Morgan v. Stephens

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION adopting 24 Report and Recommendation. Ordered that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied and the case is dismissed with prejudice. Ordered that any and all motions which may be pending in this action are hereby denied. Signed by District Judge Ron Clark on 1/25/2018. (bjc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
ARNOLD D. MORGAN, JR., #694741

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VS.

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DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:15cv0061

MEMORANDUM OPINION ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Arnold Darrell Morgan, Jr., (Morgan), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This Court ordered that the
matter be referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3)
and the Amended Order for the Adoption of Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United
States Magistrate Judges.
I. Background
Morgan is in state custody pursuant to a 1994 conviction for the offense of aggravated
sexual assault of a child. He was sentenced to fifty years’ imprisonment in December 1994. While
Morgan did not file a direct appeal, records show that he filed a state habeas application in February
2004. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his application in 2005. He filed this federal
petition in September 2014.
II. Morgan’s Federal Claims
Morgan contended that there was no evidence whatsoever in which to convict; he insisted
that he was willing to undergo a polygraph examination to prove his innocence. He also
maintained that his criminal conviction rests upon lies.

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After a review of the pleadings, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report, (Dkt. #24),
recommending that Morgan’s petition be denied and his case dismissed with prejudice because it
was time-barred by virtue of the statute of limitations. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge found that
Morgan neither demonstrated actual innocence nor equitable tolling.
III. Standard of Review
The role of federal courts in reviewing habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners is
exceedingly narrow. A prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus review must assert a violation of a
federal constitutional right; federal review is unavailable to correct errors of state constitutional,
statutory, or procedural law unless a federal issue is also present. See Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d
1364, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 503 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2007) (“We
first note that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”) (internal citation
omitted). When reviewing state proceedings, a federal court will not act as a “super state supreme
court” to review error under state law. Wood v. Quarterman, 503 F.3d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 2007).
Furthermore, federal habeas review of state court proceedings is governed by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. Under the AEDPA, which
imposed a number of habeas corpus reforms, a petitioner who is custody “pursuant to the judgment
of State court” is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or
2. resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The AEDPA imposes a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state
court rulings,” which demands that federal courts give state court decisions “the benefit of the

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doubt.” See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal citations omitted); see also
Cardenas v. Stephens, 820 F.3d 197, 201-02 (5th Cir. 2016).
IV. Morgan’s Objections, Discussion, and Analysis
In response to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, Morgan submitted
correspondence replete with profanity-laced language. See Dkt. # 26 (sealed). Throughout his
profanity infused letter, which one could argue almost rises to the level of threatening, Morgan
again insists that he is innocent and that the “system” is corrupt. Because this disturbingly crude,
inappropriate, and unacceptable tone of Morgan’s correspondence reveals a lack of respect for the
Court and the judicial system, the Court will strike this document. See United States Steel Corp.
v. United Mine Workers of Am., 526 F.2d 377, 377 (5th Cir. 1976) (“By using in their petition for
rehearing unprofessional language lacking in respect for the Court, counsel for petitioner has
invited the Court to strike their petition.”); Hartfield v. Thaler, 498 Fed.App’x 440, 442 (5th Cir.
2012) (unpublished) (“The disturbingly unprofessional tone of the this petition reveals a lack of
respect for the court and constitutes an invitation to strike the petition.”).
Nonetheless, the Magistrate Judge correctly and properly found that Morgan’s federal
habeas petition is time-barred. As the Magistrate Judge explained, an inmate must file a section
2254 motion within one year of the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have
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been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244 imposes a general one-year statute of limitations.
Generally, a case is final when a judgment of conviction is entered, the availability of an
appeal is exhausted, and the time for filing a petition for certiorari has lapsed or the certiorari
petition is actually denied. When a defendant does not file a direct appeal, the conviction becomes
final when the time for filing a notice of appeal has expired—which is thirty days. See, e.g., Garcia
v. Director, 2012 WL 1481503 at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2012) (“In this case, Garcia was convicted
on October 16, 2009, and did not take a direct appeal; accordingly, his conviction became final on
November 16, 2009, after the expiration of 30 days . . .”); see also Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a).
Here, as the Magistrate Judge found, because Morgan did not file a direct appeal, his
conviction became final in January 1995. Any federal petition was thus due in January 1996,
absent tolling. His 2004 state habeas application did not toll the time period for which he was
permitted to file a timely federal petition because he filed the 2004 state habeas application after
the one-year period expired. See Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Finally,
Scott’s state habeas application did not toll the limitation period under § 2244(d)(2) because it was
not filed until after the period of limitations had expired.”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the
Magistrate Judge properly found that Morgan’s petition was time-barred.
Moreover, as the Magistrate Judge indicated in the Report, Morgan failed to demonstrate
actual innocence. Actual innocence, if proven, “serves as a gateway through which the petitioner
may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar … or, as in this case, expiration of the statute
of limitations.” See McQuiggen v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). In this way, the Supreme
Court explained that tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare; a petitioner does not meet
the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of new evidence, no

