Horner et al v. City of Highland Village et al

Filing 57

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. The Court finds Defendant's Motion (Dkt. 29) is GRANTED and Plaintiffs' claims are DISMISSED. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that all claims PlaintiffS asserted, or could have asserted, aga inst Defendants in this lawsuit are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees are taxed against the party incurring the same. All relief not previously granted is hereby DENIED, and the Clerk is directed to CLOSE this civil action. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kimberly C Priest Johnson on 5/22/2018. (daj, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
CRYSTAL HORNER and ALYSHA
HORNER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF HIGHLAND VILLAGE, CITY OF
HIGHLAND VILLAGE POLICE
DEPARTMENT, DOUGLAS REIM, and
CORY GULLO,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No.: 4:17-cv-00774-KPJ

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendants City of Highland Village, City of Highland Village
Police Department, Douglas Reim (“Reim”), and Officer Cory Gullo’s (“Gullo”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or in the Alternative for a More
Definite Statement Pursuant to Rule 12(e) (the “Motion”) (Dkt. 29). Pro se Plaintiffs Crystal
Horner and Alysha Horner (“Plaintiffs”) filed a response in opposition (Dkt. 32); Defendants filed
a reply (Dkt. 33); Plaintiffs filed two additional sur-replies (Dkts. 34, 46); and Defendant filed a
reply solely to address information first raised in Plaintiffs’ sur-reply (Dkt. 56). After review of
the pleadings, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. 29) is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’
claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in their entirety.
I.

BACKGROUND

On October 27, 2017, pro se Plaintiff Crystal Horner (“C. Horner”) filed her original
complaint (Dkt. 3) against Defendants, seeking compensatory damages in the amount of
$2,500,000.00. On November 1, 2017, the Court informed C. Horner that, as she is proceeding pro

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se, she may not bring a lawsuit on behalf of Plaintiff Alysha Horner (“A. Horner”). See Dkt. 9. To
comply with the Court’s order, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint (Dkt. 11) bearing both of
their signatures. See Dkt. 11.
The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint (Dkt. 31) on January 18, 2018
(see Dkt. 49) for failing to include an actual amended complaint and for failing to include the
original claims in the “amendment” information, which was included in the Motion to Amend
(Dkt. 31). In the January 18, 2018 Order, the Court allowed Plaintiffs additional time to properly
amend their complaint; however, they failed to do so. See Dkt. 49. Although Plaintiffs did not
properly amend their pleadings in the allotted extra time, being mindful of Plaintiffs’ pro se status,
the Court considered and liberally construed all of Plaintiffs’ filings, including the original
complaint (Dkt. 3), amended complaint (Dkt. 11), and information contained in Plaintiffs’ motion
to amend (Dkt. 31) (collectively, the “Complaint”). Further, Plaintiffs submitted two sur-replies
(Dkts. 34, 46) to Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. 29), both of which the Court fully considered.
Plaintiffs allege that on October 24, 2016, Plaintiff A. Horner was picked up from her job
at 6:00 p.m., by Darreon Johnson (“Johnson”). See Dkt. 11 at 2. The Complaint alleges that while
driving with Plaintiff A. Horner, Johnson was “being harassed” by two vehicles and eventually
ended up in an altercation with the persons in those vehicles at a location within Highland Village.
See id. During the altercation, firearms were presented, and at some point, a gun discharged. See
id. That night, at 8:30 p.m., Defendant Reim, Chief of Police for Highland Village Police
Department, contacted Plaintiff C. Horner and told her that Plaintiff A. Horner was involved in an
incident, and he needed her to come to the police station. See Dkt. 11 at 3. According to the
Complaint, Plaintiff A. Horner and Johnson were traveling to Oklahoma City. See id. In an
apparent coordinated effort, Oklahoma City police arrested Plaintiff A. Horner and Johnson in

