113, 5th Circuit;
7/15/11 Reply Brief for the
Appellants Novo Point, LLC
and Quantec, LLC, Netsphere,
Inc. v. Baron, Case 10-11202,
5th Cir.
6/22/11 Motion for Stay of
Receivership and Civil
Lockdown Order Based Upon
Recent Developments,
Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, Case
10-11202, 5th Cir.
10/21/11 Preliminary
Response to Tenth Motion for
Fees for Vogel’s Law Firm,
Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, Case
10-11202, 5th Cir.
5/6/11 Order Striking
Affidavit from Record and
Placing Under Seal (Dkt.
546), Netsphere, Inc. v.
Baron, Case No. 3:09-cv0988-F, N.D. Tex.
21
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
72
Stipulated Dismissal With
Prejudice
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
73
Brief for Appellants Novo Point,
LLC
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
74
Emergency Motion of Trustee for
Appointment of a Receiver
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
75
Order Directing Establishment of
Security Deposit
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
76
Order Granting the Receiver’s
Third Motion to Clarify Order
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
77
Order appointing Receiver
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
78
Motion to Stay Ex-Parte Order
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
Exhibit I – Stipulated
Dismissal with Prejudice from
Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, Case
3:09-cv-0988-F, N.D. Tex.
(filed in Case 11-10113, 5th
Cir., 3/21/11)
10/6/11 Brief for Appellants
Novo Point, L.L.C., Quantec,
L.L.C., and Jeffrey Baron,
Case No. 11-10501, 5th Cir.
11/24/10 Emergency Motion
of Trustee for Appointment of
a Receiver Over Jeffrey Baron
(Dkt. 123), Netsphere, Inc. v.
Baron, Case No. 3:09-cv0988-F, N.D. Tex.
9/18/10 Order Directing
Establishment of Security
Deposit (Dkt. 446), In re:
Ondova Limited Company,
Debtor, Case No. 09-347-84SGJ-11, N.D. Tex.
2/3/11 Order Granting the
Receiver’s Third Motion to
Clarify the Receiver Order
(Dkt. 272), Netsphere, Inc. v.
Baron, Civil Action No. 3:09cv-0988-F, N.D. Tex. (also
labeled Exhibit AG, Case 1110113, 5th Cir.)
11/24/10 Order Appointing
Receiver (Dkt. 124),
Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, Civil
Action No. 3:09-cv-0988-F,
N.D. Tex.
2/20/11 Appendix A to
Motion to Stay Ex-Parte
Order Appointing Receiver
over Jeffrey Baron,
Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, Case
No. 10-11202, 5th Cir.
22
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
79
Response to Vogel Sealed Motion
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
80
Collin County Observer by Bill
Baumbach
81
Order Denying Motion to Vacate
Order
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
82
Report and recommendation to
District Court
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
83
Order Granting Motion to Seal
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
9/16/11 Response to Vogel
Sealed Motion to Have the
Propriety of His Actions
Confirmed and Motion for
Evidentiary Hearing,
Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, Case
No. 10-11202, 5th Cir.
11/19/08 posting from
www.pegasusnews.com by
Bill Baumbach entitled “Who
gains from Collin County’s
suit against its auditor?”
2/3/11 Order Denying
Emergency Motion to Vacate
Order Appointing Receiver
and in the Alternative, Motion
for Stay Pending Appeal (Dkt.
268), Netsphere, Inc. v.
Baron, Case No. 3:09-cv-988F, N.D. Tex.
10/12/10 Report and
Recommendation to District
Court (Judge Royal
Furgeson): That Peter Vogel,
Special Master, Be
Authorized and Directed to
Mediate Attorneys Fees
Issues, In re: Ondovoa
Limited Company, Debtor,
Case No. 09-37484-SGJ-11,
filed as Dkt. 123-1 in Case
3:09-cv-00988-F, N.D. Tex.
5/18/11 Order Granting
Motion to Seal (Dkt. 577),
Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, Civil
Action No. 3:09-cv-0988-F,
N.D. Tex.
23
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
84
Sue Sponte Order
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
85
Brief for Appellant Jeffrey Baron
in Reply to Sherman Briefing
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
86
Brief for Appellants Novo Point
LLC
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
87
Supplemental Complaint Judge
Jernigan
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
88
Complaint Judge Jernigan March
02, 2011
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
7/23/10 Sua Sponte Order
Requiring Sealing of Affidavit
to be Filed by Jeff Baron by
July 27, 2010, but Allowing
Access to Certain Parties-inInterest (Dkt. 389), In re
Ondova Limited Company,
Debtor, Case 09-34784-sgj11,
Bankr. N.D. Tex.
11/21/11 Brief for Appellant
Jeffrey Baron in Reply to
Sherman Briefing on Appeals,
Nos. 11-10289, 11-10390, 1110501, Netsphere, Inc. v.
Baron, No. 10-11202, 5th Cir.
11/21/11 Brief for Appellants
Novo Point, LLC and
Quantec, LLC in Reply to
Sherman Briefing on Appeals
Nos. 11-10390, 11-10501,
Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, No.
10-11202, 5th Cir.
Letter from John Margetis and
Mickey Margetis re:
Supplemental Complaint
Judge Jernigan, Docket
number 05-11-90144 re:
Mickey Margetis bankruptcy
3/2/11 Letter from John
Margetis and Mickey
Margetis re: complaint
pertaining to Judge Jernigan
in Mickey Margetis
bankruptcy
24
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
89
Letter to Clifford White, Ramona
Elliott, and Lanny Breuer
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
90
Letter to Stacia Hylton, U.S.
Marshals Service
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
91
Letter to Gary Koenig and
Edward Quintana
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
92
Inspector General Letter January
20, 2012
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
12/6/11 Letter to Clifford
White, Ramona Elliott, and
Lanny Breuer re: Judicial
Corruption; 12/5/11 Letter
from Sharon Rondeau to
Criminal Enforcement Unit
Executive Office for U.S.
