Network-1 Technologies, Inc v. Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. et al

Filing 1050

ORDER denying 681 Motion to Strike Certain Litigation Settlement Agreements. Signed by Magistrate Judge K. Nicole Mitchell on 10/23/2017. (rlf)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

§
§
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:11-cv-492§ RWS-KNM
§
§
§

v.

ALCATEL-LUCENT USA, INC., ET AL.

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants Hewlett-Packard Company’s and Hewlett Packard
Enterprise Company’s (“Defendants” or “HP”) Motion to Strike Certain Litigation Settlement
Agreements. Doc. No. 681. The Court held a hearing on this Motion on June 19, 2017. The
Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Network-1 Technologies, Inc. (“Network-1”) accuses Defendants1 of infringing
U.S. Patent No. 6,218,930 (“the ‘930 Patent”). The ‘930 Patent was issued on April 17, 2001, and
relates to an apparatus and method for remotely powering access equipment over a 10/100
switched Ethernet network. See ‘930 Patent.

1

The remaining Defendants in this action are Hewlett-Packard Company, Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company, and
Juniper Networks. However, Network-1 initially asserted this patent against Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc.; Alcatel-Lucent
Holdings Inc.; Allied Telesis Holdings K.K.; Allied Telesis, Inc.; AXIS Communications AB; AXIS Communications,
Inc.; Dell Inc.; GarrettCom, Inc; Hewlett-Packard Company; Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.; Huawei
Technologies Co., Ltd.; Huawei Technologies USA Inc.; Juniper Networks, Inc.; Motorola Solutions, Inc.; NEC
Corporation; NEC Corporation of America; Polycom, Inc.; Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.; Samsung Electronics
America, Inc.; Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC; ShoreTel. Inc.; Sony Corporation; Sony Corporation of
America; Sony Electronics Inc.; and Transition Networks, Inc. See Doc. No. 1.

1

The ‘930 Patent was previously litigated in Network-1 Security Solutions, Inc. v. Cisco
Systems, Inc. in 2010 before Judge Leonard Davis. No. 6:08-CV-30 (“the Cisco Trial”). During
the trial, all of the Cisco Defendants entered into settlement agreements with Network-1.2
APPLICABLE LAW
Daubert Motion
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a)
the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient
facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
The trial judge has a gate-keeping role to ensure that expert testimony is relevant and
reliable. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Indeed, “[t]he proponent [of
the expert testimony] need not prove to the judge that the expert’s testimony is correct, but she
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony is reliable.” Moore v. Ashland
Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th. Cir. 1998). “The reliability prong [of Daubert] mandates
that expert opinion ‘be grounded in the methods and procedures of science and . . . be more than
unsupported speculation or subjective belief.’” Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452, 459 (5th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Curtis v. M & S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Factors to consider in determining whether a proposed expert’s methodology is
scientifically valid or reliable are:
(1) whether the expert’s theory can be or has been tested;
(2) whether the theory has been subject to peer review and publication;
2

The Defendants in this case were Cisco Systems, Inc.; Cisco-Linksys, LLC; Adtran, Inc.; Entersays Networks, Inc.;
Foundry Netowrks, Inc.; Netgear, Inc; and 3Com Corporation. Netgear, Inc. settled prior to trial.

2

(3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when
applied;
(4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and
(5) the degree to which the technique or theory has been generally accepted
in the scientific community.
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–95.

A court must decide whether the Daubert factors are

appropriate, use them as a starting point, and then ascertain if other factors should be considered.
Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 2007).
In Kumho Tire Company, Limited v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court applied the Daubert
principles to technical or specialized expert testimony. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). The Court explained
that the overarching goal of Daubert’s gate-keeping requirement is to “ensure the reliability and
relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Id. at 152. A trial court has
the discretion to exclude expert testimony if there is “simply too great an analytical gap” between
the expert’s reasoning and the conclusion. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
“At base, ‘the question of whether the expert is credible or the opinion is correct is generally a
question for the fact finder, not the court.’” Eidos Display, LLC v. Chi Mei Innolux Corp., No.
6:11-CV-201-JRG, 2017 WL 1079441, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2017) (quoting Summit 6, LLC
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 802 F.3d 1283, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). “Under Rule 702, the question
is whether the expert relied on facts sufficiently related to the disputed issue.” i4i Ltd. P’ship v.
Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 856 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 564 U.S. 91 (2011). “To properly carry
this burden, the patentee must ‘sufficiently [tie the expert testimony on damages] to the facts of
the case.’” Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted). “Questions about what facts are most relevant or reliable to calculating a reasonable

