Soniat v. Mitchell
ORDER AND OPINION - The Court finds Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney (Dkt. 5 ) is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kimberly C Priest Johnson on 9/1/2017. (baf, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CAROLYN A. MITCHELL,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:17-CV-00572
JUDGE MAZZANT/JUDGE JOHNSON
ORDER AND OPINION
Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Shelley Soniat’s Motion for an Attorney (Dkt.
5). For the following reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. 5) is DENIED.
Plaintiff previously filed a lawsuit in three separate actions in this district in 2014.1 The case
was referred to Magistrate Judge Don D. Bush from Judge Richard Schell (collectively, the “Judicial
Defendants”). Judge Bush denied Plaintiff’s request for the issuance of summons and recommended
Plaintiff’s case be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. See Soniat v. Jackson, 2014
WL 6968871, at *2, 6 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2014). Judge Schell subsequently adopted Judge Bush’s
report and dismissed the consolidated action. See Soniat v. Jackson, 2015 WL 1503650 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 31, 2015). Plaintiff appealed, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed. See Soniat v. Jackson, 628 F.
App’x 292 (5th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, but
it was denied on May 16, 2016. See Soniat v. Jackson, 136 S. Ct. 2016, 2016 WL 900300 (May 16,
See Soniat v. Jackson, et al., No. 4:14cv77, consolidated with 4:14cv122 and 4:14cv131 (E.D. Tex.).
On May 20, 2016, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit in this district against the Judicial
Defendants and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).2 She asserted the
Judicial Defendants discriminated against her by not allowing her to exercise and enjoy her rights
under the Fair Housing Act. Further, she asserted HUD’s policy of deferring to the Judicial
Defendants’ discretion and refusing to respond to her previous lawsuit has a discriminatory effect
on women and minorities. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed after the Judicial Defendants refused to
issue summons in her previous case, she sent a personal letter to HUD, and it refused to answer her
lawsuit, resulting in a discriminatory effect. On December 16, 2016, the undersigned entered two
Report and Recommendations recommending Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed against all of the
defendants in that suit, in which the district court adopted on January 6, 2017. See Soniat v. Dep’t
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 2017 WL 68562 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2017); Soniat v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 2017 WL 73073 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2017). That case is currently pending on appeal.
On March 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed another action against Texas Real Estate Commission,
Texas Association of Realtors, and National Association of Realtors.3 Plaintiff essentially made the
same complaints as she did in her first two lawsuits in this district.4 On April 21, 2017, the
undersigned recommended Plaintiff’s claims against the Texas Association and Realtors and
National Association of Realtors be dismissed, in which the district court adopted on May 12, 2017.
See Soniat v. Tex. Real Estate Comm’n, 2017 WL 2021323 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2017). On May 15,
2017, the undersigned recommended Plaintiff’s case against the Texas Real Estate Commission be
dismissed, in which the district court adopted on June 5, 2017. See Soniat v. Tex. Real Estate
Comm’n, 2017 WL 2426499 (E.D. Tex. June 5, 2017). That case is currently pending on appeal.
See Soniat v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 4:16cv337 (E.D. Tex.).
See Soniat v. Tex. Real Estate Comm’n, et al., No. 4:17cv166 (E.D. Tex.).
Plaintiff also filed a motion for appointment of an attorney in her previous case, in which the Court denied her request.
See Soniat v. Tex. Real Estate Comm’n, 2017 WL 1337630 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2017).
On August 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Carolyn A. Mitchell, alleging
essentially the same facts as those asserted in her previous three lawsuits (Dkt. 1). On August 29,
2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of counsel (Dkt. 5).
In general, there is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in civil cases. See
Santana v. Chandler, 961 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1992). Parties to an action for discrimination in
housing may seek the appointment of counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(1). However, appointment
of counsel is left to the discretion of the court. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(b); Roberts v. McKinney Hous.
Auth., 2007 WL 1795691, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 20, 2007).