Trustees re: Judicial
Corruption in Jeff Baron
litigation; Document entitled
“Stop Legalization of Human
Bondage in America – Free
Man in Receivership as
Property” with link to sign
petition regarding Jeff Baron
litigation
3/16/12 Letter from John
Margetis to Stacia Hylton re:
Official report of crimes and
misconduct being conducted
against victims and witnesses
in the Northern District of
Texas
12/19/11 Letter from John
Margetis to Gary Koenig and
Edward Quintana re: Judge
Jernigan and Judge Furgeson
in Mickey Margetis
bankruptcy and Jeff Baron
litigation
1/20/12 Letter from John
Margetis to Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties Complaints,
Office of the Inspector
General, U.S. Department of
Justice re: Judge Jernigan and
Judge Furgeson in Mickey
Margetis bankruptcy and Jeff
Baron litigation
25
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Reason It Is
Number
Inadmissible
93
Letter of Introduction to Members Hearsay (FED.
of Congress
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
94
Letter from Don Freese
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
95
Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq.
Official Statistics of the Admin.
Office
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
96
Letter to Eric Schwethelm, Steve
Cochell
97
Complaint Judge Jernigan
05/27/11
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
1/12/12 Letter from John
Margetis entitled “Letter of
Introduction to Members of
Congress with Emergency
Request for Assistance from
House and Senate Judiciary
Committees, Members of
Texas Delegation, and
Department of Justice” re:
Judge Jernigan and Judge
Furgeson in Mickey Margetis
bankruptcy and Jeff Baron
litigation
3/27/12 Letter from Donald
W. Freese, Assistant Special
Agent in Charge, re: Margetis
Judicial Corruption Complaint
returning documents
submitted to FBI by John
Margetis
Document from Dr. Richard
Cordero, Esq. entitled “The
Official Statistics of the
Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts Show the
Systematic Dismissal by
Federal Judges Including the
Justices of the Supreme Court,
of Judicial Misconduct
Complaints Against them
(same as Exhibit 54)
1/17/12 Letter from Steve
Cochell to Eric Schwethelm
re: Jeff Baron litigation
5/27/11 Complaint of Judicial
Misconduct by John Margetis
and Mickey Margetis re:
Judge Jernigan in Mickey
Margetis bankruptcy
26
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
98
Complaint Judge Jernigan
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
99
Settlement and Release
Agreement
100
Amended Adversary Complaint
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
101
Letter to the Editor, Binkley
102
Dee Dee Arnold Complaint
Furgeson 01/08/05
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
103
Glenda Pinkston Court Copies
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
104
Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
Unlabeled document re:
Mickey Margetis bankruptcy
and Judge Jernigan
Unsigned Settlement and
Release Agreement between
John Litzler, James G. Rea,
Marc W. Taubenfeld,
McGuire, Craddock, &
Strother, P.C., John A.
Margetis, and Mickey K.
Margetis
8/4/11 Amended Complaint of
Mickey K. Margetis [Debtor],
and John A. Margetis
[Debtor’s Son], In re: Mickey
K. Margetis, Debtor, Mickey
K. Margetis and John A.
Margetis v. James G. Rea,
Case. 05-37345-SGJ-13,
Adversary No. 11-03376-bjh,
Bankr. N.D. Tex.
3/31/10 posting entitled
“Letter to the Editor | ‘Our
Concern is the Integrity of
[Bob] Carroll.’” Signed by
Bruce & Camella Binkley
1/8/05 Letter from Andrea D.
Arnold to Fifth Circuit re:
Petition for Review of Chief
Judge’s Disposition of
Complaint of Judicial
Misconduct
Documents from In the
Guardianship of Willie
Howard Hubacek, an
incapacitated person, Cause
No. 07-G-1018, Ellis County
Court at Law No. 1
5/22/00 Plaintiff’s Motion to
Recuse, Hatteberg v. Adair
Enters., Inc., C.A. No. MO97-CA-209, W.D. Tex.
27
Exhibit
Plaintiffs’ Title
Number
105
Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment
Reason It Is
Inadmissible
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
106
Andrea Hatteberg Letter to Judge
Furgeson
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
107
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint,
Andrea Hatteberg
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
108
Orders issued by Royal Furgeson
Reversed by Fifth Circuit
109
Requests to Comply with Touhy
Regulations
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
110
Ron Holland Letter from Alan
Baron
Hearsay (FED.
R. EVID.
801(c)),
Irrelevant (FED.
R. EVID. 401)
Description
8/8/00 Order Denying
Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and
Granting Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment,
Hatteberg v. Adair Enters.,
Inc., MO-97-CA-209, W.D.
Tex.
5/27/99 Letter from David W.
Tucker to Judge Furgeson re:
Hatteberg v. Red Adair Co.,
Inc., Replies to Responses to
Report of Special Master
12/10/97 Plaintiff’s Original
Complaint and Request for
Preliminary Injunction,
Hatteberg v. Red Adair Co.,
Inc., MO97CA209, W.D. Tex.
Various orders from Fifth
Circuit re: Jeff Baron
litigation with spreadsheet
Multiple copies of letters from
John Margetis and Alan Baron
re: individuals served with
subpoenas in 4:12-cv-753,
Margetis v. Furgeson,
E.D.Tex.
Letter from Alan Baron to
Ron Holland re: Jeff Baron
litigation
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (Dkt. 84) is DENIED. Plaintiffs
filed a Motion for Clarification (Dkt. 88) on March 27, 2014, six days after the hearing, asking
whether the court “will take note of the numerous exhibits” prior to making a ruling on the
Motion for Sanctions. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Clarification (Dkt. 88) is GRANTED. As explained
above, the court has received and reviewed each exhibit and finds that the exhibits are
28
inadmissible and do not support Plaintiffs’ contention that Rule 11 sanctions are not warranted in
this matter.
Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Docketing (Dkt. 92) is DENIED. Plaintiffs ask the
court to electronically docket the exhibits submitted in the CM/ECF system. Many of the
documents provided by Plaintiffs contain offensive and completely unsubstantiated accusations
against Judge Furgeson and Judge Jernigan, and for that reason the court has not published them
in the electronic record of this case, but the court will make them available to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Each and every page provided by Plaintiffs is inadmissible
because it is irrelevant or hearsay or both.
IV.
ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiffs’ allegations against the United States Magistrate Judge
First, the court addresses Mr. Margetis’s allegations against the United States Magistrate
Judge in this matter. Mr. Margetis accuses the United States Magistrate Judge in this case of
being inhumane by refusing to allow Mr. Margetis to leave the hearing on May 9, 2013. This
court has reviewed the transcript and the minutes of that hearing. The hearing lasted a total of six
minutes. When the case was initially called, Mr. Margetis asked for a continuance, and Judge
Bush denied it. However, within three minutes, Judge Bush told Mr. Margetis he could leave and
that the hearing would go on with respect to Mr. Baron only. Mr. Margetis insisted that he had to
stay and defend his rights. Judge Bush again told Mr. Margetis that he would grant a continuance
of the hearing as to his claims, and that if the court needed anything further, Judge Bush would
call another hearing. Three minutes after that, the hearing concluded. Judge Bush did not force
Mr. Margetis to remain in the courtroom while his mother was dying. Mr. Margetis’s accusations
against Judge Bush are entirely unjustified and frivolous.
29
B. Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint Fails to State a Plausible Claim for Relief
Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint (Dkt. 1) alleging claims for (1) defamation; (2)
intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) conspiracy; (4) violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; and (4) unlawful deprivation of constitutional rights.
The Magistrate Judge recommended, and this court ordered, that the complaint be dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(1). Indeed, the complaint also fails to state a plausible claim for relief under
Rule 12(b)(6).
“A claim for relief is plausible on its face when plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” 59 Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” 60 In other words, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 61 Facial
plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 62 “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” 63 First, the court identifies conclusory allegations and proceeds to disregard them
because they are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 64 Second, the court “consider[s] the
factual allegations in [the complaint] to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to
59
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
61
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 679.
60
30
relief.” 65 This evaluation is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on
its judicial experience and common sense.” 66
Plaintiffs have not put forth any factual content to support their allegations. Plaintiffs
merely offer that their contentions are “on information and belief” but put forth no facts to
support their belief. The Original Complaint only contains conclusory allegations such as that
Defendants were “engaging in unlawful activities,” 67 “extorting inviduals,” 68 “bullying,
harassing and intimidating Plaintiffs,” 69 that Defendants “reached an agreement to unlawfully
intimidate, harass and defame Plaintiffs in retaliation,” 70 and that
Plaintiff’s [sic] believe that the alleged death threat to Jernigan and/or Furgeson is
fabricated, staged by the Operative Defendants Jernigan and/or Furgeson in
retaliation for Plaintiffs’ and their family’s cooperation with media, and for
providing information and testimony to law enforcement about Jernigan and
Furgeson’s criminal activities, and to deter Plaintiffs and their families from
speaking about the criminal activity. 71
Plaintiffs contend that they have been defamed by “Operative Defendants’ statements regarding
Plaintiff’s [sic] being suspects of a crime,” 72 but offer no supporting details. In support of their
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiffs simply allege that “Operative
Defendants’ harassing and intimidating numerous persons without any legitimate purpose
constitutes intentional and outrageous conduct” that caused Plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional
distress. 73 In support of their conspiracy claim, Plaintiffs merely state “Defendants had a meeting
65
Id. at 681.
Id. at 679.
67
Dkt. 1 ¶ 12.
68
Dkt. 1 ¶ 13.
69
Dkt. 1 ¶ 16.
70
Dkt. 1 ¶ 19.
71
Dkt. 1 ¶ 32.
72
Dkt. 1 ¶ 34.
73
Dkt. 32 ¶ 36.
66
31
of the minds to defame Plaintiffs and to cause Plaintiffs to suffer emotional distress” 74 and “to
intimidate witnesses, informants and victims; and to hinder and delay witnesses and informants
reporting criminal activities.” 75 Plaintiffs’ RICO allegation includes the statement that
[a]ll Defendants conspired to, and did operate as a RICO enterprise to injure
Plaintiffs and other victims by means of Intimidating victims and witnesses and
tampering with victims and witnesses, inhibiting and delaying victims and
witnesses from providing information and testimony about crimes. Every
Defendant participated in the organization as a RICO enterprise. 76
Finally, Plaintiffs conclusorily assert that “[a]ll of Defendants’ predicate acts have a similar
purpose: To inhibit and delay individuals from providing information and testimony to crimes
committed by Jernigan, Furgeson and others. Defendants have accomplished this through
intimidating individuals associated with Plaintiffs and their families, interfering with their
businesses.” 77 Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations are not entitled to a presumption of truth.
The failure of Plaintiffs to state a plausible claim for relief in their Original Complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6) is not by itself sufficient to warrant the imposition of sanctions. 78 But
Plaintiffs’ failure to show that (1) the baseless and derogatory allegations they have asserted have
any evidentiary support, and (2) that they conducted an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances to determine whether they should file this suit, does support the imposition of
sanctions. Further, the court finds that based on the objectively ascertainable circumstances of
this case, it is empirically clear that Plaintiffs have brought this suit for an improper purpose.
74
Dkt. 1 ¶ 38.
Dkt. 1 ¶ 39.
76
Dkt. 1 ¶ 43.
77
Dkt. 1 ¶ 45.
78
Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 595 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A complaint does not merit sanctions
under Rule 11 simply because it merits dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”); Protective Life
Ins. Co. v. Dignity Viatical Settlement Partners, L.P., 171 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The mere
fact that a claim ultimately proves unavailing, without more, cannot support the imposition of
Rule 11 sanctions.”).
75
32
After being informed that their claims lacked merit, they continued to pursue their baseless
claims and attempted to skirt unfavorable law by oblique pleading and testimony.
i.
