Eolas Technologies Incorporated v. Adobe Systems Incorporated et al

Filing 914

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 568 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Indefiniteness. The Court interprets the claim language in this case in the manner set forth in this Order. Signed by Judge Leonard Davis on 08/22/11. cc:attys 8-22-11 (mll, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
EOLAS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Plaintiff,
vs.
ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC., et al
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 6:09-CV-446
PATENT CASE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This Memorandum Opinion construes the disputed terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 5,838,906 (the
“‘906 Patent”) and 7,599,985 (the “‘985 Patent”). The Court further DENIES Defendants’ Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment of Indefiniteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶2 (Docket No. 568).
BACKGROUND
Patents-In-Suit
The ‘906 Patent, entitled “Distributed Hypermedia Method for Automatically Invoking
External Application Providing Interaction and Display of Embedded Objects Within a Hypermedia
Document,” issued on November 17, 1998 to Michael Doyle, David C. Marin, and Cheong S. Ang.
The ‘985 Patent, entitled “Distributed Hypermedia Method and System for Automatically Invoking
External Application Providing Interaction and Display of Embedded Objects Within a Hypermedia
Document,” issued on October 6, 2009 to Michael Doyle, David C. Marin, and Cheong S. Ang. The
‘906 and ‘985 patents are generally directed to a software system that is operable without user
activation to access an object, present it in a browser display window, and then allow a user to
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manipulate the object.1 Eolas is the exclusive licensee of the patents-in-suit.
Eolas alleges that Defendants Adobe Systems, Inc.; Amazon.com, Inc.; Apple, Inc.; CDW
Corp.; Citigroup, Inc.; Ebay, Inc.; Frito-Lay, Inc.; The Go Daddy Group, Inc.; Google, Inc.; J.C.
Penney Co., Inc.; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; New Frontier Media, Inc.; Office Depot, Inc.; Perot
Systems Corp.; Playboy Enterprises Intl, Inc.; Rent-A-Center, Inc.; Staples, Inc.; Oracle America,
Inc. f/k/a Sun Microsystems, Inc.; Texas Instruments, Inc.; Yahoo! Inc.; and YouTube, LLC
(“Defendants”) infringe the ‘906 and ‘985 patents.
Prior Litigation Involving The ‘906 Patent
In December 2000, Eolas filed suit against Microsoft Corporation for infringement of the
‘906 Patent in the Northern District of Illinois. Eolas v. Microsoft Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18886 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Microsoft”). The Microsoft Court construed a term that is disputed in this
case, executable application. The Microsoft case proceeded to trial and was appealed to the Federal
Circuit. On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed—among other things—construction of the term
executable application. Eolas v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Eolas contends
this Court should adopt the prior construction of executable application because its construction was
upheld by the Federal Circuit.
APPLICABLE LAW
It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to
which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381

1

The patents have largely the same specification. Unless otherwise noted, all citations are to the ‘906
Patent’s specification.
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F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). In claim construction, courts examine the patent’s intrinsic
evidence to define the patented invention’s scope. See id.; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc.,
262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the
specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d
at 861. Courts give claim terms their ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the entire patent. Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
The claims themselves provide substantial guidance in determining the meaning of particular
claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. First, a term’s context in the asserted claim can be very
instructive. Id. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the claim’s meaning
because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id. Differences among
the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For example, when a
dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that the independent claim
does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314–15.
“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id. (quoting
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). “[T]he
specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive;
it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299
F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This is true because a patentee may define his own terms, give
a claim term a different meaning than the term would otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow the
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claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. In these situations, the inventor’s lexicography governs.
Id. Also, the specification may resolve ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and accustomed
meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be
ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. But, “‘[a]lthough the
specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular
embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the
claims.’” Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting
Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1323. The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim
construction because a patent applicant may also define a term in prosecuting the patent. Home
Diagnostics, Inc., v. Lifescan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of the
specification, a patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent.”).
Although extrinsic evidence can be useful, it is “‘less significant than the intrinsic record in
determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting
C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court understand
the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use claim terms, but
technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad or may not be
indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony may aid
a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the particular meaning of a term
in the pertinent field, but an expert’s conclusory, unsupported assertions as to a term’s definition is
entirely unhelpful to a court. Id. Generally, extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent and
its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Id.
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The patents in suit may contain means-plus-function limitations that require construction.
Where a claim limitation is expressed in “means plus function” language and does not recite definite
structure in support of its function, the limitation is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Braun Med., Inc.
v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In relevant part, 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
mandates that “such a claim limitation ‘be construed to cover the corresponding structure . . .
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.’” Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6).
Accordingly, when faced with means-plus-function limitations, courts “must turn to the written
description of the patent to find the structure that corresponds to the means recited in the
[limitations].” Id.
Construing a means-plus-function limitation involves multiple inquiries. “The first step in
construing [a means-plus-function] limitation is a determination of the function of the means-plusfunction limitation.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2001). Once a court has determined the limitation’s function, “the next step is to
determine the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Id.
A “structure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or
prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Id.
Moreover, the focus of the “corresponding structure” inquiry is not merely whether a structure is
capable of performing the recited function, but rather whether the corresponding structure is “clearly
linked or associated with the [recited] function.” Id.

