Taylor v. Delta County et al
Filing
27
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 6 MOTION to Dismiss FILED SUBJECT TO AND WITHOUT WAIVING THEIR MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE WITHIN DISTRICT filed by Zach Williamson, Sheriff Charla Singleton, County Attorney Jay Garrett, Former Sheriff Ricky Smith, Delta County, Delta County Sheriff's Department, County Judge Jason Murray. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff Patrick Andre Taylor II's civil rights claims against the Delta County Sheriff's Department are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by District Judge Amos L. Mazzant, III on 5/31/2022. (daj, )
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United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
PATRICK ANDRE TAYLOR II, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
DELTA COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
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§ Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-250
§ Judge Mazzant
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§
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§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Filed Subject to and Without
Waiving their Motion to Transfer Venue Within District (Dkt. #6). Having considered the motion
and relevant pleadings, the Court finds it should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Patrick Andre Taylor II (“Taylor”) filed this action individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, on October 15, 2021, in the Marshall Division of the Eastern District
of Texas (Dkt. # 1). Taylor brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging violations of his
constitutional rights and other related claims against Defendants Delta County (the “County”),
Delta County Sheriff’s Department (the “Department”), Former Sheriff Ricky Smith, Sheriff
Chara Singleton, County Attorney Jay Garret, County Judge Jason Murray, and Zach Williamson
(“Williamson”) (collectively, “Defendants”).
Williamson is a former police officer with the Department.
Williamson began his
employment with the Department in September of 2019. However, on September 1, 2019,
Williamson’s Texas Peace Officer’s License (the “License”) expired.
On October 18, 2019, Williamson arrested Taylor in the driveway of Taylor’s residence
for Driving While Intoxicated. During Taylor’s arrest, Williamson placed Taylor in a shoulder
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lock, forced Taylor to the ground, and kept Taylor in a chokehold until another officer arrived.
Taylor was placed in Delta County Jail (the “Jail”).
Taylor alleges that members of the Department discovered Williamson arrested Taylor
while unlicensed and then conspired to “cover up the negligent hiring of [] Williamson and []
Williamson’s unlawful arrests and actions.” (Dkt. #1 ¶ 54). Taylor’s complaint alleges several
constitutional violations against all defendants, along with claims for negligent hiring, retention
and supervision, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and fraud against all defendants except
for Williamson. Taylor has also brought a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
against all defendants.
Defendants filed the current motion on November 22, 2021 (Dkt. #6), while this suit was
still pending in the Marshall Division. Taylor responded on December 6, 2021 (Dkt. #11).
Defendants filed their reply on December 14, 2021 (Dkt. #13).
Also on November 22, 2021, Defendants moved to transfer venue to another division
within the Eastern District of Texas (Dkt. #5). On March 29, 2022, Chief Judge Rodney Gilstrap
granted the motion, and transferred suit to the Sherman Division (Dkt. #24).
LEGAL STANDARD
A party may move to dismiss a case if the plaintiff does not “state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) must be read with Rule 8, which
requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). “To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege
‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d
534, 537 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Rule 8
“does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned,
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the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege ‘more than labels and
conclusions,’ as ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Heinze
v. Tesco Corp., 971 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To be
viable, a complaint must contain more than “legal conclusions, conclusory statements, or ‘naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Benfield v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th
Cir. 2019) (brackets omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “A complaint ‘does not need
detailed factual allegations,’ but the facts alleged ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.’” Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Conversely, ‘when the allegations in a complaint, however
true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should be exposed at the
point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” Cuvillier v.
Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).
ANALYSIS
Defendants argue Taylor has not pleaded any facts which would show that the County has
granted its servient agency, the Department,1 the capacity to engage in separate litigation, and
Defendants refer repeatedly to the “Delta County Sheriff’s Office” in their motion (Dkt. #6). However, there is no
such party to this case. Taylor sued, among others, the “Delta County Sheriff’s Department” (Dkt. #1). Having read
the motion, the Court can surmise Defendants allege Taylor has failed to state a claim against the Department. The
Court will proceed accordingly.