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Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on October 25, 2016, at 3:00 a.m., on behalf of the City of Highland
Village Police Department. See id. at 1. Plaintiff A. Horner was arrested for aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon. See id. Incident to the arrest, Plaintiff A. Horner’s vehicle was impounded
and her cell phone was confiscated. See id. at 3, 5. After the arrest, Plaintiff A. Horner was held in
the City of Oklahoma jail for thirteen days. See Dkt. 32 at 5. Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff A.
Horner’s jail stay lasted for nearly two weeks because the bail set for her release was excessive
under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 4.
Upon review of the Complaint (Dkts. 3, 11, 31) and Plaintiffs’ briefing in response to the
Motion (Dkts. 32, 34, 36), Plaintiffs appear to assert the following claims: (1) improper arrest of
Plaintiff A. Horner; (2) malicious prosecution; (3) Fourth Amendment violation for improper
impoundment of Plaintiff A. Horner’s vehicle and confiscation of her phone; (4) failure to provide
adequate medical care in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”); (5) Eighth
Amendment violation for excessive bail; (6) defamation of character; and (7) witness tampering.
See Dkts. 3, 11, 31, 32, 34, 36.
In response to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defendants filed the current Motion (Dkt. 29) on
December 7, 2017, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. In the Motion, Defendants
argue Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed as to the individual Defendants because the Complaint
is devoid of facts demonstrating a violation of any federal rights. See Dkt. 29 at 6. Further,
Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed as to the municipality and police
department because there are no facts illustrating any form of misconduct by the entities regarding
failure to train or any unlawful policy—the only bases for civil recourse against such entities. See
id. at 6-7.

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The Court has evaluated the substance of Plaintiffs’ allegations, rather than the form. In its
findings below, the Court has been mindful that pro se pleadings are entitled to a liberal
construction that includes all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from them. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972); Tassio v. Onemain Fin., Inc., 2016 WL 410024, *1 (E.D. Tex.
Feb. 3, 2016).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. RULE 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) provides a party may move for dismissal of an action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court must accept as true
all well-pleaded facts contained in the plaintiff’s complaint and view them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). A complaint must
provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a). A complaint that does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” will not survive a motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678-79 (2009).
When considering a motion to dismiss, the court’s review is limited to the complaint, any
documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that
are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint. See Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v.
Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)).

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III. ANALYSIS
A. PLAINTIFF C. HORNER’S STANDING
Prior to reaching the merits of any case, the Court must undertake a “careful judicial
examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to
an adjudication of the particular claims asserted,” i.e., whether a plaintiff has “standing.”
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1867 (2006) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 752 (1984)). The question of standing involves the determination of whether a particular
litigant is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court in order to decide the merits of a
dispute or of particular issues. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). A
party has standing if: (1) she has suffered a “concrete and particularized” injury that is actual or
imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there is a causal relationship between the
injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) it is likely and not merely speculative that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992); Westfall v. Miller, 77 F.3d 868, 871 (5th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff has the burden of proof
and persuasion as to the existence of standing as to her claims. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; Int’l Ass’n
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Goodrich Corp., 410 F.3d 204, 211-12 (5th Cir. 2005).
In order to bring a claim for civil rights violations, a party must establish a personal
deprivation of one of her own rights or privileges secured by the Constitution. Brumfield v. Jones,
849 F.2d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1988). Indeed, “[t]he right to sue under the Civil Rights Act is personal
in nature.” Id.; see also Johnson v. Fordice, 996 F.2d 306, 306 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal
of complaint where plaintiff did not allege or argue that he was personally affected by the order he
challenged). Plaintiff C. Horner has not shown how she has suffered any “concrete and
particularized” injury sufficient to confer standing on her. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. All of the factual