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DISPUTED TERMS
Executable Application
“Executable application” is present in every claim of the patents-in-suit. Eolas contends this
term needs no further construction. However, if the Court determines the term requires construction,
Eolas proposes “any computer program code, that is not the operating system or a utility, that is
launched to enable an end-user to directly interact with the data.” Eolas argues that this construction
has been affirmed by the Federal Circuit, citing Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. (“Microsoft”)
399 F.3d 1325, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Eolas further contends Defendants’ proposed construction
improperly imports narrowing limitations.
Defendants contend the term should be construed as “a native binary program that remains
separate from the browser and is not part of an operating system or a utility.” Thus, the parties
disagree about whether the executable application is limited to native binary code or whether it can
be other computer program code (such as interpretive code).
Prior Construction in Microsoft
Defendants primarily argue that Plaintiff’s stare decisis argument is without merit because
the court in Microsoft did not squarely address this issue in its prior construction, as it was not
materially contested.2 The dispute regarding “executable application” in Microsoft centered around
whether the application was limited to “standalone programs.” Eolas, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at
*13–14. In Microsoft, Eolas proposed “program code for causing the display of the object and

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Defendants also argue that: (1) the Microsoft construction occurred before the Federal Circuit’s en banc
opinion in Phillips v. AWH Corp. (415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)), and the term was construed too
broadly; and (2) the ‘906 patent has undergone two reexaminations following the Microsoft construction. Defendants
contend these reexaminations are a significant change to the intrinsic record.
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enabling interactive processing of that object.” Id. Microsoft argued that executable application
referred to “standalone” programs only. Id. The District Court analyzed the term with regard to
whether it included components that were not standalone (e.g. dynamically linked libraries, or
“DLLs,” such as spell check). Id. The Federal Circuit also analyzed this term with regard to
standalone programs on appeal. Eolas Techs., 399 F.3d at 1336.
Here, the parties’ dispute does not involve standalone programs. Instead, the parties disagree
about whether the program is limited to native binary—a compiled program that is in machine
code—as opposed to an interpretable program that is in, for example, bytecode (e.g. scripts).
Accordingly, the dispute in this case was not raised in Microsoft and Plaintiff’s stare decisis
argument is misplaced. The Court, therefore, declines to adopt Plaintiff’s proposed construction
based on this argument.
Patents-in-suit and Prosecution History
The term “executable application” is not used in the written description of the ‘906 patent
specification, it only appears in the claims. The specification uses the terms “controllable
application” in the summary at 6:58–59, “application program” at 7:3, and “application client” in
numerous places including describing the embodiment of Fig. 5 at 8:67.
A review of the prosecution history explains the difference in terminology between the
specification and the claims, and also gives insight into the applicant’s intentions regarding the type
of code claimed—interpretive or compiled. In the claims as originally filed, for example claim 1,
the applicant used the term “controllable application.” See Defendants’ Exh. J at 1 and appended
Mukherjee Declaration at 906 PH Ex. 1, PH_001_783829. First, in rejecting claims 1–4 and 15–16

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as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the examiner characterized USC’s Mercury Project prior
art as using a method as claimed wherein a hypermedia document included an embedded controllable
application. Second, in rejecting claims 1–43 as being obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the examiner
relied upon a combination of prior art disclosed by the applicant and Hansen.1 In fashioning the
obviousness rejection, the examiner considered the applicant’s disclosed prior art to be without an
embedded “controllable application” in the hypermedia document. The scope of the construction
given by the examiner to the term “controllable application”

was

inclusive of

“executable/interpretable/launchable program instructions/codes.” Hansen was alleged to teach
enhancing hypertext documents by embedding programs into such documents.
In response to the rejections, the applicant amended claim 1, for example, to redirect focus
from displaying a hypermedia document having an embedded controllable application to focusing
on the browser display of a hypermedia document having an embed text format that leads to
identification and locating of an “executable application.” The applicant also added computer
program product claims reciting “an [external] executable application” in, for example, claim 44.
In dependent claim 45, the applicant reintroduced “controllable application” as being a further
characterization of “executable application.”2
In remarks to the examiner, the applicant pointed out that, as amended, claim 1 recited an
executable application invoked by the browser to display and process an object within the browser’s

1

A listing of prior art cited by applicant in its Information Disclosure Statement (“IDS”) is shown at Defendants’ Exh.
J at 1 and appended Mukherjee Declaration at 906 PH Ex. 2, PH_001_783875-77.
2
In claims that dependent from claim 45 (i.e., claims 50 and 52), the applicant further specified that the controllable
“executable” application is a spreadsheet program or a word processor. Spreadsheet and word processor programs are
compiled programs in machine code.
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window. The applicant distinguished the Mercury Project prior art because it involved a new servergenerated webpage that is sent to the browser for display in place of an original webpage being
displayed in the browser window, i.e., static HTML document display. In contrast, the executable
application processes an object and displays it in a portion of the browser window. Hansen was
distinguished as having both an executable script (i.e., program code)3 and an object to be embedded
within a document rather than a browser-invoked external application.
Thus, beginning with the examiner’s construction of “controllable application” as being
inclusive of the separate types of program instructions or code known as “executable” and
“interpretable,” the applicant redirected the claims to specify an “executable application.” Further,
the applicant specified only particular types of “executable applications” in further restricting the
“executable application” limitation to a spreadsheet program or a word processor program. In
characterizing the prior art, the applicant observed a known distinction between an “executable
application” and an “executable script.”
The Microsoft Press Dictionary defines the term “executable program” as follows:
A computer program that is ready to run. The term usually refers to a compiled
program that has been translated into machine code in a format that can be loaded
into memory and run. However, for interpreted languages it can simply refer to
source code in the proper format. Applications such as word-processing programs are
executable programs. The user does not have to alter the program in any way before
being able to run it.
Microsoft Press Dictionary (1991). Thus, the term “executable program (application)” is primarily
used to designate a compiled program in machine code that can be loaded into memory and run, but

