Ferguson et al v. Lockheed Martin Corporation

Filing 89

REDACTED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. It is therefore ORDERED that the Defendant Lockheed Martin Corporation's Motion to Transfer or Alternatively to Dismiss (Dkt. 43 ) should be GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that this case is TRANSFERRED to the Fort Worth Division of the Northern District of Texas. Signed by District Judge Amos L. Mazzant, III on 12/18/2023. (baf, )

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel.
MARIA DEL CARMEN GAMBOA
FERGUSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-097
Judge Mazzant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Lockheed Martin Corporation’s Motion to
Transfer or Alternatively to Dismiss (Dkt. #43). Having considered the motion and the relevant
pleadings, the Court finds that Defendant Lockheed Martin Corporation’s Motion to Transfer or
Alternatively to Dismiss (Dkt. #43) should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
I.

Factual Background
This is a False Claims Act case (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 95–100). Plaintiff Maria Del Carmen Gamboa

Ferguson (“Ferguson”) previously worked as an auditor at Defendant Lockheed Martin
Corporation (“Lockheed”) from 2005 until June 2018 (Dkt. #1 ¶ 9). During that time, she served
as Director of Internal Audit, Senior Manager of the Subcontract Audit Group, and Manager of
Internal Audit/Subcontract Audit (Dkt. #1 ¶ 9). In these roles, she audited subcontractors that
supplied parts and labor for various aircraft to ensure that the subcontractors and Lockheed
complied with standards within the Federal Acquisitions Regulation and the Truth in Negotiations

Act (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 10–11). Ferguson claims that through her work, she learned that Lockheed had
violated these laws and regulations from 2010 through 2017 and passed fraudulent costs onto the
government (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 25–28). Specifically, Ferguson claims violations of the False Claims Act
occurred in connection with multiple defense procurement contracts, including the C-130J
Hercules Aircraft, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, the F-22 Raptor, and the F-22 (Dkt. #1
¶ 1).
Currently, Ferguson resides in New Jersey (Dkt. #63, Exhibit 14 ¶ 1). She previously
resided in Colorado, at least during a portion of 2018 (Dkt. #43, Exhibit 11 ¶ 5). No party claims
that she resided in the Eastern District of Texas at any point during this case or the events leading
up to this case. Further, Ferguson did not perform any work relating to her employment with
Lockheed within the Eastern District of Texas (Dkt. #43, Exhibit 11 ¶ 7).
Lockheed is a corporation incorporated in Maryland with its headquarters in Bethesda,
Maryland (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 6). Although Lockheed maintains a presence across the country, the
headquarters of its aeronautics business is in Fort Worth, Texas, within the territory of the
Northern District of Texas (Dkt. #43, Exhibit 11 ¶¶ 3, 8). 1 The aeronautics business of Lockheed
executed approximately 198 prime contracts under the four programs Ferguson has identified: the
F-35, F-22, F-16, and C-130J programs (Dkt. #43, Exhibit 11 ¶ 9). The only Lockheed facility
located in and doing business in the Eastern District of Texas is in Lufkin within Lockheed’s

Although a small portion of the Fort Worth extends beyond Tarrant County into Denton County, which lies within
the Eastern District of Texas, Julia A. Novikoff’s declaration that Lockheed’s only facility located in and doing
business in the Eastern District of Texas is in Lufkin demonstrates that the aeronautics business headquarters is not
in the Eastern District of Texas (Dkt. #43, Exhibit 11 ¶ 8). Therefore, the aeronautics business headquarters must be
located within the Northern District of Texas because the remainder of Fort Worth lies within the Northern District
of Texas.