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allegations in the pleadings before the Court relate to alleged harms against Plaintiff A. Horner.
See generally Dkts. 3, 11, 31, 32, 34, 36.
It is well established that “[i]f a plaintiff lacks Article III standing, then a federal court
lacks jurisdiction to hear the complaint.” Delta Commercial Fisheries Assoc. v. Gulf of Mexico
Fishery Mgmt. Council, 364 F.3d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 2004). Therefore, this Court is not the forum
to resolve Plaintiff C. Horner’s grievances, should she have any, and hence, Plaintiff C. Horner’s
claims are dismissed. Because Plaintiff C. Horner is dismissed, all references to “Plaintiff” below
shall refer to Plaintiff A. Horner only.
B. PLAINTIFF’S FALSE ARREST CLAIM
Defendants contend that, taking Plaintiff’s claims as true, because it is undisputed that
Plaintiff’s arrest was supported by a warrant issued by an independent intermediary judge,
Defendants cannot be liable for any claim of improper arrest or malicious prosecution. See Dkt.
33 at 2-3. In support, Defendants cite Fifth Circuit case law stating, “It is well settled that if facts
supporting an arrest are placed before an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or grand
jury, the intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the
initiating party.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 170 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Taylor v. Gregg,
36 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1994)).
In response, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gullo “mis[led] the magistrate” by offering
false statements to secure the warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest. See Dkt. 34 at 2. Plaintiff also alleges
that Defendant Gullo stated he was “not confident in [the witness’] statement” before he submitted
a sworn statement to obtain the warrant. See Dkt. 32 at 3. Plaintiff concludes that Defendant Gullo
“knowingly with malice, disregard for the facts, intentionally, with reckless disregard of the truth”

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made false statements to secure the warrant. See Dkt. 34 at 2. The Court finds Plaintiff’s conclusion
to be unfounded.
In Deville, the Fifth Circuit held, “Despite review by an independent intermediary, the
initiating party may be liable for false arrest if the plaintiff shows ‘the deliberations of that
intermediary were in some way tainted by the actions of the defendant.’” Deville, 567 F.3d at 170
(citing Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1428 (5th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff asserts the following facts:
Plaintiff was picked up from Taco Bell in Highland Village on October 24, 2016, at 6:00 p.m., by
Johnson (see Dkt. 11 at 2); Johnson was driving the vehicle owned by Plaintiff, a gray Nissan
Sentra (see id.); an incident occurred while driving Plaintiff’s car that same night (see id.); in
obtaining the warrant, Defendant Gullo testified Plaintiff’s vehicle, a “gray in color 2012 Nissan
Sentra . . . bearing the license plate Texas HTG0699 . . . [was] involved in the commission of the
crime.” Dkt. 32 at 3. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Defendant Gullo did not “mislead the
magistrate” in obtaining the arrest warrant; rather, Defendant Gullo accurately described the
vehicle involved in the incident, including the persons who were in the vehicle. Accordingly, the
Court finds the deliberations regarding the issuance of the warrant for Plaintiff were not tainted by
the actions of Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims regarding an improper or false arrest are
dismissed.
C. FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION CLAIM FOR IMPOUNDMENT
OF VEHICLE AND SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF CELL PHONE
Plaintiff further asserts that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when her car was
impounded incident to her arrest. See Dkt. 11 at 8. As previously discussed, Plaintiff was arrested
pursuant to a valid warrant; therefore, the impoundment of her vehicle was proper and not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-69 (1976);

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United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Ponce, 8 F.3d 989,
996 (5th Cir.1993).
Regarding the seizure of Plaintiff’s cell phone, Plaintiff alleges the following facts: the
personal cell phone of Plaintiff was seized incident to the October 25, 2016, arrest (see Dkt. 46 at
2); Defendant Gullo received the cell phone on January 6, 2017 (see id.); a search warrant for the
cell phone issued on August 21, 2017 (see id.). Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that Defendants
maintained possession of the cell phone for eight months before obtaining a search warrant for its
contents. See Dkt. 46 at 2. Plaintiff further states Defendant Gullo obtained the search warrant by
claiming there was new technology to extract data which was not available at the time of the arrest.
See id. Plaintiff alleges the technology was actually available since April 2016; therefore, the
search warrant was falsely obtained and Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. See
id.
In response, Defendants state that, based on information received during the investigation,
Defendant Gullo reasonably believed Plaintiff’s cell phone contained evidence of the crime for
which she was arrested. See Dkt. 56 at 3. Therefore, Plaintiff’s cell phone was secured to prevent
destruction of potential evidence. See id. at 4. Ultimately, a valid warrant was obtained to search
the cell phone. See id.
In support of her position, Plaintiff cites one case from a Massachusetts court which held
that an officer seizing a cellular device for sixty-eight days during the investigation of a crime was
unreasonable. See Com. v. White, 59 N.E.3d 369, 372 (Mass. 2016). The Court finds this authority
unpersuasive. Instead, the Court relies upon Supreme Court authority stating that police officers
may search and seize items from an arrestee incident to a lawful arrest. See United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-26 (1973) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969));