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“Scripts” are known to be “interpretable” programs.
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can also reference source code when used in the context of interpretable programs.
While the applicant’s amendments to claim 1 in response to the examiner’s rejection, and the
applicant’s remarks as to the Mercury Project prior art standing alone may not evince a clear
disavowal of interpretable programs from the meaning of “executable application (program),” the
primary and secondary meanings of the term indicated by the Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary
definition set out above are substantiated and followed by the applicant in this portion of the
prosecution history.
Finally, turning to the specification of the ‘906 patent, Fig. 5 illustrates an embodiment that
includes application client 210 described as residing on the hard disk or RAM of the client computer.
The application client 210 is further described as being loaded and executed when the browser
detects a link to it. See 8:66–9:7. The description refers to the operation of a computer processing
unit (CPU) to execute or run program instructions in machine code that have been moved from nonvolatile memory to random access memory by an operating system. The CPU fetches a machine
code instruction from memory according to a specified address. The machine code instruction must
be in a binary form that is compatible with the native instruction set of the CPU for operations (i.e.,
OP code). Further, examples of application client 210 are identified as spreadsheet program,
database program, and word processor. See 13:11–15. As set forth in the Microsoft Computer
Dictionary definition, such programs are “executable” meaning that they are compiled into machine
code and ready to be run directly on the computer processor (CPU).4

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See Defendants’ Ex. J at 18-19; Notice of Intent to Issue Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate. The examiner’s comments
are relied upon for their technical description of the computer technology related to the ‘906 patent. PTO examiners are
assumed to have some expertise in and be familiar from their work with the technology of the art they examine. Aloft
Media, LLC v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. TX. 2008).
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The ‘906 patent claims also recite that the client workstation is “executing” or is caused “to
execute” a browser application. See ‘906 Patent Reexamination Certificate, claim 1 at 1:31–32 and
claim 6 at 3:56–57. The ‘906 patent describes that the browser client 208 of the preferred
embodiment is Mosaic. See ‘906 patent at 8:9–12, 10:16, 14:9–11, and 16:12. As the applicant
explained to the PTO, Mosaic browser subroutines that responded to the meanings of tags “were
built from machine-specific native code . . . .” See Mukherjee Declaration at 906 PH Ex. 16,
PH_001_784146–47. Thus, the “executing” and “to execute” claim language as to the browser
application, when read in view of the intrinsic record, demonstrates that the applications (browser
and executable) are compiled programs in machine code.5
Accordingly, the Court construes the term “executable application” in accordance with the
primary sense of the Microsoft Press Dictionary definition as “a compiled program that is in native
machine code in a format that can be loaded into memory and run.”
Automatically Invoking the Executable Application
“Automatically [invoking/invoke] [the/said] executable application” and “executable
application is automatically invoked by the browser” are collectively present in every claim of the
patents-in-suit. Eolas contends these terms need no construction. Alternatively, Eolas offers the
following: “automatically calling or activating the executable application” and “executable
application is automatically called or activated by the browser.” Defendants’ revised construction
proposes “the executable application is launched to permit a user to interact with the object without

