Peters v. Davis et al

Filing 167

ORDER overruling objections and adopting 156 Report and Recommendation. The 152 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and defts Mark A Sandlin and Thomas R Taylor are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to terminated all remaining defendants except Lori Davis pursuant to 107 Order. Signed by District Judge Ron Clark on 4/20/19. (tkd, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
MICHAEL
#2019190,

GEOFFREY

PETERS,

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§

Plaintiff,
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v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:17-CV-00595-RC
§

LORIE DAVIS, THOMAS
MARK SANDLIN,
Defendants.

TAYLOR,
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§

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The above entitled and numbered civil action was referred to United States Magistrate
Judge John D. Love pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. On March 14, 2019, the Magistrate Judge
issued his Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 156), recommending that Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 152) be granted and that Defendants Thomas Taylor and Mark
Sandlin be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to absence of a
case or controversy. Plaintiff Michael Peters (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding pro se, filed
objections (Doc. No. 159), which stated, among other arguments, that Plaintiff was never served
with a copy of Defendants’ Motion. Accordingly, the Court issued an order permitting Plaintiff
to file supplemental objections after having an opportunity to review Defendants’ original
Motion. (Doc. No. 162.) On April 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed his supplemental objections (Doc. No.
166). The Court reviews de novo the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings to which
objections have been raised. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Having reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s
findings and Plaintiff’s objections, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections (Doc. No.

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159) and supplemental objections (Doc. No. 166) and ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation (Doc. No. 156) as the findings of the Court.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court reviews objected-to portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court
shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
and recommendations to which objection is made.”). A court conducting a de novo review
examines the entire record and makes an independent assessment under the law. Douglass v.
United States Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute
on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from ten to
fourteen days).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action originally alleging various claims against various parties. (Doc.
No. 1.) Subsequently, the Court entered an Order of Partial Dismissal (Doc. No. 107), which
dismissed several of Plaintiff’s claims and narrowed the scope of the instant action. The only
remaining claim is Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) against Defendants Lorie Davis, Thomas Taylor, and Mark Sandlin.
(Doc. No. 107, at 12.) In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended
dismissing Defendants Thomas Taylor and Mark Sandlin without prejudice due to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 156.) Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding Defendants Taylor and Sandlin’s power and
authority to transfer Plaintiff to a facility with a kosher kitchen. Accordingly, the Magistrate

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Judge found that Plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a case or controversy redressable by
Defendants Taylor and Sandlin.
I.

Original Objections (Doc. No. 159)
In his original objections (Doc. No. 159), Plaintiff raises several arguments. First,

Plaintiff argues that the Court has failed to address Plaintiff’s other allegations, including:
assault, neglect of said assault being investigated, legal mail theft, confiscation of Plaintiff’s law
books, retaliation, medical neglect and abuse, the State’s cover-up and retaliation for exposing
racketeering crimes of the State; and discrimination. (Doc. No. 159, at 1–2.) For reasons stated in
the Court’s prior Order, these claims have already been dismissed. (Doc. No. 107.) Accordingly,
it is unnecessary for the Court to further address these claims.
Next, Plaintiff argues he never received Defendants’ Motion and accordingly was unable
to file a timely response. (Doc. No. 159, at 2.) Defendants have certified that another copy of the
Motion has been sent to Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 161.) Accordingly, the Court provided Plaintiff an
opportunity to submit supplemental objections. (Doc. No. 162.) Plaintiff has since filed
supplemental objections. (Doc. No. 166.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has been
provided adequate notice and an opportunity to respond to both Defendants’ Motion and the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.
Further, Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff is not able to adequately respond to Defendants’
Motion because he has had law books confiscated and lacks access to adequate legal resources.
(Doc. No. 159, at 2.) Indeed, while prisoners have certain rights pertaining to access to the
courts, these rights do not afford prisoners a right to unlimited access to prison law libraries.
Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325–26 (5th Cir. 1999). Prisons may regulate access to law