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State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Regarding cell phones, the
Supreme Court has held that police officers are required to obtain a warrant before they search the
contents of the phone. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). In Riley, the Supreme
Court also stated that police officers may seize and secure cell phones to prevent destruction of
evidence while seeking a warrant. See id. at 2486; see also State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399,
412 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“[T]he police may legitimately “seize” the property and hold it while
they seek a search warrant. . . .”).
Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants searched Plaintiff’s cell phone without a warrant.
In fact, Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendants secured Plaintiff’s cell phone and obtained a
warrant prior to conducting any search. See Dkt. 46 at 2. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Defendants complied with the procedure regarding cell phone searches as pronounced by the
Supreme Court: Defendants (1) seized Plaintiff’s cell phone incident to arrest; (2) based on
information that the cell phone contained evidence of the crime for which Plaintiff was arrested,
secured the cell phone; and (3) obtained a search warrant prior to searching the contents of the
phone.
Although Plaintiff complains about the delay in obtaining the warrant, she does not present
any valid legal authority to assert that any such delay was a constitutional violation. Once the issue
of qualified immunity is raised, a plaintiff has the burden of rebutting the defense by demonstrating
that the government official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law. See
Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim regarding Fourth Amendment
violation in the seizure of Plaintiff’s cell phone is dismissed.

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D. PLAINTIFFS’ REMAINING CLAIMS ARE DISMISSED
Each of Plaintiff’s remaining claims fail on different bases. First, Plaintiff alleges a claim
of “malicious prosecution” and states that it “is a violation of the Fourth Amendment right to
secure a person.” Dkt. 11 at 8. The Fifth Circuit has stated there is no “freestanding constitutional
right to be free from malicious prosecution.” Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir.
2003). Instead, a claim of “malicious prosecution” can lead to claims under the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 946. Accordingly, any claim asserted by Plaintiff for “malicious
prosecution” under Section 1983 is facially inadequate, and therefore, dismissed.
Although not facially apparent, even if Plaintiff intended to allege a claim for malicious
prosecution under state law, such a claim fails. Pursuant to Texas law, a plaintiff asserting a
malicious prosecution claim must establish:
(1) the commencement of a criminal prosecution against the plaintiff;
(2) causation (initiation or procurement) of the action by the defendant;
(3) termination of the prosecution in the plaintiff’s favor;
(4) the plaintiff’s innocence;
(5) the absence of probable cause for the proceedings;
(6) malice in filing the charge; and
(7) damage to the plaintiff.
Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1997). For reasons previously
explained, Plaintiff’s claim regarding an improper or false arrest has been dismissed. See supra
Section III.A. As such, Plaintiff cannot establish the “absence of probable cause for the
proceedings,” and any Texas state law claim for malicious prosecution is therefore dismissed.
Next, Plaintiff’s claim for failure to provide adequate medical care in violation of the ADA
is dismissed for two reasons. First, Plaintiff’s claim, if viable, is directed at the incorrect
Defendants. Any complaint for deficiency in care while jailed should be directed to the entity
detaining the person—in this case, the jail where Plaintiff was detained in Oklahoma City. Second,