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royalty are for the jury.” i4i Ltd. P’ship, 598 F.3d at 856. “The jury [is] entitled to hear the expert
testimony and decide for itself what to accept or reject.” Id. Ultimately, “Daubert and Rule 702
are safeguards against unreliable or irrelevant opinions, not guarantees of correctness. “Federal
Rules of Evidence 403 provides that otherwise relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or
misleading the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Settlement License Agreements
The Federal Circuit recognizes the relevance of settlement agreements to the issue of
reasonable royalties in patent cases. In re MSTG, Inc., F.3d 1337, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “There is
no per se rule barring reference to settlements simply because they arise from litigation.”
AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 782 F.3d 1324, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015). However, litigation
licenses are not per se admissible. See Res-Q-Net.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 872 (Fed.
Cir. 2010). Because litigation licenses are influenced to some degree by the coercive environment
of patent litigation, “the Court assesses litigation licenses on a case-by case basis in determining
their admissibility.” ReedHycalog, UK, Ltd. V. Diamond Innovations Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 543,
547 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
Specifically, when evaluating the admissibility of a settlement license agreement, the court
must determine the reliability of the settlement license agreement in the context of the hypothetical
negotiation and the economic demand for the patented technology, while under the assumption
that the asserted patent claims are valid and infringed. LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer,
Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 77-78 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Uniloc USA, Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

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DISCUSSION
Defendants move to strike certain litigation settlement agreements between Network-1 and
various defendants. Doc. No. 681 at 1. Defendants categorize the litigation settlement agreements
as either “Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements,” the settlement agreements entered during the Cisco
trial, or “Pending Case Settlement Agreements,”3 the subsequent license agreements entered after
the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements with the Defendants sued in this action. Id.
Defendants argue that the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements and the Pending Case
Settlement Agreements were only entered into because of highly adverse circumstances. Doc. No.
681 at 1. Defendants also argue that both sets of settlement agreements: (1) do not reflect the
conditions of a hypothetical negotiation or the value of the ‘930 Patent; and (2) are prejudicial, and
should thus be inadmissible. Doc. No. 681 at 1.
I.

Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements
Defendants seek to exclude the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements for three reasons. First,

they were entered into under highly adverse trial circumstances. Second, they were entered into
under a desire to avoid further litigation. And finally, they resulted in a per-port royalty rate.
a. Trial Circumstances
The Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements encompass the license agreements entered into
during the Cisco Trial. Doc. No. 681 at 1. These are licenses for the ‘930 Patent, which is asserted
in the instant case. Defendants contend that the Cisco Settlement Agreements are not probative of
the economic value of the ‘930 Patent but rather Cisco’s desire to avoid a jury verdict because of
the disadvantageous trial circumstances. Doc. No. 681 at 2.

Defendants note that they do not include the Netgear, Inc. settlement agreement in the definition of the “Pending
Case Settlement Agreements” in this motion even though Netgear, Inc. was a defendant in both suits because Netgear’s
settlement agreement was entered prior to Cisco trial. See Doc. No. 681 at 3, n. 3.
3

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Defendants focus their inadmissibility argument on the adverse circumstances Cisco faced
during trial. Doc. No. 681 at 3. Defendants note that Judge Davis granted Network-1’s Daubert
motion that precluded Cisco’s non-infringement analysis of two disputed claims two weeks before
trial, which severely undercut Cisco’s non-infringement defense. Id. Then, during trial, Cisco’s
expert witness, Karl Nakamura, unexpectedly testified on cross-examination that the ‘930 Patent
was not obvious and thus “certainly valid,” which undermined Cisco’s invalidity defense. Doc.
No. 681 at 4. Defendants contend that because Cisco was left without a viable non-infringement
or invalidity defense, it was forced to settle under a “tainted environment,” especially given Judge
Davis’s repeated encouragement that the parties settle. Doc. No. 681 at 4-5.
Relying on LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer USA, Inc., Defendants argue the
Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements were entered into under “unique coercive circumstances”
similar to the BenQ settlement agreement. 694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Doc. No. 681 at 7.
Network-1 responds that the Cisco trial circumstances actually bring the negotiation of the
Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements closer to the hypothetical negotiation. Doc. No. 719 at 5.
Plaintiff contends that because the non-infringement opinions were stricken prior to trial, and the
expert witness testified that the patent was valid, the parties were closer to the position of assuming
the patent was valid and infringed when Cisco took the license. Id.
First, the Federal Circuit has held that a finding of validity and infringement placed
settlement negotiations closer to the setting of a hypothetical negotiation and ultimately admitted
the contested litigation settlement license. AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 782 F.3d 1324, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2015). Here, Cisco’s weakened invalidity and non-infringement arguments at the time
of the negotiation of the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements similarly brings the negotiation closer
to the hypothetical negotiation.