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In addition, the applicant made the point that by having the executable application execute on the client
workstation, the browser’s functionality can be extended without changes to the browser’s object code that is being
executed. See, Mukherjee Declaration at 906 PH Ex. 11, PH_001_784052.
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any intervening activation of the object by the user.” The dispute centers around whether
automatically invoking the executable application excludes an application that requires a “click” or
activation by the user in order to launch. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ “without any intervening
activation of the object by the user” language constitutes an improper limitation that is not supported
by the intrinsic record.
Defendants rely on portions of the prosecution history, arguing that the term was added to
the claims in order to distinguish the prior art Mosaic browser. Specifically, Defendants contend that
during prosecution, the applicant distinguished the Mosaic browser by noting that Mosaic required
a user to first “click” on a hyperlink URL after a hypermedia document has been parsed in order for
the user to be able to interact with an object. Thus, Defendants argue that the term requires this
construction to prevent Plaintiff from recapturing what it surrendered to secure allowance of the
claims.
The prosecution history relied on by Defendants concerns the applicant’s response to an
obviousness rejection based upon a combination of references including the prior art Mosaic
browser. See Defendants’ Exh. J at 1 and appended Mukherjee Declaration at 906 PH Ex. 10,
PH_001_784013-16. Specifically, the applicant amended the claims to recite “automatically invoke
said executable application.” See Defendants’ Exh. J at 1 and appended Mukherjee Declaration at
906 PH Ex. 11, PH_001_784030. In remarks to the examiner, the applicant characterized the Mosaic
browser as launching viewer applications in a separate window in response to a user’s interactive
command (i.e., “clicking” on a URL link). Id. at 784034–35. Thus, the applicant distinguished the
Mosaic browser: “[a]ccordingly, [in Mosaic] the external application is not automatically invoked
as a result of the browser parsing the hypermedia document text, as required by the claim, but rather
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it is invoked by an interactive command given by the user, namely interactively selecting the URL
anchor.” Id. at 784039.
As Plaintiff argues, the prosecution history does not support a construction of the term
“automatically invoke” that imports a limitation of “activation of the object.” However, the
prosecution history does support a construction that an executable application is launched without
user activation.6 Accordingly, the Court construes the terms “Automatically [invoking/invoke]
[the/said] executable application” and “executable application is automatically invoked by the
browser” as meaning that “the executable application is launched without user activation.”
Text Format
“Text format” is present in every claim of the patents-in-suit. Eolas contends the term means
“text that initiates processing,” while Defendants contend it means “tags or symbols that specify
document formatting.” The parties dispute whether the term should be limited to tags or symbols,
or whether it can include text. Defendants argue that a “text format” is a tag or symbol and not
simply text. Defendants contend that Eolas’s construction reads “formats” out of the claim. Eolas
points to the specification—which includes tags, symbols, and words—to demonstrate that
Defendants’ proposed construction improperly imports limitations into the claim. Tr. 46, Ll. 21–23.
Plaintiff’s proposed construction improperly sets forth what a “text format” allegedly does
and not what it is. Defendants’ proposed construction is too limiting. At the claim construction
hearing, the Court proposed “coded information that describes how the content of a hypermedia
document is to be interpreted by a browser application for display.” Tr. 48:19–25. The parties
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Indeed, the claim language itself sets forth that the browser launches the executable application when
parsing of the hypermedia document reveals an embed text format. Such was the argument made during prosecution
to distinguish Mosaic.
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requested 48 hours to review this proposed construction prior to committing to it. At the hearing,
Defendants requested “interpreted” be changed to “used,” citing the specification’s teaching “that
the browser directly uses text formats, tags or symbols to control how that document looks on the
display.” Tr. 51: 2–5.
Following the hearing, both parties submitted additional proposed constructions along with
arguments in support. Defendants’ new proposed instruction is “coded information that describes
how the content of a hypermedia document is to be displayed by a browser application.”
Defendants’ proposed construction deletes the word “interpreted,” as requested at the hearing.
Plaintiff agrees with the Court’s proposed construction except for the language “for display.”
Plaintiff argues this language is improperly limiting. Plaintiff’s proposed construction is “coded
information that describes how the content of a hypermedia document is to be interpreted by a
browser application.” Upon review of the parties’ additional arguments and proposed constructions,
the Court construes the term as “coded information that describes how the content of a hypermedia
document is to be displayed by a browser application.”
Embed Text Format/Embed Text Format Specifies the Location of at least a portion of
[an/said] object/Embed Text Format Located at a first location in said first distributed
hypermedia document/Embed Text Format [which] correspond[s/ing] to [a/said] first location
in the document/identify[ing] and embed text format
These “Embed Text Format” terms are collectively present in every claim of the patents-insuit. Eolas contends none of these terms need construction. However, Eolas alternatively proposes
constructions for each term should the Court determine construction is necessary.
Embed Text Format
Eolas contends “embed” has no technical meaning and no specialized meaning within the

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patent and thus should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Alternatively, if the Court
determines that a construction is needed, Eolas offers “text format for embedding an object.”
Defendants propose “a tag that specifies the object to be embedded at the location of the tag.”
Defendants contend “embed text format” is not a term of art, nor is it found in the written description
or original claims. The term was coined by the inventor and added by amendment in August 1996
to designate a special tag called the EMBED tag. Def. Br. At 11. Plaintiff argues Defendants’
construction is too limiting for several reasons. First, Plaintiff points to the specification to
demonstrate that a text format can be at least a “word, tag, or symbol.” ‘906 patent at 14:24–29.
Second, Plaintiff argues that pursuant to the doctrine of claim differentiation, the claim must mean
more than a tag. Claim 1 of the ‘985 patent contains the term at issue. Dependent claim 3 adds the
limitation “where the text formats are HTML tags.” ‘985 patent, claims 1, 3. This gives rise to a
strong presumption that the independent claim is not limited to a tag.
Embed text format designates a special type of text format. The term is supported in the
specification by the disclosure of the EMBED tag (‘906 patent, 14:32–33); however, the term is not
limited to only a tag. Consistent with the Court’s construction of “text format,” and in view of the
specification, the Court construes “embed text format” as “coded information that specifies to a
browser application that an object is to be embedded in a displayed hypermedia document.”
Embed Text Format Specifies the Location of at least a portion of [an/said] object
Eolas argues this phrase needs no construction; however alternatively offers “embed text
format that specifies the location of at least part of an object.” Defendants propose “specifies the
location of at least a portion of [an/said] object” where “specifies” has its common meaning: “to
name or state explicitly or in detail.” The parties appear to agree that the location of at least a
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portion of an object is specified.
In light of the Court’s construction of “text format,” this phrase needs no construction. The
additional language in this phrase is clear in the context of the claims and will be readily
understandable to the jury. See Orion IP, LLC v. Staples, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 717, 738 (E.D. Tex.
2005) (Davis, J.) (stating that “although every word used in a claim has meaning, not every word
requires construction” in declining to construe claim terms).; see also Eon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
83442 at *71–72; Mirror Worlds, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82070, at *20. Regarding the “specifies
the location” language, the parties’ proposed constructions are merely attempts to restate the claim
language or an effort to include the plain and ordinary meaning. Accordingly, this term needs no
construction.
Embed Text Format, Located At/Corresponding To A First Location In Said First
Distributed Hypermedia Document
Eolas argues these phrases need no construction; however alternatively offers “embed text
format locates at a first location in the first distributed hypermedia document” for “located at a first
location.” Eolas offers “embed text format which relates to a first location in the document” for
“corresponding to a first location.” For the “located at a first location” phrase, Defendants offer “tag
located at the place in the received document where the embedded object will appear within the
displayed document.” For the “corresponding to a first location” phrase, Defendants offer “tag
located at the place in the received file where the embedded object will appear within the displayed
document.”
The parties dispute whether the recited phrases “located at a first location” and
“corresponding to a first location” mean that the embed text format is located in the document where

