Gestion Proche, Inc. v. Dialight Corporation

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by Judge Amos L. Mazzant, III on 6/30/2017. (pad, )

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

GESTION PROCHE, INC.
v.
DIALIGHT CORP.

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Civil Action No. 4:16-CV-407
Judge Mazzant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff Gestion Proche, Inc.’s (“Plaintiff” or “GP”) Opening Claim
Construction Brief (Dkt. #35), Defendant Dialight Corp.’s (“Defendant” or “Dialight”)
Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. #40), and Plaintiff’s Reply Claim Construction Brief
(Dkt. #43).1 Also before the Court are the parties’ April 13, 2017 Joint Claim Construction and
Prehearing Statement (Dkt. #30) and the parties’ June 5, 2017 Joint Claim Construction Chart
(Dkt. #38). The Court held a claim construction hearing on June 15, 2017, to determine the
proper construction of the disputed claim terms in United States Patent No. 7,557,524 (the “’524
Patent”).
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The parties proposed the schedule of an opening brief due May 24, 2017, a response brief due June 7, 2017, and a
reply brief due June 14, 2017, followed by the claim construction hearing on June 15, 2017 (Dkt. #18-1 at p. 2). The
Court adopted this proposed briefing schedule (Dkt. #20 at p. 2). Plaintiff later requested a two-day extension for its
opening brief, which Defendant did not oppose (Dkt. #34). Defendant then requested a two-day extension for its
response brief, which Plaintiff did not oppose and the Court granted (Dkt. #36; Dkt. #37). Nonetheless, Plaintiff has
stated in its reply brief:
GP has had only three days to analyze Dialight’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief,
and to prepare this [reply] and for the claim construction hearing. Counsel for GP conferred with
counsel for Defendant to determine if Defendant was opposed to a brief two (2) day extension to
file this reply given the time constraints. Counsel for Defendant indicated Defendant was opposed
to such an extension. Accordingly, GP is filing this reply without a request for an extension of
time.
Given the time constraints, the scope of this reply is limited to those matters GP has been
able to address during this brief three day period.
(Dkt. #43 at p. 1). To the extent Plaintiff has asserted it has been prejudiced by the reduction of the reply time from
five business days to three business days, any purported prejudice is not cognizable in light of the parties’ joint
proposed schedule and the absence of any objections to the first two above-noted requests for extensions. At the
June 15, 2017 hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that Plaintiff does not intend to assert that it has been unfairly
prejudiced.

The Court issues this Memorandum Opinion and Order and hereby incorporates-byreference the claim construction hearing and transcript as well as the demonstrative slides
presented by the parties during the hearing. For the following reasons, the Court provides the
constructions set forth below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings suit alleging infringement of United States Patent No. 7,557,524. The
’524 Patent, titled “Lighting Device,” issued on July 7, 2009, and bears an earliest priority date
of December 19, 2001. The Abstract of the ’524 Patent states:
An LED lighting device is provided which is capable of being connected to a
network and being controlled by a host computer also connected to the network.
The lighting device has several lifespan expanding features such as including
several extra LEDs such that as the LEDs of the lighting device degrade over time
more LEDs can be turned on thus allowing a constant luminosity to be
maintained.
’524 Patent at Abstract. Plaintiff has asserted Claims 1, 6, 12, 14, 15, and 17 of the ’524 Patent
(Dkt. #35 at p. 1).
LEGAL STANDARDS
Claim construction is a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d
967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The purpose of claim construction is to
resolve the meanings and technical scope of claim terms. U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). When the parties dispute the scope of a claim term, “it is
the court’s duty to resolve it.” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d
1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention
to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
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381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The Court examines a patent’s intrinsic evidence to
define the patented invention’s scope. Id. at 1313–14; Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad
Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Intrinsic evidence includes the
claims, the rest of the specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13;
Bell Atl. Network Servs., 262 F.3d at 1267. The Court gives claim terms their ordinary and
customary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
Claim language guides the Court’s construction of claim terms.

Phillips, 415 F.3d

at 1314. “[T]he context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.”
Id. Other claims, asserted and unasserted, can provide additional instruction because “terms are
normally used consistently throughout the patent.” Id. Differences among claims, such as
additional limitations in dependent claims, can provide further guidance. Id.
“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id.
at 1315 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 979). “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to
the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the
meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2002). In the specification, a patentee may define his own terms, give a claim term a different
meaning than it would otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow some claim scope. Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1316. Although the Court generally presumes terms possess their ordinary meaning,
this presumption can be overcome by statements of clear disclaimer. See Cultor Corp. v. A.E.
Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d 1328, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Claims are not correctly construed to

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cover what was expressly disclaimed.”). This presumption does not arise when the patentee acts
as his own lexicographer. Irdeto Access, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
The specification may also resolve ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and
accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of
the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325. For example, “[a]
claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the scope of the claim ‘is rarely,
if ever, correct.’” Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elam Comput. Grp. Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583). But, “[a]lthough the specification may aid
the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed language in the claims, particular embodiments
and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.” Constant
v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Phillips, 415 F.3d
at 1323.
The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim
construction because a patentee may define a term during prosecution of the patent. See, e.g.,
Home Diagnostics Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] patent
applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent . . . .”). The well-established doctrine of
prosecution disclaimer “preclud[es] patentees from recapturing through claim interpretation
specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.” Omega Eng’g Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d
1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003). When a patentee distinguishes a claimed invention over the prior
art, he is “indicating what the claims do not cover” and “by implication surrendering such
protection.” Ekchian v. Home Depot, Inc., 104 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “As a basic
principle of claim interpretation, prosecution disclaimer promotes the public notice function of

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the intrinsic evidence and protects the public’s reliance on definitive statements made during
prosecution.” Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d at 1324. However, the prosecution history must show
that the patentee “clearly and unambiguously ‘disclaimed or disavowed the proposed
interpretation during prosecution to obtain claim allowance.”’ Middleton Inc. v. Minn. Mining
and Mfg. Co. (3M Co.), 311 F.3d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Statements will constitute disclaimer of
scope only if they are “clear and unmistakable statements of disavowal.” Cordis Corp. v.
Medtronic AVE, Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “An ambiguous disavowal will not
suffice.” Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 593 F.3d 1275, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative
meaning of claim language,” the Court may rely on extrinsic evidence to “shed useful light on
the relevant art.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Technical dictionaries and treatises may help the Court understand the underlying technology
and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use claim terms, but such sources may also
provide overly broad definitions or may not be indicative of how terms are used in the patent. Id.
at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony may aid the Court in determining the particular meaning of
a term in the pertinent field, but “conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the
definition of a claim term are not useful.” Id. Generally, extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than
the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Id.
ANALYSIS
Agreed Claim Terms
The parties have agreed upon the following constructions:

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Term

Agreed Construction

“light emitting diode” / “light emitting diodes”

“a semiconductor diode that emits light when
conducting current”

Claims 1, 12, 15
“part of said illumination groups”

“a member of one or more of said illumination
groups”

Claim 1
“separate from said illumination groups”

“not a member of one or more of said
illumination groups”

Claim 1

(Dkt. #30 at p. 1; Dkt. #38, App’x A at pp. 2, 7).

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Disputed Claim Terms
A. “control means for maintaining the luminosity of the lighting device at a desired
level”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendant’s Proposed Construction

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.