Judge Jernigan and Judge Furgeson are absolutely immune from this suit.
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the problem that judicial immunity poses to their claims by
arguing that their claims are not based on orders made by Judge Jernigan and Judge Furgeson in
their judicial capacities. In their brief submitted the day of the hearing, Plaintiffs assert that
“functions performed by Defendants, federal and state judges, in Plaintiff’s Complaints was non
judicial and non-adjudicatory.” 79 Plaintiffs do not specify the functions to which they are
referring. In support of this assertion, Plaintiffs point to Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121 (5th
Cir. 1993), arguing that it is analogous to this case. It is not. In Malina, a state court judge
stopped a motorist on the highway, sent an officer to summons the motorist to court, and then
held him in contempt when he questioned the judge’s authority to take such actions. Plaintiffs in
this case have not pointed to any encounter with Judge Furgeson or Judge Jernigan that took
place outside the context of the judges’ official capacities. Plaintiffs also point to Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993), Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir
2007), Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2005), and KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105 (9th
Cir. 2004) to support their argument. In the cited cases, the courts were evaluating when
prosecutors are shielded by qualified immunity in performing their duties. Plaintiffs also cite to
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993), in which the Court determined that
court reporters are not entitled to immunity as part of the judicial function because their job
requires no discretionary judgment. Finally, Plaintiffs point to Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681
(1997), which held that the doctrine of separation of powers does not bar every exercise of the
courts’ jurisdiction over the President of the United States. None of the cases cited support
79
Dkt. 83.
33
Plaintiffs’ allegations in this case, and none of them provide any basis for a determination that
Judge Jernigan and Judge Furgeson somehow acted outside of their official capacities and are
subject to civil liability as a result.
“Judges are absolutely immune against an action for damages for acts performed in their
judicial capacities, even when such acts are alleged to have been done maliciously or
corruptly.” 80 In what appears to be an attempt to circumvent the clearly applicable law,
throughout the hearing Plaintiffs insisted that their complaint is not about rulings made by Judge
Jernigan and Judge Furgeson. However, Plaintiffs never clearly articulated what actions taken
outside of their official capacities Plaintiffs believe to be (1) criminal and (2) subject to a civil
suit by Plaintiffs. When pressed on the matter, inevitably, Plaintiffs would return to a discussion
of decisions made by Judge Jernigan in the Mickey Margetis bankruptcy case and the Jeffrey
Baron litigation and by Judge Furgeson in the Jeffrey Baron litigation. For instance, during his
direct testimony at the court’s hearing on sanctions, Mr. Margetis stated that Judge Jernigan’s
final order concluded that she lacked subject-matter jurisdiction but that Judge Jernigan stated
that she believed that a lease agreement at issue in Mickey Margetis’s bankruptcy had been
forged despite not having subject-matter jurisdiction. Mr. Margetis asserted that Judge Jernigan’s
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction means that all actions taken by her in relation to the dispute
were “ultra vires.” Mr. Margetis also asserted that the Defendants’ “illegal activities” were
related to orders that had been overturned by the Fifth Circuit. Mr. Margetis’s testimony makes
clear that his objections relate to Judge Jernigan’s and Judge Furgeson’s judicial actions. The
ultimate determination that a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim or the fact that a
80
McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221, 222 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and
punctuation omitted).
34
court’s decision is overturned by an appellate court does not mean that the court’s actions in that
case are criminal or fall outside their official role subjecting the judge to civil liability.
Plaintiffs maintained throughout the hearing that the exhibits they had gathered would
prove their allegations, but nothing in the documents reviewed by this court shows anything
other than that Plaintiffs have spent a lot of time disparaging Judge Jernigan and Judge Furgeson
over the last three years to various individuals and entities. Indeed, many of the exhibits
submitted are pleadings, transcripts, or judicial misconduct complaints related to either Mickey
Margetis’s bankruptcy or Jeffrey Baron’s litigation, which only underscores the fact that this suit
is based on Plaintiffs’ disagreement with Judge Jernigan and Judge Furgeson’s actions taken in
their official capacities in those cases.
ii.
Plaintiffs lack standing to assert claims based on these allegations.
Moreover, the judicial decisions about which Plaintiffs are aggrieved are not even
directed to these Plaintiffs, and Plaintiff Margetis has previously been informed that he lacks
standing to assert a claim against Judge Jernigan based on her rulings in his mother’s bankruptcy
case. 81 None of Plaintiffs’ allegations, even if taken as true, and even if the actions formed the
basis of a plausible civil claim, would support Mr. Margetis’s and Mr. Baron’s allegations in
their complaint. None of those things happened to either Mr. Margetis or Mr. Baron, and
therefore Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert any claim based on those actions. Plaintiffs,
particularly Mr. Margetis, appear to be laboring under the impression that if they perceive that a
wrong has occurred, it is their duty and right to file a lawsuit complaining about it.
81
Dkt. 34-8 at 5 (“John Margetis lacks standing to complain of the Bankruptcy Judges’ conduct.
He was not a creditor in either of his mother’s prior bankruptcy cases. While he is upset about
what he perceives as mistreatment that his mother allegedly received by the Bankruptcy Judge,
he is not a person aggrieved by that conduct such that he has legal standing to sue.”).
35
“[T]he elements of constitutional standing are: (1) that the plaintiff have suffered an
‘injury in fact-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) actual or imminent’; (2) that there is a ‘causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of’; and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision.” 82 A lawsuit is not the proper way to engage in what Plaintiffs perceive as
“whistleblowing.” In fact, “[t]he right of access to the courts is neither absolute nor
unconditional and there is no constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action
that is frivolous or malicious.” 83 The fact that Plaintiffs are acting pro se does not give them an
“impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial
machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” 84
C. Plaintiffs did not perform an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.
i.
