TransData, Inc. v. Centerpoint Energy Houston Electric LLC et al

Filing 186

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION. Signed by Magistrate Judge John D. Love on 06/07/16. (mll, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
TRANSDATA, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CENTERPOINT ENERGY HOUSTON
ELECTRIC LLC, et al,

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CASE NO. 6:10cv557 RWS-JDL

Defendants.

TRANSDATA, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CENTERPOINT ENERGY HOUSTON
ELECTRIC, LLC,

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CASE NO. 6:16cv407-JDL

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Centerpoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC
(“Centerpoint”), Denton Municipal Electric (“Denton”), Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC
(“Oncor”), and Denton County Electric Cooperative d/b/a CoServ Electric (“CoServ”)
(collectively “Defendants”) claim construction briefs regarding the term “proximate.” (6:10-cv557, Doc. No. 178; 6:16-cv-407, Doc. No. 21.)1 Plaintiff Transdata, Inc. (“Transdata”) has filed
responsive briefs. (6:10-cv-557, Doc. No. 180; 6:16-cv-407, Doc. No. 22.)

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The briefing filed in both cases is nearly identical. Therefore, all citations herein will be to cause number 6:16-cv407 unless otherwise noted.

BACKGROUND
The above-titled civil action number 6:10-cv-557 was originally filed on October 21,
2010, alleging Defendants Centerpoint, Denton, Oncor, and Texas-New Mexico Power
Company2 infringe U.S. Patent Nos. 6,903,699 (“the ’699 Patent”), 6,492,713 (“the ’713 Patent”)
and 6,181,294 (“the ’294 Patent”). A separate civil action, 6:11-cv-113, was filed on March 14,
2011, alleging Defendant CoServ infringes the ’294, ’713, and ’699 Patents. On January 27,
2012, these actions were transferred to the Western District of Oklahoma to proceed in
multidistrict litigation in that district. (W.D. Okla. 5:12-ml-2309.) On February 22, 2016, the
actions were remanded to this Court for trial from the Western District of Oklahoma. Upon
remand, this Court held a status conference to address scheduling issues for trial. Thereafter, this
Court severed Defendant Centerpoint into the above-captioned action, 6:16-cv-407, for a
separate trial, and consolidated that action with 6:10-cv-577 as the lead case.
During the scheduling conference, Defendants indicated that they would like to file a
motion requesting that the Court construe the term “proximate.” Defendants stated that the MDL
court had considered the term for claim construction, but held that it was a term of degree and
that it was up to the jury to decide “how close is necessary to meet the term.” (W.D. Okla. 5:12ml-2309, Doc. No. 597.) This Court granted Defendants permission to file such a request, and
thereafter Defendants filed the instant briefing, requesting that the Court construe the claim term
“proximate” to mean “adjacent.” (Doc. No. 21, at 2.)
A. The Patents
All of the asserted patents generally relate to electric meters and various components
thereof. As it pertains to the present dispute, claim 17 of the ’294 Patent is representative and
recites:
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Texas-New Mexico Power Company was dismissed on March 28, 2016. (Doc. No. 141.)

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17. An electric meter, comprising:
an electric meter chassis having a dielectric housing
protruding therefrom;
electric meter circuitry;
a wireless communication circuit coupled to said electric
meter circuitry; and
an antenna for allowing said electric meter circuitry to
communicate Wirelessly through said dielectric
housing, including:
antenna elements, located proximate said electric meter
circuitry, adapted to transmit and receive electro
magnetic radiation, and
a balance circuit, coupled to said antenna elements to
cause said antenna elements to act as said antenna
and to an unbalanced output port of said Wireless
communication circuit, that balances an impedance
of said unbalanced output port thereby to balance
said antenna.
(’294 Patent at 8:12-29.)
APPLICABLE LAW
The Federal Circuit has held: “When the parties raise an actual dispute regarding the
proper scope of [the] claims, the court . . . must resolve that dispute.” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v.
Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The court must resolve
the dispute because “the scope of the asserted claims is a question of law,” and the court cannot
leave “the jury free to consider the[] [parties’] arguments” on a disputed question of law. Id. at
1361–62.
The Court applies the familiar principles of claim construction to resolve this dispute.
Those begin: “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’”
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “[T]he context in which a term is
used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Id. Other claims, asserted and unasserted,
can provide additional instruction because “terms are normally used consistently throughout the
patent.” Id. at 1314. “[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a

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part.’” Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex. Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am.
Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
The specification may also resolve ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and
accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of
the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. For
example, “[a] claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the scope of the
claim ‘is rarely, if ever, correct.’” Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elam Computer Group Inc., 362
F.3d 1367, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583). But, “[a]lthough
the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed language in the
claims, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be
read into the claims.” Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1988); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
Although, “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative
meaning of claim language,” the Court may rely on extrinsic evidence to “shed useful light on
the relevant art.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quotation omitted). Technical dictionaries and
treatises may help the Court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one
skilled in the art might use claim terms, but such sources may also provide overly broad
definitions or may not be indicative of how terms are used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly,
expert testimony may aid the Court in determining the particular meaning of a term in the

