Henderson v. Davis et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE. It is ordered that Plaintiff's objections 30 are overruled. It is ordered that that Plaintiff's lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice as frivolous. Signed by District Judge Ron Clark on 12/11/18. (mrp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
DERRICK D. HENDERSON, #1422462

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VS.

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LORIE DAVIS, ET AL.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:17cv320

MEMORANDUM OPINION ADOPTING THE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THEUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, an inmate formerly confined at the Beto Unit within the Texas Department of
Justice (TDCJ), proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging purported violations of his constitutional rights during a disciplinary proceeding. The
case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge, the Honorable John D. Love, for findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of the petition.
I. Background
Henderson maintained that he is subjected to cruel and unusual punishment while
imprisoned at the Coffield Unit because he is housed in a 45-square feet cell with another inmate
sometimes for 24-hours a day. He argued that such double-celling is a constitutional violation,
especially when the unit is on lockdowns, which can last for weeks. Henderson complained that
the 45-square foot cell is “not even adequate enough for two people to move around
simultaneously.”
Henderson further highlighted how he experiences depression, fatigue, stress, anger,
sadness, hopelessness, anxiety, and sleep deprivation because of his housing placement. He argued
that each Defendant has intentionally “implemented and maintained” an unconstitutional policy to
house inmates in double cells at the Coffield Unit in which he states, “put simply, life on Coffield

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is like living in a third world ghetto.” Henderson seeks $100.000 for each day that he has been
housed in a double cell and punitive damages.
On July 12, 2018, the Judge Love issued a Report, (Dkt. #26), recommending that
Henderson’s complaint be dismissed as frivolous. Henderson has filed timely objections, (Dkt.
#30).
II. Henderson’s Objections
In his objections, Henderson states that he is challenging “the totality of his living
conditions—that is the combined effect of what stems from being forced to live in an overcrowded
prison, such as sleep-deprivation, double-celling, extreme heat, contaminated water, lack of toilets,
extreme cold, and an unsanitary chow hall.” (Dkt. #30, pg. id. #154). He argues that the Magistrate
Judge “refused to even address the totality of the living conditions” and notes that the “total effect
of these living conditions are repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”
III. Discussion and Analysis
The Magistrate Judge correctly and properly recommended that Henderson’s complaint is
frivolous. As an initial matter, however, the Court notes that—generally—an issue raised for the
first time in an objection to a Magistrate Judge’s Report is not properly before the District Court.
See Place v. Thomas, 61 F. App’x 120, 2003 WL 342287, *1 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1992). Moreover, and importantly, a party objecting to a
Magistrate Judge’s Report must specifically identify those findings to which he or she objects.
Frivolous, conclusory, or general objections need not be considered by the District Court. See
Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), overruled on other grounds
by Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

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Here, a review of Henderson’s complaint and memorandum of law shows that he did not
raise specific issues concerning sleep deprivation, heat, cold temperatures, contamination, and lack
of toilets. The crux of Henderson’s complaint concerned double-celling and overcrowding—as he
repeatedly complained about the lack of space inside the cells, especially during lockdowns. Such
double-celling, overcrowding, and lack of space contributed to his depression, fatigue, stress,
anger, sadness, hopelessness, and anxiety. While Henderson does mention “sleep deprivation,”
the sleep deprivation stemmed from the double-celling and he offered no specific facts about sleep
deprivation. Accordingly, many of Henderson’s objections are not properly before the District
Court and should be overruled.
Henderson implores the Court to undergo a “totality of the circumstances” analysis. But
to do so would require the Court to analyze the issues he raised for the first time on objection,
which are not properly before the Court. Moreover, as Judge Love found, it is well-settled that
double celling is constitutional and overcrowding is not, by itself, a constitutional violation. See,
e.g., Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (holding that double celling inmates did not violate the Eighth
Amendment because “[t]he double celling made necessary by the unanticipated increase in prison
population did not lead to deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation.”); Collins v.
Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 539 (5th Cir. 2004) (Overcrowding of persons in custody is not per se
unconstitutional.”); Ruiz v. Estelle (Ruiz II), 666 F.2d 854, 858 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The [l]ack of
space alone does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, save perhaps the most aggravated
circumstances.”).
Moreover, there is no constitutional right to a single cell. See Barber v. Quarterman, 2010
WL 1417650 *9 (E.D.Tex.—Tyler Apr. 5, 2010) (citing Parker v. Currie, slip. op. no. 08-41023,
2010 WL 10924 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2010) (inmate desired a single cell but was assigned to general

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population; no constitutional liberty interest infringed)). Because the crux of Henderson’s entire
complaint concerns double celling and overcrowding within his own cell—neither of which are
constitutional violations—Judge Love properly recommended that his complaint be dismissed.
Turning to Henderson’s concerns regarding his physical and mental health while housed—
as well as his request for the Court to undergo a totality analysis—the Court notes that the
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons and “to the extent that such conditions are
restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Simply put, the Constitution does not afford protection
against mere discomfort or inconvenience. See Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989). As mentioned, Henderson highlights how he experiences
depression, fatigue, stress, anger, sadness, hopelessness, anxiety, and sleep deprivation because of
housing in a double cell. However, there is no constitutional right to a pleasant or stress-free
environment while incarcerated. See Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1987).
Likewise, the fact that Henderson is housed in a double cell does not show that he faces
substantial, irreparable harm—especially given how his complaints evince mere discomfort and
disagreement rather than the deprivation of basic human needs. See, e.g., McClure v. TDCJ-CID,
2011 WL 806227 *14 (E.D.Tex—Texarkana Jan. 31, 2011) (“Instead, his pleadings depict an
environment which is uncomfortable, unpleasant, and unquestionably stressful, but he has not
shown that it is one which is unconstitutional.”). As Judge Love recommended, his complaint
should be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
The Court has conducted a careful de novo review of record and the Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings and recommendations. See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) (District Judge shall “make a

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de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.”). Upon such de novo review, the Court has
determined that the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge is correct and Fountain’s
objections are without merit. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s objections, (Dkt. #30), are overruled. The Report of the
Magistrate Judge, (Dkt. #26), is ADOPTED as the opinion of the Court. Furthermore, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s civil rights lawsuit is DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous.
So ORDERED and SIGNED December 11, 2018.

____________________________
Ron Clark, Senior District Judge

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