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libraries so long as the regulations are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Id.
Plaintiff has not shown he was denied adequate access to the courts.
Next, Plaintiff argues that he has satisfied the requirements for constitutional standing set
out in Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). First, Plaintiff argues he has suffered an
injury, as he assets his First Amendment rights have been violated because he has been unable to
attend Jewish religious services and is not provided a Kosher diet in accordance with Jewish law.
(Doc. No. 159, at 4.) Plaintiff further argues that denial of Plaintiff’s right to practice his religion
(i.e. attend services or maintain a Kosher diet) is causally related to the First Amendment
violation he claims he suffers. (Doc. No. 159, at 5.) Plaintiff also cites the redressability prong
of Lujan. (Doc. No. 159, at 5.)
Plaintiff also addresses the merits of his claims. Plaintiff argues that prisons must provide
prisoners a reasonable opportunity to meet with religious clergy of their faith, wear religious
headgear, and accommodate prisoners’ religious diets. (Doc. No. 159, at 5–6.) Plaintiff further
argues that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits prisons from
discriminating on the basis of religion. (Doc. No. 159, at 6–7.)
Plaintiff argues this Court has jurisdiction because Defendant Taylor completed
paperwork regarding Plaintiff’s religious status, which in turn was provided to Defendant
Sandlin to process a transfer based on Plaintiff’s religious status. (Doc. No. 159, at 8–9.) Plaintiff
argues this conduct led to the denial of Plaintiff’s transfer to a unit with a Kosher kitchen and
therefore is the basis of this cause of action. Plaintiff argues that Defendants Taylor and Sandlin
provided information to the Unit Classification Committee (UCC) and State Classification
Committee (SCC), which in turn was relied upon to deny Plaintiff his constitutional rights. (Doc.

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No. 159, at 9.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants Taylor and Sandlin knew the information they
provided would be used to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 159, at 9.)
Plaintiff’s original objections (Doc. No. 159) do not address the basis upon which the
Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal—namely that Defendants Taylor and Sandlin lack
authority to transfer Plaintiff to a unit with a Kosher kitchen and therefore are unable to redress
Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s original objections (Doc. No. 159) are
overruled.
II.

Supplemental Objections (Doc. No. 166)
The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s supplemental objections (Doc. No. 166). As discussed,

supra, the Court permitted Plaintiff to file supplemental objections because he claimed he was
not served a copy of Defendants’ Motion. (Doc. No. 162.) Plaintiff was served with a copy of
Defendants’ Motion prior to submitting his supplemental objections. (Doc. No. 161.) Plaintiff
raises several grounds in his supplemental objections.
Plaintiff’s supplemental objections are primarily directed toward the merits of his claim.
Plaintiff argues he was unable to comply with TDCJ Chaplaincy Policy 7.02 because he was
unable to provide an address for his mother and grandmother because they are deceased. (Doc.
No. 166, at 2.) Plaintiff argues that his inability to provide contact information for his Jewish
relatives should not serve as a basis to deny Plaintiff access to Kosher meals. Plaintiff further
challenges TDCJ’s policy of working with a third-party entity, the Aleph Institute, to determine
Plaintiff’s religious status and argues the third-party entity took $4,300 from Plaintiff under false
pretenses.
Plaintiff also reiterates his prior argument that Defendants Taylor and Sandlin prepared
reports that they knew would be used for the purpose of violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
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(Doc. No. 166, at 5.) Plaintiff argues the reports prepared by these Defendants at the unit level
implicate the ultimate results of a transfer decision. (Doc. No. 166, at 7.) Plaintiff’s arguments
with respect to Defendants Taylor and Sandlin, however, are insufficient to establish standing.
Plaintiff’s assertions that Defendants Taylor and Sandlin may have been involved with
paperwork leading to Plaintiff’s prior transfer denials does not establish their ability to
prospectively effectuate Plaintiff’s transfer to a unit with a Kosher kitchen. According,
Defendants Taylor and Sandlin are unable to redress Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s supplemental objections (Doc. No. 166) are also overruled.
CONCLUSION
Having made a de novo review of the objected-to portions of the Report and
Recommendation (Doc. No. 156), the Court finds, for the reasons explained above, that
Plaintiff’s objections (Doc. No. 159) and supplemental objections (Doc. No. 166) should be
OVERRULED and the Magistrate Judge’s Report (Doc. No. 156) should be ADOPTED.
Defendants Taylor and Sandlin’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 152) is GRANTED
and Defendants Thomas Taylor and Mark Sandlin are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Court notes that the docket maintained by the Clerk’s Office currently
lists as active several Defendants previously dismissed by the Court. (Doc. No. 107.) The Clerk’s
Office is ORDERED to terminate all Defendants, with the exception of Lorie Davis. The only
remaining claim in this action is Plaintiff’s claim arising under RLUIPA asserted against
Defendant Lorie Davis.

So ORDERED and SIGNED April 20, 2019.

____________________________
Ron Clark, Senior District Judge

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