Defendant contends that this
governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.

phrase

is

Function:
“maintaining luminosity of the lighting Function:
device at a desired level”
“controlling the electrical current
provided to the illumination groups to ensure
Structure:
the measured brightness of the lighting device
The various embodiments of computers, or remains at a constant predetermined level”
components thereof, or both, or equivalents
thereof, as described in e.g. 2:38–2:41; 4:53– Structure:
62; 10:65–67; 21:1–22:37; FIGS. 4, 8, and 9–
“a microprocessor connected to one or
11.
more current sources and a light intensity
measuring device and configured to calculate
the LED degradation factor using the formula
FI = ((L1/Lr1)+(L2/Lr2))/2, to calculate the
number of LED groups to be illuminated
throughout the lighting device’s lifecycle using
the formula Non(t) = Ltot / {nled * Lled(t)} and to
select and turn on the LED groups with the
least amount of usage time to ensure all LED
groups have an equalized usage time as
described at Col. 15, ll. 5 – 21, Col. 13, ll. 5 –
45, and Col. 16, ll. 22 – 41, and equivalents
thereof”
(Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at p. 2; Dkt. #35 at p. 5; Dkt. #38, App’x A at pp. 2–3; Dkt. #40 at pp. 11–
12). The parties submit that this term appears in Claim 1 (Dkt. #3J0, Exhibit A at p. 2; Dkt. #38,
App’x A at p. 2). The parties agree that this is a means-plus-function term governed by 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
1. The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that whereas its proposal is supported by the specification, Defendant’s
proposal “contravenes the plain language of the claims” and “does not account for the

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embodiments of the claimed invention where the lighting device’s luminosity is controlled based
only [on] a luminosity reading” (Dkt. #35 at p. 6).
Defendant responds that “the stated function is maintaining the luminosity of the lighting
device—not maintaining the luminosity of a network of lighting devices” (Dkt. #40 at p. 13).
Defendant also argues that “[t]he parties agree that the corresponding structure includes
microprocessor 80,” “[b]ut the corresponding structure must also include the algorithms executed
by microprocessor 80 to perform the claimed function, which Plaintiff omits” (Dkt. #40 at p. 14).
Defendant further argues the specification does not clearly link the “Host PC” to the claimed
“maintaining” function (Dkt. #40 at p. 15).
Plaintiff replies by emphasizing that Claim 1 recites that control is carried out “in
response to a luminosity reading and/or a usage time measurement” (Dkt. #43 at p. 2). As for
the corresponding structure, Plaintiff notes that an algorithm need not be a mathematical formula
but rather may be set forth in prose or “in any other manner that provides sufficient structure”
(Dkt. #43 at p. 3 (quoting Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2008))).

Moreover, Plaintiff argues that no algorithm is required at all because the Katz

exception applies (Dkt. #43 at p. 3 n.2 (citing In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent
Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011))).
2. Analysis
Title 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (formerly § 112, ¶ 6) provides: “An element in a claim for a
combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the
recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).

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The first step in the construction of a means-plus-function claim element is to
identify the particular claimed function. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem.
Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The second step in the analysis is to
look to the specification and identify the corresponding structure for that function.
Id. Under this second step, “structure disclosed in the specification is
‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly
links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” B. Braun
Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
The first step is thus the “determination of the meaning of the words used to describe the
claimed function, if such meaning is in dispute.” Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.,
133 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Claim 1 of the ’524 Patent recites:
1. An illumination lighting device comprising
a plurality of illumination groups, each of said illumination groups
containing one or more light emitting diodes and being configured for passing
between an energized light emitting state and a non-energized state, and
control means for maintaining the luminosity of the lighting device at a
desired level, said luminosity being controlled by, at predetermined time
intervals, transferring an appropriate number of illumination groups between
said energized light emitting state and said non-energized state,
whereby
said transfer is effected in response to a luminosity reading and/or a usage
time measurement, and
said lighting device comprises at least one of usage time measuring means
for providing a usage time measurement for each of said illumination groups at
predetermined time intervals, and
a luminosity measuring system comprising
i) luminosity measuring means,
ii) one or more test light emitting diodes equivalent to the light
emitting diodes of said plurality of illumination groups,
said luminosity measuring means being able to provide said luminosity
reading at predetermined time intervals, on the basis of the light of said one or
more test light emitting diodes when said one or more test light emitting diodes
are in an energized state, wherein said one or more test light emitting diodes are
selected from among light emitting diodes which are part of said illumination
groups and which are separate from said illumination groups.
’524 Patent at 23:20–51 (emphasis added).

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The claim recites that the function of the “control means” is to maintain the luminosity of the
lighting device at a desired level by, at predetermined time intervals, transferring an appropriate
number of illumination groups between said energized light emitting state and said nonenergized state in response to a luminosity reading and/or a usage time measurement. Defendant
has not adequately justified its proposed modification of this claim language, particularly as to
Defendant’s proposals of “electrical current” and “predetermined level.”
As for the proper corresponding structure, the parties agree that the corresponding
structure includes microprocessor 80. For example, the specification discloses:
The microprocessor 80 is set to control the lighting device, and is in this
embodiment of the invention a controller means.
’524 Patent at 10:65–67.
Plaintiff has also cited disclosure regarding a “host computer” that “control[s] important
global aspects of the lighting system, such as the lighting intensity in specific zones of the
system as a function of the time-of-day and/or ambient illumination, gradual dimming of lighting
intensity in intensity level transitions, and activation of special functions such as integrated lane
use signals.” Id. at 21:9–14; see id. at 21:1–22:37. However, these disclosures regarding a “host
computer” relate to controlling multiple lighting devices, such as in a roadway tunnel, and are
not “clearly link[ed] or associate[d]” with the above-discussed claimed function of maintaining
the luminosity of a particular lighting device. Med. Instrumentation, 344 F.3d at 1210. In other
words, the specification does not clearly link the claimed function to “[t]he network linking of a
number of lighting devices with a host computer.” ’524 Patent at 21:6–7; see id. at 4:53–62
(disclosing “manipulating the light intensity in a tunnel”); see also Triton Tech of Tex., LLC v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 753 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In exchange for using this form of
claiming, the patent specification must disclose with sufficient particularity the corresponding
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structure for performing the claimed function and clearly link that structure to the function.”
(emphasis added)); cf. ACCO Brands, Inc. v. Micro Sec. Devices, Inc., 346 F.3d 1075, 1079
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The presence in the . . . specification of embodiments carried over from the
parent application, but claimed in other patents, does not serve to broaden the scope of the . . .
claims that were the subject of the divisional application.”). In addition, these disclosures relate
to varying luminosity rather than maintaining it. See, e.g., ’524 Patent at 21:25–27 (“Because it
has individual control over each lighting device, the host computer can vary the intensity level
for each specific zone of the lighting area.”); id. at 4:53–62.
Because the specification links the claimed function to a general-purpose processor,
namely microprocessor 80 as discussed above, an algorithm is required. See, e.g., Net MoneyIN
Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Thus, in a means-plus-function
claim ‘in which the disclosed structure is a computer, or microprocessor, programmed to carry
out an algorithm, the disclosed structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather the
special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm.’” (quoting WMS
Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that the Katz exception applies because the claimed function of maintaining
luminosity is not a function that could be performed by any general-purpose computer without
special programming.

See In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316 (“Absent a possible narrower

construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be
achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming.”).
The specification discloses, in the context of determining the number of extra LED
groups needed, an algorithm for adjusting the number of LED groups that are turned on:
The number of extra groups is determined as follows, using this set of
definitions:
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Ltot=Total Luminosity of the lighting device
Non(t)=Number of groups turned On (as a function of time) to maintain
constant Ltot
Lled(t)=Luminosity (as a function of usage time) for a typical LED
telc=End-of-Life-Cycle time
nled=Number of LEDs per group
Nstart=Number of LED groups needed at life-cycle startup (t=0)
Nextra=Number of extra groups needed to maintain Total Luminosity Ltot at
End-of-Life-Cycle time telc
Ngroup=Total number of groups in lighting device
At any given time, the microprocessor monitors Lled(t) through the
monitor LEDs. It then adjusts the number Non(t) of groups turned On so that the
Total Luminosity Ltot of the lighting device remains constant, according to the
following relation:
Ltot=Non(t)*nled*Lled(t)
From which is obtained:
Non(t)=Ltot/{nled*Lled(t)}
’524 Patent at 13:3–25.
Nonetheless, the above-reproduced claim language recites that determining which
illumination groups should be energized and which should be non-energized can be based on “a
luminosity reading and/or a usage time measurement.” Thus, the above-disclosed Lled(t), which
is “Luminosity (as a function of usage time) for a typical LED,” amounts to a prospective
estimate and is only one of two alternatives.

The other alternative is to measure actual

luminosity while in use:
The light intensity-measuring device 102 coupled to the test LEDs 101 is
read by the controller means. By comparing the test intensity to a reference value,
the calculation means can estimate the LED luminosity variations at any given
moment and compensate by adjusting the number of LEDs groups turned ON,
thereby regularizing the overall lighting device luminosity.
The comparison to the reference values can be seen in FIG. 5, reference
number 180. The test intensities L1 and L2 are measured in 176 and 178. These
values are then compared to reference values Lr1 and Lr2 which are set during the
calibration of the lighting device (154, 156, 158). The LED degradation factor FI
is calculated using the following formula FI=((L1/Lr1)+(L2/Lr2))/2. As can be
seen from the formula the LED degradation factor is averaged over the test diodes
such that in the case of abnormal behaviour in one test LED the results will not be
completely skewed.