An inquiry reasonable under the circumstances must relate to the signed
pleading filed with the court.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(3) explains that “[b]y presenting to the court a
pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
. . . (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”
An inquiry reasonable under the circumstances requires an inquiry of the facts and law specific
82
Fla. Dep’t of Ins. V. Chase Bank of Tex. Nat’l Ass’n, 274 F.3d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
83
Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 193 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sieverding v.
Colo. Bar Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1343 (10th Cir. 2006).
84
Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986)
36
to the claim contained in the pleading at the time it is signed and filed. 85 To determine whether
Plaintiffs made a “reasonable inquiry” into the law governing this case, “the court should
consider: (1) the time available to prepare the pleading; (2) the plausibility of the legal argument;
(3) the pro se status of the litigant; and (4) the complexity of the legal and factual issues raised in
the case.” 86 “Pro se litigants are entitled to some additional latitude in pleading.” 87 But “pro se
status is not a license to litter the dockets of the federal courts with patently baseless suits.” 88
“Sanctions on pro se litigants are appropriate if they were warned that their claims are frivolous
and they were aware of ‘ample legal authority holding squarely against them.’” 89
At the hearing, Mr. Margetis argued that if the hearing on the motion to dismiss would
have been reset, that he and Mr. Baron could have found evidence to support their claims. A
party that files a pleading must have performed an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances
before filing it with the court, not after. The discovery process is not intended to be used by
Plaintiffs as an opportunity to uncover a claim. 90 “Tolerance of factual contentions in initial
pleadings by plaintiffs or defendants when specifically identified as made on information and
belief does not relieve litigants from the obligation to conduct an appropriate investigation into
85
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873-74 (5th Cir. 1988) (“It is well
established that Rule 11 imposes the following affirmative duties with which an attorney or
litigant certifies he has complied by signing a pleading, motion, or other document. (1) that the
attorney has conducted a reasonable inquiry into the facts which support the document . . .”).
86
McCampbell v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 982 F. Supp. 445, 448 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
87
Taylor v. C.I.R., 350 F. App’x 913, 915 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)).
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
See Russell v. Choicepoint Servs., Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 654, 670-671 (“The discovery rules
are designed to assist a party to prove a claim it reasonably believes to be viable without
discovery, not to find out if it has any basis for a claim.”).
37
the facts that is reasonable under the circumstances; it is not license to join parties, make claims,
or present defenses without any factual basis or justification.” 91
ii.
Plaintiffs’ subjective beliefs are insufficient to support filing the complaint.
Plaintiffs’ subjective belief in the truthfulness of their allegations is insufficient to
support the filing of this suit and protect them from sanctions. Just as a court should not
necessarily sanction a party for that party's own subjective bad faith when it has filed a
document that has a reasonable basis in law or fact, the Plaintiffs’ own self-serving and
subjective declarations of good faith in filing this complaint that has no basis in fact or law does
not spare them from sanctions. 92
At the hearing on the Defendants’ motion for sanctions, the court asked Plaintiffs
repeatedly to explain their basis for filing this suit. Mr. Baron stated that Plaintiffs believed they
were simply exercising their constitutional rights and they were not acting with malice. Mr.
Margetis testified that he acted purely on his own beliefs that a wrong had occurred. However, it
is insufficient that a party’s “subjective belief and purpose are innocent; it is also necessary that
such mental state be based upon reasonably inquiry, objectively analyzed, into the basis for the
facts alleged and into the law.” 93
Plaintiffs assert that the factual basis of some of their claims is that Judge Jernigan
fabricated receipt of a death threat and then named John Margetis and Jeffrey Baron as potential
suspects to the Marshals Service in retaliation for their reporting to the media her allegedly
illegal actions. The court specifically asked Mr. Margetis what the basis for this specific
allegation is, and Mr. Margetis simply insisted that it was his belief. Mr. Margetis was also asked
91
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1993).
Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A good faith belief in the merits of a
case is insufficient to avoid sanctions.”)
93
Harlyn Sales Corp. Profit Sharing Plan v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 9 F.3d 1263, 1270 (7th
Cir. 1993).
92
38
what media had reported on his allegations of criminal conduct against Judge Jernigan, and Mr.
Margetis was unable to provide any evidence that any media has published a report based on his
statements. Also during the hearing, Mr. Margetis accused Judge Furgeson of having the
Marshals follow him. When asked what makes him think Judge Furgeson asked the Marshals to
follow him around, he responded that it was simply his belief. Plaintiffs were unable to put forth
any evidence that supports their claims, and it is clear that they did not perform an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances before filing their claims and making these allegations and
ignored unfavorable law relating to the Defendants’ immunity to civil liability.
The court notes that Plaintiffs offered completely inconsistent testimony, however, when
directly asked whether they thought they could file a lawsuit based on their subjective beliefs. In
response, Mr. Margetis stated that he did not believe that was the case and that he believed the
evidence and exhibits he brought to the hearing would show that a pattern of illegal activities had
occurred. Plaintiffs’ contention that they can establish a “pattern” by providing witnesses that
also have complaints against these Defendants does not support their allegations and does not
constitute an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances to support their subjective beliefs.
a. It is not sufficient to find others who also have grievances against a
defendant to support the claims asserted.
When questioned about what inquiry he performed before filing this suit, Mr. Margetis
insisted that Plaintiffs “talked to lots of people, lots of people contacted us. And I can—it’s
again, judicial—it’s public record.” 94 Plaintiffs argued that by gathering complaints of others
about the same two judges’ actions in other instances, they had performed an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances to support their claims. The legal and (sparse) factual contentions
94
This statement also seems to support the court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs are attempting to
assert a complaint based on the Defendants’ judicial actions.
39
asserted by Plaintiffs are not supported by the testimony of others who also believe Defendants
have acted improperly in other completely distinct situations.
At the hearing on the Defendants’ motion for sanctions, Mr. Margetis never answered the
court’s question regarding an evidentiary basis for the crimes alleged against the Defendants in
his complaint. He simply stated that he talked to other people who agreed with him that he and
his mother were somehow mistreated, and he located other litigants who had cases in front of
Judge Furgeson and/or Judge Jernigan and who had complaints about how their cases were
handled. Occasionally, unhappy litigants will blame the judge.