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pertinent field, but “conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim
term are not useful.” Id.
In patent construction, “subsidiary fact finding is sometimes necessary” and the court
“may have to make ‘credibility judgments’ about witnesses.” Teva v. Sandoz, 135 S.Ct. 831, 838
(2015). In some cases, “the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic evidence
and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science or
the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period.” Id. at 841. “If a
district court resolves a dispute between experts and makes a factual finding that, in general, a
certain term of art had a particular meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of
the invention, the district court must then conduct a legal analysis: whether a skilled artisan
would ascribe that same meaning to that term in the context of the specific patent claim under
review.” Id. (emphasis in original). When the court makes subsidiary factual findings about the
extrinsic evidence in consideration of the “evidentiary underpinnings” of claim construction,
those findings are reviewed for clear error on appeal. Id.
ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that the construction of the term “proximate” is disputed and must be
resolved. (Doc. No. 21, at 2.) Specifically, Defendant Centerpoint contends that its expert opined
that “proximate” means adjacent (“next or nearest”), while Transdata’s experts contend that
“proximate” means “closely related in space,” “very near,” “near,” “near with respect to the
dimensions of the objects that are being considered for proximity,” and that “two things are
proximate if their distance from each other is very comparable to the largest dimension of the
largest object being considered for proximity.” Id. at 3. In support of their construction of
“proximate” to mean “adjacent,” Defendants cite to Figure 1 of the ’294 Patent and argue that

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because the claims already require the antenna element and electric circuitry to be under the
housing, the term “proximate” must require something more than simply under the housing.
(Doc. No. 21, at 5.) Lastly, Defendants argue that Transdata’s experts’ opinions should be
rejected as flawed. (Doc. No. 21, at 6.)
Transdata argues that Defendants’ construction of “proximate” is flawed because (1) it
ignores the use of “proximate” in the specifications; (2) it excludes a disclosed embodiment; and
(3) attempts to limit the claims to a disclosed embodiment. (Doc. No. 22, at 2.) Transdata
contends that “proximate” need no construction, but that if the Court does construe the term, that
it be construed to mean “nearby.” (Doc. No. 22, at 3.) In support, Transdata cites to a portion of
the specification that it contends equates the terms “nearby” and “proximate.” Id. citing ’294
Patent at 2:24–29 (“A roving truck carrying a transceiver may then establish communication
with the meter as it passes nearby, thus reading the meter. Unfortunately, the truck must be
physically deployed to locations proximate the meters.”) Transdata contends that this portion of
the specification also demonstrates that Defendants’ proposed construction of “proximate” to
mean “adjacent” is incorrect because it would require a truck reader to “drive onto a
homeowner’s lawn, through any fence, and around any tools or pets to pass … an electric meter
in order to read it.” (Doc. No. 22, at 3–4.) For this reason, Transdata also argues that Defendants’
construction is inconsistent with Figure 1 of the ’294 Patent. Id. Finally, Transdata contends that
Defendants have changed positions in an effort to manufacture an O2 Micro issue, as they first
contended “proximate” meant “near,” then that it needed no construction, and now that it means
“adjacent” or “immediately next to.” (Doc. No. 22, at 5.)
The claims of the asserted patents recite the term “proximate” as a term of degree to
express the closeness of components of an electrical meter. For example, claim 17 of the ’294

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Patent recites “antenna elements, located proximate said electric meter circuitry…”. ’294 Patent
at 8:21–23. Similarly, claim 15 of the ’713 Patent recites “an antenna element located within
said dielectric housing proximate said circuit board rack…”. ’713 Patent at 8:12–14. The
specification, in describing Figure 1, similarly describes “[t]he antenna 170 includes antenna
elements 172, 174, located within the dielectric housing 120. In the illustrated embodiment, the
antenna elements 172, 174 are located between the circuit boards 150 and proximate the electric
meter circuitry 140.” See, e.g., ’294 Patent at 4:56–60. Figure 1 is shown below:

(’294 Patent (Fig. 1).)
As is seen in Figure 1, and similarly described in the specification, the antenna elements
172 and 174 are shown “proximate” to the electric meter circuitry 140. See ’294 Patent Fig. 1;
4:56–60. Notably, as shown in Figure 1, a circuit board (150) is located between the antenna

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elements (172 and 174) and the electric meter circuitry (140). ’294 Patent Fig. 1. The
specification contains no other discussion of the term proximate as it pertains to what is claimed
under the housing of the electric meter. The only other mention of the term “proximate” in the
specification is in relation to the truck readers being proximate the meters to get a reading. See
’294 Patent at 2:24-29 (“A roving truck carrying a transceiver may then establish communication
with the meter as it passes nearby, thus reading the meter. Unfortunately, the truck must be
physically deployed to locations proximate the meters.”)
From both the claims and the specification, it is clear that the asserted patents use the
term “proximate” as a term of degree to describe the closeness of various components of the
claimed electric meters. The claims and specification provide sufficient guidance for the bounds
of this term. As Defendants concede, on the upper bound, “proximate” is bounded by the claim
requirement of the dielectric housing itself. (Doc No. 21, at 4.) That is, the antenna element and
the electric meter circuitry must be under the housing. See, e.g., ’294 Patent at 8:12–29; ’713
Patent at 8:12–14. On the lower bound, the specification teaches that “proximate” must be
something more than “adjacent” or “immediately next to.” That is, the only instructive portion of
the specification teaches that the electric meter circuitry need not be immediately next to the
antenna elements, and indeed shows otherwise. ’294 Patent Fig. 1; 4:56–60. Moreover, the
embodiment that describes the reader truck, although it does not describe the term “proximate”
as it pertains to components under the meter hood, also does not use the term “proximate” to
mean “adjacent” or “immediately next to.” See ’294 Patent at 2:24–29 (“A roving truck carrying
a transceiver may then establish communication with the meter as it passes nearby, thus reading
the meter. Unfortunately, the truck must be physically deployed to locations proximate the
meters.”)

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As explained herein, the term “proximate” cannot mean “adjacent.” Having rejected
Defendants’ proposed construction, the Court has resolved the claim scope dispute between the
parties. Within the bounds described herein, the term “proximate” is a term of degree limited by
the parameters discussed herein. No further construction is necessary.
CONCLUSION
As discussed herein, the Court has resolved the parties’ dispute regarding the term
“proximate,” and finds no further construction is necessary.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 7th day of June, 2016.

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