12

Id. at 15:5–21; see id. at 14:40–15:4.
Both alternatives, however, assume that usage time is spread evenly across all
illumination groups so that all of the LEDs of the illumination groups experience substantially
the same degradation over time. See id. at 13:3–25 (“Lled(t)=Luminosity (as a function of usage
time) for a typical LED”).

This is necessary so that all illumination groups generate

approximately the same luminosity when turned on, and as a result, the illumination groups are
essentially interchangeable for purposes of contribution to the total luminosity, Ltot. Id. The
specification thus describes “rotation of the LED groups turned On.” Id. at 13:60–14:4; see id. at
16:22–41 (“Automatic LED Usage Equalization”).
The Court therefore finds that “control means for maintaining the luminosity of the
lighting device at a desired level” is a means-plus-function term. The claimed function is
“maintaining the luminosity of the lighting device at a desired level by, at predetermined
time intervals, transferring an appropriate number of illumination groups between said
energized light emitting state and said non-energized state in response to a luminosity
reading and/or a usage time measurement,” and the corresponding structure is
“microprocessor 80 configured to perform the algorithms set forth in the ’524 Patent at
column 16, lines 22–41, and: (1) column 13, lines 17–25, and/or (2) column 15, lines 5–21;
and equivalents thereof.”

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B. “equivalent to the light emitting diodes of said plurality of illumination groups”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendant’s Proposed Construction

No construction needed.

“having equal luminosity as the light emitting
diodes of said plurality of illumination groups”

However, if the Court finds construction
necessary, then “having approximately equal
luminosity as one or more of the light emitting
diodes of said plurality of illumination
groups.”
(Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at pp. 2–3; Dkt. #35 at p. 7; Dkt. #38, App’x A at p. 6; Dkt. #40 at p. 23).
The parties submit that this term appears in Claim 1 (Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at pp. 2–3; Dkt. #38,
App’x A at p. 6).
1. The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that no construction is necessary and urges that Defendant’s proposal of
“equal” is “overly narrow” because Defendant “cannot identify any lexicography, disclaimer, or
disavowal” (Dkt. #35 at p. 7).
Defendant responds that “Plaintiff points to no disclosure—and there is none—of test
LEDs ‘approximately identical’ to illumination groups’ LEDs” (Dkt. #40 at p. 22). Defendant
urges that “‘equivalent to’ here means that . . . each test LED is ‘identical’ to each LED within
the illumination groups—i.e., having the same luminosity” (Dkt. #40 at pp. 23–24). Further, for
to Plaintiff’s proposal of “one or more,” Defendant argues that “[t]he claim and specification
state that each test LED is ‘equivalent’ to each illumination group LED” (Dkt. #40 at p. 24).
2. Analysis
Claim 1 of the ’524 Patent recites, in relevant part:
a luminosity measuring system comprising
i) luminosity measuring means,
ii) one or more test light emitting diodes equivalent to the light
emitting diodes of said plurality of illumination groups.
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’524 Patent at 23:38–42. The specification discloses using “test LEDs” that are “identical
to the LEDs used in the groups”:
For the long term degradation compensation of the lighting device to be
effective it is important that the calculation means has an accurate idea of the
current luminosity output of the LED groups. Therefore, in addition to the LED
groups, this system will use one (or more) test LED 101 opto-coupled to a light
intensity-measuring device 102, as shown in FIG. 4. The light intensity
measuring devices 102 can be for instance photodiodes or any appropriate light
sensor. When desired the light intensity-measuring devices 102 can measure the
luminosity output of the test LEDs 101, and obtain a standard luminosity for the
LEDs of the lighting device.
The test LEDs 101 will be identical to the LEDs used in the groups,
supplied with the same constant current, kept at the same temperature as the group
LEDs, and turned On and Off in such a way as to maintain or reflect the same or
analogous long-term usage rate as the group LEDs, as described below.
Id. at 14:40–55 (emphasis added); see id. at Fig. 4.
Whereas the specification uses the word “identical,” the disputed term recites
“equivalent.” The parties have submitted an extrinsic dictionary definition of “equivalent” as
meaning: “corresponding or virtually identical especially in effect or function” (Dkt. #35,
Exhibit B, Merriam–Webster’s Deluxe Dictionary 616 (10th ed. 1998) (emphasis added);
Dkt. #40, Exhibit 10 (same)). This evidence suggests that the word “equivalent” is somewhat
broader than “identical,” which is the word used in the specification as quoted above. ’524
Patent at 14:51. Here, the word “substantially” is appropriate because “[t]he term ‘substantial’ is
a meaningful modifier implying ‘approximate,’ rather than ‘perfect.’” Liquid Dynamics Corp. v.
Vaughan Co., 355 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004). At the June 15, 2017 hearing, Plaintiff
agreed that using “substantially” is a fair interpretation of the word “equivalent” as recited in the
present disputed term.
Finally, the parties appeared to agree at the June 15, 2017 hearing that the disputed term
refers to equivalence between each test LED and each of the light emitting diodes of the
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illumination groups. Although Plaintiff’s alternative proposed construction appears to suggest
otherwise, Plaintiff has not presented any argument to support one test LED being equivalent to a
group of illumination LEDs rather than one illumination LED. See Dkt. #35 at pp. 7–8.
The Court therefore construes “equivalent to the light emitting diodes of said plurality
of illumination groups” to mean “each test LED has luminosity substantially equal to that
of each of the light emitting diodes of said plurality of illumination groups.”
C. “illumination groups”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendant’s Proposed Construction

No construction needed.

“a collection of one or more light emitting
diodes connected to a current source providing
However, if the Court finds construction a single current level”
necessary, then “one or more light emitting
diodes”
(Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at p. 4; Dkt. #35 at p. 8; Dkt. #38, App’x A at p. 1; Dkt. #40 at p. 16). The
parties submit that this term appears in Claims 1, 12, and 15 (Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at p. 4;
Dkt. #35 at p. 8; Dkt. #38, App’x A at p. 1).
1. The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “[n]o construction for this term is necessary because its plain and
ordinary meaning is clear,” and “Dialight cannot identify any lexicography, disclaimer, or
disavowal” (Dkt. #35 at p. 8).

Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s proposed

construction “improperly imports limitations into the claims” and “is inconsistent with the
doctrine of claim differentiation” (Dkt. #35 at p. 8).
Defendant responds that the claims and the specification contemplate that illumination
groups either can be only on or off, that is, “energized” or “non-energized” (Dkt. #40 at pp. 16–
17).

16

2. Analysis
Plaintiff has argued claim differentiation as to dependent Claim 4 of the ’524 Patent.
Claim 4 depends from Claim 2, which in turn depends from Claim 1. Claims 1, 2, and 4 recite,
in relevant part:
1. An illumination lighting device comprising
a plurality of illumination groups, each of said illumination groups
containing one or more light emitting diodes and being configured for passing
between an energized light emitting state and a non-energized state, . . . .
2. A lighting device as claimed in claim 1 wherein said controller means further
comprises: means for detecting whether any of said illumination groups of light
emitting diodes have a light emitting diode unable to pass between said energized
light emitting state and said non-energized state, and for transferring a so detected
group to a nonfunctional state.
....
4. A lighting device as claimed in claim 2 wherein for the energization of light
emitting diodes, said device comprises constant current source means.
’524 Patent at 23:20–24, 23:52–59, 23:63–65 (emphasis added).
Because Defendants’ proposal of a “single current level” essentially appears as the
“constant current” limitation in dependent Claim 4, the doctrine of claim differentiation weighs
against Defendant’s proposal of “a current source providing a single current level.” See Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1315 (“[T]he presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives
rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim.”).
Applying the doctrine of claim differentiation to the present disputed term is also
consistent with the specification, which discloses:
While in this embodiment the current source 70 is a constant current
source, it could also be a variable current source. A variable current source has
certain advantages in that it could be used to implement a long term LED
degradation compensation system in which the current source could supply more
power to compensate for lower output by the LEDs over time.
’524 Patent at 11:33–39 (emphasis added).

