In the matter of Sonya Chandler Anderson
Filing
12
OPINION AND ORDER Signed by District Judge J. Campbell Barker on 12/03/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(ksd)
Case 6:20-mc-00013-JCB Document 12 Filed 12/03/20 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 52
No. 6:20-mc-00013
In the matter of
Sonya Chandler Anderson
OPINION AND ORDER
In this matter, the court ordered attorney Sonya Chandler
Anderson to show cause why she should not be sanctioned
for failing to obey court orders in United States v. Mitchell, No.
6:16-cr-00008 (E.D. Tex.), in which she was counsel. Rather
than providing any explanation for her failure to obey court
orders, Anderson filed an “Objection to Jurisdiction,” Doc. 8,
arguing (1) that imposing a sanction without a jury trial
would violate her due-process rights and (2) that the court
should “dismiss [this matter] and refer the Court complaint
of professional misconduct against [her] to the proper
administrative agency[,] the Texas State Bar.” Id. at 2.
The court held a hearing at which Anderson was offered
another chance to give reasons for her failure to obey court
orders or explain why she should not be sanctioned. But she
raised only her jurisdictional objection, elaborating that “I just
don’t trust the judicial system,” Doc. 11 at 4:16-17; that “I just
don’t trust judges anymore,” id. at 5:17-18, after she discerned
“underlying biases and prejudice” in other judges, id. at 4:19;
that she “do[es] not want to create a record” in this
proceeding, id. at 5:24-25; and that she is “trying to get out of
practicing law,” id. at 6:23. The court then reviewed the
relevant rules and orders and gave Anderson “one more
chance to decide if you wish to participate” in the disciplinary
proceeding. Doc. 11 at 7:13-14. Anderson again failed to offer
any cause for not obeying court orders.
The court now finds that the sanction of a public
reprimand is warranted and imposes that sanction.
Case 6:20-mc-00013-JCB Document 12 Filed 12/03/20 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 53
Background
A. On April 10, 2018, the court substituted Anderson as
counsel for defendant Cory Carnell Mitchell in United States
v. Mitchell, No. 6:16-cr-00008 (E.D. Tex.). See Attachment A
(docket sheet). Anderson is registered with the court’s
electronic-filing system, which constitutes consent to receive
service and notice of judicial orders by email. E.D. Tex. Local
R. CV-77. Registration with the court’s electronic-filing
system imposes on attorneys an obligation to “maintain their
own account information, including changes in e-mail
address.” Id. at CV-5(a)(2)(A). And all attorneys have a duty
to obey court orders, id. at AT-2(d)(1)(B), and conduct
litigation properly, id. at AT-2(d)(1)(D), which of course
entails keeping the court apprised of their current contact
information.
In 2020, Mitchell filed in his criminal case a pro se motion
to reduce his prison sentence. See Attachment A, Doc. 252
(Apr. 8, 2020). Anderson’s appearance as Mitchell’s counsel in
that case had not been terminated and remained in effect. The
court denied Mitchell’s pro se motion. Id. (Apr. 14, 2020).
Mitchell then again filed a pro se motion for a sentence
reduction, which the court denied. Id., Doc. 254 (Apr. 24,
2020). The court explained that a defendant is not entitled to
representation both pro se and through counsel
simultaneously, and the court ordered Anderson to either
confer with her client regarding the representation and file a
motion on his behalf, if appropriate, or else file a motion to
withdraw as his counsel. Id., Doc. 255 (Apr. 29, 2020).
Anderson did neither. She did not file a motion on
Mitchell’s behalf for a sentence reduction. Nor did she file a
motion to withdraw as his counsel. Mitchell, however, filed
another pro se motion for a sentence reduction. Id., Doc. 256
(July 20, 2020). The court then ordered Anderson to show
cause within 14 days why she should not be sanctioned for
failing to obey the court’s order to either move on her client’s
-2-
Case 6:20-mc-00013-JCB Document 12 Filed 12/03/20 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 54
behalf for a sentence reduction or move to withdraw as
counsel. Id., Doc. 257 (July 30, 2020). The court struck
Mitchell’s pro se motion as improper because Anderson
remained his counsel of record when the motion was filed. Id.,
Doc. 262 (Aug. 26, 2020). Anderson did not respond to the
court’s show-cause order within 14 days. Citing Anderson’s
failure to respond to two court orders, the court discharged
Anderson as counsel in that case so that Mitchell could
proceed pro se. Id., Doc. 261 (Aug. 20, 2020).