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the embedded object will appear. Eolas argues that nothing in the ordinary meaning of these phrases
requires that location to be “where the embedded object will appear.” Defendants respond that the
claim language itself specifies that the embed text format and the display area are both at the same
location.
This phrase does not require additional construction beyond the Court’s construction of
“embed text format.” The “location” terms are clear and understandable. Defendants’ proposed
construction improperly includes a requirement that the term designate where the embedded object
will appear within the displayed document. This proposed construction accrues based on a limitation
that is later in the claim language. The claim goes on to recite “. . . in order to display said object
. . . within a display area created at said first location . . . .” (’906 Patent, Claim 1 at 17:24–26). This
later limitation logically demonstrates that the embed text format location in the document is where
the displayed object will appear. However, that requirement does not accrue from the language “at
a first location” or “corresponds to a first location.” These phrases need no further construction.
Identifying An Embed Text Format/An Embed Text Format Is Identified
Eolas contends no construction is needed; however, it alternatively proposes “detecting an
embed text format”and “an embed text format is detected” respectively. Defendants offer “detecting
an embed text format during parsing of a hypermedia document” for both phrases. Eolas argues
Defendants’ proposal improperly equates “identifying” with “parsing,” and the doctrine of claim
differentiation precludes such an interpretation. Eolas points to claim 1 of the ‘985 patent—which
contains the “identifying an embed text format” term—then notes that dependent claim 5 adds the
limitation “where the step of identifying an embed text format comprises: parsing the received file
to identify text formats included in the received file.” ‘985 Patent, Claims 1, 5. Thus, Eolas argues
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that while identification may occur during parsing, it is not required.
Defendants argue that the specification describes identifying an embed text format as a substep of parsing, and so identifying the embed text format must occur during parsing. Defendants
representation of the specification is inaccurate. The specification describes a routine where HTML
tags can be identified. The routine (see Figure 7A below) has a loop with steps 254, 256, and 258
where step 256 is a parsing step and 258 is an EMBED tag detection step. The step of detecting
follows the step of parsing. Thus, the specification does not support Defendants’ proposed
construction.
In addition, dependent claim 5 narrows the step of identifying to include a step of parsing the
file to breakdown the file into the text formats present in the file. Defendants’ proposed construction
is overly narrow. The term “identifying” is really used in the sense of “determining the existence
of.” The language is clear when given its ordinary meaning, and no construction is necessary.

18

Object
This term is present in every claim of the patents-in-suit. The parties agree that an “object”
encompasses “information presentable to a user of a computer system.” The dispute centers around
whether the object may include a software program or anything with source code or byte code. Eolas
proposes “text, images, sound files, video data, documents or other types of information that is
presentable to a user of a computer system.” Defendants propose “information presentable to a user
of a computer system, which is not a program and which does not include source code or byte code.”
19

Defendants argue that a software program cannot be an object because it is not information that is
presentable to a user for viewing and manipulation. Def. Br. at 18.
Eolas’s proposed construction is supported by––indeed comes straight from—the
specification. ‘985 Patent, 2:12–15 (“Objects may be text, images, sound files, video data,
documents or other types of information that is presentable to a user of a computer system.”).
Defendants’ proposed construction improperly includes a negative limitation. Eolas’s construction
could be more clear, and the Court construes the term as, “text, images, sound files, video data,
documents, and/or other types of information that is presentable to a user of a computer system.”
Hypermedia Document/Distributed Hypermedia Document/File Containing information
These terms are collectively present in every claim of the patents-in-suit. Eolas contends
“[first] hypermedia document” should be construed as “a document that allows a user to click on
images, sound icons, video icons, etc., that link to other objects of various media types, such as
additional graphics, sound video, text, or hypermedia or hypertext documents.” For “distributed
hypermedia document,” Eolas proposes “[first] hypermedia document that allows a user to access
a remote data object over a network.” Finally, with regard to “file containing information,” Eolas
proposes “the file contains information to allow the browser application to display at least part of
a distributed hypermedia document.”
Defendants propose one construction for both “[first] hypermedia document” and “distributed
hypermedia document”— “a document received by the browser that includes hyperlinks to graphics,
sound, video or other media.” For “file containing information,” Defendants propose “the file
contains information to allow the browser application to display at least part of a distributed
hypermedia document.”
20

“[First] hypermedia document” and “distributed hypermedia document” are used
interchangeably in the claims and will therefore receive the same construction. Eolas’s proposal
comes directly from the specification. See, e.g. ‘906 Patent, 2:24–27. Defendants’ proposal includes
inherent aspects of other surrounding claim limitations. Defendants’ requirement that the document
be “received by the browser” that includes “links” imports limitations that are unsupported by the
intrinsic record. Accordingly, the Court construes “[first] hypermedia document” and “[first]
distributed hypermedia document” as “a document that allows a user to click on images, sound icons,
video icons, etc. that link to other objects of various media types, such as additional graphics, sound
video, text or hypermedia or hypertext documents.”
The “file containing information” term does not need further construction. When read in
view of the Court’s construction of “[first] hypermedia document,” the term will be understood by
a jury. See Eon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83442 at *71–72; Mirror Worlds, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82070, at *20. The parties’ proposed constructions do not provide any additional meaningful
guidance beyond the claim language.
Distributed Application
This claim is present in independent claims 36, 40, and 44 of the ‘985 patent. Both parties
agree that a distributed application is an application that is broken up and performed between two
or more computers. The parties disagree about: (1) whether an application must be broken up and
performed between two or more computers; and (2) whether the actions must be performed in
parallel. Eolas proposes “an application that may be broken up and performed among two or more
computers.” Defendants propose “an application in which tasks are broken up and performed in
parallel on two or more computers.”
21

