Obey v. Frisco Medical Center L.L.P. et al

Filing 91

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION, ORDER re 61 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Colleen Wooldridge. CRNAs Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #61) is hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiffs claims in their entirety against Defendant Colleen Wooldridge are DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Amos L. Mazzant, III on 1/30/15. (cm, )

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

SHAWANDA RENEE OBEY, M.D.

§
§
V.
§
§
FRISCO MEDICAL CENTER, L.L.P. d/b/a
§
BAYLOR MEDICAL CENTER AT FRISCO, §
WILLIAM KEATON, Individually and as CEO §
Of Baylor Medical Center at Frisco, DR.
§
JAMES LAFERNEY, Individually and as Vice §
President of Baylor Medical Center at Frisco, §
DR. DALE BURLESON, Individually and as §
Representative of Baylor Medical Center at
§
Frisco Medical Executive Committee, DR.
§
KEITH MATHENY, Individually and as
§
Representative of Baylor Medical Center at
§
Frisco, KAREN MURCHISON, Individually §
And as Representative of Baylor Medical
§
Center at Frisco, and COLLEEN
§
WOOLDRIDGE, Individually
§

CASE NO. 4:13-CV-656
Judge Mazzant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Colleen Wooldridge, CRNA’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. #61). After considering the motion, the responses, and the relevant
pleadings, the Court finds the motion should be granted.
BACKGROUND
In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Shawanda Renee Obey, M.D. (“Dr. Obey”)
alleges a claim of defamation against Defendant Colleen Wooldridge, CRNA (“Wooldridge”)
(Dkt. #35). Plaintiff asserts that on March 16, 2013, one of her patients, Shana Hallmark
(“Hallmark”), was a patient at Frisco Medical Center, L.L.P. d/b/a Baylor Medical Center at
Frisco (“Frisco Medical”) and was admitted for the birth of her son (Dkt. #77, Ex. 4 at 1). At
that time, Plaintiff contends that Wooldridge told Hallmark that her baby “would be born ‘sloppy

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and floppy’ and that he would have extreme withdrawals and would be in a tremendous amount
of pain.” Id. Wooldridge allegedly told Hallmark this information after Wooldridge learned that
Hallmark was prescribed hydrocodone during her pregnancy by Dr. Obey. Id.
On October 20, 2014, Wooldridge filed her motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #61).
On November 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed her response (Dkt. #77).

On December 11, 2014,

Wooldridge filed her reply (Dkt. #81). On December 15, 2014, Wooldridge filed her amended
objections to Plaintiff’s evidence supporting her response (Dkt. #86).
LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported
claims or defenses. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Summary judgment
is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
“[show] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The trial court must resolve all
reasonable doubts in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Casey
Enters., Inc. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations
omitted). The substantive law identifies which facts are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 247. If the
movant bears the burden of proof on a claim or defense on which it is moving for summary
judgment, it must come forward with evidence that establishes “beyond peradventure all of the
essential elements of the claim or defense.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th

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Cir. 1986). Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof, the movant may discharge its
burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmovant’s case.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000).
Once the movant has carried its burden, the nonmovant must “respond to the motion for
summary judgment by setting forth particular facts indicating there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Byers, 209 F.3d at 424 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49). The nonmovant must adduce
affirmative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. No “mere denial of material facts nor . . .
unsworn allegations [nor] arguments and assertions in briefs or legal memoranda” will suffice to
carry this burden. Moayedi v. Compaq Computer Corp., 98 F. App’x 335, 338 (5th Cir. 2004).
Rather, the Court requires “significant probative evidence” from the nonmovant in order to
dismiss a request for summary judgment supported appropriately by the movant. United States v.
Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2001). The Court must consider all of the evidence but
must refrain from making any credibility determinations or from weighing the evidence. See
Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007).
ANALYSIS
“A statement is ‘defamatory’ if it ‘tends to injure a living person’s reputation’ and results
in financial injury to that person.” Young v. Krantz, 434 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Tex. App – Dallas
2014, no pet.) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001). To maintain a cause of
action for defamation, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant: (1) published a statement; (2)
that was defamatory concerning the plaintiff; (3) while acting with negligence, if the plaintiff
was a private individual, regarding the statement. WFAA-TV v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571
(Tex. 1998); Young, 434 S.W.3d at 343.

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Wooldridge contends that Dr. Obey failed to present any evidence that (1) Wooldridge
made the alleged statements; (2) that the statements were false; (3) that the statements were
defamatory as to Dr. Obey; and (4) that Dr. Obey suffered any damages as a result of the alleged
statements. In support of her claims, Dr. Obey offers a letter purportedly written by Hallmark,
the patient to whom Wooldridge allegedly made the defamatory statements (Dkt. #77, Ex. 4).
Wooldridge objects to the admissibility of this evidence, and requests that the letter be stricken
from the summary judgment record (Dkt. #86).
Wooldridge first objects to the entirety of the letter attached to Plaintiff’s response as
Exhibit 4. This letter is purportedly written by Hallmark, addressed to “To Whom It May
Concern” at Frisco Medical, and dated March 18, 2013 (Dkt. #77, Ex. 4). Wooldridge objects to
the letter as inadmissible hearsay under Federal Rules of Evidence 801 and 802, and objects to a
lack of foundation for this document under Federal Rules of Evidence 602 and 701.
“Hearsay” is a statement that “the declarant does not make while testifying at the current
trial or hearing,” and is offered in evidence “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c). A “statement” includes a person’s written assertion, if the
person intended it as an assertion. FED. R. EVID. 801(a). The Court finds that Hallmark’s letter
is hearsay, as it is a written assertion, which Hallmark intended as an assertion, that was not
made while testifying at the current trial or hearing, and is offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted (that the alleged defamatory statements were made and the content of those statements).
Plaintiff does not respond to Wooldridge’s evidentiary objections; however, the Court will
consider whether the statement falls under any exception to the hearsay rule. See FED. R. EVID.
803.