17

Defendant argues that the claim differentiation presumption is rebutted here because the
specification does not provide sufficient disclosure regarding any “variable” current source (Dkt.
#40 at p. 17). However, Defendant has not demonstrated that the patentee limited the current
source to a constant current source or that a person of ordinary skill in the art would find such a
limitation apparent or inherent.
Finally, Defendant has noted that the Background of the Invention discusses
disadvantages of “current control” disclosed in other patents:
Certain patents, such as U.S. Pat. No. 6,236,331 B1 Dussurealt, U.S. Pat.
No. 6,153,985 Grossman, and U.S. Pat. No. 5,783,909 Hochstein, propose to
compensate for long term LED degradation through a variable current. In these
lighting devices, which deal mostly with traffic lights, the luminosity output of
traffic lights using LEDs is stabilized by varying the current flow. The lighting
devices measure the luminosity output of the LEDs and either increase or
decrease the current being supplied to the LEDs as a result. The current control is
usually performed either through proportional DC (Direct Current) control, or
through PWM (Pulse Width Modulation) of the LED supply. In the context of
roadway or tunnel lighting, the use of PWM to control the LED intensity may be
problematic. This is because it can lead to visible stroboscopic beat effects in the
light superposition of multiple lighting devices each having slightly different,
non-synchronized PWM frequencies.
’524 Patent at 1:66–2:15 (emphasis added). Of note, the patentee here focused on pulse width
modulation as being potentially “problematic.” In any event, Defendant has not demonstrated
that the above-reproduced passage gives rise to any disclaimer or otherwise overrides the
doctrine of claim differentiation.
The Court therefore expressly rejects Defendant’s proposed construction. No further
construction is necessary, particularly in light of the context provided by surrounding claim
language. See U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568 (“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of
disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the
patentee covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement. It is not an

18

obligatory exercise in redundancy.”); see also O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362 (“[D]istrict courts are
not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation present in a patent’s asserted
claims.”); Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 802 F.3d 1283, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(determining “the district court did not err by declining to construe” a claim term”).
Accordingly, the Court construes “illumination groups” to have its plain meaning.
D. “illumination lighting device” / “lighting device”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendant’s Proposed Construction

No construction needed.

“a sign, display, or light fixture”

However, if the Court finds construction
necessary, then “one or more illumination
lighting devices / lighting devices, or a system
of one or more illumination lighting devices /
lighting devices.”
(Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at p. 5; Dkt. #35 at p. 10; Dkt. #38, App’x A at p. 1; Dkt. #40 at p. 29). The
parties submit that this term appears in Claims 1, 6, 12, 14, 15, and 17. (Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at
p. 5; Dkt. #38, App’x A at p. 1).
1. The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that these disputed terms “are not claim limitations, but are instead
phrases appearing in the preambles of claims” (Dkt. #35 at p. 10). Alternatively, Plaintiff argues
that “[t]he doctrine of claim differentiation, the ’524 Patent’s specification, and the prosecution
history make clear Dialight’s proposed construction is wrong” (Dkt. #35 at p. 10).
Defendant responds that “[t]he intrinsic record is abundantly clear that the ‘lighting
device’ is not, itself, a communication network or system of lighting devices” (Dkt. #40 at p. 29).
Likewise, Defendant argues that “a communication network or system of lighting devices (e.g.,
of light fixtures) is not, itself, a ‘lighting device’” (Dkt. #40 at p. 30).

19

2. Analysis
Although Plaintiff argues that these disputed terms are not limiting because they appear
in the preambles, this argument appears to be irrelevant here because the body of Claim 1 recites
“the lighting device” and “said lighting device.” Because the preamble of Claim 1 recites only
“An illumination lighting device comprising,” there does not appear to be any dispute as to
whether the preamble recites additional limiting details.2 The only real dispute, then, is whether
the recited “lighting device” is limited to being “a sign, display, or light fixture.”3
Plaintiff has argued claim differentiation as to dependent Claim 21, which depends from
Claim 1. Claims 1 and 21 recite, in relevant part:
1. An illumination lighting device comprising
a plurality of illumination groups, each of said illumination groups
containing one or more light emitting diodes and being configured for passing
between an energized light emitting state and a non-energized state, and
control means for maintaining the luminosity of the lighting device at a
desired level, said luminosity being controlled by, at predetermined time intervals,
transferring an appropriate number of illumination groups between said energized
light emitting state and said non-energized state,
whereby
said transfer is effected in response to a luminosity reading and/or a usage
time measurement, and
said lighting device comprises at least one of usage time measuring means
for providing a usage time measurement for each of said illumination groups at
predetermined time intervals, and
a luminosity measuring system comprising
i) luminosity measuring means,
ii) one or more test light emitting diodes equivalent to the light
emitting diodes of said plurality of illumination groups,
said luminosity measuring means being able to provide said luminosity
reading at predetermined time intervals, on the basis of the light of said one or
more test light emitting diodes when said one or more test light emitting diodes
are in an energized state, wherein said one or more test light emitting diodes are

2

Claim 26 (which does not appear to be asserted in the present case) similarly begins with “[a] lighting device
comprising.”
3
In denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice (Dkt.
#10), the Court stated: “In terms of whether the ‘illumination lighting device’ should be construed as [‘]a sign,
display, or light fixture,’ the Court will not engage in claim construction at this stage.” (Dkt. #32 at p. 5).

20

selected from among light emitting diodes which are part of said illumination
groups and which are separate from said illumination groups.
....
21. A lighting device as claimed in claim 1 wherein said lighting device is a
single device.
’524 Patent at 23:20–42, 24:56–57 (emphasis added).
Claim 21 limits Claim 1 such that “said lighting device is a single device,” but the
relevance of this to the present dispute is unclear. For example, the present dispute is not
whether Claim 1 is limited to a single “lighting device.” Instead, the dispute is whether multiple
light fixtures can together amount to the recited “lighting device.” In other words, the parties
dispute whether all of the limitations of the recited “lighting device” must be satisfied by a single
light fixture. The recital of a “single device” in Claim 21 offers limited probative value because
the phrase “single device” does not necessarily connote a single physical object (as opposed to a
collection of physically separate components).
In terms of the prosecution history, Plaintiff has argued as a threshold matter:
[T]he presumption that claim 1 covers multiple devices, or a system or network of
devices, is reinforced by FIG. 12, which clearly shows a “multiple device” or
“system of devices” embodiment of invention. FIG. 12 was cited in support of
the amendment adding dependent claim 21. Under the doctrine of claim
differentiation, claim 21’s recitation of a ‘single device’ makes clear that claim 1
includes more than one device, display sign, or light fixture.
(Dkt. #35 at p. 15).4 The prosecution history cited by Plaintiff refers to “element 1” in Figures 1,
2, and 12 (Dkt. #35, Exhibit D, Nov. 18, 2008 Response at p. 10 (“For support for claims 29, 33,
37 and 41 please see figs 1, 2 and 21 (element 1).”)).5 This “element 1” is “lighting device 1,”

4

As discussed above, the significance of Claim 21 in this regard is less than clear.
The Court assumes for the sake of argument that Plaintiff is correct that the reference to “Figure 21” in the cited
prosecution history was an inadvertent transposed reference to Figure 12. In addition, Plaintiff submits that
“[i]ssued dependent claim 21 corresponds to pending claim 29, which was renumbered prior to issuance” (Dkt. #35
at p. 14 n.4).
5