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Missiles and Fire Control business (Dkt. #43, Exhibit 11 ¶ 8). Other than that Lockheed owns the
Lufkin facility, Ferguson does not claim the facility bears any substantive connection to this case.
Several potential relevant witnesses reside in and at least one set of relevant records is
located in the Northern District of Texas. Ferguson identified valid addresses for twenty-two
named current and former Lockheed employees who may serve as potential witnesses and “are
likely to have discoverable information [Ferguson] may use to support her claims” (Dkt. #69,
Exhibit 2 at pp. 4–15). Eighteen of the twenty-two potential witnesses reside in the Northern
District of Texas (fourteen in Tarrant County, three in Parker County, and one in Dallas County)
(Dkt. #69, Exhibit 2 at pp. 5–15). Three of the potential witnesses live outside of Texas (one each
in Minnesota, Florida, and Arizona) (Dkt. #69, Exhibit 2 at pp. 5–15). Only one potential witness
lives in the Eastern District of Texas (Denton County) (Dkt. #69, Exhibit 2 at pp. 5–15).
Additionally, Lockheed claims that relevant records of the Supplier Rate Verification department
in Lockheed’s aeronautics business, where Ferguson worked while employed at Lockheed, are
primarily located in Fort Worth, in the Northern District of Texas (Dkt. #43, Exhibit 11 ¶¶ 4, 6, 8;
Dkt. #69 at p. 7). The parties have not identified any relevant evidence located in the Eastern
District of Texas.
II.

Procedural History
Ferguson, individually and on behalf of the United States, brought suit against Lockheed

for alleged violations of the False Claims Act (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 95–100). On February 27, 2023,
Lockheed filed a motion to transfer the case to the Fort Worth Division of the Northern District
of Texas or alternatively to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to state

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a claim (Dkt. #43). Ferguson timely filed her response (Dkt. #63). Lockheed timely filed its reply
(Dkt. #69).
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 1404(a) permits a district court to transfer any civil case “[f]or the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice . . . to any other district or division where it might
have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the
district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case
consideration of convenience and fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)
(quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). The purpose of Section 1404 “is to
prevent the waste of time, energy and money and to protect the litigants, witnesses and the public
against unnecessary inconvenience and expense . . . .” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 616 (quoting Cont’l
Grain Co. v. The Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 27 (1960)).
The threshold inquiry when determining eligibility for transfer is “whether the judicial
district to which transfer is sought would have been a district in which the claim could have been
filed,” or whether all parties consent to a particular jurisdiction. In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201,
203 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Volkswagen I”). Once that threshold inquiry is met, the Fifth Circuit has
held the determination of convenience turns on eight factors, where “[n]o factor is of dispositive
weight.” In re TikTok, Inc., 85 F.4th 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2023).
The four private interest factors include: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
(2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of
attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,

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expeditious and inexpensive. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (“Volkswagen II”).
The four public interest factors include: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from
court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the
familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary
problems of conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law. Id. These factors are neither
exhaustive nor exclusive. Id.
The party seeking transfer of venue must show good cause for the transfer. Id. The moving
party must show that the transferee venue is “clearly more convenient” than the transferor venue.
Id.; TikTok, 85 F.4th at 358. The plaintiffs’ choice of venue is not a factor in this analysis, but rather
contributes to the defendant’s burden to show good cause for the transfer. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d
at 315 n.10 (“[W]hile plaintiff[s] ha[ve] the privilege of filing his claims in any judicial division
appropriate under the general venue statute, § 1404(a) tempers the effects of the exercise of this
privilege.”). However, “when the transferee venue is not clearly more convenient than the venue
chosen by the plaintiff[s], the plaintiff[s’] choice should be respected.” Id. at 315. And while the
multi-factor analysis is informative, ultimately, “the district court has broad discretion in deciding
whether to order a transfer.” Balawajder v. Scott, 160 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Caldwell v. Palmetto State Sav. Bank, 811 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir. 1987)). However, “a district court
abuses its discretion by denying transfer when not a single relevant factor favors the [plaintiffs’]
chosen venue.” TikTok, 85 F.4th at 358 (quoting Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 318).

