Stetson Petroleum Corp. et al v. Trident Steel Corporation
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - DENYING 111 MOTION to Strike the Expert Supplemental Opinion of Thomas M. Wadsworth, P.E. filed by Aju Besteel Co. Ltd, Commercial Metals Company, DENYING 112 MOTION to Strike Certain Opini ons and Testimony of Designated Defense Experts filed by Excelsior Resources, Ltd., Stetson Petroleum Corp., R & R Royalty, Ltd., DENYING 120 Opposed MOTION to Strike Supplemental Expert Report of Exponent filed by Excelsior Resources, Ltd., Stetson Petroleum Corp., R & R Royalty, Ltd. Signed by Judge Amos L. Mazzant, III on 11/4/2015. (baf, )
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
STETSON PETROLEUM CORP.,
EXCELSIOR RESOURCES, LTD., R&R
TRIDENT STEEL CORPORATION
CASE NO. 4:14-CV-43
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are Third-Party Defendants AJU Besteel Co. Ltd’s and CMC
Cometals Steel, A Division of CMC’s Motion to Exclude the Expert Supplemental Opinion of
Thomas M. Wadsworth, P.E. (Dkt. #111), Plaintiffs’ Stetson Petroleum Corp., Excelsior
Resources, Ltd., and R&R Royalty, Ltd. Objections and Motion to Exclude Certain Opinions and
Testimony of Designated Defense Experts (Dkt. #112), and Plaintiffs’ Stetson Petroleum Corp.,
Excelsior Resources, Ltd., and R&R Royalty, Ltd. Opposed Motion to Exclude the Supplemental
Expert Report of Exponent Failure Analysis Associates (Dkt. #120).
After reviewing the
relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the motions should be denied.
The present case concerns a casing pipe failure. Stetson Petroleum Corp. (“Stetson”)
bought a string of new 5.5”, 17# (.304 wall) and 20# (.361 wall), L-80, LT & C, API 5CT AJU
BESTEEL casing from Trident Steel Corporation (“Trident”) (Dkt. #112 at p. 1). Trident
delivered the casing to the Coley 35-6 #1 ST well in Conecuh County, Alabama (the “Well”), in
which Stetson was the operator (Dkt. #112 at pp. 1-2). However, during the final positioning of
the casing to set it in the slips of the wellbore, the casing jumped out as a result of a connection
failure (Dkt. #112 at p. 2; Dkt. #121 at p. 3).
On January 21, 2014, Plaintiffs Stetson Petroleum Corp., Excelsior Resources, Ltd., and
R&R Royalty, Ltd. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed their complaint in the Eastern District of
Texas (Dkt. #1). On March 28, 2014, Stetson filed its amended complaint against Trident,
alleging claims under breach of contract, misrepresentation, breach of warranty, the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (the “DTPA”), and negligence in selling the casing (See Dkt. #4). On May
22, 2014, Trident filed its Third-Party Complaint, in which it impleaded AJU Besteel Co., Ltd.
(“AJB”), CMC Cometals Steel, A Division of CMC (“CMC,” collectively with AJB
“AJB/CMC”), and AJU Besteel, USA, Inc. (Dkt. #10). The Third-Party Complaint alleged
causes of action for contribution and indemnity, declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and
breach of warranty (Dkt. #10). On August 28, 2014, Plaintiffs filed cross-claims against CMC
and AJB, alleging causes of action for breach of warranty, negligence, and deceptive trade
practices (Dkt. #30).
On January 5, 2015, Plaintiffs served their Designation of Experts, and designated
Thomas Wadsworth, P.E. (“Wadsworth”), as Plaintiffs’ expert witness (Dkt. #111 at p. 3).
Wadsworth’s report concludes that the casing failed in part because of pin jumpout (Dkt. #111 at
On February 18, 2015, AJB served their Designation of Experts, where it designated Dr.