Plaintiffs offered the testimony of Mptanashi Tayari Garrett about her grievances with
Judge Jernigan and attempted to offer the testimony of Andrea Arnold regarding her grievances
with Judge Furgeson. When asked the significance of Ms. Arnold’s testimony, Mr. Margetis
explained it would show a pattern.
Even if the court were to assume the veracity of the testimony and the evidence provided
by Plaintiffs related to these two witnesses and construe it in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, what happened to these witnesses is not relevant to claims asserted by Plaintiffs in this
suit against these Defendants, and tracking down these individuals does not constitute an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances for asserting Plaintiffs’ claims. Further, Plaintiffs have no
standing to assert any claims based on what may have happened to any other individual.
b. It is irrelevant that others recommended Plaintiffs file this suit.
The final argument that Plaintiffs offered to support their contention that they had not
violated Rule 11(b) was that numerous individuals, including some federal employees, told them
to file this lawsuit. The fact that any individual advises someone to file a lawsuit does not relieve
the person filing the lawsuit of his obligation to comply with the mandates of Rule 11. ““The
40
person signing, filing, submitting, or advocating a document has a nondelegable responsibility to
the court, and in most situations should be sanctioned for a violation.” 95 The court pointed out to
Plaintiffs during the hearing that when they signed the complaint, they were certifying that they
had conducted a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances, and Mr. Margetis replied that they
had and that’s why federal officials had allegedly told them to file the instant suit. An individual
can seek advice from anyone, but someone’s advice to file a lawsuit, even if that person works
for the government, does not satisfy the party’s obligation to conduct an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances and to have an evidentiary basis for the allegations made in that lawsuit.
Plaintiffs had ample time available to prepare their original complaint in this case. In fact
they had filed similar complaints two times previously based on these same allegations
beginning in May 2012. Plaintiffs offered no plausible legal argument and offered no factual
allegations to support their claims. There are no complex legal or factual issues raised in the case
because there are simply no viable legal or factual issues asserted by Plaintiffs. The only factor
weighing in Plaintiffs’ favor is their pro se status. But Plaintiffs demonstrated that they are more
than capable of researching the law through the documents that they have filed in this case.
Plaintiffs have also demonstrated their willingness to try and avoid the law by arguing that their
claims are not based on official actions.
iii.
Plaintiffs persisted in pursuing this suit even after they were warned that the
claims were unsustainable.
Plaintiffs were advised that federal judges have absolutely immunity from civil claims
stemming from their actions taken in their official capacity as judges and that the United States
Marshals have absolute or qualified immunity for actions taken as part of their investigation
95
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1993).
41
concerning the death threat made to Judge Jernigan. 96 Plaintiffs have amply demonstrated that
they are able to research the law and they appear to be capable of understanding what the law is.
They also failed to heed warnings that they would be subject to sanctions for pursuing this
frivolous and malicious campaign and have not shown any intent to discontinue it.
V.
SANCTIONS
Sanctions are warranted in this matter because Plaintiffs violated Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11(b)(1) and 11(b)(3) by filing a complaint with an improper purpose and without any
evidentiary or legal basis. Plaintiffs have been given notice and an opportunity to respond as
required by FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1). Plaintiffs filed an objection both to the recommendation of
sanctions in the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (Dkt. 27)
and Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. 34). Plaintiffs had over seventy days’ notice of this
court’s intention to hold a hearing on the matter. Plaintiffs filed a brief, appeared, and responded
at the hearing. The hearing lasted over five hours.
Plaintiffs later filed, on May 19, 2014, fifty-nine days after the hearing, an “Emergency
Motion Filing This Supplemental Objections to Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions” (Dkt. 93)
arguing that Defendants failed to comply with the “safe harbor” provision of Federal Rule of
Procedure 11(c)(2). Plaintiffs contend that because Defendants litigated their motion to dismiss
before filing a motion for sanctions that Defendants are not entitled to sanctions. Plaintiffs failed
to raise this argument during the ample time in which they had to respond to the motion for
sanctions and at the hearing on March 21, 2014. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs’ argument is without
merit. Rule 11(c)(2) requires service of a motion for sanctions 21-days before filing “to give the
96
Dkt. 34-19; McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221, 222 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Judges are
absolutely immune against an action for damages for acts performed in their judicial capacities,
even when such acts are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
42
parties at whom the motion is directed an opportunity to withdraw or correct the offending
contention.” 97 Informal notice is not sufficient. 98 In this instance, Defendants complied with Rule
11(c)(2)’s notice requirement. 99 Defendants served their motion for sanctions on Plaintiffs on
September 18, 2013. The motion was filed with the court on October 18, 2013, thirty days later.
After they were served with a copy of the motion for sanctions, Plaintiffs continued to pursue
their claims by filing an objection to the Report and Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge 100 rather than withdrawing any of their claims. 101 Plaintiffs went on to respond
to the sanctions motion and assert their claims both in writing and at the hearing. At no point did
Plaintiffs attempt to voluntarily dismiss their claims.
Plaintiffs have failed to make any showing that their claims were not brought for an
improper purpose or that they conducted an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances to
determine that their claims had evidentiary or legal support. Plaintiffs cite to F.D.I.C. v.
Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 580-81 (5th Cir. 2008) to support their argument that sanctions are
not warranted in this instance. Plaintiffs argue that the court cannot attempt to read their minds to
determine that they filed this suit for an improper purpose. However, the court in Maxxam
explained that courts should generally not sanction nonfrivolous representations that are well
grounded in fact and law, even if they were subjectively brought with an improper purpose or
ulterior motive. Maxxam holds that “the court must focus on objectively ascertainable
97
In re Pratt, 524 F.3d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id.
99
See Dkt. 28. Prior to the filing of this suit, Defendants also informally warned Plaintiffs that if
they persisted, sanctions would be sought. However, Defendants do not rely on this informal
warning as compliance with Rule 11(c)(2) but on the service of the actual motion for sanctions.