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Second, Defendants’ reliance on Laserdynamics is misplaced. In LaserDynamics, the
license at issue was between Laserdynamics and BenQ. LaserDynamic, Inc. v. Quanta Computer,
Inc., 694 F.3d at 58. BenQ licensed the patent weeks before trial after it was repeatedly sanctioned
by the district court for discovery misconduct and misrepresentations. Id. The district court cut
BenQ’s time for voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument. Id. The district court also
struck one of BenQ’s pleaded defenses, awarded attorneys’ fees to LaserDynamics for bringing
the sanctions motion, and sanctioned BenQ $500,000 as an additional punitive and deterrent
measure. Id. The district court felt these sanctions were appropriate because BenQ “demonstrated
a conscious intent to evade the discovery orders of this Court, as well as violated this Court’s
orders and the rules to an extent previously unknown by this Court.” Id. Thus, these sanctions for
litigation misconduct put BenQ at a severe procedural disadvantage at the time of trial. The Federal
Circuit held the district court erred in admitting the BenQ settlement license because the unique
circumstances surrounding the BenQ settlement—which was entered into after BenQ had been
repeatedly sanctioned by the district court—made the license unreliable. Id. at 77-78.
In Cisco, Cisco’s invalidity defenses and non-infringement arguments were undermined
by Daubert rulings and unexpected expert testimony. However, Daubert rulings and expert
testimony allow for adjudication of the merits of the case. The Defendants in Cisco were not
procedurally handicapped by litigation sanctions wholly unrelated to the merits of the case. The
rulings and testimony in the Cisco case went straight to the merits of infringement and validity.
Thus, although the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements were entered into while Cisco was in a
weakened litigation position, the position was one that resulted from adjudication of issues relevant
to valuing a license. The circumstances of the Cisco Trial are not parallel to the circumstances
surrounding the LaserDynamics settlement agreement. Doc. No. 681 at 7.

7

Although the Federal Circuit ultimately found the BenQ settlement agreement
inadmissible, it recognized:
Actual licenses to the patented technology are highly probative as to what constitutes a
reasonable royalty for those patent rights because such actual licenses most clearly reflect
the economic value of the patented technology in the marketplace.
LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 77-79. In fact, the first of the Georgia-Pacific factors to determine
the amount of a reasonable royalty for a patent license is “[t]he royalties received by the patentee
for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.” GeorgiaPacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (emphasis added).
The Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements are actual licenses of the ‘930 Patent and are thus
highly probative of the ‘930 Patent’s market value. Further, the Defendants’ concern with the
impact the adverse circumstances of litigation are best addressed through cross-examination. See
Tycho Healthcare Group LP v. E-Z-EM, Inc., 2010 WL 774878 at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2010)
(“parties are entitled to show whether and to what extent the rate from a prior license agreement is
the result of a compromise or reflects a desire to avoid litigation”).
b. Desire to Avoid Litigation
Defendants next argue that the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements should be excluded
because they were entered into under a desire to avoid further litigation, again relying heavily on
LaserDynamics. Doc. No. 681.
With ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., the Federal Circuit admitted expert testimony that
relied on the “most reliable license in this record [which] arose out of litigation.”594 F.3d 860,
872 (Fed.Cir. 2010). LaserDynamics did not overturn this holding in ResQNet.com. Instead, the
Federal Circuit distinguished the BenQ settlement agreement as “the least reliable license” on the
record “by a wide margin” because it reflected a strong desire to avoid further litigation rather than