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juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) (claim of actual innocence requires the petitioner to
support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence, whether it be exculpatory
scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence which was not
presented at trial)).
Morgan’s assertions that there is no evidence in which to convict is conclusory. He
provided no specifics regarding this evidentiary claim in his underlying federal petition or in his
subsequent correspondence to the Court. Morgan’s conclusory allegations and bald assertions are
insufficient to support a claim of actual innocence—let alone a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
See Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2000); Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 530 (5th
Cir. 1990); Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1011 (5th Cir. 1983).
Finally, the Magistrate Judge also correctly determined that Morgan was not entitled to
equitable tolling. Under the AEDPA, the one-year statute of limitations period may be equitably
tolled only if the petitioner demonstrates that (1) “he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and
(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way” and prevented timely filing. See
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); Palacios v. Stephens, 723 F.3d 600, 604 (5th Cir.
2013). Furthermore, the doctrine of equitable tolling is available in only the most rare and
exceptional circumstances, particularly when the plaintiff is “actively misled by the defendant
about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” See
Flores v. Quarterman, 467 F.3d 484, 486 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d
398, 402 (5th Cir. 1999)). Furthermore, lack of legal knowledge—however understanding the
ignorance may be—does not justify equitable tolling. Id. at 487.

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Morgan has neither demonstrated that he has been actively pursuing his rights, other than
the actual filing of his federal petition, nor that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.
The Court does not find this situation a rare or extraordinary circumstance. See Mathis v. Thaler,
616 F.3d 461, 474 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We have stated that equity is not intended for those who sleep
on their rights.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). As the Magistrate Judge reasoned,
given that Morgan was convicted in 1994 and did not file a direct appeal, he waited more than over
a decade to challenge his conviction. The Court cannot find that Morgan was diligent in pursuing
relief, as one of the components of his obligation to pursue his rights diligently is not to squander
the one-year grace period. See Johnson v. Quarterman, 483 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge correctly found that Morgan was not entitled to equitable
tolling.
V. Conclusion
A review of the pleadings, the Magistrate Judge’s Report, and Morgan’s correspondence
demonstrate that his federal habeas corpus petition is untimely. The Court has conducted a careful
de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and recommendations. See 28 U.S.C.
§636(b)(1) (District Judge shall “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”). Upon such de
novo review, the Court has determined that the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge is
correct and the Morgan’s objections are without merit. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Petitioner Morgan’s correspondence/objections, (Dkt. # 26), is
STRICKEN from the record.

Any future filings by Petitioner Morgan containing such

disturbingly crude and profanity-laced language in this case may result in sanctions. The Report

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of the Magistrate Judge, (Dkt. # 24), is ADOPTED as the opinion of the District Court.
Furthermore, it is
ORDERED that the above-styled petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED and the
case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Finally, it is
ORDERED that any and all motions which may be pending in this action are hereby
DENIED.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 25 day of January, 2018.

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Ron Clark, United States District Judge

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