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therefore Taylor has failed to state a claim against the Department (Dkt. #6 at p. 4). Taylor argues
the Department is a “final and independent policymaker” with the capacity to sue and be sued
(Dkt. #11 at pp. 10–12).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) requires that a party to a lawsuit must have the
capacity to sue or be sued. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b); Jacobs v. Port Neches Police Dep’t, 915 F.
Supp. 842, 844 (E.D. Tex. 1996). An entity’s capacity to sue or be sued “shall be determined by
the law of the state where the court is located.” FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3). In this case, that law is
the law of Texas. A plaintiff has the burden of showing that a . . . department has the capacity to
be sued. Hutchinson v. Box, No. 4:10-CV-240, 2010 WL 5830499, at *1 (E.D. Tex., Aug. 20,
2010) (internal citations and quotations omitted) report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:10CV-240, 2011 WL 839864 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2011) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)).
“In order for a plaintiff to sue a city department, it must ‘enjoy a separate legal existence.’”
Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep’t, 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Mayes v. Elrod, 470
F. Supp. 1188, 1192 (N.D. Ill. 1979)). Accordingly, “unless the true political entity has taken
explicit steps to grant the servient agency with jural authority, the agency cannot engage in any
litigation except in concert with the government itself.” Id. Taylor attempts to distinguish this
case from Darby and its progeny (Dkt. #11 at pp. 8–10). However, the Fifth Circuit has
unequivocally held that a “[s]heriff’s [d]epartment does not have a separate legal existence and
therefore cannot be sued.” Evans v. Dallas Cnty. Sheriff, 4 F.3d 991 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
Moreover, this Court has repeatedly relied on Darby in holding that a county sheriff’s department
is not a jural entity. See Marshall v. Abbott, No. 4:21-CV-384-SDJ-CAN, 2022 WL 671009, at
*3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2022) (“The Eastern District of Texas and numerous other federal courts in
Texas have repeatedly and consistently held that a county’s Sherriff’s Office is a nonjural entity
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that is not amenable to suit.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:21-CV-384, 2022 WL
659159 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2022). The Court need not deviate from the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Darby for the case at bar.
The fact of the matter is that the Department is a servient entity of Delta County, Texas
and thus has no separate legal existence. Torgerson v. Henderson Cnty. Justice Ctr., No.
6:19cv514, 2020 WL 1281647, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan 3, 2020) (quoting Darby, 939 F.2d at 313).
As such, the Department does not have the capacity to be sued. Darby, 939 F.2d at 313; see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b). Further, Taylor has not pleaded any facts showing the County took explicit
steps to grant the Department jural authority. Id. Thus, Taylor’s claims against the Department
are subject to dismissal.
Taylor contends the Department is not a servient entity because it is a final and independent
policymaker in the area of law enforcement (Dkt. #11 at pp. 10–11 (citing Robinson v. Hunt Cnty.,
Tex., 921 F.3d 440, 448 (5th Cir. 2019)). The mere fact that the Department can be deemed a
policymaker does not make it a legal entity capable of being sued. As Defendants point out in
their reply, a county in Texas is a “corporate and political body,” TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE
§ 71.001, whereas a county’s sheriff’s department is a law enforcement agency organized and
existing as a departmental subdivision of the county (Dkt. #13 at p. 2). Because Taylor has not
shown that the “true political entity,” Delta County, has taken explicit steps to grant the
Department with jural authority, the Department “cannot engage in any litigation.” Darby, 939
F.2d at 313.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Filed Subject to and
Without Waiving their Motion to Transfer Venue Within District (Dkt. #6) is hereby GRANTED.
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.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff Patrick Andre Taylor II’s civil rights claims against
the Delta County Sheriff’s Department are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 31st day of May, 2022.
___________________________________
AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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