With regard to the first dispute, at the hearing the Court asked the parties whether they would
agree to changing Eolas’s proposed “may” to “is capable of.” Eolas agreed with the Court’s
proposal. Defendants argued the term should be “that is” not “may.” The Court gave the parties an
opportunity post-hearing to review the Court’s proposed construction and notify the Court as to
whether they were amenable to the proposed language. The parties did not change their positions
regarding the term. Eolas’s proposed definition again comes directly from the specification. ‘985
Patent, 11:2–4 (“In the present example, tasks such as volume rendering may be broken up and easily
performed among two or more computers.”) (emphasis added). Defendants’ requirement that the
tasks be broken up is a limitation that is not inherent in the term.
Defendants next argue that the tasks must be performed in parallel (i.e. simultaneously). For
support, Defendants cite ‘985 at 5:31–6:15. This section of the specification describes a specific
type of image processing wherein several computers are used for distributed processing. Id.
However, that description does not specifically relate to the term “distributed application.”
Defendants’ proposed construction improperly brings into the construction one aspect of how the
distributed application is performed among two or more computers, i.e. in parallel.
The Court construes the term as “an application that is capable of being broken up and
performed among two or more computers.”
Client Workstation/Network Server
These terms are collectively present in every claim of the patents-in-suit. Eolas asserts that
“client workstation” means “a computer system connected to a network that serves the role of an
information requester. Eolas contends “network server” should be construed as “a computer system
that serves the role of an information provider.” Eolas points to the specification in support of these
22

constructions. ‘906 Patent, 4:55–59 (“For purposes of this specification, client and server computers
are categorized in terms of their predominant role as either an information requestor or provider.
Clients are generally information requesters, while servers are generally information providers.”).
Defendants contend “client workstation” means “a desktop or deskside computer with an
operating system and hardware designed for technical or scientific applications that provides higher
performance than a personal computer.” For “network server,” Defendants propose “a computer
running software that is capable of executing applications responsive to requests from a client
workstation, and that processes commands from a client workstation to locate and retrieve
documents or files from storage.” Defendants argue that workstation is a term of art and implies
hardware with greater capacity than a personal computer. Defendants contend the network server
was identified as being server computer 204, and the specification describes server computer 204
as having the capabilities set forth in Defendants’ proposed construction.
Plaintiff’s constructions of “client workstation” and “network server” are consistent with the
specification.

With regard to Defendants’ proposed construction of “client workstation,”

Defendants’ distinction between a workstation and a personal computer is too limiting. Further, the
characterization of “higher performance than a personal computer” is subjective and thus indefinite.
With regard to “network server,” Defendants’ proposed construction restricts the term to the
preferred embodiment. Accordingly, the Court construes “client workstation” as a computer system
connected to a network that serves the role of an information requester,” and “network server” as “a
computer system that serves the role of an information provider.”

23

Means-Plus-Function Terms
Defendants argue that there are fifty-three claim elements that invoke Section 112, Paragraph
6. These include four groups of claims: (1) ‘985 claims 24–27: “the method comprising: enabling
. . .”; (2) ‘985 claims 20–23 and 40–43: “communicating . . . in order to cause”; (3) ‘985 claims
16–19 and 28–31: “software . . . operable to . . . cause”; and (4) ‘906 claims 6–8 and 13: “computer
readable program code for causing . . . .”
Defendants admit none of these claims use the word “means.” This fact triggers a
presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382
F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, Defendants argue that these terms claim a functional
result rather than sufficient structures or acts for achieving that result and thus § 112, ¶ 6 should
apply. Assuming § 112, ¶ 6 applies, Defendants argue Eolas failed to identify the proper
corresponding structure(s).
Eolas argues that virtually every element asserted by Defendants includes a phrase containing
either the words “computer readable program code for . . .” or “software comprising computer
executable instructions [to] . . .” followed by a description of the code’s (or software’s) operation.
Pl. Br. at 26. The code and software in these claims describes sufficient structure to avoid the
application of § 112, ¶ 6. Defendants present no valid basis for applying § 112, ¶ 6, and the Court
declines to do so.

24

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF INDEFINITENESS
Defendants contend claim 28 of the ‘985 patent and claims 6–8 and 13 of the ‘906 patent
are invalid as indefinite (Docket No. 568). Having considered the motion and all responses, the
motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND AND THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
Defendants argue these claims are indefinite under the Federal Circuit’s holding in IPXL
Holdings, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc. because they are drafted to cover both an apparatus and various
method steps of using the apparatus. 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Specifically,
independent claim 6 of the ‘906 Patent—and dependent claims 7–8 and 13—are directed to both an
apparatus (“a computer program product”) and to various method steps (e.g. “. . . wherein said object
has type information associated with it utilized by said browser to identify and locate . . .”; “. . .
wherein said embed text format is parsed by said browser to automatically invoke said executable
application . . .”). ‘906 Patent C2, Claim 6, 4:8–15. Similarly, claim 28 of the ‘985 patent is
directed to both an apparatus (“an executable application”) and various method steps performed by
a separate “browser application” (e.g. “. . . wherein the executable application is automatically
invoked by the browser . . .”). ‘985 Patent Claim 28, 20:30–32.
Defendants also argue that if §112, ¶ 6 does not apply—and the Court holds that it does
not—then the claims are indefinite because they use purely functional language. Specifically, the
language in the patents-in-suit “in order to cause,” “software . . . operable to . . . cause,” and “for
causing” is functional.
Plaintiff responds the claims at issue are not mixed method/apparatus claims under IPXL.
Rather they are “computer readable” code claims. In response to Defendants’ functional language
25

