Shugart v. Six Unknown Fannin County Sheriffs et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL. ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). It is further ORDERED that the claims against the six unknown Fannin County sheriff deputies are DISMISSED with prejudic e to their being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met. It is further ORDERED that the claims against the State of Texas are DISMISSED with prejudice for all purposes. It is finally ORDERED that all motions not previously ruled on are DENIED. Signed by Judge Amos L. Mazzant, III on 1/21/2015. (kls, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

RICKY JOE SHUGART, #1917471

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VS.

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SIX UNKNOWN FANNIN COUNTY
SHERIFFS, ET AL.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14cv782

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Ricky Joe Shugart, an inmate previously confined in the Fannin County Jail,
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed the above-styled and numbered civil lawsuit pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against six unknown Fannin County sheriff deputies and the State of Texas.
The Plaintiff is complaining about events that led to his Fannin County conviction for the
offense of possession of marijuana. He states that on or about September 2, 2013, he was in the
privacy of his home when six unknown Fannin County deputies barged into his house without a
warrant. The Plaintiff admitted to them that he had a small bag of marijuana in a drawer next to his
living room seat. He was arrested. While being escorted outside, he observed agents going in and out
of a greenhouse located behind his residence. One of the deputies commented about the large quantity
of marijuana located in the greenhouse.
Upon the advice of his attorney, the Plaintiff pled guilty to possessing over 50 and under 2,000
pounds of marijuana. He was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. He alleges that he was
subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure, but his attorney would not consider the defense. He
is asking for damages associated with the search and destruction of his property.
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The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff who seeks to recover damages under § 1983 for
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid must first prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). The Supreme Court provided the following
explanation:
We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging
the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that
necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just
as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution.
Id. at 486. The Supreme Court thus held that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,
the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would the complaint must be dismissed unless the
plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487.
In the present case, the Plaintiff is complaining about the facts surrounding his conviction for
possession of marijuana. In particular, he alleges that he was the victim of an unreasonable search and
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A judgment in his
favor in this case would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. He has not shown that his
conviction has been invalidated. Consequently, the lawsuit is barred by Heck. The lawsuit fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted and is frivolous in that it lacks any basis in law and fact.
The lawsuit should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit has held that
claims barred by Heck should read as follows: “Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice to their
being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met.” Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th
Cir. 1996). The Fifth Circuit referred to this language as the “preferred” language. Id.

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The Fifth Circuit raised one additional factor in Heck situations for courts to consider in Boyd
v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1994). The Fifth Circuit held “that it remains appropriate for district
courts to consider the possible applicability of the doctrine of absolute immunity, . . .” Id. at 284. To
prevent a plaintiff from refiling claims against defendants with absolute immunity, such as judges and
prosecutors, such claims should be dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 284-85. The Plaintiff has sued the
State of Texas. The Eleventh Amendment provides the State of Texas immunity from liability.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985). The claims against the State of Texas should be
dismissed with prejudice for all purposes. It is accordingly
ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). It is
further
ORDERED that the claims against the six unknown Fannin County sheriff deputies are
DISMISSED with prejudice to their being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met. It is
.

further
ORDERED that the claims against the State of Texas are DISMISSED with prejudice for all
purposes. It is finally
ORDERED that all motions not previously ruled on are DENIED.
SIGNED this 21st day of January, 2015.

___________________________________
AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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