Garza v. Stephens

Filing 22

ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 USC 1915A(b)(1). All motions not previously ruled on are denied. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 3/7/2017. (bjc, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION

ROSFEL GARZA, #1181215

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VS.

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WILLIAM STEPHENS, ET AL.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:16cv479

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Rosfel Garza, an inmate confined at the Coffield Unit of the Texas prison system,
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed the above-styled and numbered civil rights lawsuit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint was referred to United States Magistrate Judge John
D. Love, who issued a Report and Recommendation (Dkt. #18) concluding that the lawsuit should
be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Mr. Garza has filed objections (Dkt. #21).
Mr. Garza complains that inmates are forced to work without compensation. In his
complaint and objections, he argues that making inmates work without compensation amounts to
slave labor in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment
states the following:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly rejected lawsuits based on the Thirteenth Amendment where
inmates complained they were not paid or compensated for their work product. Ali v. Johnson,
259 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[I]nmates sentenced to incarceration cannot state a viable
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Thirteenth Amendment claim if the prison system requires them to work.”). The Court observed
that the Thirteenth Amendment specifically excepts “punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted.” Wendt v. Lynaugh, 841 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. 1988). In his objections,
Mr. Garza asserts that he may not be subjected to slavery or servitude in the absence of a judgment
sentencing him to hard labor, but the Fifth Circuit has rejected such arguments. Ali, 259 F.3d at
318 (“it lacks authority”). Plaintiff’s complaints about involuntary servitude and slave labor lack
merit.
Mr. Garza also argues in his objections that forcing inmates to work without compensation
violates the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment provides the following:
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people.
In applying the provision, the Fifth Circuit has found that the “Ninth Amendment does not confer
substantive rights upon which civil rights claims may be based.” Johnson v. Texas Bd. of Criminal
Justice, 281 F. App’x 319, 320 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The Court thus rejected an
inmate’s civil rights claims based on the Ninth Amendment. Id. Mr. Garza’s claims based on
the Ninth Amendment are equally frivolous.
Mr. Garza’s objections also discuss mandatory supervision. He asserts that inmates have
an entitlement to be released on mandatory supervision. “There is no constitutional or inherent
right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.”
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2014
(1979). Under the Constitution, a prison system is entitled to incarcerate an inmate the entire
length of his sentence. A State may, however, establish a parole system. Id. An inmate may
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have a due process right in good time and an expectancy of early release depending upon the
wording of a state statute. Id. at 11-12, 99 S. Ct. at 2106. Texas law does not create an
entitlement to release on parole. Williams v. Briscoe, 641 F.2d 274, 277 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 854, 102 S. Ct. 299 (1981). By comparison, Texas’ mandatory supervision law creates
some “expectancy of release,” thereby providing a protected liberty interest. Boss v. Quarterman,
552 F.3d 425, 427 (5th Cir. 2008). Thus the question for the court’s consideration is whether Mr.
Garza is entitled to release on mandatory supervision. He is in custody pursuant to a 2003 Hidalgo
County conviction for the offense of murder, with an offense date of July 26, 2001. His appeal
was dismissed. Garza v. State, No. 13-03-00557-CR, 2004 WL 2335126 (Tex. App. - Corpus
Christi May 20, 2004, no pet.). See also Garza v. Stephens, No. M-15-230, 2016 WL 1622612
(S.D. Tex. March 28, 2016). He is not eligible for release on mandatory supervision due to the
nature of his conviction. Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.149(a)(2) (Vernon 2001). Because he is not
eligible for release on mandatory supervision, Mr. Garza does not have a protected liberty interest
in good conduct time or earned work time. Bagby v. Karriker, 539 F. App’x 468, 469 (5th Cir.
2013). He does not have a basis for a federal claim concerning the loss of good conduct time or
earned work time due to the lack of a protected liberty interest. His claim focusing on the right
to irrevocable good conduct time or work time based on mandatory supervision lacks merit.
Finally, Mr. Garza renews his complaint about officials punishing inmates if they refuse to
work. The Fifth Circuit has clearly held, however, that the “refusal to work, by a group or even
a single inmate, presents a serious threat to the orderly functioning of a prison. Any unjustified

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refusal to follow the established work regime is an invitation to sanctions.” Mikeska v. Collins,
900 F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1990), modified, 928 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1991). The claim is frivolous.
The Report of the Magistrate Judge, which contains his proposed findings of fact and
recommendations for the disposition of such action, has been presented for consideration, and
having made a de novo review of the objections raised by Mr. Garza to the Report, the court is of
the opinion that the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct, and Mr. Garza’s
objections are without merit. Therefore, the court adopts the findings and conclusions of the
Magistrate Judge as the findings and conclusions of the court. It is accordingly
ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1). All motions not previously ruled on are DENIED.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 7 day of March, 2017.

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Ron Clark, United States District Judge

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