Sanchez et al v. SAFECO Insurance Company of Indiana et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 27 ) is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Amos L. Mazzant, III on 8/21/2018. (rpc, )

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

MIKE AND JACQUELINE SANCHEZ
v.
SAFECO INSURANCE OF INDIANA

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Civil Action No. 4:17-CV-00892
Judge Mazzant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana’s (“Safeco”) Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. #27). After reviewing the relevant pleadings, the Court finds the motion
should be denied.
BACKGROUND
On November 29, 2017, Plaintiffs Mike and Jacqueline Sanchez (“Plaintiffs”) filed their
Complaint against Safeco in Texas state court, alleging (1) breach of contract, (2) noncompliance
with the Texas Insurance Code: Unfair Settlement Practices, (3) noncompliance with the Texas
Insurance Code: the Prompt Payment of Claims, (4) Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing, (5) DTPA Violations, (6) Negligent Hiring, and (7) fraud (Dkt. #1, Exhibit 3 at pp. 8–
13). Safeco filed its Answer on December 21, 2017 (Dkt. #1, Exhibit 6 at p. 2). On December 28,
2017, Safeco removed this matter to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction (Dkt. #1 at
pp. 2–3). On June 7, 2018, Safeco filed its Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #27). On
July 6, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their Response (Dkt. #32).
LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims
or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). Summary judgment is proper
under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine when “the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. The trial court
“must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment.” Casey Enters., Inc. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1981).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of its
motion and identifying “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials” that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the movant bears the
burden of proof on a claim or defense for which it is moving for summary judgment, it must come
forward with evidence that establishes “beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the
claim or defense.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). Where the
nonmovant bears the burden of proof, the movant may discharge the burden by showing that there
is an absence of evidence to support the nonmovant’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Byers v.
Dall. Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000). Once the movant has carried its
burden, the nonmovant must “respond to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth
particular facts indicating there is a genuine issue for trial.” Byers, 209 F.3d at 424 (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49). A nonmovant must present affirmative evidence to defeat a
properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Mere denials of
material facts, unsworn allegations, or arguments and assertions in briefs or legal memoranda will
not suffice to carry this burden. Rather, the Court requires “significant probative evidence” from

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the nonmovant to dismiss a request for summary judgment. In re Mun. Bond Reporting Antitrust
Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111,
114 (5th Cir. 1978)). The Court must consider all of the evidence but “refrain from making any
credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476
F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007).
ANALYSIS
The relevant pleadings reveal a stark dispute of material fact. Plaintiffs claim that their
roof sustained functional damage due to a hail storm. Plaintiffs submitted evidence in support of
this factual contention (Dkt. #32, Exhibit 1). Safeco counters that Plaintiffs’ roof suffered no
functional damage due to the same hail storm. The resolution of this factual dispute will decide
this matter as it is inextricably linked to all of Plaintiffs’ claims (Dkt. #5 at pp. 8–12). Thus, a
genuine dispute of material fact bars the Court from granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary
.

Judgment.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #27) is
DENIED.
SIGNED this 21st day of August, 2018.

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AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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