argument, Plaintiff argues that the claims describe capability of the claimed apparatuses, they do not
claim the activity itself.
APPLICABLE LAW
A party seeking to invalidate a patent must overcome a presumption that the patent is valid.
See 35 U.S.C. § 282; United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212 (Fed.
Cir. 1996); Hibritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
This presumption places the burden on the challenging party to prove the patent’s invalidity by clear
and convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011);
United States Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d at 1212. Close questions of indefiniteness “are properly resolved
in favor of the patentee.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that claims be particular and distinct. “The specification shall
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2. The primary purpose of the
definiteness requirement is to ensure public notice of the scope of the patentee’s legal protection,
such that interested members of the public can determine whether or not they infringe. Halliburton
Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I, LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Thus, the definiteness
inquiry focuses on how a skilled artisan understands the claims, and a claim is indefinite if the
“accused infringer shows by clear and convincing evidence that a skilled artisan could not discern
the boundaries of the claim based on the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution
history, as well as her knowledge of the relevant art area.” Id. at 1249–50. “If the meaning of the
claim is discernible, even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over
26

which reasonable persons will disagree, . . . the claim [is] sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on
indefiniteness grounds.” Exxon Res. & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2001). Thus, a claim is indefinite only if its meaning and scope are “insolubly ambiguous.” Id.
A claim may be invalid if it combines two separate statutory classes of invention. See IPXL
Holdings, L.L. C. v. Amazon. com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (hereinafter “IPXL
Holdings”). In Ex parte Lyell, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences held that reciting both
an apparatus and a method of using that apparatus renders a claim indefinite under § 112 ¶ 2. 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1548, 1550 (B.P.A.I. 1990). On the basis of this rule, the BPAI invalidated as indefinite
a claim whose preamble described “an automatic transmission tool . . . and method for using same.”
In IPXL Holdings v. Amazon.com, the Federal Circuit endorsed the reasoning of Ex parte
Lyell by invalidating the following claim:
The system of claim 2 [including an input means] wherein the predicted transaction
information comprises both a transaction type and transaction parameters associated
with that transaction type, and the user uses the input means to either change the
predicted transaction information or accept the displayed transaction type and
transaction parameters.
Id. (quoting patent) (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit explained that, because the claim recited
use by a user as a claim limitation, it is unclear if infringement would occur when one creates a
system that allows a user to change the predicted transaction information, or when a user actually
uses the system. In other words, the claim language ambiguously claimed both a system and the
method for using the system. Id. A potential seller of the claimed system would not know from the
claim whether it might also be liable for contributory infringement if a buyer later performs the
claimed method of using the system. Thus, the Federal Circuit found the claim invalid under § 112
27

¶ 2. Id.
The Federal Circuit recently clarified its holding in IPXL Holdings. In Microprocessor
Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., the Federal Circuit explained that apparatus claims
are not necessarily indefinite for using functional language. 520 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(citing Halliburton Energy Servs. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). For example,
functional language which merely describes the capability of the claimed invention will not render
a claim invalid under IPXL Holdings. Id. This sort of language does not impermissibly mix two
different statutory classes of subject matter. See Yodlee, Inc. v. Cashedge, Inc., No. 05–01550, 2006
WL 3456610, at *4–6, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2006) (hereinafter “Yodlee”) (finding that the claims at
issue are valid because they “describe what the apparatuses do, when used in a certain way. They
do not claim use of the apparatuses”). Since evaluating indefiniteness arguments under IPXL
Holdings, courts have repeatedly distinguished IPXL Holdings from situations in which the claim
language offered sufficient notice to potential defendants as to the actions which would constitute
infringement. See, e.g.,Yodlee, 2006 WL 3456610, at *4; Toshiba Corp. v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
No. 03-1035, 2006 WL 1788479, at *4 (D. Del. June 28, 2006); Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper
Cameron Corp., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1164 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
ANALYSIS
A.

The Mixed Method/Apparatus Argument
Defendants argue that the claims at issue are mixed method/apparatus claims and are

therefore indefinite under IPXL. With regard to claim 28 of the ‘985 patent, Defendants contend that
because the claim covers both an apparatus (“executable application”) and method steps that must
28

be performed by a separate browser, it is unclear whether infringement would occur upon
making/using/selling the accused executable application, or only after the separate “browser” has
used the executable application to perform the claimed method steps. Similarly, because claim 6 of
the ‘906 patent (as well as the dependent claims at issue) covers an apparatus (“a computer program
product”), but all of the method steps in the claim must be performed by a “browser,” it is unclear
whether infringement occurs upon making/using/selling the accused website, or only after the
separate “browser” has used the website to perform the claimed method steps.
Reading the claims in light of cases applying IPXL Holdings, however, suggests that
Defendants’ position is misplaced. Yodlee, 2006 WL 3456610, at *5 (citing ‘073 patent at 10:2–13
and 11:11–24); see also Toshiba Corp. v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 2006 WL 1788479, at *4
(evaluating the claim term “wherein the control message processing unit communicates with the next
hop node . . . .”). It is well-established that for a limitation to introduce a method step, the limitation
must require action, or “actual use” of something instead of merely requiring or setting forth a
particular capability. See, e.g., Microprocessor Enhancement, 520 F.3d at 1374–75; compare with
IPXL Holdings, 430 F.3d at 1384 (invalidating the challenged claim because the user of the
apparatus performed the claimed method of using the apparatus). The claim limitations challenged
in this case do not require action. Instead, they delineate the capability of the claimed apparatuses.
Claim 28 of the ‘985 patent reads:
One or more computer readable media encoded with software comprising an
executable application for use in a system having at least one client workstation and
one network server coupled to a network environment, operable to:
cause the client workstation to display an object and enable an end-user to directly
interact with said object while the object is being displayed within a display area
29