21

and Figure 12 illustrates multiple such lighting devices without any indication that the multiple
lighting devices can together constitute a single “lighting device.”
Defendant has focused on restriction requirements during prosecution and the patentee’s
election in response thereto. The examiner issued restriction requirements between (among other
groups) claims “drawn to a lighting device having controller means for controlling groups of
LEDs” (“Group I”) and claims “drawn to a computer network controlling the status of LED
lighting devices” (“Group III”) (Dkt. #40, Exhibit 2, June 22, 2004 Office Action at p. 2; Dkt.
#40, Exhibit 3, Oct. 19, 2007 Office Action at p. 2). The examiner explained:
In the instant case, the combination as claimed does not require the particulars of
the subcombination as claimed because Group I addresses a lighting device with
controller means controlling the energized or non-energized light emitting state of
LEDs upon a standard luminosity reading or usage time measurement whereas
Group Ill addresses a computer network determining the status of a plurality of
LED lighting devices.
(Dkt. #40, Exhibit 2, June 22, 2004 Office Action at pp. 2–3; Dkt. #40, Exhibit 3, Oct. 19, 2007
Office Action at p. 2).
The patentee responded by electing Group I, namely the “lighting device” claims
(Dkt. #40, Exhibit 2, Sept. 22, 2004 Response to Restriction Requirement at p. 6; Dkt. #40,
Exhibit 3, Apr. 15, 2008 Response to Restriction Requirement at p. 6). Defendant concludes that
as a result, the elected claims cannot encompass the non-elected “computer network.” During
claim construction, however, an examiner’s restriction requirement offers limited probative
weight:
We . . . do not assign much weight to the patent examiner’s restriction
requirement with respect to claims for a “fuel filter” and a “fuel system
component” during prosecution of the . . . application. In making the restriction
requirement, the examiner did not construe the claim term “fuel system
component” or determine its meaning in light of the written description. He
merely required that the applicant elect one aspect of his invention for prosecution
without applying it to the specification.
22

Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see Colorquick,
LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 6:06-CV-390, 2008 WL 5771324, at *10 (E.D. Tex. June 25,
2008) (“[A]s noted by the significant number of other courts refusing to use restriction
requirements to limit the claims during claim construction, a restriction requirement is an
administrative tool, and therefore offers little guidance in construing the claim language.”); see
also Bestop, Inc. v. Tuffy Sec. Prods., Inc., No. 13-10759, 2015 WL 470552, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
Feb. 4, 2015) (“Absent applicant argument in the face of a restriction requirement, however, the
courts have consistently refused to find an examiner’s restriction requirement, by itself, to result
in a disavowal of claim scope.”).
Defendant has cited authority holding that “a patent applicant’s response to a restriction
requirement may be used to interpret patent claim terms or as a source of disclaimer.” Uship
Intellectual Props., LLC v. United States, 714 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see Rambus Inc.
v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that a restriction
requirement characterizing what each group of claims did not require demonstrated that a
particular element was not required by the elected claims).
Here, the patentee did not characterize the scope of the “lighting device” claims when
electing Group I, and the examiner did not state that Group I necessarily excludes a network or
collection (Dkt. #40, Exhibit 2, June 22, 2004 Office Action at pp. 2–3; Dkt. #40, Exhibit 3, Oct.
19, 2007 Office Action at p. 2). Therefore, the prosecution history cited by Defendant does not
carry significant weight in resolving the parties’ claim construction dispute.
Turning to the specification, Plaintiff has cited various disclosures regarding controlling a
“plurality of lighting devices.” ’524 Patent at 4:53–62; see id. at 7:46–49 (disclosing “multiple
lighting devices” and “a great number of lighting devices”); id. at 8:54–56 (disclosing “a series
23

of identical lighting devices”); id. at 21:6–14 (disclosing a “network linking of a number of
lighting devices with a host computer”); see also id. at Fig. 12. These disclosures regarding
groups of lighting devices are not significantly probative in resolving whether a particular
“lighting device” can be made up of multiple light fixtures.
Likewise, disclosures in the Background of the Invention regarding using “a plurality of
LEDs” in a single lighting device do not address the question of whether a particular “lighting
device” can be made up of multiple light fixtures. See, e.g., id. at 1:39–65. If anything,
disclosures in the Background of the Invention weigh in favor of finding that a “lighting device”
is an individual light fixture. See id. at 2:2–5 (“In these lighting devices, which deal mostly with
traffic lights, the luminosity output of traffic lights using LEDs is stabilized by varying the
current flow.”).
Nonetheless, Defendant has failed to identify any definitive statements in the
specification or the prosecution history that would justify requiring “a sign, display, or light
fixture.” Likewise, no such limitations are apparent in the claims, which themselves do not give
rise to any ambiguity in this regard. See Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d
1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and
customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the
context of the specification and prosecution history. There are only two exceptions to this
general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or
2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during
prosecution.”) (citations omitted).

24

The Court therefore expressly rejects Defendant’s proposed construction. No further
construction is necessary. See U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568; see also O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at
1362; Summit 6, 802 F.3d at 1291.
Accordingly, the Court construes “illumination lighting device” and “lighting device”
to have their plain meaning.
E. “luminosity measuring means”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.

Defendant’s Proposed Construction
Defendant contends that this
governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.

phrase

is

Function:
“measuring luminosity of ambient light, or Function:
[one or more] light emitting diodes, or both”
“measuring the brightness of one or more
test light emitting diodes”
Structure:
“a light sensor,” “ambient illumination Structure:
sensor,” “photodiodes or any appropriate light
“a photodiode connected to a test light
sensor,” or “one or more test light emitting emitting diode by an optocoupler that filters
diodes coupled to light sensors, such that said out all outside light as described at Col. 14,
test diodes can emit light which will then be ll. 40–50 and Col. 15:46–50, and equivalents
measured by the light sensors,” or equivalents thereof”
thereof
(Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at p. 9; Dkt. #35 at p. 20; Dkt. #38, App’x A at p. 5; Dkt. #40 at pp. 17–18).
The parties submit that this term appears in Claim 1 (Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at p. 9; Dkt. #38,
App’x A at p. 5). The parties agree that this term is a means-plus-function term governed by 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
1. The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that its proposed corresponding structures are set forth in the specification
and linked to the claimed function (Dkt. #35 at pp. 20–21). Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s
proposed construction “does not account for the embodiments of the claimed invention where the

25

luminosity of the lighting device is controlled based, at least in part, on ambient illumination”
(Dkt. #35 at p. 21).
Defendant responds that its proposed function is consistent with surrounding claim
language and with the specification, both of which refer to measurement of the light intensity of
the test light emitting diodes (Dkt. #40 at p. 20). As for the corresponding structure, Defendant
argues that “the photodiode and the test LED must be optically coupled—i.e., connected in such
a way that outside light is not measured by the photodiode” (Dkt. #40 at p. 20 (footnote
omitted)). Defendant urges that “[t]he specification nowhere mentions that an ambient light
sensor provides a ‘luminosity reading’ of one or more test LEDs—the stated function” (Dkt. #40
at p. 21).
2. Analysis
Claim 1 of the ’524 Patent recites:
1. An illumination lighting device comprising
a plurality of illumination groups, each of said illumination groups
containing one or more light emitting diodes and being configured for passing
between an energized light emitting state and a non-energized state, and
control means for maintaining the luminosity of the lighting device at a
desired level, said luminosity being controlled by, at predetermined time intervals,
transferring an appropriate number of illumination groups between said energized
light emitting state and said non-energized state,
whereby
said transfer is effected in response to a luminosity reading and/or a usage
time measurement, and
said lighting device comprises at least one of usage time measuring means
for providing a usage time measurement for each of said illumination groups at
predetermined time intervals, and
a luminosity measuring system comprising
i) luminosity measuring means,
ii) one or more test light emitting diodes equivalent to the light
emitting diodes of said plurality of illumination groups,
said luminosity measuring means being able to provide said luminosity
reading at predetermined time intervals, on the basis of the light of said one or
more test light emitting diodes when said one or more test light emitting diodes
are in an energized state, wherein said one or more test light emitting diodes are
26

selected from among light emitting diodes which are part of said illumination
groups and which are separate from said illumination groups.
’524 Patent at 23:20–42 (emphasis added).
The claim thus expressly requires that the “luminosity measuring means” must measure
luminosity of light from one or more test LEDs that are in an energized state. Accordingly, the
Court finds that the claimed function for this means-plus-function term is “measuring the
luminosity of one or more test light emitting diodes.”
Plaintiff has cited disclosures regarding ambient light sensors as purportedly
corresponding structure (e.g., the ’524 Patent at 21:44 states “ambient illumination sensor at the
entrances to the tunnel”), but the claimed function, as construed above, relates to measuring the
luminosity of test LEDs and not the luminosity of ambient light. Disclosures regarding ambient
light sensors are not “clearly link[ed] or associate[d]” with the claimed function found above.
Med. Instrumentation, 344 F.3d at 1210; cf. ACCO Brands, 346 F.3d at 1079 (“The presence in
the . . . specification of embodiments carried over from the parent application, but claimed in
other patents, does not serve to broaden the scope of the . . . claims that were the subject of the
divisional application.”).
As for the proper corresponding structure, the specification discloses “[t]he light intensity
measuring devices 102 can be for instance photodiodes or any appropriate light sensor.” ’524
Patent at 14:46–47; see id. at 2:42–46 (mentioning “light sensors”); see also id. at 15:5–6 (“The
light intensity-measuring device 102 coupled to the test LEDs 101 is read by the controller
means.”). Also, Figure 4 of the ’524 Patent illustrates reference numeral 102 as a “Light
Sensor.”
Finally, the claim does not recite any limitation to exclude ambient light. This is a
specific feature of particular disclosed embodiments that should not be imported into the claims.
27