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to properly assert a claim under the ADA, a person must assert they have a disability. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 et seq. Plaintiff has not alleged any disability. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for relief
under the ADA is dismissed.
Next, Plaintiff’s claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment for excessive bail is also
dismissed. Plaintiff alleges bail, set at $50,000.00, was excessive because Plaintiff was eighteen
(18) years old with minimal income. See Dkt. 34 at 2. The Fifth Circuit has held that “bail setting
is not constitutionally excessive merely because a defendant is financially unable to satisfy the
requirement.” United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988); see generally, Pugh
v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations do not constitute
a federal violation, and thus, the claims regarding excessive bail are dismissed.
Next, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 4101. Upon review, 42 U.S.C. §
4101 involves foreign defamation judgments, and does not involve any cause of action for
defamation against governmental entities or individuals. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim regarding
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 4101 is dismissed. That said, analyzing the substance rather than the
form, the Court also finds that Plaintiff’s claim of defamation is dismissed for the reasons set forth
below.
First, assuming Plaintiff intended to bring her defamation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, for such claims, allegations of injury to reputation alone are not sufficient. See Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). Such defamation claims must be accompanied by a constitutionally
recognized injury. See id. This rule is known as the “stigma-plus” standard, which requires a
plaintiff to show that a government official’s conduct deprived the plaintiff of a previously
recognized property or liberty interest in addition to damaging plaintiff’s reputation. See id. In all
of Plaintiff’s allegations, she does not allege deprivation of any right or tangible property interest.

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Second, even if Plaintiff intended to bring her defamation claim under Texas state law,
such a claim is not cognizable against the governmental Defendants. The Fifth Circuit has stated
that “[g]overnmental units maintain sovereign immunity from the intentional tort of defamation”
unless a state has waived such immunity. See Rivera v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 431
F. App’x 356, 357 (5th Cir. 2011). In Rivera, the Fifth Circuit recognized that “Texas has not
waived immunity for intentional tort claims such as defamation and libel” and therefore, claims
against governmental units in Texas are not cognizable. See id. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s potential
state defamation claims against the governmental Defendants are dismissed.
Plaintiff’s potential state defamation claims against individual Defendants also fail.
Pursuant to Texas law, defamation requires the following elements:
(1) the publication of a false statement of fact to a third party, (2) that was defamatory
concerning the plaintiff, (3) with the requisite degree of fault, and (4) damages, in some
cases.
In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 593 (Tex. 2015) (citing WFAA–TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d
568, 571 (Tex. 1998)). Plaintiff alleges that certain Defendants, including those named, defamed
her by “releasing information to media outlets regarding the alleged incident.” Dkt. 34 at 3.
Plaintiff also states that her “mugshot was hastily released prior to the conclusion of an
investigation” and that such release of information and mugshot caused damage to Plaintiff’s
reputation and was made intentionally, with malice. See Dkts. 32 at 2; 34 at 3.
Despite general allegations, Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any information about
the “publication of a false statement.” The “release of information” to media is not equivalent to
such information being false. Without further information regarding the released information, the
Court cannot determine whether such information was actually false. Accordingly, any claim
Plaintiff may have asserted for defamation under Texas state law must be dismissed.

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Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Reim violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) and §
1512(b)(2)(A) when Defendant Reim told a witness that a written statement must be believable.
See Dkt. 32 at 5. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 is a criminal statute, and the conduct described by Plaintiff does
not constitute a crime. A plaintiff does not have a civil cause of action under this statute.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim regarding witness tampering is dismissed.
In its findings herein, the Court has been mindful that pro se pleadings are entitled to a
liberal construction that includes all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from them. See
Haines, 404 U.S. at 521; Tassio, 2016 WL 410024 at *1. Indeed, “a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, pro se
litigants are still required to provide sufficient facts in support of their claims. United States v.
Pineda, 988 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1993). Even construing all the facts in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Defendant’s Motion (Dkt. 29) is GRANTED
and Plaintiffs’ claims are DISMISSED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that all claims
PlaintiffS asserted, or could have asserted, against Defendants in this lawsuit are hereby
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees are taxed
against the party incurring the same.
All relief not previously granted is hereby DENIED, and the Clerk is directed to CLOSE
this civil action.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 22nd day of May, 2018.
.

____________________________________
KIMBERLY C. PRIEST JOHNSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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