Rule 803(1) provides that hearsay statements “describing or explaining an event or

condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately

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thereafter” should be admissible. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). “The justification for this hearsay
exception relies on the contemporaneousness of the event under consideration and the statement
describing that event.

Because the two occur almost simultaneously, there is almost no

‘likelihood of [a] deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.’” Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co.,
Inc., 922 F.2d 272, 280 (5th Cir. 1991).

The alleged defamatory statements were made to

Hallmark on March 16, 2013, and the letter is dated March 18, 2013. Two days passed between
the time the statements were made and the letter was written, which would allow time to
“consciously manipulate the truth.” See id. (finding a two day period between the event and the
writing to be too long to fit the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule). The
Court finds the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule does not allow this
evidence to be admissible. Rule 803(4) provides that hearsay statements that are “made for—
and [are] reasonably pertinent to – medical diagnosis or treatment” and “describes medical
history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause” should be
admissible. FED. R. EVID. 803(4). The hearsay statements at issue here do not meet this
exception either. While the statements were made in a hospital in a medical environment, the
statements made by both Hallmark and Wooldridge were not made for the purpose of medical
diagnosis or treatment, do not describe past or present symptoms or sensations, their inception or
their general cause. There are no other exceptions to the hearsay rule that would reasonably
apply to the hearsay statements made here, and the Court finds that the letter written by Hallmark
consists of inadmissible hearsay.
Wooldridge also objects to the letter on the basis of improper foundation and that the
letter is not authenticated. “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of
evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is

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what the proponent claims it is.” FED. R. EVID. 901(a). This letter is unsigned, there is no
accompanying affidavit, and there is nothing in the letter to indicate that Hallmark drafted the
letter. There is also no evidence showing that it was sent to Frisco Medical. In her affidavit, Dr.
Obey states that “Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the March 18, 2013 letter from Shana
Hallmark given to me by Ms. Hallmark in March 20013 [sic].” (Dkt. #77, Ex. B at 33, ¶ 43).
This statement is insufficient to show that this document was properly authenticated or establish
a foundation for the letter. The Court agrees that this document is unauthenticated, lacks a
foundation, and is inadmissible. For these reasons, the Court finds that this letter is stricken from
the summary judgment record.
Apart from the letter attached to Dr. Obey’s response as Exhibit 4, Dr. Obey provides no
evidence that Wooldridge made the alleged statements, that they were defamatory, that they were
directed at Dr. Obey, that they were false, or that they caused Dr. Obey any damages. For these
reasons, the Court finds that Wooldridge’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and Dr.
Obey’s defamation claim against Wooldridge is dismissed with prejudice.
Further, even if the letter was admissible, Dr. Obey has provided no evidence that the
statements made were false and defamatory as to Dr. Obey. “Whether a publication is capable of
the defamatory meaning alleged by the plaintiff is a question of law to be determined by the
court.” Double Diamond, Inc. v. Van Tyne, 109 S.W.3d 848, 854 (Tex. App – Dallas, 2003, no
pet.) (citing Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 114 (Tex. 2000)). The alleged
defamatory statement must be construed “as a whole, in light of the surrounding circumstances,
based upon how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive it.” Id. “A statement may be
false, abusive, unpleasant or objectionable to the plaintiff and still not be defamatory in light of
the surrounding circumstances.” Id. (citing Durckel v. St. Joseph Hosp., 78 S.W.3d 576, 583-84

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(Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)). The threshold question is “whether the
complained-of statements are reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning.”

Id. (citation

omitted).
Hallmark’s letter states that after learning that Dr. Obey prescribed her hydrocodone for
sciatica and pelvic bone separation during her pregnancy, that Wooldridge told her that “[her]
baby would be born ‘sloppy and floppy’ and that he would have extreme withdrawals and would
be in a tremendous amount of pain” (Dkt. #77, Ex. 4 at 79). Hallmark’s letter also states that
Wooldridge stated it was absurd that Hallmark had taken this medication during her pregnancy
and that she couldn’t believe that Hallmark did not know that the baby would be born
dysfunctional. Id. Hallmark reiterated that two separate doctors in two separate pregnancies had
prescribed the exact same treatment and medications, to which Wooldridge responded “doctors
prescribe these type [sic] of medications all the time and never feel the need to tell patients that it
will cause the baby to be born with complications.”

Id.

First, the statements made by

Wooldridge do not identify Dr. Obey personally. “Statements that neither identify the plaintiff
nor set forth any wrongful conduct have no defamatory meaning.” Id. (citing Durckel, 78
S.W.3d at 583).

Second, there is no evidence to indicate that the statements made by

Wooldridge were false. Wooldridge made these statements as a medical professional discussing
the effects that oral narcotic medication would have on a baby. While the statements made to
Hallmark may have been alarming or unpleasant, there is no evidence to indicate that the
statements made were actually false. “True statements cannot form the basis of a defamation
complaint.” Id. (citing Randall’s Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex.
1995)). Thus, for this additional reason, the Court finds that Wooldridge’s motion for summary
judgment is granted.

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.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant Colleen Wooldridge, CRNA’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #61) is hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims in their
entirety against Defendant Colleen Wooldridge are DISMISSED with prejudice.
SIGNED this 30th day of January, 2015.

___________________________________
AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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