See ’524 Patent at 15:46–50 (“Each test LED must be optically coupled to a light intensitymeasuring device, such as a semiconductor photo-sensor. Furthermore, no outside light must
filter in this coupling, so that the intensity measurement accurately reflects the Test LED
intensity.”); see also Constant, 848 F.2d at 1571; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
Likewise, the extrinsic evidence cited by Defendant does not require excluding ambient
light. See Dkt. #40, Exhibit 8, The Illustrated Dictionary of Electronics 488–89 (1997) (defining
“optical coupler” as “A coupling device consisting essentially of a light source (actuated by an
input signal) mounted in an opaque housing with a light-sensitive device (that delivers the output
signal). In its simplest form, the arrangement consists of a light-emitting diode (LED) and a
photodiode.”). Indeed, one of the dictionary definitions provided by Defendant refers to an
“optocoupler” as a special-purpose component designed for providing electrical isolation
between systems:
A solid-state device that provides high electrical isolation by converting the input
signal to light emission and reconverting it to an electrical signal. It consists of a
photoemitter (such as a light- or infrared-emitting diode—LED or IRED) and a
photodetector (such as a phototransistor). Optocouplers prevent the transmission
of unwanted noise and provide coupling between systems operating at different
voltage levels. It is also called an optoisolator or photocoupler.
(Dkt. #40, Exhibit 9, McGraw-Hill Electronics Dictionary 322 (6th ed. 1997)).
The Court therefore finds that “luminosity measuring means” is a means-plus-function
term. The claimed function is “measuring the luminosity of one or more test light emitting
diodes,” and the corresponding structure is “light intensity measuring devices 102, which can
be, for example, photodiodes or any appropriate light sensor; and equivalents thereof.”

28

F. “luminosity reading”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendant’s Proposed Construction

No construction needed

“measurement of the brightness of one or more
test light emitting diodes”

However, if the Court finds construction
necessary, then “measurement of the
luminosity of ambient light, or one or more
light emitting diodes, or both.”
(Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at p. 10; Dkt. #35 at p. 22; Dkt. #38, App’x A at p. 3; Dkt. #40 at p. 18).
The parties submit that this term appears in Claim 1 (Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at p. 10; Dkt. #38,
App’x A at p. 3).
1. The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that the plain meaning of this disputed term is clear, and “Defendant
cannot identify any lexicography, disclaimer, or disavowal” (Dkt. #35 at p. 22).
Defendant responds that whereas “Plaintiff argues . . . that a ‘luminosity reading’
includes ambient light or light sources other than test LEDs,” “Plaintiff’s argument is
contradicted by the claims and specification, both of which are clear that what is measured is the
brightness of one or more test LEDs” (Dkt. #40 at p. 19).
2. Analysis
Plaintiff’s alternative proposal would allow for measuring only ambient light.

As

previously discussed regarding the related term “luminosity measuring means,” Claim 1 of the
’524 Patent does not recite any limitation to exclude ambient light, but the claim does require
that the “luminosity measuring means” measure luminosity of light from one or more test LEDs
that are in an energized state. See ’524 Patent at 23:43–47 (“[S]aid luminosity measuring means
being able to provide said luminosity reading at predetermined time intervals, on the basis of the

29

light of said one or more test light emitting diodes when said one or more test light emitting
diodes are in an energized state . . . .” (emphasis added)).
Defendant has also submitted extrinsic evidence defining “luminosity” in relevant
contexts as referring to “brightness” (Dkt. #40, Exhibit 6, Random House Webster’s Unabridged
Dictionary 1144 (2d ed. 2001) (“[T]he brightness of a light source of a certain wavelength as it
appears to the eye, measured as the ratio of luminous flux to radiant flux at that wavelength.”);
(Dkt. #40, Exhibit 7, Chambers Dictionary of Science & Technology 695 (1999) (“The visual
perception of the brightness of an area. The density of luminous intensity in a particular
direction.”)).
At the June 15, 2017 hearing, Defendant reiterated that construing “luminosity” as
“brightness” would be helpful to the jury. Plaintiff agreed that the word “brightness” accurately
describes how the patentee used the term “luminosity.” Thus, “some construction of the disputed
claim language will assist the jury to understand the claims.” See TQP Dev., LLC v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., No. 2:08-CV-471, 2012 WL 1940849, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 29, 2012).
The Court therefore construes “luminosity reading” to mean “measurement of
brightness.”
G. “test light emitting diodes”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendant’s Proposed Construction

No construction needed.

“a light emitting diode identical to the light
emitting diodes in the illumination groups that
However, if the Court finds construction is optically coupled to a light intensity
necessary, then “light emitting diodes having measuring device”
approximately equal luminosity as one or more
of the light emitting diodes of said plurality of
illumination groups, or the remaining light
emitting diodes of said plurality of illumination
groups.”

30

(Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at pp. 11–12; Dkt. #35 at p. 23; Dkt. #38, App’x A at pp. 5–6; Dkt. #40 at
p. 21). The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 1 and 15. (Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at
pp. 11–12; Dkt. #38, App’x A at p. 5).
1. The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that the plain meaning of the term is clear, Defendant has identified no
definition or disclaimer, and the meaning of the term is further defined in Claim 1 (Dkt. #35 at p.
23). Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s proposed construction “improperly imports
limitations from certain embodiments disclosed in the Patent’s specification” (Dkt. #35 at p. 24).
Defendant responds that the claim language requires that the “test light emitting diodes”
are “equivalent to the light emitting diodes of said plurality of illumination groups,” and
Defendant submits that “[t]he specification only discloses test LEDs that are identical to the
LEDs of the illumination groups” (Dkt. #40 at p. 22).
2. Analysis
The disputed term appears in Claims 1 and 15 of the ’524 Patent, which recite:
1. An illumination lighting device comprising
....
a luminosity measuring system comprising
i) luminosity measuring means,
ii) one or more test light emitting diodes equivalent to the light
emitting diodes of said plurality of illumination groups,
said luminosity measuring means being able to provide said luminosity
reading at predetermined time intervals, on the basis of the light of said one or
more test light emitting diodes when said one or more test light emitting diodes
are in an energized state, wherein said one or more test light emitting diodes are
selected from among light emitting diodes which are part of said illumination
groups and which are separate from said illumination groups.
....
15. A lighting device as defined in claim 1, wherein said test light emitting diodes
are selected from light emitting diodes which are members of said illumination
groups.
’524 Patent at 23:20, 23:38–51, 24:34–36 (emphasis added).
31

Whereas Claim 1 recites that the test LEDs are either among the LEDs of the illumination
groups or separate from the illumination groups, Claim 15 specifies that the test LEDs must be
selected from among the LEDs of the illumination groups.
Defendant’s proposal would improperly import an “identical” limitation from a particular
disclosed embodiment. See ’524 Patent at 14:51–55 (“The test LEDs 101 will be identical to the
LEDs used in the groups”); see also id. at 15:39–42. Instead, Claim 1 requires only “one or
more test light emitting diodes equivalent to the light emitting diodes of said plurality of
illumination groups.” The “equivalent” limitation is a disputed term addressed separately above.
Extrinsic dictionary definitions of “equivalent” submitted by the parties weigh against importing
an “identical” limitation. See Dkt. #35, Exhibit B, Merriam–Webster’s Deluxe Dictionary 616
(10th ed. 1998) (defining equivalent as “equal in force, amount, or value” and “corresponding or
virtually identical especially in effect or function”); see also Dkt. #40, Exhibit 6, Random House
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 657 (2d ed. 2001) (defining equivalent as “equal in value,
measure, force, effect, significance, etc”).
Likewise, optical coupling is disclosed in the specification regarding particular preferred
embodiments (e.g., the ’524 Patent at 14:43–50 states “this system will use one (or more) test
LED 101 opto-coupled to a light intensity-measuring device 102, as shown in FIG. 4”), and no
such limitation appears in the above-reproduced claims. See Constant, 848 F.2d at 1571; see
also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
The Court therefore expressly rejects Defendant’s proposed construction. No further
construction is necessary, particularly in light of the context provided by the above-reproduced
claim language reciting the role of test “light emitting diodes” as part of a “luminosity measuring

32

system.” See U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568; see also O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362; Summit 6,
802 F.3d at 1291.
Accordingly, the Court construes “test light emitting diodes” to have its plain meaning.
H. “usage time measurement”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendant’s Proposed Construction

No construction needed.