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ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the Court may address the issue of whether to transfer venue without
first addressing jurisdiction challenges. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549
U.S. 422, 425 (2007) (“[A] court need not resolve whether it has authority to adjudicate the
cause (subject-matter jurisdiction) or personal jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines
that, in any event, a foreign tribunal is plainly the more suitable arbiter of the merits of the
case.”); Suter v. United States, No. 3:18-cv-2693-B-BT, 2020 WL 874812, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
28, 2020). The Court does not address Lockheed’s alternative grounds to dismiss the case for
lack of subject matter or failure to state a claim because the facts of this case indicate that the
Northern District of Texas provides a clearly more convenient venue for this case.
Lockheed argues that this case should be transferred to the Northern District of Texas
under Section 1404(a) (Dkt. #43 at p. 22). Neither party disputes that this case could have been
filed originally in the Northern District of Texas. The Court therefore moves on to the second part
of the transfer inquiry: whether transfer is appropriate under the private and public interest factors.
The Court finds that the factors tip towards transferring the case to the Northern District of Texas.
I.

Private Interest Factors
First, the Court considers the private interest factors. The private interest factors are: (1)

the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. Volkswagen II, 545
F.3d at 315.

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A.

The Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof

This factor “focuses on the location of documents and physical evidence relating to the
[case].” TikTok, 85 F.4th at 358. The relative ease of access to sources of proof is still a relevant
part of the transfer analysis despite technological advances that have made transporting large
volumes of documents across the country more convenient. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316. “That
means this factor weighs in favor of transfer where the current district lacks any evidence relating
to the case.” TikTok, 85 F.4th at 358. “But when the vast majority of the evidence [is] electronic,
and therefore equally accessible in either forum[,] this factor bears less strongly on the transfer
analysis.” Id. (quoting In re Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc., 52 F.4th 625, 630 (5th Cir.
2022)).
Ferguson claims that the some of the most important documents in this case will come from
the Department of Defense and its offices in charge of the F-16, F-22, F-35, and C-130J aircraft
production programs, none of which are located in the Northern District of Texas or the Eastern
District of Texas (Dkt. #63 at pp. 16; see generally Dkt. #16, Exhibit 2). Assuming these sources of
proof are equally accessible in both districts, this factor would be neutral if no other source of proof
exists in either forum. See TikTok, 85 F.4th at 358(quoting Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630).
However, at least one source of proof exists in the Northern District of Texas.
Lockheed claims that relevant evidence in the form of records of the Supplier Rate
Verification department in Lockheed’s aeronautics business are primarily located within the
Northern District of Texas (Dkt. #43, Exhibit 11 ¶¶ 4, 6, 8; Dkt. #69 at p. 7). At first glance, this
fact suggests that this factor favors transfer. See Lozada-Leoni v. MoneyGram Int’l, Inc., No. 5:19CV-11-RWS-CMC, 2019 WL 7875058, at *16 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2019) (quoting In re Radmax,

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Ltd., 720 F.3d 285, 288(5th Cir. 2013) (“The Fifth Circuit found the relative ease of access to
sources of proof weighed in favor of transfer because all of the documents and physical evidence
[were] located in the [transferee district].”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:19-CV00011-RWS-CMC, 2020 WL 428080 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2020). However, Ferguson asserts any
such documents from the Northern District of Texas would be produced electronically, therefore
“the Court should not weigh this factor in the convenience analysis” (Dkt. #63 at p. 15). See
TikTok, 85 F.4th at 358 (quoting Planned Parenthood, Inc., 52 F.4th at 630). So, under the current
precedent of Planned Parenthood and TikTok, the Court finds that this factor weighs just slightly in
favor of transfer because some documents themselves are located in the Northern District but are
equally accessible in either forum.
B.

The Availability of Compulsory Process

The second private interest factor considers the availability of compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses. TikTok, 85 F.4th at 360 (citing Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315).
This factor “receives less weight when it has not been alleged or shown that any witness would be
unwilling to testify.” TikTok, 85 F.4th at 360 (quoting Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630–31). In
the pending case, both parties agree that this factor is neutral (Dkt. #43 at p. 17; Dkt. #63 at p. 17).
Compulsory process is available nationwide under the False Claims Act. See 31 U.S.C. § 3731(a).
The Court finds that this factor is neutral.
C.

