Staples v. Director, TDCJ-CID

Filing 51

ORDER of dismissal. Ordered that the habeas action is dismissed with prejudice. Ordered that Petitioner Staples is denied a certificate of appealability sua sponte. Ordered that any and all motions which may pending in this action are hereby denied. Signed by District Judge Ron Clark on 2/25/2019. (bjc, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
CHESTER ALAN STAPLES, #1853049

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VS.

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DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:16cv1041

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Petitioner Chester Alan Staples (“Staples”), pro se, filed this petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging the illegality of his convictions. The cause of action was
referred to the United States Magistrate Judge, the Honorable John D. Love, for findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of the petition.
After a review of the record and pleadings, Judge Love issued a Report, (Dkt. #31),
recommending that Petitioner’s petition be dismissed, with prejudice, and that Petitioner also be
denied a certificate of appealability sua sponte. Petitioner has filed timely objections, (Dkt. #36).
As an initial matter, a party objecting to a Magistrate Judge’s Report must specifically
identify those findings to which he or she objects. Frivolous, conclusory, or general objections
need not be considered by the District Court. See Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8
(5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n,
79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Here, Petitioner’s objections are general and conclusory. Petitioner made no objections to
any of Judge Love’s specific findings or analyses contained in the Report—other than to say he
disagrees and has shown a constitutional violation. Specifically, Petitioner begins by remarking
that he “objects to all adverse rulings in the Report and Recommendation.” (Dkt. #36, pg. 1).
Petitioner also states that he “contends that all arguments show color and substantial merit,
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[therefore] the objection still stands.” Id. Because Petitioner does not address specific findings
articulated in the Report, his objections are general in nature and will be overruled.
The crux of Petitioner’s objections is his disagreement with Texas state habeas procedures.
Specifically, Petitioner opines that he “objects to the Report and Recommendation due to the fact
that the Court’s adjudication is based on ‘No Action,’ ‘No Hearing,’ ‘No conclusions of law,’ and
‘No findings of facts.’ The Report and Recommendation is unsupported.” (Dkt. #36, pg. 3).
Petitioner then proceeds, for about eight pages, to explain how the Texas state habeas procedures,
under Article 11.07, are inadequate because the state habeas court did not make findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Petitioner then highlights how there was a dissenting opinion within his
habeas adjudication—which is nonbinding and only argues that Petitioner be appointed postconviction counsel to better articulate his claims. (Dkt. #18, pg. id. #1114-15).
However, it is well-settled than any alleged infirmities in state habeas proceedings are not
grounds for federal relief. See Haynes v. Quarterman, 526 F.3d 189, 195 (5th Cir. 2008); see also
Rudd v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 2001) (“That is because an attack on the state habeas
proceeding is an attack on a proceeding collateral to the detention and not the detention itself.”).
Furthermore, the failure to enter express findings of fact does not preclude deference under
the AEDPA because “[a]s a federal court, we are bound by the state habeas court’s factual findings,
both implicit and explicit.” See Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 2004); see also
Becerril v. Quarterman, 2007 WL 1701869 *4 (S.D.Tex.—Houston Jun. 11, 2007) (“The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the trial court’s findings when it denied relief. A federal court
is bound by the state habeas court’s factual findings, both implicit and explicit.”) (citation omitted).
In Texas, when the Court of Criminal Appeals denies a state habeas petition—with or
without an order or opinion—the “denial” means that the court addressed and rejected the merits

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of a particular claim. See Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (“In our
writ jurisprudence, a ‘denial’ signifies that we addressed and rejected the merits of a particular
claim while a ‘dismissal’ means that we declined to consider the claim for reasons unrelated to the
claims merits.”); Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Under Texas law, a denial
of relief by the Court of Criminal Appeals serves as a denial of relief on the merits of the claim.”).
Here, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Petitioner’s state habeas application.
(Dkt. # 18, pg. id. #1004). Accordingly, the state court addressed and rejected the merits of his
habeas claims—irrespective of whether it entered explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Because the AEDPA requires federal courts to provide deference to the state habeas courts’ express
and implicit findings, Petitioner’s objections are meritless.
The Court has conducted a careful de novo review of record and the Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings and recommendations. See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) (District Judge shall “make a
de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.”). Upon such de novo review, the Court has
determined that the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge is correct and the Petitioner’s
objections are without merit. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Petitioner’s objections, (Dkt. #36), are overruled and the Report of the
Magistrate Judge, (Dkt. #31), is ADOPTED as the opinion of the District Court. It is also
ORDERED that the above-styled habeas action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Moreover, it is
ORDERED that Petitioner Staples is DENIED a certificate of appealability sua sponte.
Finally, it is

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ORDERED that any and all motions which may be pending in this action are hereby
DENIED.
So ORDERED and SIGNED February 25, 2019.

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Ron Clark, Senior District Judge

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