“the cumulative amount of time
illumination group has been illuminated”

an

However, if the Court finds construction
necessary, then “the cumulative or noncumulative amount of time something has been
used.”
(Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at p. 12; Dkt. #35 at p. 25; Dkt. #38, App’x A at p. 4; Dkt. #40 at p. 25).
The parties submit that this term appears in Claim 1 (Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at p. 12; Dkt. #38,
App’x A at p. 4).
1. The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that the plain meaning of this disputed term is clear, and “Defendant
cannot identify any lexicography, disclaimer, or disavowal” (Dkt. #35 at p. 5). Alternatively,
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s proposal “improperly reads limitations into the claim and
renders one or more claims superfluous” (Dkt. #35 at p. 5).

Plaintiff also argues claim

differentiation as to dependent Claim 18 (Dkt. #35 at p. 5)
Defendant responds that whereas Plaintiff’s alternative proposal is “vague and
unhelpful,” and “[t]he claim is clear that what is measured is usage time of each illumination
group” (Dkt. #40 at p. 26).
2. Analysis
Claims 1 and 18 of the ’524 Patent recite:
1. An illumination lighting device comprising
33

....
control means for maintaining the luminosity of the lighting device at a
desired level, said luminosity being controlled by, at predetermined time intervals,
transferring an appropriate number of illumination groups between said energized
light emitting state and said non-energized state,
whereby
said transfer is effected in response to a luminosity reading and/or a usage
time measurement, and
said lighting device comprises at least one of usage time measuring means
for providing a usage time measurement for each of said illumination groups at
predetermined time intervals, . . . .
....
18. A lighting device as claimed in claim 1, wherein said usage time
measurement is a cumulative usage time measurement for each of said
illumination groups of light emitting diodes.
’524 Patent at 23:20, 23:25–36, 24:43–46 (emphasis added).
On one hand, Plaintiff cites the doctrine of claim differentiation, arguing that the “usage
time measurement” recited in Claim 1 is not limited to “cumulative” usage time because such a
limitation appears in dependent Claim 18. See Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc.,
239 F.3d 1225, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Claim differentiation, while often argued to be
controlling when it does not apply, is clearly applicable when there is a dispute over whether a
limitation found in a dependent claim should be read into an independent claim, and that
limitation is the only meaningful difference between the two claims.”); see also Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1315 (“[T]he presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives
rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim.”).
Further, at the June 15, 2017 hearing, Plaintiff cited disclosure that stated, “It should be clear that
the controller means can be configured to transfer said groups of light emitting diodes between
said first energized groups and said second non-energized group in response to any suitable
criteria.” ’524 Patent at 3:56–59 (emphasis added).

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On the other hand, construing the disputed term as referring to “cumulative” usage time
is consistent with how the specification uses the phrase “usage time”:
For example the controller means could activate test LEDs every time the
average cumulative usage time of the lighting LEDs exceeds the cumulative usage
time of the test LEDs, and turn the test LEDs off every time the cumulative usage
time of the test LEDs is greater than or equal to the cumulative usage time of the
lighting LEDs.
’524 Patent at 14:66–15:4. Admittedly, these disclosures of “cumulative usage time” could be
read as implying that “usage time” is not necessarily cumulative. Cf. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314
(“[T]he claim in this case refers to ‘steel baffles,’ which strongly implies that the term ‘baffles’
does not inherently mean objects made of steel.”).
Yet, the specification repeatedly refers to “usage time” in like manner without specifying
“cumulative.” See ’524 Patent at 15:39–42 (“In order to provide an accurate picture of the
lighting device’s lighting LEDs state, the test LEDs must operate under identical conditions:
same junction current, same temperature, same usage time.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at
16:23–29 (indicating the memory means “will keep count of the usage time of each of the LEDs
group in the LED Array”); id. at 16:31–32 (indicating the partitioning means “prioritize the use
of LEDs groups having the shortest usage time”); id. at 16:35 (“sort[ing] the LED groups by
usage time”).
Claim 1 recites the disputed term in the context of a “control means for maintaining the
luminosity of the lighting device at a desired level.” For the usage time to be useful in this
context, the usage time must be cumulative. See id. at 10:23–24 (“LED output gradually
decreases with usage time.”); id. at 13:8–9 (“Lled(t)=Luminosity (as a function of usage time) for
a typical LED”). Plaintiff’s proposal of encompassing “non-cumulative” usage time, by contrast,
would encompass any arbitrary time measurement. For example, Plaintiff’s proposal would

35

encompass “time of day” luminance adjustments as well as “ramping” of such adjustments. See
id. at 21:33–63. The disclosures that refer to control of multiple lighting devices by a “host
computer” do not refer to measuring any “usage” time. Plaintiff’s extrinsic dictionary definition
of “operating time” (“[t]he interval during which an equipment is in operation”) does not compel
finding otherwise (Dkt. #35, Exhibit J, The Illustrated Dictionary of Electronics 488 (7th ed.
1997)).
The great weight of the intrinsic evidence, as provided by the context of the claim, as
disclosures in the specification, and as discussed above, demonstrate that the doctrine of claim
differentiation is rebutted for the present disputed term. See Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v.
Zimmer, Inc., 822 F.3d 1312, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[C]laim differentiation is a rebuttable
presumption that may be overcome by a contrary construction dictated by the written description
or prosecution history”); N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (“While it is true that dependent claims can aid in interpreting the scope of claims
from which they depend, they are only an aid to interpretation and are not conclusive. The
dependent claim tail cannot wag the independent claim dog.”); see also Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v.
Apple Inc., 830 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Consistent use of a term in a particular way
in the specification can inform the proper construction of that term.”); Nystrom v. TREX Co.,
424 F.3d 1136, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting “context maintained throughout the written
description”).
The Court therefore construes “usage time measurement” to mean “cumulative
amount of time in use.”

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I. “usage time measuring means for providing a usage time measurement for each of
said illumination groups at predetermined time intervals”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.

Defendant’s Proposed Construction
Defendant contends that this
governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.

phrase

is

Function:
“providing usage time measurement”

Function:
“counting, storing, and providing the
Structure:
cumulative amount of time that each
“Software and hardware which keeps track illumination group and test light emitting diode
of time”, as described in ’524 Patent, 12:28– have been illuminated”
29; 2:55–58; 16:26–29; and 12:17–19; or
equivalents thereof.
Structure:
“a microprocessor including a counter and
a memory as described at Col. 2, ll. 55–58,
Col. 14, ll. 56–65, and Col. 16, ll. 23–29 and
equivalents thereof”
(Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at p. 13; Dkt. #35 at pp. 26–27; Dkt. #38, App’x A at p. 4; Dkt. #40 at
p. 25). The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 1, 6, and 17 (Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at p.
13; Dkt. #38, App’x A at p. 4). The parties agree that this is a means-plus-function term
governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
1. The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s proposed construction “does not account for the
embodiments of the claimed invention wherein the time is a non-cumulative usage time”
(Dkt. #35 at p. 27).
Defendant responds that “the claims and specification state that ‘providing a usage time
measurement’ means to ‘count and store the cumulative usage time during which each LED
group is activated’” (Dkt. #40 at p. 27). As for corresponding structure, Defendant argues that
“[i]t is unclear exactly what Plaintiff refers to by ‘software and hardware which keeps track of