Cost of Attendance for Willing Witnesses

“The third private factor, which considers the conveniences for witnesses who attend
willingly, has been described as the most important factor.” Seagen Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd.,
546 F. Supp. 3d 515, 531 (E.D. Tex. 2021) (citations omitted). In considering the availability and

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convenience of witnesses, a court must concentrate primarily upon the availability and
convenience of key witnesses. Shoemake v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 233 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832 (E.D.
Tex. 2002). The Fifth Circuit uses a “100-mile thresh-old” to assess this factor. TikTok, 85 F.4th
at 361 (citing Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315). “When the distance between an existing venue for
trial . . . and a proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more than 100 miles, the factor of inconvenience
to the witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional distance to be traveled.” Id. While
the Court can consider imposed costs on witnesses when the proposed transfer is within 100 miles,
“this factor has greater significance when the distance is greater than 100 miles.” Radmax, 720
F.3d at 289.
The Fort Worth and Sherman courthouses sit less than 100 miles apart from each other, so
this factor, while relevant, receives less significance. See id. Ferguson, as a key witness herself, lives
in New Jersey (Dkt. #63, Exhibit 14¶ 1). She claims that she would not be inconvenienced by
having to travel to Sherman (Dkt. #63 at p. 19). Lockheed names twenty-two witnesses who
Ferguson provided addresses for and listed as current and former Lockheed employees that may
serve as witnesses (Dkt. #69, Exhibit 2 at pp. 4–15). 2 The overwhelming majority (eighteen out of
twenty-two) of the witnesses that Lockheed names live in Parker, Tarrant, and Dallas Counties
(Dkt. #69, Exhibit 2 at pp. 5–15). These eighteen witnesses live closer to the Fort Worth
courthouse than to the Sherman courthouse (Dkt. #69, Exhibit 2 at pp. 5–15).
The Court finds this factor to slightly favor transfer. Normally, the convenience of party
witnesses receives lesser weight than the convenience of non-party witnesses. Scrum Alliance, Inc.

Ferguson’s initial disclosures to Lockheed also lists these witnesses’ likely testimony (Dkt. #69, Exhibit 2 at pp. 5–
15). McGinnis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 181 F. Supp. 2d 684, 688 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (“At an absolute minimum, [the moving
party] must identify key witnesses and provide a brief summary of their likely testimony . . . .”).

2

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v. Scrum, Inc., 4:20-CV-227, 2021 WL 1845154, at *6–7 (E.D. Tex. May 7, 2021). However, the
parties have only identified party witnesses for the purposes of analyzing this factor (Dkt. #43 at
p. 19; Dkt. #69, Exhibit 2 at pp. 5–15). 3 Any difference in the inconvenience in traveling to the Fort
Worth courthouse as opposed to the Sherman courthouse from New Jersey appears to be negligible
for Ferguson (See Dkt. #63, Exhibit 14¶ 1). However, the eighteen potential witnesses living in the
Northern District of Texas would experience a lesser inconvenience traveling to the Fort Worth
courthouse than to the Sherman courthouse (See Dkt. #69, Exhibit 2 at pp. 5–15). Even the sole
potential witness living in Denton County would experience a lesser inconvenience traveling to the
Fort Worth courthouse than to the Sherman courthouse because the Fort Worth courthouse is
closer to his residence (See Dkt. #69, Exhibit 2 at p. 7). Further, any difference in the
inconvenience in traveling to the Fort Worth courthouse as opposed to the Sherman courthouse
appears to be negligible for the remaining three out of state potential witnesses (See Dkt. #69,
Exhibit 2 at p. 8). Accordingly, the Court finds this factor to slightly favor transfer.
D.

