Houser v. Castle Montessori Schools, Inc.

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM ADOPTING 27 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 19 ) is hereby DENIED. Signed by District Judge Amos L. Mazzant, III on 5/30/2019. (rpc, )

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
ANDREA HOUSER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASTLE MONTESSORI SCHOOLS, INC.,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:18-cv-00241-ALM-KPJ

MEMORANDUM ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Came on for consideration the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge in this
action, this matter having been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636. On May 2, 2019, the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge was
entered (the “Report”) (see Dkt. #27) recommending Defendant Castle Montessori Schools,
Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. #19) be denied. See Dkt. #27
at 9.
Defendant filed objections to the Report (the “Objections,” Dkt. #28) and Plaintiff
filed a Response (Dkt. #30). The Court has made a de novo review of the Objections and
is of the opinion that the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct and
the Objections are without merit as to the ultimate findings of the Magistrate Judge.

The

Court hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as the findings
and conclusions of the Court.
I.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Defendant’s termination of Plaintiff Andrea Houser.
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant, first as a preschool teacher and later in
a housekeeping/kitchen role. See Dkt. #1 at 2; Dkt. #19-1 at 3; Dkt. #25 at 1;

Dkt. #25-2 at 15, 19. Plaintiff alleges that after she was asked by Defendant to provide
information related to her medical

restrictions

and

disability,

she

provided

said

information, and was subsequently terminated. See Dkt. #25 at 1; Dkt. #25-2 at 15, 19.
Plaintiff further alleges she was terminated on the basis of her disability and that
Defendant refused to determine if a reasonable accommodation could be found. See Dkt.
#25 at 1–3. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the issues of: (1) whether Plaintiff’s
claim for back pay should be limited due to an offer of reinstatement extended by Defendant;
and (2) whether Plaintiff’s claims for back pay, front pay, and reinstatement should be
dismissed because Plaintiff has not applied for any teaching jobs since her termination. See
Dkt. #19.
II.

DISCUSSION

Reinstatement Offer
The Magistrate Judge found a question of fact regarding whether either a substantive
reinstatement offer was tendered or Plaintiff acted unreasonably in rejecting the reinstatement
offer. See Dkt. #27 at 6–7. Defendant argues that the Court should find Plaintiff unreasonably
rejected an unconditional reinstatement offer as a matter of law. See Dkt. #28.
Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence and all justifiable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 549 (1999). The appropriate inquiry is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986).
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“If a defendant establishes that it made an unconditional offer for a substantially similar
position, then the plaintiff must present evidence that the refusal was reasonable.” See Mahoney
v. Ernst & Young LLP, 487 F. Supp. 2d 780, 785–86 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (citing Ford Motor Co
v. E.E.O.C., 458 U.S. 219, 241 (1982); Smith v. World Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1456, 1465 (8th Cir.
1994)). Courts consider whether the totality of the circumstances would have allowed the jury
to reach the conclusion that it was objectively reasonable to reject an offer. See id. (noting that
courts have considered the length of time between termination and offers of reinstatement).
In reviewing the evidence, the Court finds there is evidence from which a reasonable
juror could find that Plaintiff acted reasonably in denying Defendant’s offer of reinstatement.
The offer was made “more than one and [a] half years after [Plaintiff’s] termination[,]”Plaintiff
alleges that her experience “left a lasting, negative impact on [Plaintiff’s] life,” which has
impacted her “disabilities and ability to work as a teacher,” and Plaintiff believes that if she
were to be reinstated, her former supervisor, Varsha Patel (“Patel”), would continue to bully
and discriminate against her. See Dkt. #24 at 6–7; Dkt. #19-1 at 1–18. Defendant argues that
the Court should disregard the proffered reasons as “conclusory.” See Dkt. #28. However,
considering the totality of the circumstances, it is possible a jury could find that it was
objectively reasonable for Plaintiff to reject Defendant’s offer. Accordingly, the Court finds no
error in the Magistrate Judge’s determination and this objection is OVERRULED.
Mitigation of Damages
Defendant argues the Magistrate Judge erred in finding a fact question regarding
whether Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages. See Dkt. #28 at 5. A plaintiff suing for back pay
under the Americans with Disabilities Act has a duty to mitigate her damages with reasonable
diligence to obtain substantially equivalent employment. Migas v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d

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1041, 1045 (5th Cir. 1998). The “employer has the burden of proving failure to mitigate.”
Palasota v. Haggar Clothing, Co., 499 F.3d 474, 486 (5th Cir. 2007). Defendant can meet this
burden by demonstrating: (1) substantially equivalent work was available, and (2) Plaintiff did
not exercise reasonable diligence to obtain this work. Sellers v. Delgado Coll, 902 F.2d 1189,
1193 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
There is evidence Plaintiff applied, and was interviewed, for jobs, but that none of the
jobs for which Plaintiff applied were in Montessori education. See Dkt. #19 at 1–3; Dkt. #19-1
at 4. However, at the time of Plaintiff’s termination, Plaintiff was employed in a housekeeping
and kitchen role, rather than as a teacher for Defendant. See Dkt. #25 at 1; Dkt. #25-2 at 15, 19;
Dkt. #25-4 at 39. Defendant submitted evidence that for the period between six days and “over
one month ago” prior to the drafting of Patel’s declaration in January of 2019, there were jobs
available in Montessori education. See Dkt. #19-4; Dkt. #19-5. Moreover, there are limited facts
regarding the nature of the jobs for which Plaintiff applied.
Defendant bears the burden to prove Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages. See Sellers,
902 F.2d at 1193. The Court cannot say that Defendant meets its burden as a matter of law to
establish both that substantially equivalent work was available and that Plaintiff did not exercise
reasonable diligence to obtain this work. Upon review, the Court finds no error in the Magistrate
Judge’s Report. Accordingly, this objection is OVERRULED.
III.

CONCLUSION

Upon review, the Objections (Dkt. #28) are OVERRULED.
Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. #19) is hereby DENIED.
This case shall proceed to trial.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 30th day of May, 2019.

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AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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