Muse v. Director TDCJ-CID
Filing
51
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION AND ORDER re 50 MOTION for Leave to File filed by Aaron Lamon Muse. ORDERED that Petitioners Pro Se Motion for Leave to Object to the Courts Order to Strike (docket entry #50), construed as a Motion for Review Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), is hereby OVERRULED and DENIED. Signed by Judge Michael H. Schneider on 6:13CV350. (gsg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
AARON LAMON MUSE, #1613149
Petitioner,
v.
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID
Respondent.
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Civil Action No. 6:13cv350
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Aaron Lamon Muse, an inmate confined in the Eastham Unit of the Texas prison
system, proceeding pro se, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254. The petition was referred to Magistrate Judge K. Nicole Mitchell pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b). The Magistrate Judge previously ordered stricken a 668-page memorandum of law,
which Petitioner challenged via a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). This Court upheld the
Magistrate Judge’s ruling. Petitioner subsequently filed a 312-page Traverse to the Director’s
Answer in this case. Along with it, he filed a Motion for Leave to File Additional Pages
Exceeding the Page Limitations and/or to File Exhibits Supporting His Responsive Pleading. In a
carefully-reasoned and explained Order, the Magistrate Judge denied the motion and ordered the
312-page Traverse stricken, again as an exceedingly over-length and off-point pleading in which
any valid points “are helplessly buried in a pleading that does not in any way follow either the
District’s Local Rules or this Court’s prior Order to Strike.” Order (docket entry #47) at 4.
Petitioner has filed a Pro Se Motion for Leave to Object to the Court’s Order to Strike
(docket entry #50), which the Court construes as another objection to the Magistrate Judge’s recent
Order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). As the Court stated in its last such review,
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Federal law affords a magistrate judge broad discretion in the resolution of
non-dispositive pretrial matters. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
“This Court may modify or set aside a magistrate judge’s order only if it is clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.” See Atel Maritime Investors, LP v. Sea Mar
Management, LLC, 2010 WL 2654440, at *1 (E.D. La. June 25, 2010) (citing
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Castillo v. Frank, 70 F.3d 382, 385
(5th Cir.1995)). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when, although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 946 (1948).
Memorandum Opinion and Order (docket entry #24) at 1-2. As before, objections pursuant to
Rule 72(a) must be made within 14 days from the objectionable order. The Court notes that
Petitioner begins his objections by arguing that the Magistrate Judge did not include a warning
pursuant to Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) in
her Order and contends that he was due such notice of a 14-day period in which to file his
objections. In the first place, Douglass pertains to findings of fact and recommendations for
disposition of cases, harmonizing with Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In this District, such findings are
commonly referred to as “Reports and Recommendations.” The Magistrate Judge’s Order was
not such a Report and Recommendation, nor was it dispositive in nature. No Douglass warning
was required. Nonetheless, Petitioner has the right to file objections within 14 days of the
issuance of a non-dispositive order pursuant to Rule 72(a). His instant objections were filed
within that time limit.
Next, he contends that the Magistrate Judge did not view his Traverse and Motion with
sufficiently liberal scrutiny as due a pro se litigant. He is incorrect. Her Order considered the
totality of Petitioner’s pleadings, to the extent they could be followed, and provided an accurate
and well-discussed analysis of them. It is simply inescapable that Petitioner has refused every
warning to rein in his voluminous writings and either remain within the District’s page limitations
or make a good faith effort to do so with a motion that effectively demonstrates that good faith. In
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a case such as Petitioner’s, a 312-page response to a brief and succinct answer from the Director
cannot be said to be in good faith.
In the remainder of Petitioner’s objections, he re-states some of his arguments from the
Traverse without demonstrating any reason for the exceptionally excessive filing. As the Court
has stated previously, the Court has an “inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue
delays in the disposition of pending cases.” Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399,
401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 8 L. Ed. 2d
734 (1962)); Guardiola v. Thaler, 2013 WL 3003659, at *3 (5th Cir. June 18, 2013) (finding the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a prisoner’s motion to supplement the
pleadings (citing Boudwin)). Petitioner’s Traverse is abusive, as was his original memorandum
of law. Londo v. Iberia Medical Center, 2010 WL 5559755, at *2 (W.D. La. Oct. 21, 2010)
(citing Cofield v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 936 F.2d 512, 517 (11th Cir . 1991)).
The Court finds no basis for error in the Magistrate Judge’s Order. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333
.
U.S. at 395.
It is accordingly
ORDERED that Petitioner’s Pro Se Motion for Leave to Object to the Court’s Order to
Strike (docket entry #50), construed as a Motion for Review Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), is
hereby OVERRULED and DENIED.
It is SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 4th day of August, 2014.
____________________________________
MICHAEL H. SCHNEIDER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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