100
Dkt. 30.
101
See Qureshi v. United States, 600 F.3d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 2010) (After the termination of an
action, a court may nevertheless ‘consider collateral issues.’”); Thomas v. Phillips, 83 F. App’x
661, 661-62 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff “had an absolute right to have his suit
dismissed” under Rule 41(a)(1) notwithstanding a pending recommendation by the magistrate
judge that the complaint be dismissed on the merits).
98
43
circumstances that support an inference that a filing harassed the defendant or caused
unnecessary delay . . . [P]urely subjective elements should not be reintroduced into the
determination concerning ‘improper purpose.’” 102 Plaintiffs also cite to Jenkins v. Methodist
Hospitals of Dallas, Inc., 478 F.3d 255, 264 (5th Cir. 2007) to support their argument that they
should not be sanctioned for a perceived improper motive. In Jenkins, the court explained that
while “the standard under which the attorney is measured [under Rule 11] is an objective, not
subjective, standard of reasonableness under the circumstances . . .an attorney’s good faith will
not, by itself, protect against the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.” 103 Plaintiffs’ situation is
distinguishable from these two cases because their representations are entirely frivolous. The
court does not have to be clairvoyant to see that the suit was intended to harass Defendants and
cause unnecessary delay, even though Plaintiffs had previously been told that their claims were
without merit. Plaintiffs’ purported good faith in bringing the claims does not reduce their
obligation to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs argue that the court should hesitate to sanction them when their case was
dismissed under Rule 12(b) because they have not had an opportunity to present any evidence to
the court. In Tahfs, decided before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the court noted that, “[a]t the pleading stage in the
litigation, ordinarily there is little or no evidence before the court at all, and such facts as are
alleged, must be interpreted in favor of the nonmovant.” 104 The court in Tahfs also pointed out
that making a determination that a complaint is filed for an improper purpose, is unwarranted by
existing law, or lacks evidentiary support “is difficult when there is nothing before the court
102
F.D.I.C. v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 581 (5th Cir. 2008).
Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 264.
104
Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir. 2003)
103
44
except the challenged complaint.” 105 But the Tahfs court also pointed out that “the central
purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court, and courts must be wary of
plaintiffs who make baseless allegations . . . in an effort to survive the early stages of
[litigation].” 106 Here, Plaintiffs have admitted that they have done exactly that—Plaintiffs
contend that they believe they could show that they have a viable claim if they could only get
discovery. Further, Tahfs is distinguishable from this case in that the plaintiff in Tahfs had
directly interacted with the court and was not attempting to allege the claims of others as Mr.
Margetis and Mr. Baron are.
Plaintiffs also cite Amphenol v. T&M Antennas, Inc. v. Centurion Int’l, Inc., No. 00 C
4298, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13795, at *14-15 (N. D. Ill. Sep. 5, 2001) to support their argument
that sanctions should not be imposed until they have had a full chance to develop their proof. The
court in Amphenol noted that “Rule 11 is violated only when it is patently clear that a claim has
absolutely no chance of success and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the signer.” 107
It is patently clear that Plaintiffs’ claim has absolutely no chance of success for all the reasons
articulated in this order and in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.
The fact that Mr. Margetis and Mr. Baron have failed to plead a plausible claim for relief
under Rule 12, on its own, is not what subjects them to sanctions in this instance. Sanctions are
warranted because their derogatory claims are entirely baseless and were brought for an
objectively ascertainable improper and harassing purpose with nothing except Plaintiffs’ own
ramblings for support and in spite of warnings that the Defendants would seek such sanctions if
Plaintiffs continued to pursue these claims. Plaintiffs show no intention of discontinuing their
105
Id. at 594.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
107
Amphenol v. T&M Antennas, Inc. v. Centurion Int’l, Inc., No. 00 C 4298, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13795, at *14-15 (N. D. Ill. Sep. 5, 2001) (citing to Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1335, at 88).
106
45
crusade. Under these circumstances, the court finds that the least severe sanction adequate to the
purpose of Rule 11 is to require Plaintiffs to reimburse Defendants for their attorneys’ fees and
costs and to enjoin Plaintiffs from filing any further pleadings in any court asserting claims
against these Defendants without first seeking leave of this court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)(4).
A. Attorneys’ fees
Monetary sanctions are necessary in this case because mere dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims
will not deter them from continuing to pursue these allegations. 108 In fact, Mr. Margetis’s claims
against Judge Jernigan in the adversary proceeding filed in his mother’s bankruptcy case were
dismissed and yet he continued to pursue similar allegations against Judge Jernigan in this case.
While Mr. Baron characterizes the actions taken by Plaintiffs when they allowed the suit filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to be dismissed for want of
prosecution and in voluntarily dismissing their initial suit in this court as harmless and “very
economical,” the reality is that “[a] litigious plaintiff pressing a frivolous claim, though rarely
succeeding on the merits, can be extremely costly to the defendant and can waste an inordinate
amount of court time.” 109 Plaintiffs’ actions have been anything but economical. Each time
Plaintiffs filed a frivolous suit it has cost the court system and Defendants significant time and
expense to respond. 110 In fact, Plaintiffs’ filings in just this action have occupied an unwarranted
amount of this court’s time in addressing the numerous motions filed by Plaintiffs (several of
them captioned as “emergency” motions, requiring the court’s immediate attention) and
preparing for and conducting the sanctions hearing, which lasted over five hours.
108
See Day v. Allstate Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Sanctions may be
necessary because often dismissal alone will not faze a venomous litigant bent on disrupting the
judicial system and committed to employing the legal process as a means to torment his
enemies.”).
109
Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980).
110
See Dkt. 34 at 14-15.