created at a first location within a portion of a hypermedia document being displayed
in a browser-controlled window . . . wherein said client workstation executes said
browser application . . . wherein the embed text format which corresponds to said
first location in the document is identified by the browser... wherein the type
information is utilized by the browsers to identify and locate said executable
application, and wherein the executable application is automatically invoked by the
browser . . . .”
‘985 patent at 20:1–32 (claim 28) (emphasis added). The “operable to” language in the claim
represents functional limitations of the capabilities of the apparatus, not method steps. See Finjan,
Inc. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding similar claimed language,
“computer-readable storage medium storing program code for causing a server . . .” claims
capability); see also Fantasy Sports Props. v. Sportsline.com, 287 F.3d 1108, 1117–1118 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (“in order to infringe the ‘603 patent, the code underlying an accused fantasy football game
must be written in such a way as to enable a user of that software to utilize the function . . . without
having to modify the code.”).
Claim 6 of the ‘906 patent reads:
A computer program product for use in a system having at least one client
workstation and one network server coupled to said network environment . . . the
computer program product comprising:
a computer usable medium having computer readable program code physically
embodied therein, said computer product further comprising: computer readable
program code for causing said client workstation to execute a browser application
to parse a first distributed hypermedia document to identify text formats included in
said distributed hypermedia document and to respond to predetermined text formats
to initiate processes specified by said text formats;
computer readable program code for causing said client workstation to utilize said
browser to display, on said client workstation, at least a portion of a first hypermedia
document received over said network from said server, wherein the portion of said
first hypermedia document is displayed within a first browser-controlled window on
said client workstation. . . wherein said object has type information associated with
it utilized by said browser to identify and locate an executable application external
30

to he first distributed hypermedia document, and wherein said embed text format is
parsed by said browser to automatically invoke said executable application to execute
on said client workstation in order to display said object and enable an end-user to
directly interact with said object . . . .”
‘906 Patent C2 at 3:48–4:20 (claim 6) (emphasis added). The wherein clauses in these claims are
clearly linked with the preceding “for causing” language—they further describe the capabilities of
the claimed computer program code in its relevant environment.
Other courts have considered indefiniteness arguments similar to those presented herein, and
have found that functional apparatus language is not indefinite when it describes the capabilities of
the apparatus. See generally Microprocessor Enhancement, 520 F.3d at 1374–75; see, e.g.,Yodlee,
2006 WL 3456610, at *4; Toshiba Corp. v. Juniper Networks, Inc., No. 03-1035, 2006 WL
1788479, at *4 (D. Del. June 28, 2006); Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp., 474 F. Supp.
2d 1148, 1164 (E.D. Cal. 2007). The ‘985 and ‘906 claim limitations at issue are critically different
from circumstances warranting invalidity for indefiniteness. Having reviewed all disputed claims,
the Court concludes that the claims at issue do not impermissibly mix subject matter and retain a
definite scope.
B.

The Functional Language Argument
Defendants next argue that if the claims are not means plus function claims, and they are not,

then the claims are indefinite because they use purely functional language. Specifically, Defendants
contend the language in the patents-in-suit “in order to cause,” “software . . . operable to cause,” and
“for causing” is functional. Defendants argue that this functional language makes it impossible to
discern what is actually being claimed. Plaintiff responds that the claims at issue are apparatus

31

claims that expressly designate functional limitations that are to be accomplished through a particular
structure (namely a “computer readable program code for causing” or “software . . . operable to . .
. cause”).
As stated above, it is clear from the claims that what is claimed is an apparatus. That
additional language exists in the claims describing the capabilities of each apparatus does not render
the claims indefinite.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court interprets the claim language in this case in the manner
set forth above. For ease of reference, the Court’s claim interpretations are set forth in a table as
Appendix A. Further, because Defendants have not presented clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) claims 6–8 and 13 of the ‘906 patent; or (2) claim 28 of the ‘985 patent are invalid, the Court
DENIES the motion for summary judgment.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 22nd day of August, 2011.

__________________________________
LEONARD DAVIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

32

APPENDIX A
Claim Term

Court’s Construction

executable application

a compiled program that is in native machine
code in a format that can be loaded into
memory and run

automatically [invoking/invoke]
executable application

[the/said]

the executable application is launched without
user activation

and
executable application is automatically invoked
by the browser
text format

coded information that describes how the
content of a hypermedia document is to be
displayed by a browser application

embed text format

coded information that specifies to a browser
application that an object is to be embedded in
a displayed hypermedia document

embed text format specifies the location of at
least a portion of [an/said] object

No construction

embed text format, located at/corresponding to
a first location in said first distributed
hypermedia document

No construction

identifying an embed text format/an embed text
format is identified

No construction

object

text, images, sound files, video data,
documents, and/or other types of information
that is presentable to a user of a computer
system

[First] hypermedia document

a document that allows a user to click on
images, sound icons, video icons, etc. that link
to other objects of various media types, such as
additional graphics, sound video, text or
hypermedia or hypertext documents

and
distributed hypermedia document

file containing information

No construction

33

distributed application

an application that is capable of being broken
up and performed among two or more
computers

client workstation

as a computer system connected to a network
that serves the role of an information requester

network server

a computer system that serves the role of an
information provider

34