B. Under Local Rule AT-2(d)(1), the court may “take any
appropriate disciplinary action against any attorney” for
infractions “after an attorney has been given an opportunity
to show cause to the contrary.” Accordingly, the court
initiated this disciplinary proceeding against Anderson and
ordered her to show cause, within 28 days, why she should
not be sanctioned for failure to obey the above-cited court
orders. Doc. 1 at 2. The matter was not referred to the chief
judge under Local Rule AT-2(d)(2), however, because the
record did not show “that conduct which might warrant
suspension or disbarment has occurred, as opposed to
conduct that might warrant a lesser sanction such as
probation, reprimand, or limitation of future practice.” Id.
Given Anderson’s registration with the court’s electronicfiling system, the court’s show-cause order was served on her
by email in accordance with the court’s local rules. Delivery
to Anderson’s email account succeeded and resulted in a
reply email, which was placed on the docket in this matter.
Doc. 2. That email, however, appears to be an automated
reply from Anderson, stating that she “will not be available
for the next few days.” Id. at 1. The email stated that
“thereafter my return I will follow up and respond to every
E-mail and call, Thank you for your patients.” Id. (verbatim).
On September 15, 2020, Anderson sent court staff another
email, which was also placed on the docket. Doc. 3. The email
states: “I got found the order today and i am drafting a
-3-
Case 6:20-mc-00013-JCB Document 12 Filed 12/03/20 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 55
respone .d I will draft the motion to withdraw.” Id. at 1
(verbatim). The email referenced the docket number of the
Mitchell criminal matter. But Anderson did not file a response
to the show-cause order in the Mitchell matter or this matter.
Accordingly, the court ordered Anderson to appear
telephonically for a disciplinary hearing. Doc. 5. On the day
of the hearing, Anderson filed a document entitled “Sonya
Chandler Anderson Special Appearance, and Objection to
Jurisdiction.” Doc. 8 at 1 (capitalization altered). She appeared
to argue that her constitutional right against the deprivation
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
requires a jury trial before a court may impose attorney
discipline and, therefore, this disciplinary proceeding should
be dismissed and the “allegation against her” “should only be
investigated and prosecuted by the Texas Bar.” Id. at 1-2.
Anderson attached to her objection an email sent by her to
the clerk’s office on Sunday, November 8, 2020 (the day before
the hearing). Doc. 8-2. The email stated, “I am not register [sic]
with the Eastern District of Texas any longer” and asked the
courtroom deputy clerk to file her jurisdictional objection and
proposed order. Id. The clerk’s office fulfilled the request to
file those documents. But neither in her written objection nor
at the hearing did Anderson make any contention about her
registration, in any sense, with the court. And court records
show that Anderson is still a member of the court’s bar and
remains registered with the court’s electronic-filing system.
At the disciplinary hearing, Anderson declined to create a
record of any good cause for, or other facts in mitigation of,
her failure to obey court orders. Instead, Anderson stood on
her argument that sanctions may be constitutionally imposed
only after a jury trial initiated by the Texas State Bar, noting
her distrust of judges acting without a jury. A transcript of the
hearing has now been docketed. See Doc. 11.
Lastly, the court notes that the record in the Mitchell case
contains an August 26, 2020 note by a clerk’s office member
-4-
Case 6:20-mc-00013-JCB Document 12 Filed 12/03/20 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 56
relaying that Anderson called and said that she (Anderson)
had started sending email notices in the Mitchell case to her
spam folder. Attachment A (Aug. 26, 2020). The court places
no weight on that staff note in the Mitchell case for purposes
of this disciplinary proceeding. First, the staff note does not
purport to be a verbatim recollection of any statement by
Anderson and was entered for purposes of the criminal case,
not this matter. Second, the statements attributed to Anderson
in the staff note would not help her. Sending court notices to
a spam-email folder is not good cause for failing to obey court
orders. Indeed, it would confirm an attorney’s inability to
conduct litigation properly.
Rather than attaching any weight to the staff note, the
court explicitly gave Anderson the chance to develop a record
in this proceeding on whether she received notice of the
court’s orders or had good cause for not obeying those orders.
Doc. 11 at 8:16-24. But Anderson declined to do so. Id. at 5:2425 (“I do not want to create a record”); id. at 14:19-20 (“I’m
going to take my own advice – don’t create a record”).