Other Practical Problems

The Court “considers all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive.” TikTok, 85 F.4th at 362 (quoting Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315).
For this factor, the Court considers two issues: (1) Ferguson’s choice of venue and (2) the existence
of duplicative suits. Overall, the Court finds this factor weighs against transfer.

“When deciding a motion to transfer under Section 1404(a), the court may consider undisputed facts outside of the
pleadings such as affidavits and declarations, but it must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve factual conflicts
in favor of the non-moving party.” Garrett v. Hanson, 429 F. Supp. 3d at 317. Because Lockheed does not specify
whether the named potential witnesses are current or former Lockheed employees, the Court assumes these
potential witnesses are current Lockheed employees and thus party witnesses. See id.

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1.

Ferguson’s Choice of Forum

In a transfer of venue analysis under Section 1404(a), the plaintiffs’ choice of forum does
not receive the receive the same weight it enjoys under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See
Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 313 n.8. The plaintiffs’ choice of venue “is not an independent factor”
within the Section 1404(a) analysis. Further, the “[p]laintiff[s’] choice of forum is also accorded
less deference when most, if not all, of the operative facts occurred elsewhere.” Alaniz v. Liberty
Life Assurance Co. of Bos., No. 1:18-CV-297, 2018 WL 11428242, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2018)
(internal citations omitted); Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315–18; Salinas v. O’Reilly Auto., Inc., 358
F. Supp. 2d 569, 571 (N.D. Tex. 2005). No event leading to Ferguson’s claims occurred in this
District (See Dkt. #43; Dkt. #63; Dkt. #69). Only one out of the over twenty potential witnesses
with valid and identified addresses lives in the Eastern District of Texas (See Dkt. #69, Exhibit 2
at p. 7). Lockheed’s only facility in this District, the Lufkin facility, bears no significant connection
to this case (See Dkt. #43, Exhibit 11 ¶ 8). No relevant factual connection exists between this case
and the Eastern District of Texas. Therefore, Ferguson’s choice of forum receives no weight.
2.

Existence of Duplicative Suits

The existence of duplicative suits involving the same or similar issues may create practical
difficulties that will weigh heavily in favor or against transfer.” Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
No. 6:09-cv-446, 2010 WL 3835762, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2010), affd In re Google, Inc., 412 F.
Appx. 295 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

Lockheed notes that the transferee forum also has handled

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discovery and substantive issues in two prior False Claims Act cases involving Lockheed’s F-35
program (Dkt. #69 at p. 8). See U.S. ex rel. Davis v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 4:09-cv-00645
(N.D. Tex.); U.S. ex rel. Solomon v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 3:12-cv-04495 (N.D. Tex.).
However, both Northern District of Texas cases are currently closed. Id. This factor considers the
existence of related pending cases and their impact on the judicial economy. See, e.g., ACQIS LLC
v. EMC Corp., 67 F. Supp. 3d 769 777–78 (E.D. Tex. 2014). A closed case has little to no impact on
the judicial economy because the judicial resources are already expended. Therefore, the two prior
cases in the Northern District of Texas have no impact on this analysis. The existence of a similar
case in this Court weighs against transfer.
Although Ferguson’s choice of forum receives no weight, a similar case exists in this Court.
Therefore, this factor weighs against transfer.
II.

Public Interest Factors
Next, the Court considers the public interest factors. The public interest factors are: (1) the

administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized
interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case;
and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws or in the application of foreign
law. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315. The Court will consider each factor in turn.
A.