46
The court finds that monetary sanctions are warranted in this matter to deter Plaintiffs
(and those similarly situated) from continuing to pursue these frivolous and malicious allegations
against Defendants. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(4) provides that “if imposed on
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part
or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation”
may be ordered. Defendants have moved for reimbursement of their attorneys’ fees and other
expenses incurred as a result of Plaintiffs’ actions, and the court holds that, in this instance,
requiring Plaintiffs to compensate Defendants for their reasonable expenses and reasonable
attorneys’ fees is the least severe sanction to effectively serve the purpose of Rule 11. 111
Accordingly, Defendants are ORDERED to file the proper documentation with the court to seek
reimbursement for up to $25,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The court will review Defendants’
request and will determine the amount for which Mr. Margetis and Mr. Baron will be jointly and
severally liable.
B. Pre-filing injunction
The court also finds that monetary sanctions alone will be insufficient to protect
Defendants and the court from Plaintiffs’ vexatious filings. 112 “A district court has jurisdiction to
impose a pre-filing injunction to deter vexatious, abusive, and harassing litigation.” 113 Indeed,
“[f]ederal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their
jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions.” 114 “In
111
See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 879 (5th Cir. 1988) (“What constitutes
‘reasonable expenses’ and a ‘reasonable attorney’s fee’ within the context of Rule 11 must be
considered in tandem with the rule’s goals of deterrence, punishment, and compensation.”).
112
See Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[W]here
monetary sanctions are ineffective in deterring vexatious filings, enjoining such filings would be
considered.”).
113
Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 187 (5th Cir. 2008).
114
In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984).
47
determining whether it should impose a pre-filing injunction . . . a court must weigh all the
relevant circumstances, including the following four factors: (1) the party’s history of litigation,
in particular whether he has filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) whether the
party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation, or simply intended to harass; (3) the
extent of the burden on the courts and other parties resulting from the party’s filings; and (4) the
adequacy of alternative sanctions.” 115 “A pre-filing injunction must be tailored to protect the
courts and innocent parties, while preserving the legitimate rights of litigants.” 116
(1)
The Plaintiffs’ history of litigation, in particular whether they have filed
vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits.
Plaintiffs have now filed three separate lawsuits asserting essentially the same baseless
allegations against the Marshals, Judge Jernigan, and Judge Furgeson. Indeed, Mr. Margetis
began this crusade even earlier when he participated as a party in the adversary proceeding
against Judge Jernigan in his mother’s bankruptcy case. Further, Plaintiffs have engaged in
dilatory tactics to prolong the pendency of this action (despite their protestations that they simply
want their day in court) that have caused both the court and Defendants to spend an undeserved
amount of time responding. Even setting aside Plaintiffs “economical” tactics in filing and not
prosecuting an action in the D.C. district court, and the filing and voluntarily dismissal of their
initial claim in Texas courts, Plaintiffs have attempted to delay these proceedings by (1)
choosing not to respond to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, despite being granted additional time
in which to do so (2) filing an amended complaint out of time and without first seeking leave of
court, and (3) seeking continuances each time the court actually attempts to resolve an issue in
this case. In all, Plaintiffs have filed fifteen motions in this case, including six that were
captioned as “emergency” motions seeking the court’s immediate attention.
115
116
Baum, 513 F.3d at 189.
Id. at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48
Plaintiffs have demonstrated their insistence on pursuing this crusade. Further, in the time
since the hearing on March 21, 2014, Plaintiffs have continued to file “emergency” motions with
the court. “Unnecessary complaints sap the time of judges, forcing parties with substantial
disputes to wait in a longer queue and condemning them to receive less judicial attention when
their cases finally are heard.” 117
(2)
Whether the Plaintiffs’ had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation, or
simply intended to harass.
Plaintiffs have been unable to show any objectively good faith basis for pursuing this
litigation. It is clear that these claims originate from Plaintiffs’ personal vendetta against these
Defendants, who Plaintiffs, without reason, believe to have collaborated against them. Plaintiffs
have engaged in a pattern of frivolous lawsuits brought against these Defendants intended to
harass Defendants and find an outlet in which to publish their unfounded claims.
(3)
The extent of the burden on the courts and other parties resulting from the
Plaintiffs’ filings.
The extent of the burden on the courts and on Defendants resulting from the Plaintiffs’
filings has been significant.
(4)
The adequacy of alternative sanctions.
The court does not believe that mere dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint, or even the
imposition monetary sanctions will be adequate to prevent Plaintiffs from continuing to consume
judicial resources by pursuing these claims.
The court finds that a pre-filing injunction is warranted to prevent Plaintiffs from
continuing to abuse the judicial system by pursuing claims against these Defendants. This
sanction is appropriate because Plaintiffs are “abusing the judicial process by such filings and
117
Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1987).
49
[are] delaying the consideration of meritorious claims.” 118 Plaintiffs are therefore
PROHIBITED from filing any additional complaints or documents in any court against the
Defendants named in this suit without first seeking leave of this court. 119 The court finds that this
prohibition is narrowly “tailored to protect the courts and innocent parties, while preserving the
legitimate rights of litigants.” 120
VI.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. 34) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are PROHIBITED
from filing any additional complaints or documents in any court against the Defendants named in
this suit without first seeking leave of this court. Further, Defendants are ORDERED to file
briefing regarding their attorneys’ fees and costs with the court on or before October 28, 2015.
The Defendants shall have until November 13, 2015 to file a response. The court will assess a
reasonable attorneys’ fee and reasonable costs to be paid by Plaintiffs and for which they will be
jointly and severally liable.
Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Continue (Dkt. 82) is DENIED; Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Leave to File Excess Pages (Dkt. 84) is DENIED; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Clarification (Dkt. 88)
is GRANTED; Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Docketing (Dkt. 92) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
.
SIGNED this the 29th day of September, 2015.
_______________________________
RICHARD A. SCHELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
118
Murphy v. J.A. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1994).
119
See Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2002) (“We have upheld an order
enjoining a litigant from bringing any future litigation on any claim arising from a particular fact
situation, where the litigant was abusing the court system by harassing his opponents.”).
120
Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 187 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
50
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