McKinney Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 107 v. McKinney Texas City of et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 13 MOTION to Dismiss and Brief to Dismiss for Failure to State A Claim filed by McKinney Police Association, McKinney Texas City of. It is further ORDERED that Plai ntiffs claim of conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further ORDERED that if Plaintiff believes it can assert a claim meeting theelements of section 1985(3), it may file a motion for leave to amend its complaint. Signed by Judge Amos L. Mazzant, III on 4/1/2016. (baf, )

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

MCKINNEY FRATERNAL ORDER OF
POLICE LODGE 107

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v.
CITY OF MCKINNEY, TEXAS and
MCKINNEY POLICE ASSOCIATION

CASE NO. 4:15-CV-689
Judge Mazzant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendants’, City of McKinney and McKinney Police
Association, 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. #13). After
considering the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that Defendants’ motion should be
granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The source of this dispute is grounded in a labor contract negotiated between the
City of McKinney, Texas (“the City”) and the McKinney Police Association (“MPA”)
(collectively, “Defendants”) that became effective October 1, 2015 (Dkt. #1 at p. 1). This
contract applies to all McKinney Police Department Officers, which includes members of
McKinney Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 107 (“Lodge 107”). The specific controversy
arises over provisions that (1) terminated Lodge 107’s automatic payroll deductions for
association dues (“dues check-offs”), and (2) barred Lodge 107’s members from further
use of police department bulletin boards (Dkt. #1 at pp. 1-2).
The parties agree that during all relevant times, the labor contract was required to
be negotiated under the meet and confer provisions of Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 142.051068 (Dkt. #1 at p. 5; see Dkt. #13 at p. 3). As the majority union, MPA was the exclusive

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bargaining agent of the McKinney Police Department (Dkt. #1 at p. 5; Dkt. #13 at p. 2).
Negotiations between MPA and the City were not open to the public,1 and none of Lodge
107’s members were included in these negotiations (Dkt. #1 at pp. 7-8; Dkt. #13 at p. 2).
Pursuant to Tex. Gov’t Code § 142.064, the proposed contract required ratification by a
majority of officers in the department before it could take effect.
Lodge 107 alleges that on or about July 5, 2015, and prior to the required
ratification vote, MPA distributed a bullet point summary highlighting the differences
between the current and the proposed labor agreements (Dkt. #17 at p. 5). Lodge 107
further alleges this summary failed to disclose that the proposed contract would terminate
dues check-offs and use of department bulletin boards for anyone not a member of MPA
(Dkt. #17 at p. 5). The parties agree that the negotiated labor contract was ratified by the
majority of the McKinney Police Department Officers on or around July 8, 2015, and
became effective on October 1, 2015 (Dkt. #1 at p. 7; Dkt. #13 at p. 3). Lodge 107
alleges that Defendants have long expressed their opposition to any competing
association, and that this represents the latest effort to suppress the viewpoints of Lodge
107’s members. (Dkt. #1 at p. 7).
On October 7, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint that asserts the following claims:
(1) deprivation of First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association under 42
U.S.C. § 1983; (2) deprivation of due process of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3)
deprivation of equal protection of the laws under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) unlawful
conspiracy to deprive Lodge 107 of its constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and
(5) declaratory relief (Dkt. #1). On November 24, 2015, Defendants filed their 12(b)(6)

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While Plaintiff and Defendants disagree on the permissibility of these meetings, the Court finds that a
plain reading of Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 142.036(b) allows for the City or MPA to conduct internal private
caucuses, but not private negotiations with each other.

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Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. #13). On January 8, 2016, Plaintiff
filed a response (Dkt. #17), and on February 10, 2016, Defendants a reply (Dkt. #28).
LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which authorizes certain defenses to be presented via pretrial motions. A
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss argues that, irrespective of jurisdiction, the complaint
fails to assert facts that give rise to legal liability of the defendant. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure require that each claim in a complaint include “a short and plain
statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The
claim must include enough factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, “[t]o
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a party may move for dismissal of an action for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court
must accept as true all well-pleaded facts contained in the plaintiff’s complaint and view
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th
Cir. 1996). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Gonzalez v.
Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009). “The Supreme Court recently expounded upon
the Twombly standard, explaining that ‘[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face.’” Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 603 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “It follows, that ‘where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but
it has not ‘shown’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id.
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court established a two-step approach for assessing the
sufficiency of a complaint in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First the Court
should identify and disregard conclusory allegations, for they are “not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. Second, the Court “consider[s] the factual
allegations in [the complaint] to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.” Id. “This standard ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary claims or
elements.” Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2009). This evaluation
will “be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a district court may generally
not “go outside the complaint.” Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir.
2003). However, a district court may consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss
if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s
claim. Id.

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ANALYSIS
After reviewing the complaint, motion to dismiss, response, and reply, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has stated plausible claims for purposes of defeating a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, except as to the 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) conspiracy to interfere with civil rights
claim, which the Court will address below.
The Supreme Court has yet to define the limits of what, “perhaps class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus” covers. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268 (1993). However, the Fifth Circuit has unequivocally held that
to state a claim under section 1985(3), a plaintiff must plead: (1) a conspiracy involving
two or more persons; (2) for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or
class of equal protection of the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4)
which causes injury to a person or property, or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States; and (5) a racially based discriminatory animus. Chaney v.
Races & Aces, 590 F. App’x 327, 330 (5th Cir. 2014); see Johnson ex rel. Wilson v.
Dowd, 305 F. App’x 221, 224 (5th Cir. 2008); Horaist v. Doctor's Hosp. of Opelousas,
255 F.3d 261, 271 (5th Cir. 2001); Newberry v. E. Texas State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 281
n.2 (5th Cir. 1998).
Defendants argue that the claim should be dismissed because Lodge 107’s status
as a “class” does not fall within the narrow scope of section 1985(3). (Dkt. #13 at pp. 1415). Defendants cite United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott,
463 U.S. 825, 837 (1983), which held that a class based upon economic animus is not
protected under section 1985(3) (Dkt. #13 at p. 15). Defendants assert that as a police
union, Lodge 107 is a class based upon economic animus, and therefore not within the

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scope of section 1985(3) (Dkt. #13 at p. 16).

Lodge 107 argues that Defendants

mischaracterize unions as purely economic based classes (Dkt. #17 at pp. 25-26). To
support this contention, Lodge 107 cites Liberty City Officers Ass’n v. Stewart, 903 F.
Supp. 1046 (E.D. Tex. 1995)2, which held a police organization to be a class within the
scope of section 1985(3) (Dkt. #17 at p. 26).
Neither party addresses the element of a racially based discriminatory animus as
required by the Fifth Circuit. The Court finds Lodge 107’s complaint and response are
devoid of any factual allegations that Defendant’s conduct was motivated by any racial
considerations. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) should be dismissed as not plausible.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants’, City of McKinney and McKinney
Police Association, 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. #13) is
hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claim of conspiracy to interfere with

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civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that if Plaintiff believes it can assert a claim meeting the
elements of section 1985(3), it may file a motion for leave to amend its complaint.
SIGNED this 1st day of April, 2016.

___________________________________
AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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In Liberty, it appears that the issue of racial animus was not assessed.

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