The Administrative Difficulties Flowing from Court Congestion

The first public interest factor concerns “whether there is an appreciable difference in
docket congestion between the two forums.” Parsons v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 375 U.S. 71, 73
(1963). Ferguson argues that this factor weighs against transfer because the median time-to-trial as
of September 2022 is about three months faster in the Eastern District of Texas than in the

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Northern District of Texas (Dkt. #63 at 20–21). The median time-to-trial in the Northern District
of Texas is 24.1 months and 21.0 months in the Eastern District of Texas. Federal Court
Management Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
data_tables/fcms_na_distcomparison0930.2022.pdf.
However, Lockheed argues that even if the median time-to-trial is three months faster in
this District, the Court should still transfer the case because it has no significant factual nexus to
this District, will relieve congestion in this District, and will avoid unnecessary burden on the
courts judicial resource (Dkt. #69 at p. 8–9). “Although the Eastern District of Texas may have a
slightly shorter median time-to-trial when compared to the [Northern District of Texas], ‘speed of
disposition of lawsuits without any [Sherman] connection is not a valid reason for forum shopping,
although filing cases without any rational relationship to the District would create congestion
beyond its judicial resources.’” Alaniz, 2018 WL 11428242, at *7 (internal citations omitted);
Hanby v. Shell Oil Co., 144 F. Supp. 2d 673, 679 (E.D. Tex. 2001). The only significant relationship
between this case and this District is that the case shares similarities with another of the Court’s
cases.

This sole connection leaves Ferguson’s argument with little

weight, regardless of a three-month lower median time-to-trial in this District. See Hanby, 141 F.
Supp. 2d at 679. Therefore, this factor favors transfer.
B.

The Local Interest in Having Localized Interests Decided at Home

The second public interest factor is the local interest in having localized interests decided
at home. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315. “Important considerations include the location of the
injury, witnesses, and the [p]laintiff[s’] residence.” Def. Distributed v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 435
(5th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). This factor recognizes that “jury duty is a burden that ought

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not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation.”
Volkswagen I, 371 F.3d at 206 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947)).
The Court should “look not to the parties’ significant connections to each forum . . . but
rather the significant connections between a particular venue and the events that gave rise to a
suit.” TikTok, 85 F.4th at 364 (quoting Def. Distributed, 30 F.4th at 435). “[T]he place of the
alleged wrong is one of the most important factors in venue determinations.” Id. (quoting Def.
Distributed, 30 F.4th at 435). “[T]his factors weighs heavily in favor of transfer [when] . . . there is
no relevant factual connection to the [transferor district].” Id. (quoting Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at
317–18). “Also, this factor can weigh against transfer when the citizens of [the transferor district]
have a greater stake in the litigation than the citizens of [the transferee district].” Id. (quoting
Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 632).
Lockheed argues that this factor favors transfer because Lockheed’s aeronautics business
is headquartered in the Northern District of Texas, none of the relevant events occurred in this
District, and Ferguson does not live in this District (Dkt. #43 at p. 20). Ferguson responds that the
Eastern District of Texas has a local interest in this case because Lockheed has a facility in Lufkin
(Dkt. #63 at p. 21). Further, Ferguson claims that this Districts local interest “remains strong
because the cause of action calls into question the work and reputation of several individuals
residing in or near that district and who presumably conduct business in that community”
(Dkt. #63 at p. 21) (citing In re Hoffman-La Roche, 587 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In support
of this argument, Ferguson claims that these “several individuals” are various unspecified
Lockheed employees who may live in this District (Dkt. #63 at p. 21). Therefore, Ferguson claims

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that the Northern District of Texas does not have a stronger local interest than the Eastern District
of Texas does (Dkt. #43 at p. 21–22).
Ferguson’s reliance on Hoffman-La Roche is misplaced. Hoffman-La Roche was a patent
infringement case dealing with an HIV inhibitor drug. 587 F.3d 1333. The transferee district
retained a strong local interest in the case because the defendant developed the accused drug there
and various sources of proof were available there, Id. at 1336. Additionally, the transferee district
retained a strong local interest because various individuals who worked on developing the drug
continued to reside in or near that district, calling into question their work and reputation. Id. The
case does not stand for the proposition that the possibility that employees of a defendant may live
within a district and may have worked on matters related to the case there is sufficient to provide
the district with a strong local interest in the case. See id. at 1336–37.
Without more concrete information, the potential of various Lockheed employees living in
the Eastern District of Texas is insufficient to provide this District with a strong local interest in
this case. Only one current or former employee of Lockheed has been identified to live in this
District (See Dkt. #69, Exhibit 2 at p. 7) (emphasis added). Without concrete information, such as
events giving rise to the case occurring in or important sources of proof located in the Eastern
District of Texas, the conclusory claim that various Lockheed employees highly involved in the
events giving rise to this case may live this District is insufficient to create a strong local interest.
See Hoffman-La Roche, 587 F.3d at 1336–37.
This District only has a weak local interest in this case. Lockheed’s Lufkin facility has no
impact on this factor because it has no connection to this case. The Lufkin facility is in Lockheed’s
Missiles and Fire Control business (Dkt. #43, Exhibit 11 ¶ 8). The parties do not claim that the

