Williams v. McDonough et al
Filing
60
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff has thirty (30) days to conduct limited expedited discovery regarding what notice, if any, Officer M. McGuire, formerly of Denton Police Department, Badge #173, received regarding this suit. Plaintiff is directed to file a motion for additional time, if needed, to conduct such discovery. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall submit a brief regarding what actual notice, if any, Officer M. McGuire received by July 8, 2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kimberly C Priest Johnson on 5/23/2019. (rpc, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
MELVIN EARL WILLIAMS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF DENTON, TEXAS, APRIL
DAWN MCDONOUGH, KEITH D.
MARTIN, and DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS,
Defendants.
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§ Civil Action No.: 4:17-cv-00811-ALM-KPJ
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Melvin Earl Williams, Jr.’s (“Plaintiff”) Opposed
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Substitute Defendants (the “Motion for Leave”) (Dkt.
43). The Motion for Leave seeks to make three significant changes: (1) remove Defendant Keith
D. Martin (“Martin”) from the suit; (2) amend allegations previously made against April Dawn
McDonough (“McDonough”); and (3) add Officer M. McGuire (Badge #173) (“McGuire”) as a
defendant. See Dkt. 43 at 2. The Motion for Leave is agreed in part and opposed in part by
Defendants McDonough, Martin, and City of Denton, Texas (collectively, “City Defendants”). See
Dkt. 47. The City Defendants do not oppose those amendments to the Complaint which dismiss
claims against Martin or amend allegations against McDonough. See Dkt. 47 at 3. However, the
City Defendants oppose adding McGuire as a Defendant. See Dkt. 47 at 1–3.
I. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the Complaint pursuant to Rule 15(c)(1)(C), which would
allow the amendment to relate back to the time of filing and overcome the statute of limitations.
See Dkt. 43 at 3. Plaintiff argues this is the type of “quintessential misidentification for which Rule
15(c)” is intended, because the Denton Police Department incident report (the “Incident Report”)
on which Plaintiff relied in filing the Complaint identifies only McDonough and Martin, not
McGuire. See id. at 4; Dkt. 43-2 at 1–2 (identifying McDonough as the “Reporting Officer” and
Martin as the “Approving Supervisor”).1 As such, Plaintiff asserts that he relied on the Incident
Report when filing suit and had no reason to know that another officer was involved. See Dkt. 43
at 3–5.
The statute of limitations has run against McGuire. See Dkt. 47 at 3. Accordingly, Plaintiff
relies on Rule 15(c) in order for his claim against McGuire to relate back to the time suit was filed.
Rule 15(c)(1) states:
An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back;
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original
pleading; or
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a
claim is asserted, if Rule (c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by
Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by
amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in
defending on the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.
Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot satisfy Rule 15(c)(1)(C) because “there is no way to
perfect service [against McGuire] within the Rule 4(m) period.” See Dkt. 47 at 7.
Where a defendant did not receive actual notice, a plaintiff may be able to satisfy the
requirements of Rules 15(c) and 4(m) by establishing the defendant had constructive notice. See,
The Court notes that on page two of the Incident Report, the responding officer is named simply as “an Officer.” See
Dkt. 43-2 at 2.
1
for example, Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Moore v. Long, 924
F.2d 586, 587 (5th Cir. 1991); Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 407–08 (5th Cir. 1980)). Plaintiff
relies on Jacobsen for the proposition that McGuire received constructive notice within the ninetyday period set forth in Rule 4(m). In Jacobsen, a plaintiff served suit on the city attorney in a case
against a city and police officers. See Jacobsen, 133 F.3d at 320. Because the city attorney
presumably investigated the allegations, newly-named officers in an amended complaint either
“knew or should have known that, but for Jacobsen’s mistaken belief that [the originally named
officer] was the arresting officer, the action would have been brought against them, therefore
satisfying clause B [of Rule 15].” See Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d at 320–21. As in Jacobson,
Plaintiff argues that McGuire received constructive notice because McGuire shares an identity of
interest with the currently named City Defendants. See Dkt. 43 at 5–7. However, unlike the facts
in Jacobsen, McGuire does not presently share counsel with the City Defendants, has not made an
appearance in this matter, and was not employed by the City at the time suit was filed. Indeed,
McGuire had not been employed by the City for over a year at the time suit was filed. Accordingly,
the awareness of the City Defendants and their counsel of the suit does not satisfy the standard for
identity of interest set forth in Jacobsen, and thus, the Court cannot infer constructive notice.
At present, there are no facts in the record which support a finding that McGuire received
actual notice as required under Rule 15(c). Because there are no grounds herein to find constructive
notice, it is Plaintiff’s burden to show that McGuire received actual notice within the Rule 4(m)
deadline. Given the procedural history in this case, there is a narrow window in which McGuire
may have received actual notice after suit was filed and prior to the Rule 4(m) deadline.
While discovery is frequently stayed in Section 1983 cases, the Court notes that the
discovery stay and lack of Rule 26(f) disclosures in this case, together with Defendants’ strategic
decision to defend this suit without clarifying that McDonough and Martin were incorrectly named
(and, indeed, that Martin was not involved in Plaintiff’s arrest), contributed to Plaintiff’s failure to
properly name McGuire in this suit. The Court notes that knowledge of what notice, if any,
McGuire received from the City Defendants is likely only known by the City Defendants and
McGuire himself. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to limited discovery on the issue
of notice to McGuire.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff has thirty (30) days to conduct limited
expedited discovery regarding what notice, if any, Officer M. McGuire, formerly of Denton Police
Department, Badge #173, received regarding this suit. Plaintiff is directed to file a motion for
.
additional time, if needed, to conduct such discovery.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall submit a brief regarding what actual
notice, if any, Officer M. McGuire received by July 8, 2019.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 23rd day of May, 2019.
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KIMBERLY C. PRIEST JOHNSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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