L. Brun Hilbert (“Hilbert”), a mechanical and petroleum engineer, and Dr. Lawrence E.
Eiselstein (“Eiselstein”), a metallurgist, as testifying experts (Dkt. #111 at p. 3). Their report
concluded that the casing failure likely occurred because either Energy Drilling exerted too much
force in pulling the casing into place, and/or Tubular defectively threaded the casing (Dkt. #111
at p. 3).
On March 13, 2015, AJB filed its Third-Party Complaint against Energy Drilling Corp.
(“Energy Drilling”) and Tubular Services, LLC (“Tubular”) alleging, in part, that “[Tubular]
improperly performed threading work on the casing.” (Dkt. #115 at p. 4; see Dkt. #75 at ¶ 23).
The complaint also alleged that “Energy Drilling pulled the casing with too much force that the
casing separated at the threaded connection.” (Dkt. #75 at ¶ 26). On April 24, 2015, CMC filed
its Third-Party Complaint against Energy Drilling and Tubular, alleging similar contentions as
AJB’s Third-Party Complaint (Dkt. #86).1
On April 1, 2015, Wadsworth supplemented his previous report in order to set forth four
different conclusions (Dkt. #111 at p. 3). On July 15, 2015, AJB/CMC supplemented the report
of their experts, Drs. Hilbert and Eiselstein (the “Exponent Supplemental Report”), in order to
include the new conclusions of Wadsworth (Dkt. #121 at p. 6).
On July 20, 2015, AJB/CMC filed their Motion to Strike the Expert Supplemental
Opinion of Thomas M. Wadsworth, P.E. (Dkt. #111). On August 6, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their
response (Dkt. #118). On August 17, 2015, AJB/CMC filed their reply (Dkt. 127).
Also on July 20, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Strike Certain Opinions and
Testimony of Certain Defense Experts (Dkt. #112).
On August 6, 2015, Trident filed its
response (Dkt. #117), and AJB/CMC filed their response (Dkt. #121). On August 17, 2015,
Plaintiffs filed their reply (Dkt. #125; Dkt. #126). On August 26, 2015, Trident filed its surreply (Dkt. #130).
On August 6, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Exclude the Supplement Expert
Report of Exponent Failure Analysis Associates (Dkt. #120).
On September 28, 2015,
AJB/CMC filed their response.
On October 30, 2015, Energy Drilling was dismissed with prejudice by AJB/CMC (Dkt. #156).
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides for the admission of expert testimony that assists
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. FED. R. EVID. 702. In
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., the Supreme Court instructed courts to function as
gatekeepers, and determine whether expert testimony should be presented to the jury. 509 U.S.
579, 590-93 (1993). Courts act as gatekeepers of expert testimony “to make certain that an
expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in
the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in
the relevant field.” Kuhmo Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
The party offering the expert’s testimony has the burden to prove that: (1) the expert is
qualified; (2) the testimony is relevant to an issue in the case; and (3) the testimony is reliable.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-91. A proffered expert witness is qualified to testify by virtue of his or
her “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” FED. R. EVID. 702. Moreover, in
order to be admissible, expert testimony must be “not only relevant but reliable.” Daubert, 509
U.S. at 589. “This gate-keeping obligation applies to all types of expert testimony, not just
scientific testimony.” Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing
Kuhmo, 526 U.S. at 147).
In deciding whether to admit or exclude expert testimony, the court should consider
numerous factors. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. In Daubert, the Supreme Court offered the
following, non-exclusive list of factors that courts may use when evaluating the reliability of
expert testimony: (1) whether the expert’s theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2)
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the
known or potential rate of error of the challenged method; and (4) whether the theory or
technique is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-94; Pipitone,
288 F.3d at 244. When evaluating Daubert challenges, courts focus “on [the experts’] principles
and methodology, not on the conclusions that [the experts] generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
The Daubert factors are not “a definitive checklist or test.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. As
the Court has emphasized, the Daubert framework is “a flexible one.” Id. at 594. The test for
determining reliability can adapt to the particular circumstances underlying the testimony at
issue. See Kuhmo, 526 U.S. at 152. Accordingly, the decision to allow or exclude experts from
testifying under Daubert is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. St. Martin v.
Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc., 224 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
Motion to Exclude Supplemental Opinion of Thomas M. Wadsworth, P.E.
AJB/CMC move to strike the supplemental opinion of Plaintiffs’ expert Wadsworth, as
untimely and unreliable under Rule 702. AJB/CMC argues that Wadsworth’s supplemental
opinion is unreliable because (1) his opinions are based on an unsupported assumption that the
casing, which allegedly failed, had a hooked end, and (2) his opinions are not the product of the
proper application of reliable principles and methods (Dkt. #111 at p. 6). AJB/CMC also
contend that Wadsworth’s supplemental opinion is untimely, as Plaintiffs supplemented their
expert opinion to include new information that was not previously disclosed by the Court’s
January 5, 2015 deadline to designate an expert (Dkt. #111 at p. 4). Plaintiffs allege that their
supplemental expert opinion is timely as Plaintiffs had a duty to supplement Wadsworth’s expert
report if new information was received in the case (Dkt. #118 at pp. 5-6). Additionally, Plaintiffs
allege that the supplemental opinion is reliable, and therefore, is admissible (Dkt. #118 at p. 8).
First AJB/CMC objects to the Wadsworth Supplemental Report as being untimely filed
(Dkt. #111 at p. 4). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) states:
(1) A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)—or who has responded
to an interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission—must
supplement or correct its disclosure or response:
(A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the
disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties
during the discovery process or in writing; or
(B) as ordered by the court.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1); see Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d
546, 570, n. 42 (5th Cir. 1996). Additionally, for an expert witness, this duty to disclose extends
to both the information included in the report and the information included during the deposition.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(2).
At the time of Wadsworth’s initial report, Plaintiffs did not have possession of documents
from AJB, CMC, or Trident (Dkt. #118 at p. 4). In October 2014, Plaintiffs received documents
pursuant to a written questions deposition by Plaintiffs regarding Tubular (Dkt. #118 at p. 4).
Plaintiffs assert that “once additional records were received from other parties and analyzed,
Plaintiffs found records from Tubular Services that indicated that 710 out of 713 joints of casing,
including the casing at issue in this case, had to be shimmed in order to be threaded due to a
condition known as ‘hooked ends.’” (Dkt. #118 at p. 4).
Additionally, in January 2015, Plaintiffs served requests for production to Trident
regarding quality control issues at AJB mills (Dkt. #118 at p. 5). Trident responded with
documents that reflected quality control issues with CMC and AJB pipe (Dkt. #118 at p. 5). In
March and April 2015, CMC supplemented its document disclosures, and Plaintiffs “learned that
the overwhelming likelihood that casing that failed in its well bore was in the production run
where Tubular Services reported 98.6% of the casing had to be shimmed because hooked ends
prevented cutting a proper API thread unless the pipe was shimmed” (Dkt. #118 at p. 5). On
March 11, 2015, AJB completed its document production (Dkt. #118 at p. 5).
The Court finds that given the dates of discovery, the Wadsworth Supplemental Report
was timely filed on April 1, 2015. Therefore, the Court overrules AJB/CMC’s objections to the
Wadsworth Supplemental Report.
Rule 702 requires that an expert witness be qualified. “A district court should refuse to
allow an expert witness to testify if it finds that the witness is not qualified to testify in a
particular field or on a given subject.” United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir.
2009); see Wilson v. Woods, 163 F.3d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 1999)). However, Rule 702 does not
demand that an expert be highly qualified in order to testify, and “[d]ifferences in expertise bear
chiefly on the weight to be assigned to the testimony by the trier of fact[.]” Huss v. Gayden, 571
F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009).
Rule 702 also requires that expert testimony be relevant. “Relevance depends upon
‘whether [the expert’s] reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.’”
Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Daubert, 509
U.S. at 593). The Fifth Circuit has stated that testimony is relevant when it “assist[s] the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Pipitone, 288 F.3d at 245
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).
Finally, Rule 702 requires that expert testimony be reliable. “Reliability is determined by
assessing ‘whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid.’” Knight, 482 F.3d at 352 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93). When determining
reliability, “[t]he court focuses on the expert’s methodology, not the conclusions generated by
it.” Orthoflex, Inc. v. ThermoTek, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 776, 783 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (citing Nunn
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 3:08-CV-1486-D, 2010 WL 2540754, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
June 22, 2010)). “If, however, ‘there is simply too great an analytical gap between the [basis for
the expert opinion] and the opinion proffered,’ the court may exclude the testimony as
unreliable.” Orthoflex, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 783 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
146 (1997)); see also Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452, 460-61 (5th Cir. 2012); Moore v.
Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1998).
AJB/CMC alleges that Wadsworth’s supplemental opinion is unreliable because his
opinion is “not the product of proper application of reliable principles methods.” (Dkt. #111 at
p. 7). Specifically, AJB/CMC argues that Wadsworth utilized a linear beam theory to support his
opinions; however, Wadsworth should have used a nonlinear beam theory, as an “application of
a linear beam theory results in a significant overestimation of the bending movement of the
casing.” (Dkt. #111 at p. 7). AJB/CMC also contend that the equation used by Wadsworth is no
longer applicable, and that Wadsworth indicates in his supplemental report that “the ‘effective’
tensile load was larger than was recorded by the Pason EDR data at the rig.” (Dkt. #111 at p. 7).
AJB/CMC do not contend that Wadsworth is not qualified to render an opinion;
therefore, the Court will only address their relevancy and reliability contentions. The Court finds
that Wadsworth’s supplemental opinion is reliable; and therefore, is admissible at trial. In his
supplemental opinion, Wadsworth does list the documents that he reviewed in reaching his
conclusion (Dkt. #118, Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3). AJB/CMC do not present the Court with any
evidence that Wadsworth’s analysis of the hooked ends and his opinion is not based on “the
proper application of reliable principles and methods.” (Dkt. #118 at p. 11). However, Plaintiffs
state that Wadsworth relied on recognized publications and texts when creating his opinion (Dkt.
#118 at p. 11). Additionally, the Court finds that the methodology used to estimate the increased
fiber stress due to the hooked ends is valid, and is supported by mechanical engineering
textbooks and taught in accredited engineering schools (See Dkt. #118 at pp. 11-12).
The Court’s gate-keeping function under Daubert is not intended to replace the
adversarial system and the jury’s responsibility to evaluate and weigh the evidence presented by
each party’s experts. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation
of contrary evience, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”); see also United States v. 14.38
Acres of Land Situated in Leflore Cty., Miss., 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996) (The trial court
must act “with proper deference to the jury’s role as the arbiter of disputes between conflicting
opinions. As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an expert’s opinion
affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its admissibility and should be left for
the jury’s consideration.”). The Court finds that Wadsworth’s supplemental opinion is relevant
Therefore, the Court finds that Third-Party Defendants’ motion to exclude
Wadsworth’s supplemental report should be denied.
Plaintiffs’ Objections and Motion to Exclude Testimony of Defense Experts (Dkt. #112)2
Expert Report of John E. Slater, Ph.D., P.E.
Plaintiffs move to strike the testimony of John E. Slater (“Slater”), Trident’s expert
witness. Although Plaintiffs do not challenge Slater’s qualifications as engineer, they maintain
that his opinion is based on speculation and is not reliable (Dkt. #112 at p. 5). Trident alleges
that Slater’s opinions are relevant, reliable, and based upon a well-founded methodology (Dkt.
#117 at p. 7).