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the value of the patent-in-suit. F.3d at 77-78 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Federal Circuit noted that
because the BenQ settlement agreement was six times larger than the next highest license for the
patent-in-suit and entered into under highly adverse circumstances going into trial, the license did
not reflect the economic value of the patent-in-suit. Id.
By contrast, the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements are licenses for the patent-in-suit, and
are in line with the license agreements that follow, as both parties have acknowledged.4 Doc. No.
931 at 66:5-14, 71:10-14. In fact, the license agreements that follow the Cisco Trial Settlement
Agreements have increased per-port royalty rates. Doc. No. 929 at 3; Doc. No. 930 at 7.
c. Per-Port Royalty Rate
Defendants also argue that the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements reflect Cisco’s
weakened position during trial because it is the first license agreement that obligates a per-port
royalty rate, which is not reflective of the true value of the ‘930 Patent. Doc. No. 681 at 2; Doc.
No. 929 at 1.
Defendants contend that “ports are not part of the invention of the ‘930 Patent and HPE
asserts that using ports as a basis for a royalty calculation is improper and contradicts current case
law on recoverable damages in patent infringement cases.” Doc. No. 681 at 5. However, HP’s
assertion is unsupported by an expert report or a case cite.5 Doc. No. 681 at 5. HP also contends
that a per-port royalty rate does not accurately reflect the value of the ‘930 Patent because only
“20-30% of PoE ports on a PSE product are typically used by an end-user.” Doc. No. 738 at 4. To
support this contention, HP relies on the deposition of Mark Thompson, an HP executive who is

4

HP acknowledges that the per-port royalty rate in the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreement is in line with the Pending
Case Settlement Agreements but notes it is because the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreement are tainted by a MFRR
provision. Doc. No. 930 at 3, 7.
5
In its Reply, Defendants point to the deposition of Joseph Deptula, an inventor of the ‘930 Patent, but the deposition
merely shows that Deptula admitted that the inventors of the ‘930 Patent did not invent the RJ45 connector. Doc. No.
738-4 at 62:2-4.

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the director of product line management for campus switching. However, Thompson admitted
that the estimate is a “general guess.” Doc. No. 738-5 at 81:6-12. Defendants also assert that the
per-port royalty structure was implemented only once Network-1 had significant leverage over
Cisco during the jury trial. Doc. No. 738 at 4.
Network-1 counters with explanations by its experts, Knox and Mills, as to why a per-port
royalty rate is appropriate. Doc. No. 719 at 9. Network-1’s CEO, Corey Horowitz, explains that
he learned from prior licensing negotiations that applying a percentage of net sales to a price of a
product for royalty calculations may lead to inaccurate representations of the value of a patented
invention. Doc. No. 719 at 9.
Defendants’ arguments with respect to the per port royalty go to the weight of the evidence,
rather than the admissibility. okay
II.

Pending Case Settlement Agreements
The Pending Case Settlement Agreements encompass the subsequent license agreements

entered after the Cisco Trial involving Network-1 and Defendants in this cause of action. 6
Defendants argue that because the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreement had a clause stipulating that
Network-1 cannot enter into any license with a third party on better terms (“a most favored nations
clause”), the Pending Case Settlement Agreements should also be excluded. Doc. No. 681 at 5.
Defendants contend that because the Pending Case Settlement Agreements require “an express
acknowledgement that the agreement is entered into to settle the pending litigation” and specifies
“an on-going per-port royalty requirement directly tied to the Network-1’s tainted agreement with
Cisco,” they should be inadmissible. Doc. No. 681 at 7.

6

Specifically, Defendants are moving to strike the licensing agreements with Alcatel; Allied Telesis; Dell;
GarrettCom; Huawei; Motorola; Polycom; Samsung; ShoreTel; Sony; and Transition.

10

Network-1 notes that HP does not present evidence indicating that the Pending Case
Settlement Agreements were entered into because of the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements or
because of the Cisco Trial. Doc. No. 719 at 13. While the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements
included a most favored nations clause, the Pending Case Settlement Agreements were entered
into willingly by the parties to those licenses and thus are probative of the market value of the ‘930
Patent. Doc. No. 930; Doc. No. 931 at 71:10-72:5. The Pending Case Settlement Agreements are
probative of the economic value of the patented technology in the marketplace because they license
the ‘930 Patent to the majority of the PoE industry at consistent rates. Further, the companies who
accepted the Pending Case Settlement Agreements are companies who directly compete with
Defendants’ accused products. Doc. No. 719 at 4. Thus, there is substantial probative value in the
Pending Case Settlement Agreements.
III.