Accordingly, the record gives no explanation for, or facts in
mitigation of, Anderson’s failure to obey court orders.
Analysis
The court’s analysis begins with Anderson’s argument
that the Fifth Amendment right against deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law requires a jury
trial before a court disciplines a member of its bar. Anderson
fails to cite any case so holding, and her argument is without
merit. Even assuming that all forms of attorney discipline
implicate a liberty or property interest cognizable under the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, that clause does not
require a jury trial. It requires due process of law. And
balancing the factors enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), courts consistently hold that the process due
in a disciplinary proceeding is notice and an opportunity to
be heard, not a jury trial. E.g., In re Cordova-Gonzalez, 996 F.2d
-5-
Case 6:20-mc-00013-JCB Document 12 Filed 12/03/20 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 57
1334, 1336 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that “the due process rights
of an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding do not extend so
far as to guarantee the full panoply of rights afforded to an
accused in a criminal case” and that only notice and an
opportunity to be heard are required) (cleaned up); Lasar v.
Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding
that “a district court need only provide notice and an
opportunity to be heard before revoking an attorney’s pro hac
vice status”); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 302, 303 (3d Cir.
1980) (holding that only “some type of notice and an
opportunity to respond” are required when a district court
seeks to revoke an attorney’s pro hac vice admission because of
professional-responsibility violations); Jabary v. McCullough,
No. 4:10-cv-00711, 325 F.R.D. 175, 198-200 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 19,
2018) (detailing process for disciplinary proceeding for
violation of this court’s rules; no jury trial involved).
Contrary to Anderson’s view, “[a] lawyer disciplinary
proceeding is not a criminal proceeding.” Rosenthal v. Justices
of the Sup. Ct. of Cal., 910 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir. 1990). As a
result, “normal protections afforded a criminal defendant do
not apply.” Id. Anderson cites no case holding that the
protections of a jury trial are constitutionally required before
a court imposes discipline on a member of its bar.
Anderson has received the process due not only under the
Constitution but also under this court’s rules. As noted above,
Local Rule AT-2(d)(1) allows the court to “take any
appropriate disciplinary action” against an attorney for
failure to comply with a court order or inability to conduct
litigation properly “after an attorney has been given an
opportunity to show cause to the contrary.” This proceeding
has given Anderson notice of the grounds for disciplinary
action and opportunity to show cause why discipline should
not issue. Anderson could have chosen to participate in this
proceeding on the merits while also preserving her dueprocess argument. But she chose to make only a due-process
-6-
Case 6:20-mc-00013-JCB Document 12 Filed 12/03/20 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 58
objection, explaining that her choice was animated by a
distrust of the judicial system and a desire not to create a
record. As a result of Anderson’s unwillingness to develop a
record on the merits in this disciplinary matter, the court is
unable to find any good cause or excuse for Anderson’s
failure to obey court orders and finds that her repeated failure
to do so reflects an inability to conduct litigation properly.
The court does not relish imposing attorney discipline and
has considered the range of available sanctions, striving to
impose the least severe sanction appropriate under the
circumstances. A public reprimand is one of several sanctions
available for attorney misconduct. See Bank of Nova Scotia v.
United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988) (noting a court’s ability
to reprimand an attorney in a published opinion as discipline
for violating a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure); United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 n.5 (1983) (listing public
chastisement of an errant attorney as a permissible form of
discipline for prosecutorial misconduct); In re Williams, 156
F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1998) (characterizing the availability of
public sanctions for attorney misconduct as “unarguable”);
Am. Bar Ass’n, Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement, Rule 10 (July 20, 2020) (sanction of “reprimand
by the court” to be “published in the official reports”). Having
considered all the circumstances, the court finds that a public
reprimand is appropriate for Anderson’s failure to obey court
orders. That failure to obey court orders also constitutes an
inability to conduct litigation properly, for which the court
again finds that a public reprimand is appropriate.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Sonya Chandler Anderson is
publicly reprimanded for failure to comply with orders of the
court and for inability to conduct litigation properly. This
proceeding is ordered unsealed, and the clerk of the court will
send copies of this final disciplinary action in accordance with
Local Rule AT-2(e).
-7-
Case 6:20-mc-00013-JCB Document 12 Filed 12/03/20 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 59
So ordered by the court on December 3, 2020.
J. C AMPBELL B ARKER
United States District Judge
-8-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?