Although the Court will address Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, Plaintiffs should note that the motion does not comply
with the Local Rule CV-7. Local Rule CV-7(h) states that “[t]he ‘meet and confer’ motions practice requirement
imposed by this rule has two components, a substantive and a procedural component. For opposed motions, the
substantive component requires, at a minimum, a personal conference, by telephone or in person, between an
attorney for the movant and an attorney for the non-movant.” L.R. CV-7(h). On August 14, 2015, Plaintiffs
submitted a notice stating that they completed their meet and confer requirement (Dkt. #124). However, the Parties
should note that they must comply with the Local Rules in the future.
The Fifth Circuit has noted that a court “must bear in mind the purpose of [the expert’s]
testimony when addressing its reliability.” Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir.
2002). The purpose of Slater’s testimony is to “offer testimony regarding metallurgical testing
and evaluation conducted in this matter…[and] the cause(s) of the casing failure.” (Dkt. #117,
Exhibit E at p. 3; Exhibit D at ¶ 3).
Plaintiffs also allege that “Slater has not stated any objective, scientific basis to conclude
that the tensile load must have increased in the 10 second interval between data gathering[;]” and
therefore, his opinion should be excluded as improper ipse dixit opinions (Dkt. #112 at p. 7).
Reliability and validity do not require certainty, but there must be evidence that the knowledge is
more than the mere speculation of the expert witness. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. The Supreme
Court noted that “it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony
must be ‘known’ to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science.” Id.
In the present case, the exact hook load weight at the time of the failure is unknown;
therefore, Slater, as well as the other experts, must infer what the tensile load was based on the
known facts and accepted truths in their fields. Slater’s opinion is based upon his physical
observations of the failed casing, as noted in the Element and T.H. Hill reports, the pullout and
fracture strengths for the connection, and his general knowledge of metallurgy and the properties
at issue (See Dkt. #117 at p. 10). The Court finds that Slater’s testimony is reliable because it is
supported by the appropriate validation. Therefore, the Court will overrule Plaintiffs objections
and deny their motion to strike the testimony of Slater.
Expert Report of Kenneth P. Malloy, P.E.
Plaintiffs object to and move to strike the testimony of Kenneth P. Malloy, P.E.
(“Malloy”) on the basis that his opinions are unsupported by objective data, which renders them
unreliable (Dkt. #112 at p. 7). Trident asserts that Malloy’s opinions are admissible because they
“are relevant, reliable, and based upon a well-founded methodology.” (Dkt. #117 at p. 10). Rule
703 allows the admissibility of an expert witness’ opinion if the sources underlying the opinion
are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the particular field when forming opinions or
inferences on the subject. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
Malloy based his opinions on the information that was made available to him, his years of
training, practical field experience, a review of current recommended practices, and associated
records (See Dkt. #117, Exhibit F). Additionally, Malloy’s report lists the publications that he
reviewed in reaching his opinions (Dkt. #117, Exhibit F).
Plaintiffs claim that Malloy’s
testimony is not admissible because “he  offers no analysis to support his conclusion that the
hold was tortuous or corkscrewed.” (Dkt. #117 at p. 11; See Dkt. #112 at pp. 8-9). Because
Malloy includes in his report the publications and materials that he relied upon in making his
decision, the Court finds that his opinion is reliable and his opinion is admissible at trial. It is the
province of the trier of fact to make determinations of witness credibility. See Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 596. Therefore, the Court overrules Plaintiffs objections and denies their motion to strike the
testimony of Malloy.
Supplemental Report of Exponent Failure Analysis Associates (Dkt. #112/Dkt. #120)
Plaintiffs object to and move to strike Exponent Failure Analysis Associates’
(“Exponent”) Supplemental Report (the “Exponent Supplemental Report”) in its entirety as
untimely and prejudicial (Dkt. #112 at p. 10). Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that the Exponent
Supplemental Report should be stricken because it is unreliable as “the opinions are not the
product of ‘reliable principles and methods’ and implements the use of ‘flawed’ methodology[.]”
(Dkt. #120 at p. 3). AJB/CMC asserts that the Exponent Supplemental Report is not untimely as
“it was served within a reasonable time after receipt of (1) the untimely supplemental expert
report by [Plaintiffs] and (2) necessary discovery needed to rebut Mr. Wadsworth’s conclusions.”