Hypothetical Negotiation
Defendants argue that because Cisco was left without a viable non-infringement or

invalidity defense during its jury trial, Cisco was forced to settle under a “tainted environment.”
Doc. No. 738 at 3. However, as discussed above, the Federal Circuit found that licenses negotiated
to settle a case after the district court held the patents to be valid and infringed were relevant
because they reflect the “willing licensor-willing licensee” fictional negotiation. AstraZeneca AB
v. Apotex Corp.,782 F.3d 1324, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting John M. Skenyon et al, Patent
Damages Law and Practice § 1:15, at 25 (2013 ed.)). Thus, instead of a weakened litigation
position as claimed by Defendants, Cisco was forced into circumstances more similar to a
hypothetical negotiation. See AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex, 782 F.3d at 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Defendants contend that the date of hypothetical negotiations between Network-1 and HP
further renders the Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements and Pending Case Settlement Agreements

11

irrelevant. Doc. No. 681 at 8. HP notes that the earliest hypothetical negotiation date was
November 2003 because that was when the first accused HP product was sold. Doc. 681 at 8. The
Cisco Trial Settlement Agreements were entered in July 2010 and the Pending Case Settlement
Agreements were entered into, at the earliest, in October 2012. Doc. No. 681 at 8. Defendants
argue that these agreements and the context in which they were entered into are not probative of
the economic value of the ‘930 Patent. Doc. No. 681 at 8.
Defendants’ contention that settlement agreements must be entered into at the earliest
hypothetical negotiation date would prevent litigation licenses from ever being admissible, which
contradicts Federal Circuit holding that “there is no per se rule barring reference to settlements
because they arise from litigation.” AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 782 F.3d 1324, 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2015). Further, courts around the country have admitted litigation licenses because they are
relevant to the determination of a reasonable royalty.7 See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v.
C.R. Bard, Inc., 2017 WL 525668 at *1 (D. Del. Fed, 8, 2017) (admitting a litigation license
agreement because prejudicial concerns may adequately addressed through cross-examination);
Sanofi-Aventis U.S. v. Genetech, Inc., 2016 WL 7444676 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2016)
(admitting five settlement agreements because they were relevant to the determination of a
reasonable royalty).

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See also Elbit Syst. Land and C41 Ltd. v. Hughes Network Sys., LLC, Case No. 2:15-CV-37, Doc. No. 388 (E.D.
Tex. June 20, 2017) (admitting expert testimony that relied on litigation licenses that were not for the patent-in-suit
because they were “sufficiently comparable to the hypothetical license at issue in suit”); Blitzsafe Texas, LLC v. Honda
Motor Co., Ltd., Case No. 2:15-CV-1274, Doc. No. 385 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2017) (admitting expert testimony that
relied on lump sum licenses for the patent-in-suit even though the remaining licenses required a running royalty
structure); PerdiemCo, LLC v. InusTrack LLC, Case No. 2:15-CV-727, Doc. No. 302 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2016)
(admitting expert testimony based on comparable licenses, even though there were four licenses of record to the
patented technology); ZiiLabs Inc., Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Case No. 2:14-CV-203, Doc. No. 506 (E.D.
Tex. Dec. 4, 2015) (admitting expert testimony that relied on a litigation settlement license); SimpleAir, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., Case No. 2:11-CV-416, Doc. No. 765 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2014) (denying judgment as a matter of
law that the jury award was unreasonable because at trial, the parties extensively disputed the comparability of thirdparty settlement licenses).

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IV.

Prejudicial Issues
Defendants finally argue that admitting the Settlement Agreements would result in a “trial

within a trial.” Doc. No. 738 at 3. Defendants rely on Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
to argue that “admitting settlement agreements inevitably invited a ‘mini-trial’ on similarities and
differences in the facts between this case and the settled claims.” 2010 WL 1727916, *4 (E.D. Tex.
Apr. 28, 2010). However, in Fenner, the expert was relying on a “purportedly comparable license”
rather than a license to the patent-in-suit. This argument is unpersuasive.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion to Strike Certain Litigation Settlement Agreements is DENIED.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 23rd day of October, 2017.

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