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Lufkin facility has any connection to this case, other that Lockheed owns it. Therefore, the Lufkin
facility does not impact the Eastern District of Texas’s local interest in this case. See Moss v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 3:10-CV-1659-M, 2011 WLL 197624, at *6 (N.D. Tex Jan. 18, 2011).
The only fact suggesting this District has any local interest in this case is that one potential witness
lives in Denton County.
Unlike the Eastern District of Texas, the Northern District of Texas has a strong local
interest in this case due to the presence of at least eighteen former or current employees of
Lockheed who likely involved in (or have knowledge of) the events giving rise to this case
(Dkt. #63, Exhibit 2 at pp. 5–15). The residency of multiple persons involved in the events giving
rise to the case supports a district having a local interest in a case. Brooks Instrument, LLC v. MKS
Instruments, Inc., No. 6:10–CV–221, 2011 WL 13196226, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2011).
The presence of the headquarters of Lockheed’s aeronautics business in the Northern
District further indicates that the Northern District has a strong local interest in this case.
Ferguson admits that Lockheed manufactures the F-35 in Fort Worth (Dkt. #63 at p. 14). A district
has a local interest when a party possesses a facility in the district that manufactures the product
at issue in the case. Brooks Instrument, 2011 WL 13196226, at *5.
The Northern District of Texas has a strong interest in this case while the Eastern District
of Texas has a relatively weak interest in this case. Therefore, this factor favors transfer.
C.

Familiarity of the Forum with Governing Law

This factor “considers the current district’s familiarity with the law that will govern the
case.” TikTok, 85 F.4th at 365 (quoting Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315). “This factor does not weigh
in favor of transfer when both districts are equally capable of applying the relevant law.” TikTok,

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85 F.4th at 365 (quoting Radmax, 720 F.3d at 289). The parties dispute whether the Court or the
Northern District of Texas has a greater familiarity with the governing law, particularly the
application of the False Claims Act to the facts of this case and issues associated with Department
of Defense requirements during discovery (Dkt. #43 at pp. 20–21; Dkt. #63 at p. 22; Dkt. #69 at
p. 10). However, the Court finds that the Court and courts in the Northern District of Texas are
equally capable of applying the relevant law. Therefore, this factor is neutral. TikTok, 85 F.4th at
365.
D.

Avoidance of Conflict of Laws

The final public interest factor “seeks to avoid unnecessary problems of conflict of laws or
in the application of foreign law.” Def. Distributed, 30 F.4th at 436 (quoting Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d
at 315). Both parties agree that this factor is neutral (Dkt. #43 at p. 19 n.12; Dkt. #63 at p. 22). The
Court finds this factor is neutral.
III.

Summary
The Court finds that four factors weigh in favor of transfer (two strongly and two only

slightly) and one factor weighs against transfer, while three factors are neutral. The Court will thus
exercise its discretion and transfer this case to the Fort Worth Division of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas pursuant to Section 1404(a).

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CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that the Defendant Lockheed Martin Corporation’s Motion to

. Transfer or Alternatively to Dismiss (Dkt. #43) should be GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that this case is TRANSFERRED to the Fort Worth Division of
the Northern District of Texas.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

SIGNED this 18th day of December, 2023.

___________________________________
AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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