(Dkt. #121 at p. 10).
In his Supplemental Opinion, Wadsworth opined, in part, that the casing that allegedly
failed had a hooked end. AJB/CMC contends that this was “espoused for the first time in
Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Report” and that “it was necessary for AJB/CMC to obtain additional
discovery regarding the casing delivered to Stetson.” (Dkt. #121 at p. 11). In order to obtain
information regarding Wadsworth’s Supplemental Report, ABJ/CMC took the deposition of
Matthew Beckmann (“Beckmann”) on June 9, 2015 (Dkt. #121 at p. 11). ABJ/CMC received
the deposition transcript on June 29, 2015, and served their supplemental report approximately
seventeen days later (Dkt. #121 at p. 11).
The Court finds that the Exponent Supplemental Report is timely, however, even if it
were untimely, the potential prejudice to Plaintiffs would be harmless. When determining if
prejudice exists, the Court looks to the following four factors: (1) the explanation for the timing
of the disclosure, (2) the potential prejudice to the opposing party if the evidence is allowed, (3)
the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice, and (4) the importance of the evidence.
CQ, Inc. v. TXU Mining Co., L.P., 565 F.3d 268, 280 (5th Cir. 2009).
AJB/CMC states that the Exponent Supplemental Report was not served until July 15,
2015, because it needed to investigate and obtain additional discovery after receiving
Wadsworth’s Supplement Report (Dkt. #121 at p. 11). The Court finds that the evidence is
necessary to AJB/CMC’s cross-examination of Wadsworth, as Wadsworth expressed new
opinions regarding hooked ends in his supplemental report. Additionally, the Court finds that the
prejudice to Plaintiffs is minimal, and could be easily cured by a continuance of the Court’s July
17, 2015 deadline to object to the supplemental expert report.
Plaintiffs also contend that the Exponent Supplemental Report should be stricken as
unreliable (See Dkt. #120 at p. 7). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the Exponent Supplement
Report “makes no reference to any authoritative text or theory upon which it relies and upon
which practitioners in the field rely to support its assertions (Dkt. #120 at p. 7). AJB/CMC assert
that “the opinions of Exponent are based on [Hilbert and Eiselstein’s] respective knowledge,
training, and experience, as well as their utilization of well-accepted methodologies within the
scientific community.” (Dkt. #140 at p. 7).
The Court finds that the Exponent Supplemental Report is reliable, and thus, admissible.
In the Exponent Supplemental Report, Hilbert and Eiselstein cite the documents that they relied
upon when reaching their conclusion (Dkt. #120, Exhibit 4). Additionally, they reached their
opinions based upon their knowledge, training, and experience. As previously stated, the Court’s
role as a gate-keeper should not invade upon the trier of fact’s role in making credibility
determinations at trial. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. Because Hilbert and Eiselstein used
accepted methodologies and stated the materials that they relied upon to make their decisions,
the Court finds that the Exponent Supplemental Report is reliable. Therefore, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs’ objections to and motion to strike the Exponent Supplemental Report is denied.
It is therefore ORDERED that Third-Party Defendants AJU Besteel Co. Ltd’s and CMC
Cometals Steel, A Division of CMC’s Motion to Exclude the Expert Supplemental Opinion of
Thomas M. Wadsworth, P.E. (Dkt. #111) is hereby DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Stetson Petroleum Corp., Excelsior Resources,
Ltd., and R&R Royalty, Ltd. Objection and Motion to Exclude Certain Opinions and Testimony
of Designated Defense Experts (Dkt. #112) is hereby DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Stetson Petroleum Corp., Excelsior Resources,
Ltd., and R&R Royalty, Ltd. Opposed Motion to Exclude the Supplemental Expert Report of
Exponent Failure Analysis Associates (Dkt. #120) is hereby DENIED.
SIGNED this 4th day of November, 2015.
AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?