37

time,” and Defendant urges that “time of day” software does not relate to measurement of
“usage” time (Dkt. #40 at p. 28).
2. Analysis
For the reasons discussed above regarding the constituent term “usage time
measurement,” the claimed function for the “usage time measuring means” is “providing a
cumulative amount of time in use for each of said illumination groups at predetermined time
intervals.” Defendant additionally proposes requiring “counting” and “storing,” but while such
functions may perhaps be inherent in the structures that correspond to the recited function of
“providing,” those other functions are not themselves part of the claimed function. See ’524
Patent at 14:56–58 (“[T]he lighting device has a controller means to count and store the
cumulative usage time during which each LED group is activated . . . .”); see also Micro Chem.,
Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that district court
erred by “incorporating unrecited functional limitations into the claims”).
As for the corresponding structure, the parties appear to agree the structure requires a
processor, memory, and a counter or timer. See ’524 Patent at 12:17–19 (“[T]he lighting device
contains a non-volatile memory 140, which can be used to store various information which the
microprocessor 80 needs to perform its function.”); id. at 16:26–29 (“The memory means 140
shown in FIG. 4, will keep count of the usage time of each of the LEDs group in the LED Array,
and store these individual usage time values.”). The specification links the claimed function to
the microprocessor 80, non-volatile memory 140, and a software method that keeps track of
time:
The microprocessor 80 shown in FIG. 4, implements several useful functions for
the lighting device. In addition to the energizing means which aids in the variable
dimming capacity and control of the LED groups, the microprocessor 80 has
several means which allows the lighting device to compensate for long-term
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luminosity degradation. These means are timer means which is a software
method which keeps track of time.
Id. at 12:23–29 (emphasis added); see id. at 12:17–19, 16:26–29.
The Court therefore finds that “usage time measuring means for providing a usage
time measurement for each of said illumination groups at predetermined time intervals” is
a means-plus-function term. The claimed function is “providing a cumulative amount of time
in use for each of said illumination groups at predetermined time intervals,” and the
corresponding structure is “microprocessor 80, non-volatile memory 140, and a software
method that keeps track of time; and equivalents thereof.”
J. “wherein said one or more test light emitting diodes are selected from among light
emitting diodes which are part of said illumination groups and which are separate
from said illumination groups”
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendant’s Proposed Construction

“wherein said one or more test light emitting
diodes are selected from the group consisting
of: diodes which are part of said illumination
groups, and diodes which are separate from
said illumination groups”

“wherein said luminosity measuring means
chooses and isolates one or more test light
emitting diodes for measurement, the one or
more test light emitting diodes to be measured
being either part of said illumination groups or
separate from said illumination groups”

This is a Markush-type claim element.
(Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at pp. 15–16; Dkt. #35 at p. 28; Dkt. #38, App’x A at pp. 6–7; Dkt. #40 at
p. 24). The parties submit that this term appears in Claim 1 (Dkt. #30, Exhibit A at pp. 15–16).
1. The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that the Court should reject Defendant’s proposed construction because
“neither the claims nor the specification state that the luminosity measuring means ‘chooses and
isolates’ anything” (Dkt. #35 at p. 28). Plaintiff submits that “the term ‘selected’ is a mode of
expression that refers to the fact that the test LEDs may comprise LEDs selected from the group
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consisting of (a) LEDs that are a part of said illumination groups, and (b) LEDs which are
separate from said illumination groups” (Dkt. #35 at p. 29).

Plaintiff also argues claim

differentiation between Claim 1 and Claims 15 and 16 (Dkt. #35 at p. 29).
Defendant responds that the term “selected” requires that a particular LED is “chosen and
isolated—preventing its light from escaping the device—to accurately measure its brightness”
(Dkt. #40 at p. 24). Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s interpretation of ‘selected’ renders this
word entirely meaningless—there is no ‘selection’ at all under Plaintiff’s definition” because
“every LED must either be part of or separate from an illumination group” (Dkt. #40 at p. 25).
Plaintiff replies by reiterating that “the term ‘selected’ is clearly a mode of expression, a
linguistic patent drafting tool, used to denote or invoke a Markush-style alternative claim format”
and “is not a function or operation performed by the lighting device or any of its components”
(Dkt. #43 at p. 5).
2. Analysis
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff has argued claim differentiation for dependent Claims 15
and 16, but Plaintiff has not shown how Defendant’s proposed construction would be
inconsistent with claim differentiation. Rather, Plaintiff’s main argument is the word “selected”
sets forth a Markush group, that is, a group of alternatives. See Multilayer Stretch Cling Film
Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1357 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (discussing
common usage of the phrase “selected from the group consisting of” to signal a Markush group,
but noting that “[n]o precise linguistic formula is required to create a Markush claim”).
Plaintiff thus appears to argue that the word “selected” does not constitute an active
limitation, such as Defendant’s proposal of “chooses and isolates,” which would interpret the
word “selected” as requiring a specific type of device configuration.

40

The specification discloses an embodiment in which optical isolation is used between a
test LED and a sensor:
In order to provide an accurate picture of the lighting device’s lighting
LEDs state, the test LEDs must operate under identical conditions: same junction
current, same temperature, same usage time.
The most direct way to accomplish this is simply to use some of the
lighting LEDs as test LEDs. However this has the following drawbacks:
Each test LED must be optically coupled to a light intensity-measuring
device, such as a semiconductor photo-sensor. Furthermore, no outside light must
filter in this coupling, so that the intensity measurement accurately reflects the
Test LED intensity. Such a coupling + photo-sensor assembly can take a
substantial amount of physical space in front of the Test LED (typically at least
one inch). Using a lighting device’s lighting LED as Test LED would require to
provide this space between the whole LEDs PC-Board and the lighting device’s
transparent display window, therefore substantially increasing the overall lighting
device’s dimension.
....
To overcome these issues separate test LEDs driven with individual
current sources can be used.
’524 Patent at 15:39–16:5 (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, as discussed above regarding the “luminosity measuring means,” Claim 1 of
the ’524 Patent does not recite any limitation to exclude ambient light. Analogously, Defendant
has not shown that Claim 1 necessarily requires collecting all of the light from a selected LED.
This is a specific feature of particular disclosed embodiments that should not be imported into
the claim. See Constant, 848 F.2d at 1571; see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
Instead, as Plaintiff has proposed, the disputed term uses the phrase “selected from
among” to indicate a group of alternatives. See Multilayer, 831 F.3d at 1357 (noting that a
Markush group is simply “a listed group of species that are useful for the purposes of the
claim”). The disputed term does not conform to the standard format for a Markush group. See
Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A Markush
group by its nature is closed. If an applicant tries to claim a Markush group without the word

41

‘consisting,’ the PTO [(United States Patent and Trademark Office)] will insist upon the addition
of this word to ensure a closed meaning. Thus, in order to ‘close’ a Markush group, the PTO
insists on the transition phrase ‘group consisting of.’”). Nonetheless, the recital of “selected
from among” in the disputed term is sufficiently clear. See Multilayer, 831 F.3d at 1357 n.2
(“Under the PTO’s guidelines for patent examination, ‘[a]lternative expressions are permitted’ so
long as the claim ‘recites a list of alternatively useable species’ with no ‘uncertainty or ambiguity
with respect to the question of scope or clarity of the claims.’ ‘[T]he phrase ‘Markush claim’
means any claim that recites a list of alternatively useable species regardless of format.’”
(quoting MPEP § 2173.05(h)).
The Court therefore construes “wherein said one or more test light emitting diodes are
selected from among light emitting diodes which are part of said illumination groups and
which are separate from said illumination groups” to mean “wherein said one or more test
light emitting diodes are selected from the group consisting of: light emitting diodes which
are part of said illumination groups, and light emitting diodes which are separate from said
illumination groups.”
CONCLUSION
The Court adopts the constructions set forth in this opinion for the disputed terms of the
patents-in-suit. The parties are ordered that they may not refer, directly or indirectly, to each
other’s claim construction positions in the presence of the jury. Likewise, the parties are ordered
to refrain from mentioning any portion of this opinion, other than the actual definitions adopted
by the Court, in the presence of the jury. Any reference to claim construction proceedings is
limited to informing the jury of the definitions adopted by the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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SIGNED this 30th day of June, 2017.

___________________________________
AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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