Although little case law exists on the appointment of an attorney by a court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613(b), courts have found case law on the appointment of an attorney under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1) to be instructive and persuasive. See Soniat v. Tex. Real Estate Comm’n, 2017 WL 1337630,
at *3; Jackson v. Park Place Condos. Ass’n, Inc., 2014 WL 494789, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 6, 2014);
Zhu v. Countrywide Realty Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157 (D. Kan. 2001). Those courts follow
factors identified by the Tenth Circuit when evaluating a motion for appointment of counsel. See id.
(citing Castner v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, 979 F.2d 1417, 1421 (10th Cir. 1992)). Before counsel
may be appointed under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, the plaintiff requesting the appointment must make
affirmative showings of: (1) financial inability to pay for counsel; (2) diligence in attempting to
secure counsel; and (3) meritorious allegations of discrimination. See id.
Plaintiff briefly states that she is unable to afford counsel. See Dkt. 1. Plaintiff submitted a
financial affidavit with her motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and the Court finds that she is
financially incapable to pay for counsel. See Dkt. 3. Plaintiff further asserts that she was unable to
secure counsel willing to take her case pro bono. See Dkt. 5 at 5. Thus, Plaintiff has met the first
and second elements. However, Plaintiff cannot show the third element.
To warrant appointment of counsel, the plaintiff must affirmatively show she asserts
meritorious claims. See Soniat v. Tex. Real Estate Comm’n, 2017 WL 1337630, at *2 (citing
Jackson, 2014 WL 494789, at *3). In the instant lawsuit, Plaintiff requests the Court to decide the
(1) Did the Defendant, Attorney Mitchell, violate the laws of the Fair Housing Act by
encouraging her client to fight a fair housing lawsuit instead of observing the laws of The
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.?
(2) Did Defendant Attorney Mitchell violate the laws of The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601
et seq., by requesting sanctions against a victim of housing discrimination, for exercising her
fair housing rights?
Dkt. 1 at 2. The Court notes that these questions are similar to the questions she asked in her prior
lawsuits. Plaintiff complained about a potential lease she was going to enter into with her boyfriend
with Major League Realty, Inc. (“Major”). See id. at 3. According to Plaintiff, the potential landlord
refused to rekey the rental property she wanted to lease. See id. Plaintiff filed a suit in state court
against Major, and Defendant represented Major in the state court action. See id. Plaintiff alleges
Defendant violated the Fair Housing Act because Defendant “encouraged her client to fight the
lawsuit, thus continuing her act of Retaliation against the Plaintiff.” Id.
In Lewis v. Am. Exploration Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 1998), an individual was
injured when a large oil rig hit a truck in which the individual was a passenger. See id. at 674. The
individual and his wife sued the owner of the premises in which the accident occurred. See id. The
defendant lied about the existence of certain discovery; thus, the plaintiffs sued the defendant and
its lawyers in a separate lawsuit for fraud and conspiracy to defraud. See id. at 675. The court found
under Texas law that “neither a party to a lawsuit nor his lawyer has a right of recovery against the
opposing attorney arising from conduct engaged in as a part of that attorney’s duties in representing
his client in that lawsuit.” Id. at 676. Here, Plaintiff is merely suing Defendant for the conduct she
engaged in as a part of her duties to Major; thus, the Court fails to find how Plaintiff has a right of
recovery. See generally Dkt. 1. The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to make an affirmative showing
of meritorious allegations of a violation of the Fair Housing Act against Defendant.
The Court has evaluated the substance of Plaintiff’s allegations, rather than the form. In its
findings herein, the Court has been mindful that pro se pleadings are entitled to a liberal construction
that includes all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from them. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 521 (1972); Tassio v. Onemain Fin., Inc., 2016 WL 410024, *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2016).
Indeed, “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (internal citations
omitted). Nonetheless, pro se litigants are still required to provide sufficient facts in support of their
claims. United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1993). The Court has evaluated Plaintiff’s
pleadings herein accordingly. Even construing all the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the
Court finds Plaintiff’s motion should be denied.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. 5) is DENIED.
SIGNED this 1st day of September, 2017.
KIMBERLY C. PRIEST JOHNSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?